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ABSTRACT
This thesis applies a schools of thought analysis to American foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War era. In chapter 1, it discusses what a schools of thought analysis involves and 
its usefulness as an analytical tool, with particular reference to Franz Schurmann's book, The 
Logic of World Power, an earlier attempt at an overarching review.
In chapters 2-4, it classifies and analyses the specific schools of thought of American 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War era; the democratists, the neo-realists, and the 
institutionalists. It illustrates how general schools of thought predilections lead to policy 
preferences with reference to five issue areas in the post-Cold War era; US-Western 
European s relations, US-Russian relations, American initiatives in Bosnia, the MFN 
controversy with China, and the American position on regional and global trade pacts (Nafta 
and Gatt). It also classifies various opinion-makers in the overall schools of thought analysis 
by matching their specific policy preferences in the five issue areas to the general schools of 
thought positions.
In chapter 5, it places individual administration and legislative decision-makers into the 
model, using the same techniques applied to the opinion-makers in chapters 2-4. In chapter 
6, it uses schools of thought analysis as a template for analysing the Clinton administration's 
response to the Bosnian crisis, with particular reference to US-Russian relations and US- 
European relations. It identifies overall administration stances regarding these three areas by 
classifying White House initiatives using the schools of thought rubric.
In chapter 7, having identified overall American foreign policy initiatives regarding 
Bosnia, Russia, and Western Europe and having placed individual political actors within the 
assessment, it is able, through the fusion of bureaucratic analysis and schools of thought 
analysis, to determine how specific policy inputs advocated by decision-makers partly due to 
their schools of thought orientation, lead to overall American foreign policy outputs. In 
chapter 8, it concludes by reassessing schools of thought analysis, both in relation to the 
Bosnian crisis and in general, and evaluating its worth as an analytical tool.
This thesis represents an attempt to relate theory directly to political processes and specific 
policy-makers. By its use I am trying to both classify and analyse the intellectual and 
practical nature of the American foreign policy-making process in the post-Cold War era.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Valentine, the hero of Tom Stoppard's excellent play, "Arcadia," aptly sums up the 
situation political scientists find themselves in. "It makes me so happy. To be at the 
beginning again, knowing almost nothing...A door like this has cracked open five or six 
times since we got up on our hind legs. It's the best possible time to be alive, when almost 
everything you know is wrong."1 So it is also for the United States. The victory parade 
celebrating American triumph in the Gulf War was one of the great moments of hubris in 
modem American history. 1.5 million people gathered in Washington to celebrate the fact 
that, at last, the ghost of the Vietnam War had been laid to rest. This, coupled with the 
astounding surprise of 1989, was certainly cause for rejoicing. The United States (US) had 
many felt, quite brilliantly, won the Cold War. Kuwait had been the first test of George 
Bush's 'New World Order'2 and it had been a resounding success. Yet just a year on from 
this idyllic day, Los Angeles was on fire, suffused in racial hatred and despair. Both of these 
seemingly paradoxical events are part of a new epoch, a new world.
This thesis will explore different conceptions of the post-1989 world by identifying, 
presenting and analysing different schools of thought that underlie the policy positions of 
both opinion-makers and practitioners in the new era. It will also examine the debate that 
underlies general American foreign policy options in the post-Cold War era, particularly 
regarding the Clinton administration. The end of the Cold War changed many things. Among 
them, the 45 years of largely bipartisan consensus over foreign policy issues, symbolised by 
the adoption of the containment doctrine by President Truman and Senator Vandenberg, has 
come to an end. There are now serious differences of opinion, both within and between the 
Democratic and Republican parties, as to what should be the general, overarching foreign 
policy of the US. This thesis will analyse the nature of the debate through the use of schools 
of thought analysis, pointing out the givens and assumptions behind the various schools of 
thought and then relating them in detail to the Bosnian crisis. A school of thought, which can 
be thought of as a type of sub-ideology, is the central part of a method (schools of thought 
analysis) which has been formulated to relate ideational givens to concrete policy actions. A 
given upon which this endeavour rests is that it is crucial to specify the assumptions 
underlying each school of thought's analysis of the world, and that these overarching foreign 
policy views, or schools of thought, can be shown to lead to policy preferences regarding the 
central foreign policy issues confronting America in the post-Cold War era.
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A) Derivation of Schools of Thought Analysis
This thesis will build on the work of Franz Schurmann who expertly related theory to 
political processes in his book, The Logic of World Power, published in 1974. Schurmann 
persuasively attempted nothing less than a systemic, if general, understanding of the US 
perspective on the workings of the post-1945 world.3 As he noted, there are, "few 
convincing analyses of the comtemporary political processes that govern the executive branch 
of the American government. "4 Schurmann's analysis of the early Cold War era stands alone 
precisely because of his use of a theoretical, ideological construct that he related directly to 
specific outcomes in American foreign policy.
Yet for all the brilliance of Schurmann's thesis, it is a fundamental flaw in his argument
that inspired the genesis of the notion of schools of thought analysis. Schurmann incorrectly
viewed political leaders as being ideological empty boxes, as not having ideological
orientations of their own which motivate their policy prescriptions. This was particularly true
of Schurmann's analysis of the Presidency. He explained,
"When challenged to make innovative policy, the leader senses certain 
currents of thought, feeling, and aspiration, which are commonly held by 
most or all members of the constituency. Using these currents as 
inspiration and adding a scheme made up of real capabilities of the 
organization, the leader comes up with a new policy which will gain him 
support from his constituency on both ideological and practical 
grounds. "5
While Schurmann was correct that political ideas, political organization, and political 
constituencies turn ideas into ideological fixtures, he was incorrect in assuming that such 
ideas come from the mass public, and that leaders somehow manipulate these currents to 
their political advantage, as though they were immune from the contagion of ideological 
impulses. The notion of currents of thought must be improved upon as leaders more reflect 
than merely manipulate ideological beliefs of the rest of society, particularly elite society in 
the case of foreign policy decision-making. To use one of Schurmann's analogies it is 
certainly true that," The clever general knows the shared sentiments of his soldiers and can 
use them to implement a new course of action."6 Yet what the concept of currents of thought 
ignores is that the 'general's' course of action is itself largely determined by his/her own 
belief system. This is a flaw schools of thought analysis hopes to correct by looking at the 
sub-ideologies of central foreign policy actors involved in the decision-making process, as 
not even the President comes to the White House all manipulator, no believer.
2
Yet despite this major weakness, Schurmann's model has much in it that is directly 
adopted into the concept of schools of thought. Firstly, Schurmann identified the centrality of 
the bureaucratic position of the leader in affecting the ideological discourse of the day. He 
saw, "the great leader or executive projecting a vision who suceeds in transforming 
ideological beliefs into structures of organizational power. "7 He correctly noted that, 
"policies, whatever their roots, are set only at the apex of the organization."8 His conviction 
is reflected in this thesis' methodological use of Allison's bureaucratic politics model, which 
posits the central role bureaucratic leaders play in determining policy outputs.
Schurmann also foreshadowed the use of Allison in observing that bureaucracies 
themselves have collective ideological leanings.9 Both his notion of currents of thought and 
the idea of schools of thought advance the point of view that the beliefs of large 
governmental organisations such as the Congress, the State Department, and the military are 
building blocs in analysing the construction of American policy outputs. As Schurmann, 
right and wrong, is an essential inspiration in the development of this thesis, it is instructive 
to now paraphrase his argument about the construction of an overriding current of thought in 
the post-1945 era. For in the detailed process are many of the same constructs that will be 
employed in a schools of thought analysis of the competing orientations in post-Cold War era 
US foreign policy.
Schurmann identified three basic strands of American opinion regarding post-war foreign 
policy, calling them currents of thought (See Table 1). Schurmann felt that imperialism was 
the overarching current which dominated post-1945 American foreign policy. It was a hybrid 
of the older orientations of nationalism and internationalism. Policy outputs however often 
had to suit all three currents, as all were embedded in the bureaucracy in Washington, with 
the nationalist bastion being the military, the internationalist current dominating the State 
Department, and the imperialists, men such as Truman, Marshall, and Acheson, dominating 
the executive branch itself. An example of the three currents agreeing on specific policy can 
be seen in the creation of the UN. "The nationalists were satisfied that American power was 
safeguarded. The internationalists were satisfied that the UN would help to advance and 
consolidate the international systems, such as those established at Bretton Woods. And the 
liberals in the Democratic Party who had come to power through the New Deal were inspired 
by the progressive ideological aura surrounding the UN." 10 This consensus over general 
policy between the various currents was essential to the success of containment as an 
overarching doctrine that, though primarily espoused by imperialists, was at least tacitly 
accepted by both the nationalists and internationalists, for largely political reasons.
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Schurmann then looked at how the basic currents related to the American political parties 
(See Table 2). The dominant imperialists, symbolised by Truman and Vandenberg, created 
an imperialist bipartisan consensus between the Democratic Party (except for its Wallaceite 
left-wing) and liberal Republicans such as Wilkie, Dewey, and Eisenhower. Schurmann 
persuasively illustrated that both the nationalists and internationalists were politically minority 
currents, with the internationalists being far too elitist to gain mass support and the 
nationalists being a minority even within their Republican Party stronghold. Schurmann 
cogently noted that bureaucracies represent interests, with historical individuals symbolising 
various ideological tenets. The internationalist bastion was the State Department, where most 
of the Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) were from Ivy League backgrounds. Interest-wise, 
the State Department had long represented East Coast corporate business interests. Many 
FSOs from this period felt that, "power was best vested in a class of wealthy and propertied 
men who had been taught responsibility in the finest schools. "11 Obviously this East Coast 
elitism would not culturally generate vast popular support in the rest of the country. The 
internationalists’ grand champion and symbol was FDR himself. With his death their power 
declined, but never disappeared, as is illustrated by the continuing career of Henry 
Wallace. 12 In fact, in their belief that the international economy was crucial to the workings 
of the new order, and in their enthusiasm for multilateral institutions, the internationalists 
were the forefathers of the institutionalists, a major school of thought of the present day.
The nationalists were another old and powerful force in American foreign policy. 
Primarily Republicans, the nationalists were epitomised by Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. 
Their failure to control the Republican Party is a central factor in the development of 
imperialism as the dominant foreign policy current in the post-war world. If Taft had 
controlled the Republicans, the bipartisan consensus that it was essential for containment to 
attain if it was to become the dominant post-war policy would have been made impossible, as 
Taft would have led the Republican Party to espouse his nationalist convictions. "The 
nationalists felt powerless even within their own preferred Republican Party. In 1940, 1944, 
1948, and 1952 the liberal wing of the Republican Party managed to nominate its own 
Presidential candidates. "13 The nationalists grew increasingly alienated from the American 
political process. They felt, "the essence of America was the small town with its white, 
middle-class population, its generally Protestant or decently Catholic religion, its values of 
individualism, private enterprise and national pride." 14 The bastion of nationalist support 
was small-town, small-time American business, forces that would be logically alienated from 
both the New Dealism of the internationalists and the imperialists, as well as the East Coast,
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corporate, liberal Republicans. Their outrage, sense of loss, for example the illuminating 
metaphor is the 'loss' of China, acquired grotesque form with the McCarthy hearings. 15 
Their alliance with the military, particularly the conservative Navy, established them as a 
permanent, if minority, current on the American foreign policy scene. "The alliance of 
electoral losers with like-minded bureaucratic losers was a major new source of power." 16 
With the dawn of the atomic age, the Navy found itself in bureaucratic budgetary peril as its 
rival, the Air Force, was the logical vehicle for nuclear weapons and thus seemed certain to 
have its budget increased at the Navy's expense. The Navy was the most conservative of the 
armed forces, as can be seen by its protracted struggle to prevent its racial integration, and 
was essentially a Pacific fleet in the interwar era as the Atlantic was the preserve of the 
British navy. The Navy's conservative, nationalist tendencies made it a logical choice for an 
alliance with the right-wing of the Republican Party. 17
One of the reasons that the right-wing Republicans adopted their Asia-first policy was 
because the Navy's interests lay in the Pacific. The war in the Pacific had been largely a 
nationalist, unilateralist show as compared with the internationalist co-operation in Europe. 18 
It was the fusing of nationalist, expansionist, unilateralist, and essentially anti-internationalist 
elements that led to calls for an Asia-first policy. "The big bankers of Wall Street were 
internationalists - so were the Communists with their Marxist doctrines, and so were the 
British with their empire. "19 These three groups were anathema to the nationalists explicitly 
because of their internationalist orientation. Then for the nationalists, as is now so for the 
neo-realist school of thought, promoting the national interest was the primary goal of foreign 
policy (See Tables 1 and 3). It was in the Pacific that the nationalists, with their Navy allies, 
hoped to implement their policy of 'America first.’
While NSC-68 reaffirmed the primacy of the Europe-first approach developed by 
Roosevelt in World War II, Schurmann noted that the process was more complicated than 
this.20 Sometimes victorious currents as well as schools of thought, and the bureaucracies 
that espouse them, have to compromise to an extent with their vanquished foes. Schurmann 
illustrated that this is exactly what happened in the post-war era. "Whereas American actions 
in Europe were an ever-changing mix of containment and peaceful coexistence [the policies 
of the imperialists and internationalists respectively], in East Asia they were a mix of 
containment and rollback [the policies of the imperialists and nationalists]. "21 An example of 
this process was post-war US policy to China. After the Korean War the US extended its 
containment policy, demarcating both Korea and Vietnam. However, unlike US policy 
regarding the USSR, America engaged in no official contact with the Chinese for twenty-five
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years. This was partially a sop to the nationalists. It was this mixture of the various foreign 
policy currents, and the interests that they represented, that ultimately helped determine 
general foreign policy outputs. It is suggested that this process will hold true for a schools of 
thought analysis of the post-Cold War era as well.
Schurmann identified the dominant current in the post-war era as that of imperialism. It 
was symbolised by men such as Harry Truman22 and George Kennan23, with the 
Presidency itself as its bureaucratic bastion. It called for a continuation of the New Deal to 
the rest of the world. "Just as the New Deal brought 'social security' to America, so 'one 
world' will bring political security to the entire world. "24 Imperialists believed that if the US 
was to learn from the errors of 1918, an activist, vigorous, foreign policy was essential to 
prevent World War III. Such a policy would, of course, cost money, supplied largely by 
business, which was not a core New Deal constituency, and make the government, 
particularly the Chief Executive, the primary actor in the world in the post-war era. The 
President, and the officials clustered around the executive branch, had a virtual monopoly 
over national security issues, particularly with the advent of the atomic bomb. It was through 
the use of national security issues that the Presidency, and the imperialist current it adhered 
to, became ever more dominant in American foreign policy. "In no comparable period of 
American history did the state undergo such an accretion of power as in those early postwar 
years. "25 Schurmann believed containment was the policy which led to and justified this 
increase in executive power and illustrated the supremacy of the imperialist current in the 
post-war era.
Containment had three basic precepts. Firstly, it wished to maintain American nuclear 
superiority. Secondly, it endeavoured to draw demarcation lines between the free and 
communist worlds. Thirdly, it was to bolster the free world, with the priority going to those 
states near the demarcation lines. As Schurmann stated, "the basic goal of containment policy 
was the creation of a Pax Americana, which would prevent a new world war from erupting, 
unify the free world under an American aegis, and give the member nations economic growth 
and political stability."26 It is the great success of this policy which has paradoxically led to 
the need for a new overarching direction in American foreign policy following the destruction 
of the Berlin Wall. President Truman succeeded in establishing imperialism as the dominant 
current by capitalising on the spectre of the Russian bear. For instance, in lobbying Congress 
to support the Truman Doctrine in 1947, he quieted both his nationalist (Taft) and 
internationalist (Wallace) opponents by highlighting the threat of the communist menace to 
Greece and Turkey. Today the threat of Russian adventurism beyond the boundaries of the
6
former USSR is simply not tenable. It is the loss of this unifying enemy and the fundamental 
structural change in the world away from the bipolarity of the Cold War era that are the main 
reasons that new overriding principles of Amercian foreign policy are needed.
While Schurmann's analysis is both comprehensive and unique, new research into the 
present ideological state of American foreign policy is essential and is a major raison d'etre of 
this work. Beyond even the fundamental differences between schools of thought analysis 
and Schurmann’s currents of thought model about the extent the leader himself/herself is 
reflective of a belief system beyond their capacity to ignore, time has not stopped, and events 
have eroded Schurmann's analysis, which was more applicable to the late 1940s-early 1950s 
than to the 1990s. Also, Schurmann's classification system is too broad to explain much that 
goes on in international affairs. This can be looked upon as an occupational hazard of grand 
theorists and is a pitfall Schurmann does not wholly avoid. As Goertzel observes, “principles 
that purport to explain everything must necessarily be quite vague and abstract. ”27 This lack 
of focus sometimes hinders Schurmann’s work.For example, Schurmann classified FDR as 
an imperialist, an internationalist, and a nationalist. Such all-pervasive classification at some 
point ceases to have meaning. Therefore, an updating and improvement upon Schurmann's 
work is necessary and is attempted in this thesis.
So definitionally what is a school of thought, and how does it relate contextually to ideas 
about ideology, belief systems, and elite consensus? Schools of thought analysis, while 
intimately connected to these three concepts, is an attempt to eradicate theoretical flaws that 
currently limit the impact of the link between beliefs and action, particularly by augmenting 
the notion of ideology.28
There is much in the notion of ideology that has direct relevance for schools of thought 
analysis. Before looking at some working International Relations definitions of the term, it is 
necessary to first assess ideology’s roots, grounded in both Marxism and modern sociology. 
Edward Shils provides a definition of ideology that highlights the concept’s broad 
philosophical aspects. He stated that ideology can be defined as, “comprehensive patterns of 
cognitive and moral beliefs about man, society, and the universe in relation to man and 
society.”29 Ideology then is a systemic attempt by man to answer the ‘big’ questions about 
his existence regarding his relationship to the universe. Yet early sociologists such as Karl 
Mannheim observed that ideology has also a collective nature and a political function. 
Goertzel notes that Mannheim defined ideologies as beliefs that reflect class or group 
interests and play a political function.30 Mannheim himself stated, “Today we recognize that
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behind every theory there are collective forces expressive of group- purposes, group-power, 
and group interests.”31 This notion that ideological beliefs reflect group political struggles 
will be a concept often applied in utilising schools of thought analysis.
Schools of thought analysis also adopts the position of sociology, that ideological 
thinking is characterised by the adoption of certain specific verities and then universalizes 
them, often ignoring evidence that does not fit into hermetically sealed paradigms. Shils 
observed that ideologies are, “integrated around one or a few pre-eminent values. ”32 As 
shall be illustrated later in chapter 1, this precept is also true for those who adhere to a school 
of thought.
Even when Marxist and sociological thinking about ideology is not directly adopted by 
schools of thought analysis, their general views regarding ideological thought as having a 
socio-historical basis is a major insight permeating the general study of beliefs. Marxists like 
the theorist Louis Althusser saw ideological thought as merely part of the superstructure 
predicated by the economic means of production. Althusser argued that for Marx, “the 
material life of men explains their history, their consciousness, their ideologies are merely the 
phenomena of their material life.”33 Mannheim goes beyond this single-factor explanation 
for ideological thought, while retaining the Marxist premise that ideological thinking is 
determined by factors other than pure reason. Mannheim argued that, “human thought arises, 
and operates, not in a social vacuum but in a definite social milieu.”34 This central concept 
can be seen as the basis for much of modem sociology. Mannheim continued, “every form 
of historical and political thought is essentially conditioned by the life situation of the thinker 
and his groups.”35 This major sociological assumption about ideology will also form a 
central component of schools of thought analysis. Only by linking an actor’s ideological 
formulations to his/her relative historical, economic, cultural, and bureaucratic position 
within society and government can his/her beliefs be given the context they need to be 
understood. Schools of thought analysis, while a factor leading to policy outputs, is not the 
only variable it is necessary to apprehend to discern the crucial context of the decision­
making process and indeed other factors (psychological, cultural, sociological, economic, 
and political) may themselves condition an actor’s adoption of a particular school of thought.
A major flaw with the notion of ideology is that its elusiveness suggests that it is too 
broad a concept to adequately explain the notion of 'praxis', the unity of thought and 
action.36 One need only look at the disparate analyses of three leading International Relations 
experts on the subject to see that the broad definitions of the term limit its direct efficacy for
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the study of the link between actions and beliefs. Michael Hunt, in his important work, 
Ideology and US Foreign Policy, defined ideology as, "an interrelated set of convictions or 
assumptions that decreases the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily 
comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality."37 
Schurmann's definition is more concise. He regarded ideology as a set of ideas designed to 
implement actions.38 While not strictly defining the term, Francis Fukuyama in The End Of 
History And The Last Man, sees Islam, Communism, Fascism, and Liberalism as the most 
important ideologies of the Twentieth Century, with Liberalism eventually prevailing in the 
global ideational struggle. Fukuyama argued, "What is emerging victorious, in other words, 
is not so much liberal practice as the liberal idea (his emphasis). That is to say, for a very 
large part of the world, there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a 
position to challenge liberal democracy. "39 Clearly these three uses of the term ideology are 
similar, yet not the same. The confusion about the very meaning of the term 'ideology' 
reflects its excessive broadness, a characteristic the schools of thought definition does not 
share.
Yet while the notion of ideology is overly vague, its main social science limitation is that 
it is too far removed from the reality of policy preferences. The schools of thought concept is 
grounded in some of the general precepts usually ascribed to ideological thought, while at the 
same time functioning as a link between ideological precepts and specific policies. This point 
is illustrated by looking more closely at what Hunt, Schurmann, and Fukuyama each mean 
by ideology, and drawing on some of their observations in the definition of a school of 
thought, which itself can be thought of as a sort of sub-ideology .40
The main problem with Hunt's view of ideology is that it does not acknowledge that in 
practice there is a direct link between beliefs and action. He stated," It is important, to begin 
with, to accept the view that the relationship between ideas and action is not rigid. The simple 
idea or set of ideas on which a policy may initially rest invariably has to leave room for 
diverse nonideological considerations. "41 Hunt is assuredly correct that ideological factors 
alone almost never determine policy outputs, but allowing for this somewhat obvious point 
does not obscure the telling evidence that Hunt's own notion of ideology in many ways 
obscures more than it reveals.
Hunt's book makes the case for the existence of an American foreign policy ideology 
predicated on the three pillars of : 1) national greatness and the promotion of liberty, 2) 
attitudes to other peoples being largely formed through racial considerations, 3) the notion
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that revolutions, particularly social revolutions, can easily spin out of control and prove to be 
a negative phenomenon.42 Hunt expertly used the whole of American history to attempt to 
persuade the reader that America has had one ideology throughout its history. While his three 
general beliefs have undoubtedly been present at various times throughout the American 
saga, it is a far stretch to believe that these three unchanging factors, and no more, lie at the 
heart of the collective American psyche. Because of the rigidity of Hunt's position, he was 
forced to make some very strange claims to preserve the inner logic of his theory. For 
example, he claimed that the outset of World War II did not significantly alter America's 
foreign policy ideology.43 To conclude that a state which had been passing neutrality acts in 
the 1930s did not go through some sort of fundamental change in the 1940s when it was 
militarily and diplomatically wholly involved in both a World War and constructing the post­
war security structure, is to be either blind to global realities or labouring under the burden of 
trying to prove an overly restrictive theory. Another example of Hunt making history rather 
oddly correspond with his theory was his characterisation of Twentieth Century American 
development policy as being mainly a continuation of earlier racial prejudices.44 Yet it is not 
necessarily racist to conceive of Africa occupying a relatively low development rung. Indeed 
after the disasters in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Rwanda in the past ten years such a view may be 
seen as objectively sensible. Certainly Hunt's conception of development policy as being 
largely a continuation of a primary American propensity to view the world through the lens 
of a racial hierarchy is open to strenuous debate.
Both of these examples point to the structural flaw with Hunt's work. He argued, "a 
nation’s self-conception provides the intellectual underpinnings - the guiding assumptions 
and concerns - for foreign policy and may even in crucial respects dictate its terms. "45 While 
Hunt was correct in illuminating the importance ideological factors play in decision-making 
he neither highlighted how this process occurs within the federal government nor 
acknowledged, as the case of his ignoring the ideological sea-change that occurred in the 
1940s attests to, that there are and have been several dominant and competing ideologies and 
that this competition has gone on at both the ideological and sub-ideological levels since the 
dawn of the Republic. Hunt's failure to support his rigid thesis of a single permanent 
ideology leads one to the conclusion that there have always been several competing American 
belief systems, and that the concept of ideology itself as Hunt and many others define it, is 
too broad to tell one much about the central linkage between systemic thought and political 
action.
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What Hunt did do well was to focus on the general importance the belief-systems of
policy-makers have on their eventual decisions, and the key and neglected role beliefs play in
the overall decision-making process. Hunt argued,
"The blend of ideas that oriented policymakers to the world should neither 
be treated in isolation nor be counted as determinative of 
policy...Personality, bureaucratic pressures, available national resources, 
and the international environment must be given their due as potent 
influences over the ways ideas are translated into action. But even after all 
these points are conceded, ideology remains the obvious starting point for 
explaining both the American outlook and American behavior in world 
affairs. "46
Hunt’s emphasis on the centrality of beliefs in the decision-making process and on the 
personal views of elites being crucial to this process will be critical facets of schools of 
thought analysis.
Francis Fukuyama's belief that liberalism has won the ideological contest of the 
Twentieth Century again illustrates that the notion of ideology is often too vague a concept to 
be of much use in International Relations, particularly at the crucial domestic level. 
Fukuyama implicitly regards liberalism as a single, all-encompassing ideology, without 
explaining what the policy outcomes are of adhering to such a creed, (beyond advocating free 
market economics and representative democracy), how these outcomes are reached, or 
accounting for the different general policy positions held by different 'liberal' states. Ben 
Wattenberg illustrated the intellectual flaw in viewing liberalism as an undifferentiated creed. 
He contrasted liberalism in the US with liberalism in Western Europe, believing them to be 
largely distinct phenomena. He sees American democracy as having, "distinctive 
features...individualism, pluralism, opportunity, dynamism, and the absence of a rigid class 
structure, "47 contrasting it with the more corporatist version of the European Open Market 
and its democratic institutions. Not only does Wattenberg see these two types of 'liberalism' 
as being unlike, he believes they are fated to come into conflict. He observed, "The global 
contest will not concern whether, but what kind of, democratic values will be influential."48 
Wattenberg once again demonstrates that Fukuyama's overly broad conception of what 
constitutes an ideology obscures more than it reveals about the workings of the international 
system.
Of the three International Relations expositors of the notion of ideology detailed here, 
Schurmann comes closest to linking beliefs directly to policy preferences of individual actors 
and detailing how these beliefs help translate into policy outcomes. Schurmann defined 
ideology as a set of ideas designed to implement actions,49 thus stressing that praxis must be 
a major part of any useful social science definition of ideology. He also noted that the term
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ideology has been obscured by, "clouds of verbiage political scientists have emitted on the 
subject,"50 a process which has led to the undervaluation of the ideological variable in the 
study of policy outputs. Unlike Hunt and Fukuyama, Schurmann directly linked beliefs to 
concrete policy actions.
Schurmann's model is also useful to schools of thought analysis in a methodological 
sense. While, as stated earlier, Schurmann wrongly viewed the President as solely 
manipulative of ideological currents, rather than noting the effect his belief system has on 
decision-making, he was correct in viewing governmental activity as largely an elite 
bureaucratic process. Schools of thought analysis adopts Schurmann's view that for a 
systemic belief to acquire political relevance, it must be represented as the collective belief- 
system of an important bureaucratic entity inside the government, such as the National 
Security Council (NSC), the Department of Defence (DoD), or the State Department.51 
Schurmann correctly focused on the executive branch, and particularly the President, as the 
actor who is most likely to influence both overall policy outputs as well as the ideological 
tone of American foreign affairs. As he stated, "the theory suggests that it does make a 
difference who is President. "52 While currents of thought has important differences from the 
schools of thought analysis utilised in this thesis, in both its recognition of the centrality of 
the idea that systemic beliefs are directly wedded to policy, and in its methodological focus 
on bureaucratic politics and the presidency, Schurmann's theory is the single most important 
forerunner of schools of thought analysis.
Yet currents of thought and schools of thought are not the same concept. Schurmann's 
currents of thought are not sub-ideologies as are schools of thought but rather are separate 
ideologies themselves. Schurmann observed, "The more clearcut and explicit they become 
[currents of thought] the more they take on certain qualities of doctrine and so become 
ideologies. "53 For Schurmann, the bureaucratic conflict that is played out in the American 
foreign policy decision-making process is between wholly different ideologies, whereas 
relying on the more conventional definitions of Hunt and Fukuyama, schools of thought 
analysis sees the concept of ideology as farther away from direct involvement in the decision­
making process. Thus schools of thought analysis is here a synthesis of both Schurmann and 
the more standard view of Hunt. While agreeing with Schurmann that ideas directly influence 
policy outputs, schools of thought analysis feels, unlike Schurmann, that this process is 
performed at a lower analytical level, thus retaining the broad notion of ideology advocated 
by Hunt and others, with one important difference. Schools of thought analysis refines the 
standard view of ideology by positing a sub-level where the various impulses within
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liberalism are prioritised in such a manner as to directly affect policy outputs in conjunction 
with bureaucratic political considerations and objective domestic and international conditions. 
For example, while agreeing with Fukuyama that 'liberalism' is the dominant ideology of the 
day and agreeing that this is certainly true in the US, this fact in and of itself does not explain 
how beliefs influence American foreign policy. Within the liberal ideology of the US 
however, are the schools of thought sub-ideologies which, when integrated within 
bureaucratic politics analysis and coupled with objective international and domestic 
conditions, lead to genuine foreign policy outputs in the post-Cold War era. Thus, while 
Schurmann's paradigm is undoubtedly the basis for much of schools of thought analysis, the 
two concepts are clearly different.
Methodologically, there are also differences between Schurmann's construct and schools 
of thought analysis. Unlike Schurmann, schools of thought analysis does not view the 
executive branch as the sole ideological battleground. Schurmann stated, "The realm of 
ideology centers on the chief executive of the state, and the realm of interests centers on the 
state's bureaucracies."54 Surely by Schurmann's own analysis, which discerned ideological 
impulses in governmental structures other than the White House, this statement 
oversimplifies what is an extremely complicated process. Schools of thought analysis takes 
the view that both the executive and legislative branches, as well as the foreign policy 
bureaucracies clustered around the presidency, all reflect and promote sub-ideological 
impulses as well as interests, and thus all can be classified and analysed by use of the 
schools of thought method. Schurmann's overly simple focus on the executive branch, as the 
key to understanding how beliefs are translated into policy in the American government, will 
be methodologically replaced in this thesis by the bureaucratic politics method linked to a 
schools of thought analysis of key Cabinet and Congressional leaders in the American 
government, as well as the President. This process will accurately reflect the complexity of 
the US foreign policy decision-making process.
There is a final point that needs to be made about the relationship between ideologies and 
schools of thought. While both relate directly to belief systems, they do so in very different 
ways. As Hinich and Munger observed, "ideologies unite personal belief systems in the 
population, even though individual schema will be different. "55 While it is true that 
ideologies serve to transform personal belief systems into a larger collective belief system 
(with some allowance for individual variation), as the Fukuyama case illustrated, this is done 
in only the most general way. Schools of thought analysis is predicated on the concept that 
there is another stage in the process, that of the school of thought sub-ideology, which unites
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personal belief systems to a more specific collective point of view that does have direct policy 
repercussions when combined with other decision-making variables.
Thus for both the concepts of ideology and schools of thought, belief systems are a 
central factor.56 The best specific definition of 'belief system' is probably Ole Holsti's, an 
expert in understanding the process of linking beliefs to foreign policy outputs. He stated that 
a belief system may be thought of as, "the set of lenses through which information 
concerning the physical and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his 
environment, defining it for him and identifying its salient characteristics. "57 In addition 
Holsti noted that a belief system implies a construct in which priorities are formed, choices 
made. He,argued, "In addition to organizing perceptions into a meaningful guide for 
behavior, the belief system has the function of the establishing of goals and the ordering of 
preferences. "58 This process of establishing priorities at the belief system level is continued 
at the higher analytical plane of schools of thought analysis. Indeed many of the differences 
between the various schools of thought boil down to differences of priority, differences first 
articulated at the individual belief system level. As schools of thought are merely the 
collective expression of the political aspects of the belief systems of individual members of 
the foreign policy elite, this is not surprising.
Belief systems, like ideologies, cover a broader philosophical area than does the notion 
of schools of thought. Belief systems are generally thought of as representing the views of 
an individual, though bureaucracies can have collective belief systems, a concept closely 
related to that of bureaucratic culture. For example, Barber defined a belief system as a 
'world view' which consists of an individual's, "primary, politically relevant beliefs, 
particularly his conceptions of social causality, human nature, and central moral conflicts of 
the time. This is how he sees the world and his lasting opinions about what he sees."59 
Belief systems are the building blocs for schools of thought analysis, which refines these 
politically relevant beliefs into a collective belief system complete with concrete policy 
outputs.
It is the idea of elites and elite consensus that is the last major concept that gives schools 
of thought analysis contextual value.60 A major assumption of schools of thought analysis is 
that it is elite belief systems that need to be assessed if foreign policy outputs are to be 
analysed. As Galtung noted, "foreign policy ideology, we feel, is a center [elite] 
phenomenon. "61 This is because, regarding foreign policy, it is the elites who have both a 
more coherent position than the general public and due to the fact that elites largely control
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the information flow of foreign policy the masses receive. Based on his analysis of the 
relationship between masses and elites in America regarding foreign policy, Jennings 
observed, "its patent that political party elites have a vastly more constrained and stable set of 
political preferences and perspectives than does the mass public in general. "62 Part of the 
reason for this heightened coherence vis-a-vis the general public is that elites, both opinion- 
makers and decision-makers, have the interest and the expertise across the spectrum of issues 
in International Relations that the general public lacks, qualities that are conducive to 
integrating policy preferences into personal elite belief systems.
Beyond having a greater belief system coherence than the mass public, elites, both 
opinion-makers and decision-makers, largely control the flow of information about foreign 
affairs to the public. Elites have a far greater level of power over foreign policy issues vis-a­
vis the general public than they do over domestic policy. As Jennings stated, "they [elites] 
serve as major sources of political information for the citizenry, through the media and other 
communication channels. This two-way flow of communication has a very asymmetrical 
quality,"63 in that in terms of immediate power it greatly favours the elites in American 
society. It is generally recognised that in most cases, foreign affairs issues are the preserve 
and interest of a tiny minority of the American population. For example, exit polls taken by 
the Washington Post during election day November 3, 1992, showed that only one voter in 
twelve cited foreign policy concerns as a significant issue that affected their vote.64 Even 
more significantly, only eight voters out of one hundred mentioned foreign policy issues as 
their main concem.65 That is not to say that on some foreign policy issues, particularly those 
involving war and peace, the general public does not make itself heard. Indeed even on less 
salient issues for the American public, such as the Bosnian crisis chronicled in this work, 
they exert a powerful if indirect influence, particularly regarding what they will not 
countenance. Still, schools of thought analysis, while accepting that the mass public is a 
factor in understanding foreign policy decision-making posits that its role is indirect, largely 
ideologically unfocused, and thus the concept of schools of thought applies primarily to the 
foreign policy elite of the United States.
Schools of thought analysis can be understood in terms of its relationship to the concepts 
of ideology, belief systems, and elite domination of the foreign policy decision-making 
process. Definitionally, schools of thought can be defined as a sub-ideology, that unlike 
Hunt's definition of ideology, can be directly linked to concrete policy preferences in 
American foreign policy. Schools of thought analysis is predicated on the Greek notion of 
'praxis', the unity of thought and action. Unlike the notion of belief systems, schools of
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thought analysis relates directly to a group or individual's political philosophy primarily, 
rather than to a general philosophical point of view. Unlike Schurmann's currents of thought 
paradigm, schools of thought analysis advocates that all of the key foreign policy actors 
themselves have a schools of thought orientation, including the Congress and the foreign 
policy bureaucracies clustered around the presidency. These organisations' schools of 
thought orientations are determined by the power struggles that take place between 
individuals in their organisations, each of whom adheres to one of the major schools of 
thought. Unlike Hunt, schools of thought analysis posits a foreign policy arena where 
several competing schools of thought battle for primacy as they have throughout American 
history, and that periodically, such as after 1941, such battles lead to a new dominant school 
of thought, emerging. Schools of thought analysis is also predicated on the idea that it is the 
orientation of American foreign policy elites that is the key factor that helps explain how 
foreign policy outputs are arrived at. Schools of thought analysis is just one variable in 
explaining foreign policy outputs, as like Schurmann's model, schools of thought analysis 
acknowledges that objective conditions of American society (particularly what is politically 
possible, a factor arrived at partly by mass public opinion) and the nature of the international 
political arena are major factors that need to be taken into account to explain foreign policy 
outputs.
B) Methodological Aspects of Schools of Thought Analysis
Something must now be said about the bureaucratic political method that, wedded with 
schools of thought analysis, will provide the methodological background for this work. The 
bureaucratic politics method is the natural partner of schools of thought analysis. The 
paradigm asserts that, "politics within a government influences decisions and actors 
ostensibly directed outward. "66 Thus the key to any analysis of US foreign policy-making 
must rest on a vision of the American government as a series of bureaucratic fiefdoms, where 
both individuals and organisations compete for the political power to most strongly influence 
overall foreign policy decision-making. As Rubin argued, "Perhaps the greatest difficulty in 
understanding US foreign policy arises when the process itself is left out of consideration. 
Anyone who has dealt directly with international affairs knows that these human elements 
and bureaucratic considerations cannot be ignored."67 The large degree of pluralism that is 
indicative of US foreign policy decision-making is the key unique feature distinguishing the 
American foreign policy-making process from that of other states.68 As Neustadt noted, 
compared to the ordered Western European governments and that of Japan, the American 
policy-making process is a rat race.69 As this is the case, the schools of thought orientations
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of both the leaders of bureaucracies within the government, such as the Secretaries of State 
and Defence, and the collective schools of thought ethos of these bureaucracies themselves, 
such as the general institutionalist orientation of the State Department, become crucial factors 
in charting the bureaucratic interplay that results in overall American foreign policy outputs.
This thesis will use a fusion of Graham Allison’s Organisational Processes Model and 
his Bureaucratic Politics Model in analysing America's response to the Bosnian crisis. He 
indicated their compatibility for fusion in his assessment of the two paradigms as emblematic 
of his double-pronged assault on the standard rational actor model of foreign policy 
decision-making. Allison reasoned, "Although the Rational Actor Model has proved useful 
for many .purposes, there is powerful evidence that it must be supplemented, if not 
supplanted, by frames of reference that focus on the governmental machine - the 
organizations and political actors involved in the policy process. "70
The Organisational Processes Model sees foreign policy as being largely predicated on 
the outputs of large organisations functioning according to regularised patterns of 
behaviour.71 The Organisational Processes Model concentrates on the notion of the 
distinctiveness of the bureaucracies operating within the American government. As Neustadt 
observed,
"operating agencies owe their existence least of all to one another - and 
only in some part to him [the President]. Each has a separate statutory 
base; each has its statutes to administer; each deals with a different set of 
subcommittees at the Capitol. Each has its own peculiar set of clients, 
friends, and enemies outside the formal government. Each has a different 
set of specialized careerists inside its own bailiwick."72
These differing functions and interests lead to fundamental differences in collective and 
personal ideologies, and often differing overall schools of thought orientations between the 
various bureaucracies. As Allison noted, "Separate responsibilities laid on the shoulders of 
distinct individuals encourage differences in what each sees and judges to be important,"73 
or in the famous phrase, "Where you stand depends on where you sit. "74 Thus Allison sees 
operational differences between bureaucracies as largely facilitating perpetual cleavages that 
lead to genuine schools of thought differences about what is in America's general interest. 
For example, as Halperin noted, "participants come to equate national security with the 
interests of their organization."75 Nor should this be looked upon as either sinister or 
surprising. The Department of Defence is a case in point. Those who decide to work there 
are likely to feel that national security is largely determined by military power, at least to a 
greater extent than the general American public. As they feel this is the case, and thus a career
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in die military is important, such individuals decide to join the military. Every day this initial 
belief is reinforced by confined contact at work with others, who as they joined the armed 
services for similar reasons, are likely to share general foreign policy views, and agree on an 
overall schools of thought orientation. This is how individuals are socialised into 
bureaucratic structures, and the reason these organisations are likely to retain unchanged in 
their collective schools of thought orientation.76
The Organisational Processes Model leads one to the conclusion that a decision-maker 
must be sensitive to his/her organisation's schools of thought orientation,77 and that this 
collective orientation can constrain a decision-maker's policy options. For example, the 
former Secretary of Defence, Les Aspin, was poorly received by the Department of Defence 
(DoD) at least partly because he did not share that organisation’s schools of thought 
orientation. DoD officials leaked complaints of Aspin’s bureaucratic shortcomings to the 
press. Aspin was eventually replaced by William Perry, who while not sharing the 
Pentagon’s primary schools of thought orientation, held significant minority beliefs that jibed 
with its collective schools of thought position, particularly regarding US relations with 
Russia and the American stance on Bosnia, both primary Pentagon concems.78
The Organisational Processes Model identifies bureaucratic organisations within the 
American government as powerful factors in the formulation of overall US foreign policy 
decision-making. American foreign policy outputs are seen as an amalgamation of 
bureaucratic governmental organisations and interests, with the President acting largely as the 
co-ordinator of these divergent governmental strains. As Rubin argued, "the State 
Department, National Security Council Staff, White House aides, Defense Department, CIA 
and Treasury and Commerce departments each represent a portion of reality which must be 
brought together to make or end decisions. "79 The model correctly recognises, as 
Schurmann put it, "the dual nature of the state - as a realm of ideology and a realm of 
interests. "80 While schools of thought analysis helps explain the nature of the ideational 
struggle within the American government, it is the Organisational Processes Model and the 
Bureaucratic Politics paradigm that discern the roles both interests and bureaucratic power 
play in the American foreign policy decision-making process.
It is, however, Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model that proves of greatest use to 
applying a schools of thought analysis to American foreign policy. While the Organisational 
Processes Model correctly identifies bureaucratic institutions within the US government as 
central players in the making of American foreign policy, it is the Bureaucratic Politics Model
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that perceives the essentially conflictual nature of American foreign policy decision-making. 
Such decision-making is seen as the result of various bargains struck by bureaucratic 
'players' in the national government. 81
In line with the Organisational Processes Model, the Bureaucratic Politics paradigm 
allows that the various bureaucracies in the American government have different interests, 
perceptions, sub-ideologies, and policy preferences. It goes on to view the government as an 
arena where these differing views and interests compete for power at the expense of other 
entrenched organisations. Further, the Bureaucratic Politics Model sees this conflict as being 
largely carried out by individual decision-makers representing both personal and bureaucratic 
interests. As Allison observed, "The hard core of the bureaucratic politics mix is 
personality. "82 Adherents of the paradigm feel that to correctly analyse how individual 
decisions are reached in American foreign policy it is essential to ascertain: Who is primarily 
concerned with the issue? (Who is playing the bureaucratic game?); What determines each 
player's stand?; and What determines each player's influence?83 This analytical list will be 
used in a modified form to highlight a schools of thought analysis of American foreign policy 
responses to the Bosnian crisis.
It is important to note the natural linkages between the Bureaucratic Politics Model and 
schools of thought analysis. Firstly, both relate to specific individuals who are central to the 
American foreign policy-making process. Where Bureaucratic Politics analysis stresses the 
power relationships that are essential to comprehend how foreign policy outputs are reached, 
schools of thought analysis provides a more convincing answer to the question as to how 
bureaucratic players determine their policy stands than has been put forward by either the 
Organisational Processes Model or the Bureaucratic Politics paradigm. While accepting that 
bureaucratic position and organisational orientation help determine an individual 
decision-maker's policy preferences, schools of thought analysis provides the crucial 
ingredient as to what primarily determines a bureaucratic player's policy stand. As such, it is 
an important refinement of the Bureaucratic Politics approach to American foreign policy 
decision-making analysis.
The three overall factors that will be posited as determining bureaucratic political 
outcomes in American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era flow from Allison's 
bureaucratic political analysis, but are slightly modified. A player's bureaucratic success is 
suggested to be determined by his/her: bureaucratic position, and its general structural power 
within the American government; the personal characteristics of each individual
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decision-maker that hamper or enhance the player's power; and the ideological fervour each 
decision-maker brings to the table regarding specific issues.
A player's bureaucratic position, and its general strength within the government, is a 
crucial factor in determining his/her chances for bureaucratic success. For example, both 
tradition and the constitutional elaboration of powers means that the views of a Secretary of 
State are usually considered more influential in determining overall American foreign policy 
outputs than the schools of thought orientation of an Assistant Secretary of Defence. 
Likewise, given the general nature of the American foreign policy process, the President will 
always play a central role in foreign policy decision-making. Yet while the presidency is the 
single most important bureaucratic entity in the American foreign policy process, it is not 
alone. As Smith argued, "the machinery of American foreign policy has become so 
sprawling and so cumbersome that no one has exclusive domain over foreign and national 
security policy."84 Neustadt concurred, saying, "The President of the United States has an 
extraordinary range of formal powers, of authority in statute law and in the Constitution. 
Here is testimony that despite his 'powers' he does not obtain results by giving orders - or 
not, at any rate, merely by giving orders...Presidential power is the power to persuade."85 
The Bureaucratic Politics Model has demonstrated the essentially pluralist nature of American 
foreign policy decision-making, that the President does not make foreign policy alone. This 
modification of the Bureaucratic Politics formula acknowledges this, while at the same time 
stressing that while there are many bureaucratic pieces on the chessboard, as in chess, these 
pieces are not all of equal worth in terms of power.
A player's personality effects the bureaucratic equation, but the notion of 'personality' 
must be assessed in further detail if it is to have a concrete effect on bureaucratic political 
analysis. As Halperin stated, for all the important foreign policy players, "The single most 
important determinant of the influence of any senior official is his relationship with the 
President,"86 and this relationship is largely influenced by the personalities involved. To win 
the President’s trust, a player must illustrate that he/she has mastered his/her own 
bureaucratic brief, and yet still has the President's interest at heart. 87 Often these two 
considerations will be in conflict, for example if the schools of thought orientation of a 
bureaucratic department does not jibe with the predilections of the President. Also, the 
attributes that make for the mastery of a bureaucratic brief: intellectual dominance, vigorous 
leadership, and taking the bureaucracy's concerns to heart, do not wholly coincide with the 
traits needed to illustrate to the President that a player has his interests at heart. These traits 
include: a sublimation of personal views for the administration's good, the propensity to be a
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'team player', and the ability to override bureaucratic objections and make presidential 
preferences into policy.
If a player can personally master these contradictions his/her bureaucratic reward is great. 
It includes the power implicit in the general acceptance of 'closeness' to the single most 
important foreign policy decision-maker, as is measured by how seriously the President 
generally considers the player's views, and in access to the chief executive. As Smith stated, 
access is both a channel for doing business and is also emblematic of presidential trust and 
bureaucratic importance.88 For example, General Marshall measured the difficult personality 
paradox and reaped the bureaucratic reward by being seen as a prime foreign policy player in 
President Truman's White House.89 While the impact of personality on the decision-making 
process is difficult to analyse, it is essential to apprehend. As Halperin argued, "there is 
nothing that Washington officials watch more closely than the relationship of particular 
individuals to the President. "90
Lastly, success in bureaucratic politics relates to a player's ideological fervour, to how 
important an issue is to the player involved. As Halperin stated, "If power in general depends 
on relationships with the President, power on a particular issue may depend much more on 
the amount of time, energy, and interest one is prepared to devote. A senior official who is 
prepared to devote substantial energy to a problem can exert influence far beyond his 
ordinary performance. The same is often true of a junior official who has the confidence of 
his principal and devotes himself passionately to any one issue."91 This fervour is partly 
predicated by schools of thought considerations.
The most obvious, and in many ways the most important bureaucratic competition, is the
eternal battle between the presidency and the Congress for control of American foreign
policy. It is certainly true that the executive branch has dominated foreign policy since the
1940s,92 but it is not that Congress is without institutional power regarding foreign
policy.93 Indeed, as Patterson argued,
"Congress is probably the most impressive specimen of its genre. Among 
other things it is a powerful legislative [his emphasis] body. In an era in 
which law-making has in most countries fallen heavily into the hands of 
executives, the American Congress continues to be a significant, 
independent law-making institution, capable of legislative innovation and 
able to undertake the creative art of law-making without executive 
leadership if necessary. "94
Regarding foreign policy, Congress' most potent power is control of the purse. As Wilcox 
stated, "Its great potential powers are to refuse to vote public moneys for foreign policies
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with which it disagrees and to investigate foreign policy with a view to influence public and 
foreign government opinion.”95 Congress' investigative powers, in decline since Watergate 
and the Iran-Contra debacle, are nevertheless still an important potential power. Its pushing 
of its agenda through control of foreign affairs appropriations is a fact of life. In the area of 
foreign aid, Congressional amendments to appropriations bills enabling the President to 
conduct foreign policy usually contain riders that reflect Congressional opinion as to how 
that money ought to be spent. These riders thus directly affect US foreign policy outputs.96 
For example, the 104th Congress has made it clear that it has little enthusiasm for aid to 
Russia. This limited the expenditure the Clinton administration formally requested of 
Congress, as they knew the grant would be unpopular. The amount of aid eventually 
approved will amount to even less than the administration originally requested.97 In this 
decisive way, through its control of all government expenditure, Congress is assured of 
relevance in foreign policy decision-making.
Constitutionally there is little doubt the founding fathers intended Congress to play a 
large role in foreign affairs decision-making, a far larger role in fact than Congress played 
throughout the Cold War era. This is illustrated by the fact that legally Congress has a wide 
array of foreign policy powers enumerated by the Constitution. Congress is given sanction 
by the founding fathers to : regulate commerce; ratify treaties (in the Senate); raise and 
maintain armed forces; control immigration; impose tariffs; and most importantly, to declare 
war (Article I Section 8).98 As Schlesinger observed, "it should not be in the power of a 
single man to bring the country into war - [this] unquestionably expressed the original 
intent,”99 of the Founders. That many of these powers have been operationally ceded to the 
presidency is not a sign of Constitutional intent, but rather of the executive's successful 
struggle throughout the Twentieth Century, particularly during the Cold War, to wrest the 
foreign policy initiative for the executive branch.
Yet there is no doubt that the Founders intended the President to play a central role in 
foreign policy decision-making. The President's institutional advantages over Congress 
regarding foreign policy are vast. 100 Noted constitutional scholar Edward Corwin, 
paraphrasing The Federalist Papers, listed four general reasons for presidential leverage over 
Congress,
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"(1) unity of office - whereas the president operates as a single decision­
maker, Congress speaks with many voices
(2) secrecy and dispatch - the president conducts policy in private away 
from public scrutiny. Congress by its nature is a very public 
institution
(3) superior sources of information - the president has access to 
information from the entire executive branch apparatus
(4) presidential availability - whereas Congress must meet formally and 
act as one body, the president has the flexibility to act without 
formal processes, increasing his ability to respond to rapidly 
changing events." 101
These prodigious institutional advantages have enabled the President to generally dominate 
foreign policy-making throughout the history of the American republic. 102 As that sage 
overseer of foreign policy decision-making, Lee Hamilton, noted, "We [the Congress] can 
modify, we can alter. But the fundamental policy remains the president's policy...I think a 
president can win any foreign policy issue if he fights hard enough for it. "103 While this 
may be overstating the President's power somewhat, the quotation neatly illustrates the 
general preponderance of presidential power over the legislative branch in the making of 
American foreign policy.
One of Corwin’s points needs to be discussed further as it bears directly on the schools 
of thought analysis of American foreign policy outputs regarding the Bosnian crisis. The 
presidential advantage of unity of office gives the chief executive a huge edge in maintaining 
schools of thought coherence vis-a-vis the Congress. The President selects his advisers and 
cabinet and can fire them at will, whereas individual Congressman have no role to play in 
selecting their fellow colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee. The President is likely 
to select his foreign policy advisers at least partly on the basis of their having a shared 
schools of thought orientation with him, and in any case, even if they deviate from the 
executive's schools of thought line, as he can fire them, the President has the vast 
preponderance of power within the executive branch in setting its overall schools of thought 
orientation.
Thus, the President has far more individual power in setting the schools of thought 
orientation of the executive branch than does the most powerful Senate leader in determining 
Congress' schools of thought point of view. This bureaucratic advantage means the 
executive branch's schools of thought orientation is apt to be more coherent and less divided 
than any Congressional schools of thought response to a foreign policy issue. This 
institutional advantage goes a long way toward explaining the Clinton administration's
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success in determining American policy regarding Bosnia during the time of the 103rd 
Congress.
The presidency was granted broad if limited powers in the Constitution. Although 
Congress was given the power to declare war, the President, as Commander-in-chief, was 
delegated the responsibility for conducting all military operations. This prerogative has 
grown to the point where the presidency has accrued more power vis-a-vis the Congress 
over issues of war and peace than it was Constitutionally granted. The Constitution also 
mandated that the President is to receive foreign envoys, and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, to appoint ambassadors to serve America abroad. 104 The President was also 
granted the responsibility for negotiating treaties, that to become law need a two-thirds 
majority in the Senate. This Constitutional enumeration of powers leads one to the 
conclusion that the Founders generally expected the President to run foreign policy, but, as 
in the case of war powers and treaties, the Congress, especially the Senate, was to have a 
legislative veto over the executive branch's conduct of foreign affairs.
In reality, inter-branch conflict over foreign policy decision-making was and is as 
inevitable as anything is likely to be in the social sciences. This is because inter-branch 
conflict has both structural and bureaucratic origins. Bureaucratically, the nature of the 
American system itself has made inter-branch conflict likely. As in other cases of 
bureaucratic politics, differing operational duties lead to different perceptions being formed in 
the Congress and the executive branch. This leads to endemic conflict. As Peters argued, 
"congressmen have devoted themselves to thwarting the will of whomever happens to be 
residing at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, often without regard to whether he is a member of 
their party."105 This is not done out of some expression of perversity, but rather because of 
differing bureaucratic roles leading to differing perceptions. The President is asked to solve 
major national and world problems, his constituency is uniquely the entire country. 
Congressmen are asked to solve individual problems their constituents have with the 
government, their constituencies are local and parochial. 106 It is not surprising then that 
these two branches should disagree about many issues, as their bureaucratic interests and 
areas of competency are so unlike. For example, over the ratification of Nafta, President 
Clinton argued that on balance the accord was in the interests of America as a whole. Even if 
this objectively was the case, it is not surprising so many members of the House derided the 
treaty and voted against its ratification. For a congressman from a district that would be hurt 
by the agreement, such as one with a large work force that manufactured textiles or had a 
large union representation, even if Nafta was in the national interest, it was most assuredly
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not in the local interest, and as the local interest was the electorate for a congressman, he/she 
would ignore its dictates at his/her peril. The struggle between the presidency and the 
Congress is in many respects merely the institutional reflection of a deeper conflict inherent 
in any state between differing national and local interests.
This general struggle is repeated in die debate about which institution should primarily 
run foreign affairs. It is a debate the Founders were well aware of, and indeed enshrined in 
the Constitution. As Schlesinger observed, "The Founding Fathers made a deliberate effort 
to divide the control of the war powers. They vested in Congress the authority to commence 
and authorize war, whether that war be declared or undeclared. At the same time they vested 
in the Presidency the conduct both of ongoing foreign relations and ongoing war as well as 
the right to respond to sudden attack when Congress was not in session."107 
Constitutionally, over this central question of foreign relations, the right to decide issues of 
war and peace, the result was, "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing 
American foreign policy. "108
It is a struggle the presidency has won hands down throughout much of the Twentieth 
Century, particularly during the era of the Cold War. One need only look at the historical 
erosion of the Congress' constitutional powers in the realm of foreign policy as illustrative of 
the vast power the presidency has accrued in this political arena. Congressional powers have 
been reduced: in deciding questions of war and peace; treaty-approving; and oversight of the 
executive branch. No one has documented this process more fully than Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr., in his seminal work, The Imperial Presidency. Schlesinger cleverly used a historical 
perspective to catalogue Congressional decline in foreign policy decision-making. He feels 
that in this century Congress has lost its war-making powers, with the process starting with 
US involvement in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, which was the first case of a President 
(McKinley, then Theodore Roosevelt) using force in International Relations without 
obtaining Congressional approval. This trend gathered pace after World War II. As Smith 
observed, "No war has been declared since World War II, but hundreds of thousands of 
Americans have fought in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and 
Grenada. "109 Clearly the Cold War brought a diminution of one of Congress' most 
significant powers.
Schlesinger argued that the presidency began accumulating foreign policy power even 
before the end of World War II. In the 1930s in a series of Supreme Court cases (US vs. 
Belmont, US vs. Curtiss-Wright Corporation et al), Presidential supremacy in foreign affairs
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was acknowledged. Also conceded was explicit recognition of the legal validity of the 
executive agreement, an executive device that while like a treaty, did not require the approval 
of the US Senate.110 Over time, executive agreements came to largely supercede treaties, 
thus removing both another presidential constraint as well as diluting another Congressional 
power. For example, up to May 1, 1972, Richard Nixon concluded 71 treaties and 608 
executive agreements. Ill
Even the seemingly uncontroversial Congressional power of executive oversight waned 
during the Cold War. This is illustrated by Congress' meek acceptance of the Central 
Intelligence Agency's (CIA) activities throughout much of the Cold War. As Schlesinger 
argued, "Though the CIA was persistently, ingeniously and sometimes irresponsibly 
engaged in undertakings that confronted the nation with the possibility of war, Congress had 
no effective means of control or oversight or even of finding out what the Agency was up 
to.’T 12 This was especially true during the 1950s when President Eisenhower made Allen 
Dulles a major actor regarding overall foreign policy decision-making. Congressional 
meekness before this uninvestigated, powerful executive bureaucracy is highlighted by the 
fact that it released the CIA from compliance with federal laws requiring the disclosure of the 
number, names, titles, functions, and salaries of public employees in the name of national 
security. 113 Up until the time of the Clinton administration, Congress did not even know the 
size of the CIA's budget.
What were the reasons for this dramatic accrual of Presidential power? Schlesinger 
cogently argued that they were primarily historical. The first major historical factor leading to 
the increase in executive power concerned Congressional failure in the inter-war period, and 
the second concerned the changed nature of the international environment in the age of the 
atom. Schlesinger clearly observed the shock Pearl Harbor was for the American foreign 
policy establishment, a surprise that remained a major argument for limiting Congressional 
power over foreign affairs decision-making after the end of World War II. As Schlesinger 
noted, after Pearl Harbor, "No one for a long time after would trust Congress with basic 
foreign policy. Congress did not even trust itself. The grand revival of presidential 
prerogative after Pearl Harbor must be understood as a direct reaction to what happened 
when Congress tried to seize the guiding reins of foreign policy in the years 1919 to 
1939." 114 After the defeat of President Wilson's Versailles peace treaty by Henry Cabot 
Lodge and the Republican Senate, an insular Congress dominated US foreign policy in the 
inter-war era. Its obsession in the 1930s with neutrality acts belied a lack of military 
preparedness that caught up with the United States December 7, 1941. It was inconceivable
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that America, which had incorrectly trusted its safety to Congress in the inter-war years, 
would repeat the mistake in 1945.
It was the Cold War era that put the seal on the presidential dominance of American 
foreign policy. A major reason for this was the dawn of the nuclear age. As Schlesinger 
noted, "The revolution in the technology of war increased the premium placed on the capacity 
for swift and secret action residing uniquely in the Presidency."! 15 It is not an anomaly that 
the CIA, the DoD, and the NSC were all founded during the early days of the Cold War. 
These powerful executive agencies, bureaucratic symbols of increased presidential power in 
the Cold War era, were operationally fitted to cope with the possibility of the US being 
menaced by nuclear weapons. The CIA secretly collected information about both the nuclear 
capabilities and the outlook of the Soviet leadership. The DoD, in bureaucratically uniting the 
armed services, made military coordination easier and most importantly swifter, in an era 
where an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) could quickly threaten the American 
mainland. The NSC provided diplomatic coordination, as it included all the major executive 
foreign policy decision-makers such as the President, the Secretary of Defence, and the 
Secretary of State. Nuclear technology itself, made the concepts of quick coordination and 
counter-striking abilities essential in times of crisis. These attributes were not the institutional 
metiers of the Congress, which was by its very structure a more decentralised institution than 
the presidency. Thus the very demands the new technology placed on the United States 
contributed to the vast accretion of presidential power in the Cold War era.
It is a major underlying premise of this thesis that with the end of the Cold War,
presidential dominance in foreign policy decision-making is at an end. As Hart noted,
"In times of crisis, other branches of government, and other powerful 
influences within the American political system, tend to stand back and let 
the president get on with the job...But in non-crisis times, the American 
polity is less enthusiastic about presidential leadership and less willing to 
give the president a free hand. In these more normal periods, the political 
system reverts to type and becomes what it was originally designed to be, 
a system of multiple centers of power. "116
We are now returning to a more normal time, and hence to a more 'normal' American foreign 
policy system of Presidential leadership, but not dominance of the decision-making process. 
In terms of geo-strategic power, the US is safer now with its Cold War enemy vanquished 
than it has been in many years. Thus the urgencies of the Cold War era have given way to 
more diffuse, less immediate threats to American security. This has practical consequences 
for the inter-branch rivalry between Congress and the President. As Jamison argued, "with 
the passing of the strategy of containment as a central organizing principle between the
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executive and legislative branches of government on questions related to the international role 
of the US, age-old questions of the purposes and conduct of US foreign policy are 
returning." 117 This thesis will demonstrate that these questions have been raised anew by 
the Clinton administration's handling of the Bosnian crisis, but have not yet been answered. 
What is clear is that Congressional actors will play an increased role in foreign policy 
decision-making in the post-1989 era, compared with that of the Cold War. As this is the 
case, Congress as a whole must be included in any bureaucratic political analysis of 
American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Allison, who wrote his seminal work 
Essence of Decision in the midst of the Cold War, concentrated on the executive branch as 
the focus of bureaucratic politics due to its then dominant role in US foreign policy decision­
making. With die end of the Cold War this overweening dominance is no more. As such, for 
a schools of thought analysis of American foreign policy to be accurate, Congressional 
leaders' schools of thought orientations need to be examined as well as executive elites for a 
comprehensive picture of the American foreign policy decision-making process to emerge.
To extend and improve on Schurmann's work, it will be necessary to first explain the 
'givens' behind each school of thought. These general predilections form the prism of 
analysis through which decision-makers view policy questions. 118 It is thus the contention 
of this thesis that if the givens of each school of thought can be discerned and analysed, their 
adherents' general policy preferences can be determined largely as a function of these 
underlying analytical and philosophical predilections. It is in linking these givens to specific 
policies and policy-makers diat forms the basis of the schools of thought classification 
system adopted in this thesis. This linkage, as well as noting the parameters in each school of 
thought, helps give one a thorough understanding of the American response to the post-1989 
era. Some of the schools of thought will engender policies that are complementary, some will 
be in friction, and all have political, economic and military dimensions. This thesis will 
attempt to classify and analyse the various American foreign policy schools of thought 
grappling with the post-Cold War era.
C) Operational Aspects of Schools of Thought Analysis
After generally delineating each school of thought in chapter 1, they will be further 
divided into majority and minority currents and sequentially analysed in chapters 2-4, in an 
attempt to add refinement and precision to schools of thought thinking that Schurmann's fine 
analysis lacked. While it is the basis of this thesis that it is extremely useful to analyse a 
school of thought as a coherent whole, a narrower level of analysis is also useful, looking at
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majority and minority currents within each school of thought, before placing individual 
opinion-makers and decision-makers into the general schools of thought analysis. In looking 
at the schools of thought as a whole, it is important to keep in mind that not all positions are 
intellectually equidistant. Also, as will be shown, not all schools of thought currents have 
equal intellectual or political power. These factors should be kept in mind when comparing 
schools of thought (See Table 3).
In chapters 2-4, after delineating the broad range of givens underlying each school of 
thought and further dividing them into majority and minority currents (where minority 
currents exist), a school of thought's general policy preferences regarding large foreign 
policy issue areas of the day can be ascertained. After having discussed these general schools 
of thought policy preferences, it is possible to place specific individuals into both a general 
school of thought and a majority/minority current within the overall orientation.
To do so, it is necessary to look once again at the general schools of thought policy 
preferences regarding five important issue areas in the post-Cold War era, that have been 
discerned from analysis of the general givens underlying each school of thought, and 
compare them to individual opinion-makers' and decision-makers' policy preferences. If they 
broadly match the general schools of thought prescriptions (in this case 3 correlations out of 
5 issue areas) the individual will be labelled as belonging to that particular school of thought. 
The general classification of each individual into the school of thought proposed here will not 
necessarily reflect the complete views of any single opinion-maker or decision-maker, as 
many espouse characteristics of more than one school of thought. Ultimately however, each 
actor will have one dominant orientation, and that is where he/she will be placed in the 
schools of thought model. However, in an effort to add further precision to this endeavour, 
an actor's minority views will also be classified. That is, if an opinion-maker or decision­
maker has a significant schools of thought orientation that correlates to a general school of 
thought's cluster of policy preferences 2 out of 5 times, it will nevertheless be noted and 
analysed after the individual's majority schools of thought orientation is discussed. The 
examination of minority views adds needed precision to schools of thought analysis, 
reflecting the reality that rarely is an individual's belief system uniform.
How were opinion-makers chosen to be assessed in this thesis? Before this query can be 
answered, the concept of 'opinion-makers' must be further refined. Throughout this work, 
the term opinion-maker connotes a leading contributor to the print argument about the debate 
over America's role in the new world order. This definition thus allows a broad range of
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individuals to be assessed using schools of thought analysis, a far wider range of actors than 
can be looked at after the term decision-maker is defined. This is methodologically as it 
should be for, unlike a decision-maker, an opinion-maker can have a wide range of 
occupational experience. For example, in this thesis, opinion-makers will be consultants, 
denizens of think-tanks, academics, columnists, and even a former President. The important 
point linking these disparate people is that they all write widely regarding the US position in 
the new era, and advocate discernible policy preferences. They are all extensively quoted, 
and are both the promulgators and popularisers of ideas. To some extent then, the individuals 
were chosen on the basis of the intellectual significance attached to them by both their peers 
and the informed public.
Opinion-makers are the first link in the schools of thought analysis chain. Many
academics, opinion-makers and decision-makers would argue that analysing belief systems
through the use of schools of thought analysis simply does not matter, as beliefs and ideas
are not essential for understanding foreign policy formulation. 119 It is a major ’given’ of this
thesis that ideas do matter, matter enormously, and that the theoretical underpinnings of
schools of thought analysis is an ignored field. It is important for all who study International
Relations, as even those who contend they have no theoretical underpinnings, unwittingly,
by this stance, espouse theoretical underpinnings. As Robert Keohane sagely commented,
"As Keynes said in another context, practitioners are prisoners of 
'academic scribblers', whose views of reality profoundly affect the 
contemporary actions of practical people. The choice for practitioners is 
not between being influenced by theory or examining each case 'on its 
merits': its rather between being aware of the theoretical basis for one's 
interpretation and action and being unaware of it. "120
As Althusser exhorted, one should not, “take an ideology’s consciousness of itself for its 
essence.” 121 This holds true for schools of thought analysis as well. Almost all the decision­
makers chronicled in this work would not classify their beliefs using schools of thought 
terminology, but that does not negate its existence and importance in analysing the foreign 
policy preferences of individual decision-makers, as well as its role in helping assess how 
overall American foreign policy outputs are arrived at. Thus a form of Mannheim’s concept 
of ‘false consciousness’ is present. Just because decision-makers are not aware of schools of 
thought analysis and terminology, does not mean the processes it analyses are not real and 
important. Opinion-makers in this thesis, in line with Mannheim’s belief that they are more 
likely to somehow transcend this ‘false consciousness’, are more likely to use schools of 
thought terminology and be aware of the processes involved in schools of thought 
analysis. 122 A key given of this work then is that there are ongoing processes involved in
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determining decision-makers’ specific foreign policy prescriptions that are not recognised by 
most of those making these decisions.
The opinion-makers in this thesis are 'academic scribblers' who, by their advocacy of 
certain general ideas and specific policy preferences, influence the decision-makers who 
create foreign policy outputs. This process exists, whether admitted or not, and as all agree it 
is crucial to understand action (foreign policy outputs), so it is important to comprehend 
schools of thought analysis, a contributing variable to foreign policy inputs. This process 
begins with the opinion-makers. Keohane argued, "we must understand the context of action 
before we can understand the action itself. "123 Schools of thought analysis provides part of 
this context by assessing the sub-ideological orientations of opinion-makers who provide 
intellectual reference points for hard-pressed decision-makers.
Beyond this rather broad definition of 'opinion-maker', the individuals assessed were 
chosen impressionistically, based on the quantity of material available on each. Certainly 
there are many other relevant opinion-makers that could have been analysed as also 
contributing to the debate about America's role in the post-Cold War era. Before this project 
was attempted, one had little idea where most of the opinion-makers selected would fall 
within a schools of thought analysis.
The major flaw with the method used in this work to select the sample of opinion-makers 
for analysis is that it is quite small. While with the use of Allison's bureaucratic politics 
model for analysis of the decision-makers this is to be accepted, regarding the opinion- 
makers this is a limitation of the work. This stands to reason intuitively, as there are 
doubtless many more opinion-makers than decision-makers who actually affect US foreign 
policy outputs. Thus while methodologically the sample is secure in that all the individuals 
analysed are significant opinion-makers based on this thesis' definition of the term, a codicil 
must be placed after the results of this work's schools of thought analysis of the opinion- 
makers mentioned here. Whatever the outcome of the sample, schools of thought analysis 
must be further investigated with a larger opinion-makers’ sample before its full efficacy can 
be conclusively illustrated.
In chapters 2-4, opinion-makers will be categorised using schools of thought analysis. 
But this is not sufficient. To understand foreign policy outputs, the factors of political power 
and electoral restraints that change, inhibit, and limit the role of a decision-maker's belief 
system must be explored. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will do just this. The political variable must
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be mixed with a decision-maker's general schools of thought orientation if foreign policy 
outputs are to be truly understood.
The Clinton administration's response to the Bosnian crisis will be analysed, in chapter 
6, using schools of thought analysis. It was chosen because three of the five policy issue 
areas that were used in analysing general schools of thought policy prescriptions intersect in 
the Bosnian crisis. They are: the US response to the Bosnian crisis itself, American views 
and policy regarding Yeltsin's Russia, and US policy regarding the post-Cold War security 
structure in Western Europe. Earlier, in chapter 5, decision-makers’ views on the three major 
American foreign policy issue-areas will be compared with general schools of thought policy 
preferences and the policy-makers will thus also be placed in a ’box* as opinion-makers were 
in chapters 2-4. However, in discerning the reason for American foreign policy initiatives it 
is important to also note the relative bureaucratic political power of the current foreign policy 
players regarding the Bosnian crisis. This will be done in chapter 7. It is this dichotomous 
process of discerning an actor's schools of thought orientation and his/her political and 
bureaucratic power within the American system, that leads to an enhanced understanding of 
US foreign policy outputs in the post-Cold War era.
The decision-maker sample was selected using the three principles earlier gleaned from 
Allison's bureaucratic politics model: 1) Does the individual hold a central position regarding 
foreign policy decision-making?; 2) Does the individual exhibit personal characteristics, such 
as closeness to the President or a widely acknowledged mastery of his/her brief which gives 
them influence in foreign policy decision-making?; 3) Does the individual exhibit ideological 
fervour regarding specific foreign policy issue-areas which makes him/her influential 
regarding these individual issues. For a decision-maker to be included in the sample, he/she 
had to exhibit at least one of these bureaucratic power variables.
Regarding the executive branch, most of the individuals selected were obvious choices. 
President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defence Peiry, and National 
Security Adviser Lake hold the four primary bureaucratic posts regarding foreign policy 
decision-making and thus are all analysed in this work. The inclusion of Strobe Talbott takes 
more of an explanation. While his position in the administration does not allow him to 
qualify for the sample as holding a central post regarding foreign policy decision-making, his 
personal relationship with President Clinton makes him far more bureaucratically powerful 
than the average Deputy Secretary of State. As Lane noted, "in the Clinton administration, 
Friends of Bill are usually more important than their bosses." 124 While this may be
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overstating the case somewhat, there is no doubt that President Clinton values personal 
relationships in apportioning bureaucratic power even more highly than most chief 
executives. Thus his old Oxford room-mate Talbott qualifies for the sample as his very close 
personal relationship with the President makes him a formidable bureaucratic power.
It is more difficult to choose a decision-maker sample regarding foreign policy questions 
in the Congress. Although Congress has leadership positions, they matter less as 
determinants of bureaucratic power regarding overall foreign policy issues than in the 
executive branch. Foreign policy power in both chambers in the Congress is concentrated in 
the hands of a few individuals, due largely to the onerous task a legislator faces in becoming 
competent,enough to vote on the wide range of issues that Congress attends to in a session. 
As Lake cogently stated,
"No senator or representative can be personally engaged or even 
knowledgeable about the full range of foreign policy and domestic issues 
facing the nation, although, some - like Lee Hamilton and Stephen Solarz - 
are leading authorities on the full range of American foreign policies.
Most pick a few issues on which they try to be expert, and when required 
to vote on other issues tend to follow the lead of their best-informed 
ideological allies." 125
It is for this reason, the institutional processes at work in Congress itself, that schools of 
thought analysis has relevance for understanding the Congressional aspects of American 
foreign policy-making. The Congressional system means that leaders emerge on most issues, 
including foreign affairs, based on: their expertise regarding the issue (a variation of the 
second bureaucratic politics principle); the bureaucratic power the leader has within the 
Congress as an institution (a variation of the first bureaucratic politics criterion); his/her 
schools of thought orientation reflects the overall viewpoint of a number of less informed 
Senators or Congressmen (a variation of the third bureaucratic politics principle). While the 
political formula for gauging bureaucratic power is slightly different in the Congress than in 
the executive branch, it is merely a variation of the bureaucratic politics principles that 
determined the decision-maker sample in the executive branch. As such, as with the White 
House, for a Congressional actor to be included in the decision-maker sample he/she must 
exhibit one of the three general indicators of bureaucratic power, as the initial criteria fit 
similarly in both processes.
Three individuals are included in the decision-maker sample based on their bureaucratic 
power within Congress as an institution. Senators Bob Dole and George Mitchell were 
important actors in determining overall foreign policy stances of the Senate (and all other 
issues besides) by virtue of the fact that they were the Minority and Majority Leaders of the
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upper chamber during the 103rd Congress. As Donovan observed, the Majority and Minority 
leaders have the practical power of control over their respective party's legislative agenda. 
The Majority Leader can keep the Senate in session, has the right to be recognised first on the 
Senate floor, and plots party strategy, determining legislative priorities for a party during the 
Congressional term. 126 The Minority Leader's powers parallel those of the Majority Leader 
in that he/she also charts his/her party's general legislative course. Thus both Dole and 
Mitchell directly affected foreign policy decision-making during the 103rd Congress.
Senator Biden also, by virtue of his bureaucratic position in the 103rd Congress, 
qualified for the decision-making sample. Regarding foreign policy power in Congress, as 
Olson noted, "The ultimate policy responsibility lies in [sic] the Foreign Relations 
Committee."127 The committee is seen as the 'expert' Congressional opinion on foreign 
affairs, and thus greatly influences the full Senate as to its policy preferences. While Olson is 
correct, the power of the Foreign Relations Committee has lessened under the weak 
leadership of Claiborne Pell, who was Chairman between 1987-94.128 It was the 
subcommittee chairmen of the Foreign Relations Committee who gained the power that Pell 
had so readily abdicated. As Politics in America wryly observed, in 1991, "Pell ceded much 
of his chairman's powers to more assertive subcommittee chairmanships. In effect, Pell 
joined in a coup against himself." 129 A result of this 'coup' was that for the first time, 
subcommittees were staffed independently of the full Foreign Relations Committee. Tlius 
Senator Biden, as Chairman of the largely autonomous European Affairs Subcommittee of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, had more of a say over the legislative initiatives regarding 
the Bosnian crisis in the 103rd Congress than did Pell, even though the latter was Chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Committee.
Senator Richard Lugar, Congressman Lee Hamilton, and then Minority Whip Newt 
Gingrich are all included in the decision-maker sample due to their personal expertise in 
mastering their respective legislative briefs. Both Lugar and Hamilton are well-known 
foreign policy leaders. The major reason for Lugar's leadership position is that he is seen as 
both a good Republican spokesman as well as being influential in forming Republican 
policies. Lugar is telegenic, being, "Well-spoken and comfortable on TV." 130 It is Lugar’s 
almost unique versatility, as both initiator and public spokesman for Republican foreign 
policy positions, that is the main reason for his prominence in helping to set overall 
Congressional schools of thought stances in the new world order.
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Likewise Hamilton is a respected foreign affairs leader in the Congress. He rose to 
prominence as the even-handed Chairman of the House Iran-Contra investigation, and has 
since preserved a bipartisan reputation for fairness. "Hamilton's judicious manner has earned 
him the reputation as one of the wise men of the House. "131 By staying above the 
partisanship that has increasingly come to characterise the House, Hamilton has earned the 
respect of Congressmen from both parties, a respect he parleys into a bureaucratic position of 
influence, for his expertise is beyond dispute. Hamilton, like Lugar, is a leader on foreign 
policy issues because of his unique versatility. Hamilton's versatility is revealed by the fact 
that he is an expert across the wide path of International Relations, being knowledgeable 
about almost all the regions of the globe and regarding all the major foreign affairs issues, 
from arms control to debt relief. 132 Hamilton's uniquely broad area of foreign policy 
competence has made him an unquestioned Congressional leader regarding American foreign 
policy decision-making.
The Minority Whip of the House during the 103rd Congress utilised a very different 
bureaucratic strategy than did Congressman Hamilton. In fact Newt Gingrich has come to 
exemplify the very notion of political partisanship. Yet even during the 103rd Congress, 
before his stunningly successful role as Republican architect of the 1994 mid-term elections 
led him to the Speaker's chair, Gingrich was already a force in every aspect of House 
business, including its limited role in foreign policy-making. Gingrich was a Congressional 
leader in that he led a new Republican faction in the House that was to radically alter the 
political equation of the Congress and thus affect its overall schools of thought orientation 
regarding foreign policy.
During the 103rd Congress, Gingrich advocated a major change in the parliamentary 
strategy for the Republicans in dealing with the majority Democrats in the House. Gingrich, 
"argued for years that ranking Republicans should fight Democratic bills, not try to 
compromise with them for a few crumbs in return." 133 Regarding foreign policy, this was a 
move away from the largely bipartisan ethos that had characterised legislative relations during 
the Cold War era. This more combative approach made Gingrich popular within the 
Republican party, whose increasingly partisan and confrontational stance reflected the then 
Minority Whip's rise to power in the House between 1989-1994. For though, "Gingrich was 
a surprise winner for minority whip in 1989, [yet] in not quite four years, members sharing 
his conservative ideology and combative approach were occupying almost all the House 
GOP leadership positions except Michel's."134 (Bob Michel, a moderate Republican, was 
then the placatory House Minority Leader. He retired in 1994.) It is obvious that as Speaker
35
of the House, Gingrich will exert far more bureaucratic power regarding foreign affairs 
decision-making in the 104th Congress. Still, even while Minority Whip Gingrich had 
mastered his brief to the extent that it was obvious that he was behind significant ideological 
changes regarding Republicans in the House, and that he, and not Michel, was largely 
directing the Minority Party throughout the 103rd Congress. As such, Gingrich was a leader 
who affected Congress' overall schools of thought orientation regarding foreign policy.
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of schools of thought analysis. As was 
briefly mentioned, several of the opinion-makers and decision-makers do not fit perfectly 
into any one school of thought 'box'. This is true for a variety of reasons, but particularly 
because of the pragmatism that is so often seen as a principal characteristic of American 
foreign policy. It is possible to note that there is often a gap between rhetoric and reality in 
the conduct of American foreign policy. This pragmatism is partly due to the political 
constraints placed upon decision-makers, particularly elected decision-makers. As John 
Kennedy paraphrased Bismarck, politics is indeed the art of the possible. Electoral 
constraints help delineate which policies are impossible for political actors to implement, 
regardless of their desirability. This underlying reality is reflected in the problems created for 
schools of thought analysis in dealing with the differences between political rhetoric and 
policy realities.
A problem of using rhetoric to determine individual decision-makers' place in the 
analysis is that, for electoral reasons, most decision-makers generally favour all positive 
foreign policy outcomes, even if they know the outcomes come into conflict with each other 
or are not likely to be achieved. For instance, in the economic sphere politicians are apt to 
favour high growth rates and low inflation, a favourable balance of trade, and a strong 
currency rate, even though several of these processes tend to be in conflict, at least to an 
extent. This same all-things-to-all-people process can be seen in rhetoric surrounding foreign 
policy initiatives. While agreeing with Friedman and Karsh that, "despite the proclivity of 
those in public office to propoganda, rhetoric, chicanery, and lies, on the whole even they 
usually end up saying what they mean and meaning what they say," 135 rhetoric alone is not 
sufficient to ascertain an individual actor's schools of thought orientation. Almost all foreign 
policy decision-makers in the US desire to promote democracy throughout the world, to 
protect US national interests, stop the appearance of a hegemonic rival, and foster world 
economic capitalisation. It is the way these goals are advanced, and most importantly, their 
priority vis-a-vis one another that helps determine foreign policy. It is this that makes a 
concentration on five specific issue areas in the post-Cold War world so valuable a part of the
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schools of thought analysis. It is an analysis of specific prescriptions that is made with the 
notions of pragmatism and rhetoric being included in the overall foreign policy output. For 
example, while most policy-makers may favour both hounding China over its human rights 
abuses and expanding trade with Deng Xiaphong’s government, the question over what to 
do about MFN with China makes the underlying priorities of these two goals evident, 
depending on the policy-maker's specific prescriptions. Thus it is by analysing the specific 
policy preferences of decision-makers relating to the five issue areas, that their genuine 
priorities and schools of thought orientation can be apprehended. Specific policies reflect a 
school of thought's prioritization of the above mentioned foreign policy benefits. The 
advocation of specific policies removes the confusion rhetorical flourishes often bring to 
disceming.an actor’s genuine foreign policy priorities.
Yet despite pragmatic political considerations, rhetorical dangers, and the fact that in 
several instances decision-makers do not fit perfectly into any one school of thought, this 
analytical tool is still valuable in understanding how American foreign policy decisions are 
made. While it is true that if there are too many exceptions to general schools of thought 
precepts the categorisations cease to have meaning, a less than perfect 'fit' (at worst in this 
case three out of five policy prescriptions conforming to the school of thought's general 
view) does not negate the overall classification. There is a difference between acknowledging 
that a decision-maker’s overall orientation is a major factor in foreign policy decision­
making, and advocating a construct that becomes a deterministic, ideological strait-jacket. 
There are certainly other major factors in foreign policy decision-making that must be taken 
into account if the reasons for specific policy initiatives are to be understood. These include 
economic factors, the dynamic of domestic political struggles, cultural factors, and the nature 
of the international system, among others.
Yet a basic answer as to why this thesis is being written is that the overall orientation 
(school of thought) a decision-maker espouses has not been accorded sufficient weight in 
thinking about International Relations. Part of the purpose of this thesis is to raise the level of 
consciousness about the importance of this variable in the decision-making process. It is to 
see not only what are the specific orientations of certain individuals regarding foreign policy 
schools of thought, but also to determine to what extent it is useful to put decision-makers 
into a general schools of thought classification system that gives this process meaning. 
Understanding the importance an individual's adherence to a foreign policy school of thought 
plays in decision-making is not to see this variable as the be all and end all, but as an 
important and undervalued component in the foreign policy decision-making process.
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Undoubtedly, the schools of thought variable matters in analysing foreign policy outputs. 
It is also a necessary tool needed in order to examine what the overarching American foreign 
policy precepts will be in the new era, as Schurmann lias shown that belief orientations are 
crucial building blocks in analysing this process. As Schurmann noted, bureaucracies 
represent interests which often have a collective orientation. Ultimately, as Schurmann 
showed was the case after 1945, the dominant new 'voice' in American foreign policy could 
either be a new intellectual construct, though undoubtedly it would be a hybrid of today's 
schools of thought, or the new era could be dominated by one distinctive, already discernible 
school of thought. Either way, the schools of thought variable is a notion worth keeping. 
The outcome of the current foreign policy debate will likely be some type of schools of 
thought synthesis of current foreign policy options, around which bipartisan support can 
coalesce. The academic argument now raging about the American role in the post-Cold War 
orderl36 and its general foreign policy goals, partly based on schools of thought disputes, 
far from being esoteric, will be played out in the corridors of power and will help determine 
US foreign policy well into the next century. Chapter 6 will examine this process in action, 
relating it to the Clinton administration's policy toward Bosnia. This thesis will contend that 
schools of thought can be established in post-Cold War American foreign policy and that 
knowledge of this decision-making variable is important in understanding the Clinton 
administration's foreign policy outputs.
What good does it do to place people into a schools of thought 'box'? By doing so, one 
is able to say what they believe in, what their general foreign policy preferences are in the 
post-Cold War era, and most importantly, what, in general, are the theoretical 'givens' they 
used to arrive at their specific policy prescriptions. The schools of thought variable provides 
part of the answer to the crucial question, Why? In this case, why do decision-makers 
believe what they do, and how do these beliefs affect foreign policy formulation? Once 
again, it is in linking the schools of thought givens to specific policies and policy-makers that 
gives this process meaning. Also by 'boxing' noted opinion-makers and decision-makers, it 
is easier to compare their general foreign policy formulations, and more importantly, to 
examine and contrast the schools of thought givens that provide each policy-maker with a 
prism of perception, a general way of viewing the world, whether they acknowledge it or 
not. 137
There are three primary differentiating embarkation points for studying the current three 
schools of thought in American foreign policy. Firstly, the three schools of thought
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orientations roughly relate to different political groupings, with the neo-realists being 
primarily Republican, the institutionalists - Democrats, and the democratists - 
neoconservatives in both parties. Secondly, regarding priorities, each has a different primary 
foreign policy goal. The democratists see the promotion of democracy around the world as 
central to their thinking, while neo-realists wish to protect and further the American national 
interest, whereas institutionalists feel the promotion of capitalism around the globe should be 
the central factor determining America’s post-Cold War foreign policy. Thirdly, these 
differences in priorities are matched by a fundamental conflict between all three major 
schools of thought over what should be the primary level of analysis used in studying global 
conditions. Democratists feel a state's policy is moved primarily by domestic concerns, neo­
realists feel systemic factors and balance of power considerations are central, and 
institutionalists believe the workings of the international economy are the prime determinant 
of a state's foreign policy. As this thesis will illustrate, from these different general priorities 
and levels of analysis shall flow distinctive schools of thought, which will lead to policy­
makers having very different ways of looking at the world if they fail to share a similar 
schools of thought orientation. From here, it follows that general, broad differences over 
policy are likely to emerge.
The democratists are the first major school of thought broadly examined in this chapter, 
and will be examined in detail in chapter 2. Among primary democratist adherents are Strobe 
Talbott and George Mitchell. They fundamentally believe that states that are democracies 
share certain universal values and that these like values have, rather conclusively, prevented 
intra-democratic warfare. As Michael Doyle observed, "even though liberal states have 
become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal 
states have yet to engage in war with one another."138 For example, despite having varied 
national interests, democratists point out that all the democratic states ended up on the same 
side in both World Wars. As democratists believe that democratic states always have 
essentially peaceful relations with one another, the successful expansion of democracy is, for 
democratists, nothing less than the cornerstone for building real peace in the world. 
Democratists shun the fashionable view of cultural relativism. They do not see democracy as 
ultimately having cultural limits, or being innately alien to certain civilisations. Democratists 
have a predilection to extrapolate their global beliefs directly and exclusively from the 
American experience. Like Thomas Paine, they feel the world can be largely remade in 
America's image.
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So how do these general democratist 'givens' relate to policy preferences? Using the case 
of aid options to Russia exposes a situation where all three schools of thought share broadly 
complementary policy preferences. All wish to aid President Yeltsin and further 
democratisation in Russia. But even in this case, where schools of thought policy 
prescriptions at least partly coincide, there is a marked difference of degree in the enthusiasm 
for Russian reform between die three schools of thought. For democratists, the Russian 
democratic experiment is a key concern. They see the success of Yeltsin as essential for the 
continued flourishing of democracy throughout all of the former USSR and Eastern Europe. 
It is their highest issue area priority. As Richard Nixon, an avid adherent of large-scale 
support for Russia, stated, "As Russia goes, so will go the other republics. If reform fails 
there, it will fail everywhere. If it succeeds there, others will follow. "139 Democratists see 
Russia as a democratic catalyst, both due to its power and its example. For democratists, 
above all else, Yeltsin must remain as President, as he currently embodies democracy in 
Russia. Unlike the institutionalists, democratists believe a strategy of extreme economic 
deprivation being used to thrust Russia into the capitalist world must go if it becomes so 
unpopular as to lead to the threat of revolution. Likewise, the West should give Russia large- 
scale aid, both bilaterally and through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), even if it does 
not meet the economic criteria usually necessary for such loans. This general cluster of policy 
preferences reflects democratism's key concern being political rather than economic factors (a 
democratist given). Democratists want the West to give more aid to Russia than do neo­
realists or institutionalists, and above all want to promote Yeltsin's democratic regime, 
whatever its economic policies. Democratists believe it may take many years for a genuine 
market economy to develop in Russia, and see that if in the meantime Russia becomes a 
genuine democracy the world will be a far better place. Why do they take this view? A core 
democratist tenet is that democracies do not go to war with one another. This basic 
democratist 'given' is at the root of its general policy preference of full-fledged support for 
Russian political reforms. Democratists feel that as Russia has had no stable democratic 
government for 1000 years, the US should try to take advantage of the current propitious, if 
perilous situation.
The neo-realists are the second major school of thought to be analysed, and will be 
examined in detail in chapter 3. Leading neo-realist decision-makers include: Bob Dole, 
Newt Gingrich, Richard Lugar, and Joseph Biden. They believe that the ambiguous concept 
of the national interest should be the defining principle of American foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War era. Neo-realists posit an anarchic international system where states view one 
another positionally and thus relatively. A main neo-realist goal is for the US to prevent the
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emergence of a hegemonic rival. They see foreign policy outputs as dominated by balance of 
power considerations. Neo-realists see the promotion of a state's immediate, selfish interests 
as the supreme goal in foreign policy. Unlike democratists, neo-realists see no natural allies, 
only natural interests. Ultimately, the only end for neo-realism is the practical consideration 
of a state’s survival. A sober evaluation of American national interests must always be the 
yardstick by which neo-realists believe all specific US policy options should be measured.
Unlike democratists, neo-realists believe all nations have fundamentally different values. 
If democratism is a universalist creed, neo-realism is very much a nationalist school of 
thought. Power is seen as relative and the key to survival in the Hobbesian jungle. Neo­
realists feel that for a state to feel itself successful, by definition, it must be more successful 
than others. Neo-realists value tangible power components, such as geopolitical and military 
power, over intangible variables, such as ideological influence, in the overall equation of 
power. The national interest is at least partly determined for neo-realists by a state's structural 
position in the international system, as well as the structural nature of the world system, its 
polarity, itself. Unlike democratists, neo-realists feel the permanence of geography 
outweighs any values states may transiently share.
The neo-realists' general cluster of policy preferences toward Yeltsin's Russia also, as 
with democratism, follows from its 'givens’. Regarding Yeltsin's survival, neo-realists want 
to hedge their bets, giving the Russians some limited aid due to its being an important state, 
while also bolstering the states surrounding Russia as insurance should it again become 
expansionistic. This use of the balance of power, a key neo-realist tenet, leads neo-realists to 
advocate giving increased aid to Eastern Europe and Ukraine, in an effort to 'balance' them 
against a possibly resurgent Russia. For example, in an effort to buttress Eastern Europe, 
neo-realists advocate quickly admitting the Poles, Czechs, and the Hungarians into Nato. 
Unlike the democratists, neo-realists do not greatly care about the political nature of the 
Russian regime, as for them Russia's geopolitical position is far more important in analysing 
Russian foreign policy outputs. For example, neo-realists are more cheered by the historical 
fact that Russia and America (with the possible exception of half-hearted American 
intervention in the Russian Civil War) never engaged in martial conflict than by the fact that 
Yeltsin is a democrat. For neo-realists the historical sign that Russian and American interests 
are not necessarily incompatible is more important than the character of the present Russian 
government.
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Thus, neo-realists are nowhere nearly as enthusiastic about the possibilities of a stable, 
democratic Russia emerging as are democratists. Pessimism towards Russia's democratic 
chances is another reason neo-realists advocate increased aid and security offers to the former 
Soviet satrapies of Eastern Europe. They want the Clinton administration to be tougher with 
the Yeltsin regime about its increasingly adventurous policies toward its 'near abroad'. Neo­
realists fear the recurring threat of Russian expansionism and want to focus American efforts 
more on protecting and stabilising East-Central Europe, the Baltic states, and Ukraine, rather 
than overemphasising the long-term chances of democratic success in Russia.
The third general school of thought, the institutionalists, believe that the increased 
capitalisation of the world should be the central priority of US foreign policy in the post-Cold 
War era. Leading institutionalist adherents include President Clinton, Warren Christopher, 
William Perry, Anthony Lake, and Lee Hamilton. Institutionalists assume capitalist states 
generally share common interests. Prosperous states are seen as less likely to threaten the 
international order than are impoverished rogue states, who have no stake in maintaining 
such an order. Unlike the neo-realists, the institutionalists view absolute rather than relative 
economic success as crucial. Multilateral institutions such as the Gatt, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the European Union (EU), the IMF and the World Bank are seen as the 
cornerstone for facilitating the world system. Unlike democratism and neo-realism, 
institutionalism has no minority currents. For institutionalists, free trade is the key to 
fostering global economic prosperity and political stability. As President Clinton stated, "The 
habits of commerce run counter to the habits of war...People who raise each others living 
standards are less likely to become combatants. "140 Institutionalists believe that in 
promoting capitalism, they will stoke the central engine that propels the motive force of 
history. This is because institutionalists feel the expansion of capitalism will lead those who 
adopt it to evolve into more open societies. It thus comes as little surprise that for 
institutionalists the key analytical orientation for viewing international relations is the study of 
the economic variable in the overall equation of power.
Institutionalists believe that the pre-eminence of the economic variable in the overall 
equation of power can be seen in the economic effect on a democratic state's domestic 
politics. The political truism has long been acknowledged that domestic economic concerns 
in democratic societies almost always outweigh military and international concerns for the 
electorate. Thus, to win reelection, a political decision-maker must put domestic economic 
concerns in a central position in his/her conduct of policy. For institutionalists, economic 
considerations largely determine political outcomes in most democratic states. To halt
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American decline, brought about in their eyes by economic stagnation, institutionalists urge 
the US to engage in multilateralism in conducting foreign policy. To avoid permanent 
decline, institutionalists believe America needs an era of intense domestic focus and reform, 
thus collective security and increased reliance on International Organisations, such as Nato 
and the UN, are essential to preserve some sort of order in the international system. Due to 
its decline, institutionalists acknowledge that America cannot expect to have the same 
influence in multilateral institutions that it once had, and must learn to function in a more 
collective decision-making process regarding foreign policy than was necessary during the 
Cold War. This belief in a fundamental change in the nature of the international system with 
the end of the Cold War is a core institutionalist tenet. Not only do institutionalists see an 
America in decline, they also believe that the relative power of the state itself is decreasing in 
the international arena as more nonstate actors, such as International Organisations (IOs) and 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs), gain a degree of power at the international level.
Regarding Russia, institutionalists are for more of an effort being made to bolster Yeltsin 
than the neo-realists advocate, but believe less effort should be expended than democratists 
favour. Institutionalists believe that foreign aid to Russia should be co-ordinated by 
multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank. They feel it is essential to engage 
Russia in the Western economic community, and strongly favour attempting to find ways to 
extend East-West trade rather than simply providing Russia with foreign aid. Unlike 
democratists, institutionalists want no easing of economic stringency to hasten the Russian 
transition to capitalism. Like the neo-realists, they believe that the IMF should employ the 
usual strict loan conditions on Russia it generally demands. Institutionalists believe that 
without Russia undergoing a painful, radical restructuring of its economy, for example using 
IMF funds to float the ruble rather than immediately providing the Russian people with 
cheaper consumer goods, it will not be able to trade with the West and thus its situation will 
stagnate or worsen, and its democratic reforms will be doomed.
Implicit in this institutionalist policy preference is its general economics-first policy 
predilection. Underlying institutionalists' general Russian policy is their belief that increased 
capitalisation is essential for the improvement of global conditions. Regarding Russia, 
institutionalists believe that if it is successful in its market reforms, it will gradually but 
inevitably become a more open and peaceful society. It will be more peaceful as increased 
economic prosperity will give Russia a greater stake in the emerging international order. It 
will become more open as institutionalists believe certain qualities of mind are essential for 
the running of a successful capitalist society. These include the ability to take risks, to think
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for oneself, and to innovate. In short, these traits all require a fairly open society. 
Institutionalists believe that authoritarian states with successful capitalist economies will 
become less politically rigid over time. They point to the example of South Korea, which 
after undergoing a capitalist transformation, increasingly became more politically open until 
today it is a democratic state. In complete contradiction to the democratists, institutionalists 
believe the openness of the Russian economy, and not the immediate openness of Yeltsin’s 
government, is the crucial first step towards modernisation and then democracy itself.
With the passing of the Cold War, it is evident that the US needs to establish new overall 
guiding principles for the conduct of foreign policy. Schools of thought analysis provides the 
building blocks needed to analyse how this process will evolve. It is a useful tool for relating 
theory to political processes. Schools of thought analysis helps explain the intellectual 
context of decision-makers' policy preferences, and helps to answer the crucial question, 
which is why certain policy-makers hold specific policy positions. Schools of thought 
analysis is an attempt to both classify and understand the intellectual nature of the post-Cold 
War era, and through this process, to begin to apprehend the contours of the strange new era 
we find ourselves in.
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Table 3 - Current American Foreign Policy Schools of Thought
Democratists Neo-Realists Institutionalists
Goal Promote Democracy Promote National Interests, 
stop appearance of a 
hegemonic rival.
Promote economic liberalism 
through international 
institutions.
D e clinist/T riumphalist Triumphalist Declinist Declinist
Schurmann Code NATIONALIST/
IMPERIALIST
IMPERIALIST/
NATIONALIST
INTERNATIONALIST
Assume Democracies have common 
values (i.e. democracies do 
not go to war with one 
another).
Nations have fundamentally 
different values. 
International Relations is a 
zero-sum game.
Capitalist states are 
inherently linked and have 
common interests. 
Multilateral institutions are 
the cornerstone for 
facilitating the world system.
Policy toward Russia Large-scale aid Aid, but not large-scale Aid mainly through IOs.
Continue shock therapy.
Variations within the 
currents
HYPER-DEMOCRATISTS/
MODERATE
DEMOCRATISTS
The difference is in degree 
but it is qualitative.
REALIST-
INTERNATIONALISTS / 
REALIST-ISOLATIONISTS. 
The difference is vast, yet the 
same ideological roots.
NO MINORITY CURRENT
Academics Allison, Wattenberg Kissinger, Buchanan Nye, Keohane
Political Actors Neoconservatives DoD, CIA, Republican Party Democratic Party
Presidency
Level of Analysis Domestic Concerns Systemic Factors, Balance of
Power Considerations
International Economy
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Chapter 2: The Democratists
Chart 2-1: The Belief System of the Democratists
1) Background: Kant
2) Goal: Promote Global Democracy
3) Assume: Liberal democracies have common values. Liberal 
democracies do not go to war with one another. Democracy 
is a universalist creed and is ultimately universally 
applicable. (Increasing world contact brought about by the 
telecommunications revolution is seen as culturally unifying 
and encouraging a global trend towards democracy.) 
Democracy leads to economic liberalism, not vice-versa.
4) See state: Run primarily by internal politics/bureaucratic politics.
5) Key analytical 
orientation:
Political, ideological.
6) Declinist/
Revivalist:
Revivalist
7) World Structure: Unipolar
8) Preferred mode
of action:
US-dominated multilateral force. Unilateral action to be
taken if necessary.
9) Basis of force: Organisations like Nato.
10) World Policeman: US, with like-minded states.
11) Key areas and foci: Newly democratic states of Eastern Europe and especially 
Russia; human rights.
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12) Schurmann 
classification:
Mix of Imperialists and Nationalists (especially in Asia).
13) General political 
supporters:
Neoconservatives
14) Political actors: Former Senator Mitchell, Deputy Secretary of State 
Talbott.
15) Bureaucratic Think-tanks, lower levels of the State Department,
bastions of support:
16) Policy cluster 
preference 
towards Western 
Europe/European 
defencesystem:
Pro-European integration, especially pro-Nato. Do not see 
a politically integrated Europe as threatening, due to shared 
values, (i.e. There is no need to fear the Germans.) Favour 
US dominated Nato. An extension of Nato is not to be 
advocated, due to concerns about Russia. Want Nato to 
engage in out-of-area missions.
17) Policy cluster Interventionist; Favour lifting of embargo and Nato 
preference towards bombing raids to bolster Bosnian government, even 
Bosnia: advocating limited US military involvement on the Muslim
side of the conflict.
18) Policy cluster Generally favour, but not a priority, 
preference towards
Trade
(Nafta and Gatt):
19) Policy cluster Strongly for large-scale aid, as it is a chief area of concern, 
preference towards
Russia:
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20) Policy cluster 
preference towards
China:
Hard-line (no MFN, or MFN with strict conditions.)
21) Academics: Wattenberg - Hyper-democratist; Muravchik and Allison - 
Moderate Democratists; Fukuyama - Moderate democratist 
with a neo-realist minority.
22) Variations within HYPER-DEMOCRATIST (Minority)/ MODERATE
the school of DEMOCRATIST (Majority); difference is in degree but it
thought: is important.
This chapter is devoted in detail to the democratists, one of the three major schools of 
thought in the post-Cold War era. It is necessary at this point to briefly delineate the 
assumptions underlying chapters 2, 3 and 4. These chapters will illustrate the contention that 
these over-arching views usually lead to specific policy clusters on the central foreign policy 
issues confronting America in the new world order.
Central here is the notion of praxis, as described by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the idea that 
theory (ideas) lead to action (policies). 1 The belief in the validity of this notion is the 
unspoken assumption undergirding the next three chapters. After outlining the general 
schools of thought in chapters 2, 3 and 4, chapters 5 and 6 will be a study of specific policies 
affected by decision-makers in the Clinton administration, showing that their general belief 
structures lead to the positions they stake out policy-wise.
At a certain level of generality nearly everyone agrees with the general goals of all three 
schools of thought. Almost all the foreign policy decision-makers in the US desire to 
promote democracy throughout the world, protect the national interest, stop the appearance of 
a hegemonic rival, and promote world economic liberalism. It is in the way these goals are 
advanced, their rationales, and their priority however, that determines specific policy. Then, 
it is only in specific policies and policy-making, that the individual priorities and general 
orientation of policy-makers can be deduced. After outlining the theoretical precepts that 
underline the democratist position, this chapter will conclude by generally describing the 
general democratist policy position towards aid to Russia, relations with China, and noting 
democratist views toward trade, Bosnia, and Western Europe.
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The democratist creed claims the German philosopher Kant as its father. In Perpetual 
Peace, written in 1795, Kant stated that a league of democratic states was the key to universal 
peace. The simple, overriding priority of the democratists is to promote democratic 
movements around the globe. As Ben J. Wattenberg, a hyper-democratist, stated in his book, 
The First Universal Nation, published in 1991, "Americans have a missionary streak and 
democracy is our mission. "2 For democratists, the advocacy of democracy combines the 
idealism of Wattenberg's statement with the practicality of another democratist's viewpoint. 
Writing in Foreign Affairs, Graham Allison noted, "America's interests clearly require that it 
support and speak out on behalf of democratic change. "3 Democratists fundamentally believe 
that American geopolitical and strategic interests are best served by the encouraging and 
nurturing of like-minded democratic states around the globe.
There are four underlying assumptions behind democratism. Firstly, democratists assume 
all democracies share basic common values. Among these are: respect for the individual and 
individual freedoms, governments having limited power, political pluralism, and free and 
regular elections.4 It is these common democratic values that are the essential reason for the 
democratists' strongest assumption, that is the second assumption, namely that liberal 
democracies do not go to war with one another. As Francis Fukuyama stated in The New 
Republic, "those that disrespect the rights of their own citizens are much more likely to 
disrespect the rights of neighboring states as well. "5 This is the common sense basis to 
democratism, that the internal nature of a state is an essential guide to its external behaviour. 
Further, that as Michael Doyle noted in his seminal democratist piece, "Kant, Liberal 
Legacies, and Foreign Affairs Part 1," published in the summer of 1983, "even though 
liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally 
secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another."6 (Emphasis added). This is 
a bold assertion, and is the single most important point in the democratist case.
It can be disputed. Peru and Ecuador were both democracies when they went to war in 
the 19th century. The Nixon administration certainly played a role in the toppling of the 
democratically elected government of Allende in Chile in the early 1970s. Even Whilhelmine 
Germany was a semi-democratic state with its Reichstag immediately prior to World War I. 
Yet the farfetchedness of these counter-examples and their paucity, simply serve to highlight 
how strong a case the democratists have on this issue. Peru and Ecuador were both nascent 
democracies when they went to war, neither having a strong democratic tradition. The Nixon 
administration helped topple Allende by means of covert operations. Given the climate
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engendered by the Vietnam War, it is highly unlikely that at that time the US could have 
sustained a prolonged, public war with another democratic state. Finally, while Whilhelmine 
Germany was an evolving constitutional monarchy over domestic issues, foreign affairs were 
still very much the preserve of the Kaiser and factions of the army in the early 20th century. 
So while one can quibble, Doyle’s general point seems beyond dispute.
Nor is this truism known only to theoreticians. Andrei Kozyrev, Yeltsin's former 
reformist foreign minister, is quoted expressing democratist sentiments in Brzezinski's 
Foreign Affairs article, "Selective Global Commitment." He said, "The main thing is that the 
Western countries are pluralistic democracies. Their governments are under the control of 
legal public institutions, and this practically rules out the pursuance of an aggressive foreign 
policy. In the system of Western states...the problem of war has essentially been removed. "7 
For a democratist, not only does democracy lead to an absence of war with other democratic 
states, a state's democratic orientation overrides all of the other major variables in the state 
system. Michael Doyle noted, "politically more significant, perhaps, is that when states are 
forced to decide by the pressure of an impinging world war, on which side of the world 
contest they will fight, liberal states wind up all on the same side, despite the real complexity 
of the historical, economic and political factors that affect their foreign policies. "8 For a 
democratist, other factors do not obviate the key determinant of a state's behaviour in the 
international arena; whether it is (or is not) a democracy. Democratists then, as Doyle points 
out, believe world peace is inevitable if and when all of the states of the world are 
democratic. Thus US policy should simply be to encourage and enlarge the world's 
democratic zone.
The third basic democratist assumption is that there is a link between democracy and the 
free market, but not necessarily vice-versa. While some economically liberal states, such as 
Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan have not become truly democratic while evolving into 
capitalist states, never has a truly democratic state been economically anything other than a 
member of the capitalist world. Wattenberg stated simply the general development formula 
for democratists, "Liberty yields peace, and peace yields prosperity, in exactly that sequence. 
Elections come first."9 For democratists, the stability engendered by the rule of the people is 
essential to long-term economic success. Tommy Thong-Bee Koh stated, "One of the 
prerequisites of economic growth is political stability and this is more likely to occur with a 
government elected by the people. "10 This legitimacy and stability is especially necessary if 
governments such as those in recently democratised Eastern Europe, have to adopt severe 
and universally unpopular austerity measures. As The Economist illustrated, "in the Eastern
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European countries that have pushed inflation below 50% a year, democratic legitimacy 
enabled governments to pursue unpopular reforms." 11 The popular, personal moral authority 
of Walesa, Havel, and to a lesser extent, Yeltsin, enabled their reformist efforts to endure the 
immediate unpopularity of necessary austerity measures. Democratists believe the causation 
here is one-sided. While democracy may enhance the stability necessary for free market 
success and protect newly-capitalising states from revolution, the urge for democracy is seen 
as emanating from non-economic sources. Fukuyama argued, "economic development is 
neither a sufficient nor a necessary cause of democracy. While democracy can best arise 
under certain economic conditions, it must be desired for essentially non-economic 
reasons. "12 This belief is in direct contradiction to that of the institutionalists, who see 
democracy as being largely the result of a developing free market society. (Witness the 
differences these two neo-Wilsonian schools of thought have over American policy towards 
China). In fact, even when democratists doubt the short-term efficacy of economic 
liberalism, as Bruce Ackerman did in Russia, democracy is seen as an achievable goal. He 
felt, "it will take decades to create a functioning market system, during which [time] 
revolutionary leaders inevitably dissipate their popular authority. Before that happens, a 
window of opportunity remains open, during which leaders can gain popular consent to 
break the hold of communist constitutionalism on the rule of law. "13 Clearly for democratists 
establishing democratic institutions takes priority over the free market, desirable though this 
latter element is judged to be.
The fourth and final precept of democratism is that not only do all democracies espouse 
universal values, democracy itself is seen to be universally applicable. Democratists shun the 
fashionable view of cultural relativism. As Allison stated, "[I] don't agree with arguments 
about the moral or practical equivalency of political systems. "14 Democratists do not see their 
creed as having cultural limitations, or being ideologically alien to certain civilisations. Even 
the neo-realist, Samuel Huntington, stated, "some support undoubtedly exists in almost 
every society for liberty, equality, democracy, and the rights of the individual." 15 When 
democratists see newly democratic states struggling to succeed, such as the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, they see a continuation of the struggle of Washington, Jefferson and 
Adams. Jeane Kirkpatrick illustrated this democratist phenomenon. She stated, "I believe 
Eastern Europeans have developed a passionate appreciation for limited government, not 
unlike the passionate appreciation for limited government felt by the American founding 
fathers. "16 This democratist predilection to extrapolate from the American experience was 
also shrewdly noted by Stanley Hoffmann in January 1968. Even then he argued that, 
"Americans, whose history is a success story, tend to believe that the values that arise from
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their experience are of universal applicability. "17 Democratists believe, as the American 
patriot Thomas Paine did 200 years ago, the world can indeed be remade in America's 
image. 18
Institutionalists would disagree about the universal applicability of democracy, as well as 
over causation regarding democratic and free market development. However, the two schools 
of thought both see the internal workings of the state as being a key determinant of its actions 
on the international stage. Hoffmann, an institutionalist, stated, "foreign policy today 
is...largely shaped by domestic demands and expectations." 19 For democratists, it is logical 
that as their focus is on the democratic nature of a regime, a state's internal political character 
is seen to be analytically crucial. The two neo-Wilsonian schools of thought differ from the 
views of the neo-realists over the matter of the crucial primary level of analysis in 
international relations. Michael Doyle interestingly illuminates this notion, through use of the 
old neo-realist staple game, 'the prisoner's dilemma.’ The game is crucial to neo-realists as it 
is supposed to point out that uncertainty and anarchy lead each ’prisoner’ (state) to pursue its 
own limited self-interest in order to attain the best (or in the case of the game, the assured, 
but second-best) outcome. Doyle turns the game on its head and in so doing highlights the 
democratists' key belief that a state's actions can only truly be understood by analysis at the 
domestic level. "The ’prisoners’ are presumed to be felonious, unrelated except by their 
partnership in crime, and lacking in mutual trust - competitive nation-states in an anarchic 
world. A similar game between fraternal or sorroral twins - Kant's republics - would be 
likely to lead to different results. "20 For democratists, intentions and not capabilities are 
crucial. This flies directly in the face of the neo-realist belief that decision-makers should 
evaluate capabilities over intentions. Democratists, valuing intentions and domestic analysis, 
would point out that the US does not fear France or Britain, although both have a nuclear 
capability because their domestic orientation and history point to their pacific intentions.
Likewise the democratist analytical orientation differs greatly from the other two schools 
of thought. Whereas neo-realists particularly value the military component of the overall 
power equation and institutionalists heavily weight economic factors, democratists 
particularly stress the political and ideological components of power. As Richard Nixon 
pointed out, American influence, "stems not only from our military and economic power but 
also from the enormous appeals or our ideals and our example."21 Fukuyama's critique of 
the neo-realist concept of the national interest is a good example of the strong democratist 
weighting of the ideological component of power. He argued, "threat perception and 
concepts of national interest aren't objective conditions established by the international
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system, but are dictated by ideology. "22 Democratists thus see ideology, not some sort of 
concrete national interest, as a primary part of the motive force of history. Indeed Allison 
defines American national security, the ultimate yardstick of 'national interests', as largely 
protection of American intangible benefits. "America's basic national security objective has 
remained unchanged for four decades: to preserve the US as a free nation with its 
fundamental institutions and values intact. "23 These values are now seen by democratists to 
be not only safe but also expanding their influence throughout the world.
Wattenberg, as always, is one of democratism's strongest cultural cheerleaders. He 
enthused, "We have sought to boost a community of ideas - political democracy, free market 
economics, and science and technology. These days those values are advancing, not 
eroding."24 US dominance in the area of ideas is of great importance to democratists, and 
helps explain the triumphalist nature of the school of thought. As Wattenberg stated, "never 
has the culture of one nation been so far-flung and potent. "25 Democratists see the continued 
spread of American culture and democratic ideals as the best general policy to follow in the 
new world order. For democratists the spread of democracy can only be ensured through 
continued American leadership in global affairs. Democratism is an involved, interventionist, 
internationalist creed. Former President Nixon urged just such a leadership role. He felt that 
the world, "needs our [US] leadership in the critical area of ideas."26 Democratism is a 
recipe for a vigorous American involvement in the world.
Triumphalism then is the democratists' response to the declinist/revivalist debate. Of the 
four major opinion-makers labelled in this thesis as democratists (Allison, Fukuyama, 
Muravchik and Wattenberg) all are revivalists, regardless of what type of democratist they 
are. There is an obvious link between democratism's triumphalism and revivalism, and the 
urging of an aggressive interventionist foreign policy. This illustrates an overarching point of 
the thesis: intellectual analysis of the American structural position in the world largely 
determines policy prescription. As democratists are unambiguously up-beat about both the 
state of the US and its global structural position, it is logical they should be so missionary, so 
interventionist. Ironically, to paraphrase Khrushchev, democratists believe that 'history is on 
our side'. Fukuyama stated, "the single- most remarkable macropolitical phenomenon of the 
past generation has been the global crisis of authoritarianism, and the spread of liberal 
democracies in its wake. "27 He pointed out that democracies have increased in number from 
3 in 1790, 13 in 1900, 27 in 1919, to 62 today. Not only have democratic states emerged, 
Fukuyama believes that democracy's rivals such as fascism and communism have all largely 
self-destructed. "All of the major systematic alternatives to liberal democracy have collapsed,
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one by one. This, and the resulting homogeneity of world politics forces us to once again 
take up the study of democracy as the central issue of any true political science. "28
The implosion of the Soviet Union is seen by democratists as a golden opportunity to 
further the historical trend. Wattenberg put it bluntly, "the collapse of the Soviet Union 
makes it easier for us to support democracies everywhere. "29 A unique feature of 
democratism is that its adherents see the new global structure as the result of this dual 
process, democratic values being increasingly embraced whilst all other major ideological 
alternatives are being discredited. Allison, as with so many other democratists, sees in this 
process the unique triumph of the United States. "Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness - 
in the wake of the Cold War and hot battle America's goals in the Declaration of 
Independence now seem ascendent around the globe...The political values of freedom and 
market inspire the world. "30 The democratist analysis of the post-Cold War world as being 
increasingly favourable for America explains their desire to aggressively promote democracy.
Democratists see the world structure as unipolar, unlike their neo-realist and 
institutionalist counterparts. None more adheres to this view than Charles Krauthammer. He 
argued, "There is but one first-rate power and no prospect in the immediate future of a power 
to rival it. "31 This democratist assertion is based on their argument that the US is the only 
state in the world with a multidimensionality of power. As Nixon noted, "Today, as the only 
nation that possesses global economic, military and political power, the US stands at the apex 
of its political power."32 As the US is the only genuine great power in the world, 
democratists believe that American policy will thus largely determine the type of world order 
that emerges.
When obligated to use force or to come to grips with a crucial issue, democratists would 
ideally like the US to be part of an American-dominated multilateral force. Democratists 
believe that such a situation occurred in the Gulf War. Fukuyama said, "the UN served 
merely as window dressing for US unilateralism during the Gulf crisis and would have been 
impotent were it not for US leadership...collective action through the UN is not an alternative 
but a complement to American leadership. It is foolish to think, however, that action through 
the UN can substitute for American leadership when even bodies of like-minded states such 
as Nato and the EC have had trouble making tough decisions."33
Unlike institutionalists, democratists see the UN as a multilateral cloak obscuring 
American unilateralism. Here, Krauthammer agreed with Fukuyama, arguing that Iraqis
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"charge that the entire multilateral apparatus established in the gulf by the US is but a 
transparent cover for what is essentially an American challenge to Iraqi regional hegemony. 
But of course."34 For democratists, multilateralism provides a useful diplomatic facade, but 
should never be confused with the real motive force of international relations in the new 
world order, American unilateralism. Democratists see the UN as a sometimes useful tool of 
American policy, but never as an international power in its own right. Here they differ greatly 
with the institutionalists, who see the renewed efficacy of the UN as a sign of a new order. 
The UN, with its bloated bureaucracy, lack of an enforcement mechanism (army), security 
council vetoes, and cacophony of voices, is seen as far too unwieldy to be a power unto 
itself. It is US leadership of like-minded democratic states that must form the focus of 
international power in the new world order. When consensus among even such like-minded 
states is impossible, democratists have a clear prescription, unilateralism. As Krauthammer 
posited, "The how [to use power] is simple: when the US wants to do something, it must be 
prepared to go it alone. Others will follow."35 The democratist unilateralist impulse marks a 
crucial difference with their fellow neo-Wilsonians, the institutionalists, who invariably 
favour a true multilateralist approach.
For democratists their structural analysis and imperatives find their institutional outcome 
in organisations like Nato. A defence organisation composed solely of democratic states, 
Nato has a long record of success and is a democratist favourite. Ironically, democratists 
agree with De Gaulle's belief that Nato is basically a creature of the United States. America's 
dominant position in Nato is bureaucratically expressed by its supreme military commander 
always being an American. The multilateralism of like-minded states led by the US finds its 
focus in Nato. However for democratists, there is no doubt who the world policeman, the 
ultimate source of force and authority, is. Krauthammer put it succinctly, "If America wants 
[international] stability, it will have to create it. "36 To secure stability democratists see the 
multilateralism of like-minded states, such as is bureaucratically epitomised in Nato, as 
desirable, but unilateralism as the mode of operation if necessary.
Obviously all regions of the world and all major issue areas are important to a global 
power such as the US. But all the schools of thought have particular areas of vital interest 
and foci. These lead to the prioritising that goes on in foreign policy, whether consciously or 
not. The priorities are largely determined by the analytical orientations of each school of 
thought. For instance, the democratists' major concern with human rights can be directly 
traced back to their valuing democratic values above all else. Among these values is respect 
for the rights of the individual, a right contravened by human rights violators. Thus concern
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for human rights is a core issue for democratists. As Brzezinski stated while National 
Security Adviser under Jimmy Carter in 1979, "It [commitment to human rights] represents a 
return to the political and moral well-springs of our uniqueness and purpose as a nation. "37 
Today, emphasis on human rights is seen as more plausible due to seismic changes in tlie 
international order. Richard Pierre Claude noted that Gregory Fossedal believed that with the 
US ascendant in the new world order, an American foreign policy based partially on human 
rights had suddenly become practicable. Claude also observed that Fossedal believed, "the 
concept that international human rights involve global issues that are no longer peripheral to 
the future of international relations. "38 Democratists see the new world order as the time, 
when bereft of enemies, America can push forward its own liberal democratic values, 
especially regarding human rights.
Regionally the democratist focus is very much on the newly emerging democracies of 
Eastern Europe and the former USSR, especially Russia. Helping fledgling democracies 
acquire stability is obviously a central priority of all democratists. In 1993, as internal 
disturbances led by Khasbulatov, Rutskoi and the recalcitrant apparatchik-laden Russian 
parliament pushed the survival of Yeltsin's generally democratic, reformist government into 
doubt, democratists led the American rally to Yeltsin's defence. The former superpower, still 
far and away the most powerful state in Eastern Europe, still possessing nuclear warheads, 
has become the key democratic test case for democratists. Krauthammer warned the public 
not to be distracted by other foreign policy problems from the crucial Russian case. "Indeed, 
the preoccupation with Bosnia, Somalia and the world's other brushfires is a convenient 
distraction from the overriding foreign policy issue facing the US: helping save the Russian 
experiment in democracy. It is on Moscow, not Mogadishu, that the peace in the post-Cold 
War world hinges. "39 Stephen F. Cohen, a noted American Sovietologist, concurred, stating 
that, "Russia will be the US's largest foreign policy concern for many years to come."40 
Democratists see the success of Yeltsin's plans for democratisation as essential for the 
continued flourishing of democracy tliroughout all of Eastern Europe. It is their highest 
regional priority.
Having delineated democratist views, the next step is to discover who in the American 
political and foreign policy establishment espouses democratist positions. The democratists 
relate to Schurmann's classification system as both imperialists and nationalists. They are 
imperialist in their triumphalist, interventionist view of the United States and nationalist in 
their missionary zeal to promote and protect American values across the globe. It is striking
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that democratists and nationalists both took a hard-line towards China's undemocratic 
communist government. These two groupings are the intellectual forebears of democratism.
Democratism seems to be very much a minority position. Neither major party espouses 
democratism as their dominant position on foreign policy issues affecting the United States. 
Rather, there seem to be democratists in both major parties. William Pfaff made the crucial 
link between the neo-conservative movement and the new democratist viewpoint. He argued, 
"the neo-conservatives of the 70's and 80's have assumed the part played in the past by 
liberal institutionalists. They want the US to lead a crusade for global democracy little 
different in inspiration from the 14 points of Wilson or the Atlantic Charter, or the UN as 
originally.envisaged by Franklin Roosevelt and his associates. "41
It is hard to find political actors who openly adhere to democratist views. It is among 
opinion-makers that democratism has found supporters. Indeed the four well-known 
opinion-makers used in this thesis that espouse democratism come from varied careers. One 
is primarily an academic (Allison), and three work in think-tanks (Muravchik, Fukuyama and 
Wattenberg). Although democratism is an active force in the political debate regarding the 
over-arching direction America should take in the post-Cold War era, it has yet to find a large 
number of concrete political backers, though there are some such as former Majority Leader 
George Mitchell and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.
Regarding Western Europe and the reorganisation of the European defence system with 
the end of the Cold War, democratists can be described as generally pro-European. They do 
not see a politically integrated Europe as threatening as a united EU would certainly share 
America's democratic values. As Brzezinski stated, "It has been the widely held American 
view that a united Europe, even though a potent [and now increasingly so in fact] economic 
rival, will have a major contribution to make to world peace. The common intellectual and 
philosophical heritage of the Atlantic world has doubtless much to do with the American 
desire for and confidence in European unity. "42
Democratists see the European-American alliance as based on common values, and not on 
the need for collective security against the USSR. For this reason, democratists expect the 
close European-American connection to continue, even without the Soviet threat. As former 
President Nixon noted, "real bonds of history and culture extend from Europe to 
America...the values of the Western tradition, the steadfast adherence to democratic 
principles and the belief in the fundamental dignity of the individual create philosophical ties
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that bind. "43 Likewise, unlike some neo-realists, democratists have no latent fear of the 
unified Germany, again the strongest state in Europe. Democratists see 'the German 
problem’ as having been resolved through West Germany's long association with Western 
institutions, states, and the democratic values they espouse. Nixon argued regarding 
Germany that, "The changes wrought by 40 years of democracy and close association with 
Western institutions has transformed its society. "44 If democratists are in favour of increased 
European political integration, they are even more enthusiastic about revitalising the Nato 
alliance. As has already been noted, the concept of Nato, a US-led multilateral organisation 
of like-minded democratic states, is the democratist's preferred modus operandi in the 
international theatre. Democratists favour the expansion of Nato's role to perform in out-of- 
area missions. However, they are not for any extension of Nato eastwards, as they fear this 
might antagonise or destabilise Russia. Democratists believe America ought to continue to 
dominate the alliance. Democratists see Nato as the 'democratic club', linchpin of the new 
post-Cold War security order.
The carnage in Bosnia provoked a strong reaction among democratists. With their 
emphasis on human rights, democratists were particularly appalled by the spectre of ethnic 
cleansing, enough to advocate American military intervention to end the horrendous human 
rights violations being propagated. After tough campaign rhetoric, the Clinton administration 
pursued a cautious, multilateralist policy towards Bosnia, saying that the US should not 
unilaterally intervene in the conflict. Democratists were outraged by this decision, feeling the 
US had failed to stop ethnic cleansing, despite there being no real checks on American 
power. Failure to end the slaughter in Bosnia remains the greatest sore point for democratists 
in the new world order, and their main foreign policy criticism of the Clinton administration.
On the issue of expanding free trade (Gatt and Nafta), democratists favouredboth 
initiatives but saw them as corollary to their primary foreign policy goals. They generally 
favour free trade but, as in the case with the MFN controversy with China, not at the expense 
of their humanitarian and democratic priorities.
Large-scale aid to Russia's fledgling democracy is probably the single most important 
policy issue for democratists. They see it as essential both practically and ideologically. 
Democratists are acutely interested in the democratic success of Russia as its very method of 
democratising is methodologically congruent with democratist theory. That is, the USSR 
under Gorbachev began political reforms before economic change was implemented, just as 
democratists would prescribe for developmental success. On the other hand, Deng
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Xiaphong’s China began economic reforms that have far outpaced new political initiatives, 
just as institutionalists would advise is the way forward. Thus Russia's approach to 
development and reform is a major reason it is an area of crucial import to democratists. For 
democratists the success of Yeltsin's Russia is more than a strategic imperative. It would 
confirm basic democratist assumptions and validate democratism as a theory itself.
During the Cold War, democratists, with their emphasis on ideology found true 
rapprochement with the USSR impossible, as the US and USSR avowed largely antithetical 
creeds. Only with the advent of true 'democrats' like Yeltsin confirming ideological victory 
for the West, symbolised by Russia adopting western political structures and democratic 
values, was a true alliance possible. As it has been so long in coming, democratists do not 
wish to fritter away the opportunity ideological congruence brings. As Nixon noted, "The 
August 1991 revolution has created an unprecedented opportunity to base peace not on the 
balance of military power, but on the foundation of common Western values. "45
Democratists feel that pursuing a peace made durable by the Russian adoption of common 
democratic values would be the crowning prize of victory in the Cold War. Allison pointed 
out, "Having spent some 5 trillion dollars to meet the military challenge of the Soviet Union 
around the globe, is the US (and its allies) to opt out now when the Soviet future is being 
formed?"46 Here he echoed the Clinton administration's argument that investment in Russia 
makes sound economic sense. If Yeltsin fails and is replaced by a leadership more 
antagonistic to the US, Clinton would be forced to raise defence spending again which would 
sabotage both of his major domestic initiatives; attempting to lower the federal budget deficit 
and to provide some form of universal health care. Democratists feel that Clinton rightly sees 
that his ambitious domestic agenda is contingent on the continued survival of a democratic 
Russia. They are supportive of his fairly major efforts to aid Yeltsin and his supporters. 
While outside aid is small compared with Russia's vast economic needs, both democratists 
and the administration would argue that it is significant. "With the nation [Russia] seemingly 
teetering between progress and retrenchment, democracy and disintegration, even marginal 
help could be decisive, advocates say. "47 If anything, democratists feel that Clinton should 
do even more than he has to bolster democratic institutions in Russia.
Democratists' fervent belief in aid to Russia found its most extreme expression in 
Graham Allison’s plan, 'The Grand Bargain,' to provide a Marshall Plan for the beleaguered 
Soviet regime of Mikhail Gorbachev. Democratism's desire to aid Russia continued unabated 
with the demise of Gorbachev and the rise of Yeltsin. If anything, for democratists Yeltsin
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was a more attractive figure, as he had fewer of the democratic ambiguities that were attached
to the General Secretary of the Communist Party. As Allison then argued,
"The US stake in the Soviet Union's future merits a Grand Bargain 
between the US and other industrial democracies and the Soviet Union 
and its republics, a US strategy of step-by-step and conditional 
engagement as robust and refined as America's victorious Cold War 
strategy. The joint program would consist of initiatives that the Soviet 
governments - the center and the republics - would take to move rapidly to 
democratic pluralism and the market economy, and actions the West 
would take to motivate, enable and facilitate these Soviet positions. "48
For Allison and other democratists, this vast outpouring of capital (estimated at around 60 
billion dollars) was justified, and was crucial to stabilising a new world order built on 
democratic values and supported by a still powerful Russia. Though the aid was to be 
primarily'economic, its major purpose was to solidify democracy in the former USSR by 
bolstering specifically democratic forces throughout the ex-Soviet states, and was to be part 
of a larger democratist strategy of providing public support for the democratic cause.
Whatever the merits of ‘The Grand Bargain', it failed to be implemented by either the
Bush or Clinton administrations. This rejection illustrates the political wilderness the minority 
democratists find themselves in within the American foreign policy community and politically 
throughout the nation. As Thomas Friedman noted, "Clinton has been reading the polls, 
which are universally negative about lavishing foreign aid on Russia."49 The American 
public's coolness toward foreign aid of any sort was cogently discussed by Senator Patrick 
Leahy, Democrat from Vermont, who was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Operations 
subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, which oversees Russian aid requests from 
Clinton. He flatly stated, "Any foreign aid bill this year [1993] is going to be an uphill battle 
because no one wants to vote for foreign aid in the same year when we are voting to cut US 
domestic programs. "50 Rather than seeing large-scale aid to Russia as a logical compliment 
to Clinton's budget cuts, Americans overwhelmingly resented a call to make economic 
sacrifices themselves while increasing foreign aid contributions to the rest of the world, 
including Russia. Friedman's amusing anecdote of Clinton’s 'spin' on the aid effort to 
Yeltsin at the Vancouver summit, aid that fell far short of 'The Grand Bargain', highlighted 
the political difficulties of the democratist position on aid to Russia. Friedman said, "Clinton 
walked a delicate verbal tightrope over the weekend, wanting his $1.6 billion aid package for 
Yeltsin to look like a lot in the eyes of his Russian supporters, a little in the eyes of his 
Russian opponents, a lot in the eyes of America's Western allies, but not too much in the 
eyes of the American voters."51 The chief danger was that the aid package would be judged 
to be too extensive. This would add fuel to the fire of Yeltsin's thenopponents, such as 
Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi, who charged that Yeltsin was a
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puppet of the West.52 It was to prevent men such as this from seizing the political initiative 
from Yeltsin that impelled Clinton to moderate aid to Russia, so as not to inflame already 
wounded Russian sensibilities, particularly in the armed forces.
With Marshall Plan style aid ruled out both due to American public opinion and the 
political situation in Russia itself, the Clinton administration opted for what democratists 
came to consider as the second-best alternative. It is neatly summed up by Krauthammer. 
Regarding Russia, he stated, "My view is: Try every thing. "5 3 For Krauthammer, 
'everything* meant aid for housing soldiers returning from Eastern Europe, promoting trade 
and private investment, and using Western hard currency to cushion the inevitable casualties 
of economic reform. In the end, Clinton offered Yeltsin $1.6 billion in Vancouver, money 
already largely proffered by the Bush administration but unspent, because of Russia's 
inability to meet the initial economic conditions tied to some of the aid.54
Yet while all three schools of thought would agree for varying reasons that Russia is 
important, they differ somewhat in degree as to how essential the democratic experiment 
actually is to the new world order. Democratists see its success as vital. Their general 
approval of Clinton’s policy increased in July 1993 with the Tokyo summit of the G-7, 
where $21.4 billion was offered to Yeltsin.55 This large multilateralist aid package illustrated 
the increasingly institutionalist tum Clinton’s policy to Russia had taken, largely due to the 
domestic unpopularity of foreign aid. As Gwen Ifil pointed out, "The proportions of 
assistance were adjusted to reflect more in loans from international lending institutions and 
less in direct cash from governments. "56 This meant that the World Bank and the IMF, 
bastions of institutionalist-favoured multilateral co-operation, would lead the effort for 
Russia, rather than the recession-plagued individual states of the G-7. But the Clinton 
administration was not following a strictly multilateralist policy. As James Stemgold 
reported, "some senior Japanese officials made it clear they felt fresh money would do little 
good and that they were acting largely at the urging of the United States. "57 Japan, sceptical 
of aid to Russia for both economic reasons and due to its dispute with Russia over the Kuril 
Islands, was persuaded not to oppose the G-7 aid package by a US-led initiative within the 
multilateralist organisation. In this case, aid to Russia has been increasingly overseen by 
states and institutions which are not dominated by the US. For instance, Germany has given 
more money to Russia than the US has, so its political views regarding Russia have been 
even more important than its overall world economic position would lead one to imagine. As 
the aid is being largely administered by international organisations, such as the World Bank 
and the IMF, which are led but not dominated by the US (the next two highest dues-payers,
73
Japan and Germany, could together outvote the US in both organisations), US leadership 
over the policy question of aiding Russia has been crucial but not paramount. However as 
US pressure on Japan over the G-7 package indicates, a multilateral arena can often be used 
for unilateralist democratist initiatives. If in its amount and administration, Clinton’s policy 
on aid to Russia is partly institutionalist, in placing it so highly in its hierarchy of priorities 
and in examples like the Vancouver summit itself, it is obvious that there is a dominant 
democratist element in the Clinton administration's overtures to the Russians.
In the fall of 1993 it seemed Clinton's policy was turning even more democratist towards 
Russia in overall orientation than before. As R. Jeffrey Smith stated, "The US plan is to help 
broker an end to the [ethnic] disputes before they destabilize the regime of President 
Yeltsin...or provide a pretext for aggressive military intervention by Russia outside its 
borders. "58 This plan of making peacekeepers available to moderate the ethnic disputes 
raging on the peripheries of the former USSR (e.g. Georgian civil war, Armenian- 
Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh) signalled the US intention to increase its 
involvement in the CIS region. This policy has not been implemented largely due to Russian 
resistance. After an initial ambivalence, Yeltsin rejected the idea. This was the result of 
obvious political circumstances. Yeltsin managed to break the back of resistance to his rule 
by Khasbulatov and Rutskoi, but only just. The sullen and resentful Red Army, still smarting 
from the vast diminution in Russian power with defeat in the Cold War, and still more 
nationalistic and expansionistic than the average Russian, threw its crucial support behind 
Yeltsin only grudgingly and late in the day after Rutskoi and Khasbulatov had incited an 
armed rebellion against the democrat.59 Yeltsin is now beholden to the army for his survival, 
an army that certainly wants to lessen a direct US presence in the region as much as possible. 
So while democratists have been generally pleased by the Clinton administration's policy 
regarding Russia, an increased US role in the region, which democratists support, has been 
stymied by both US public opinion and Russian internal politics.
Whereas the Clinton administration's policy towards Russia has been a mixed victory for 
democratist views, its policy towards China has been an unequivocal democratist defeat. 
Over China, democratists are in many ways the ideological heirs of Schurmann's 
nationalists, having a missionary, anti-communist zeal for the region. China is a key issue for 
all three basic American foreign policy schools of thought that have emerged in the new 
world order. It is particularly crucial for institutionalists and democratists. These two 
schools, both neo-Wilsonian, both critical of the traditionalist neo-realist view of the world, 
are often categorised as part of the same creed. That they are not identical can be seen in their
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vastly different policy prescriptions over China. In many ways, China is the litmus test case 
between democratists and institutionalists. Keith Bradsher framed the policy options nicely, 
’'President Clinton finds himself forced to decide if the US should risk its access to China's 
booming economy for the sake of political freedom there. "60 The specific policy debate was 
over whether Clinton should renew China's most-favoured-nation (MFN) trading status with 
the US. Without MFN, tariffs on Chinese goods to the US would increase between 8-40% 
and make most of their exports uncompetitive in the US market. Such a move would derail 
the increasingly booming trade between the two countries. (East Asia is currently far and 
away the economic hot spot of the world, particularly China's coastal regions where GDP 
has increased up to a staggering 10% per annum.) This trade is crucial to a US just beginning 
to show signs of coming out of recession. However, democratists reject this institutionalist 
argument.
Democratists favour a hard-line policy regarding China. They see the communist-led 
government of Deng Xiaphong as being the butchers of Tiananmen Square, murderers of the 
pro-democracy movement, and an administration with an extremely dubious human rights 
record, particularly regarding Tibet. Democratists argue that part of the reason that Chinese 
goods are so competitive is that a number of them are made with slave labour, which of 
course eliminates a worker's wage enabling costs to be drastically cut The slave-labour 
camps are composed of political prisoners and are an affront to democratists, who champion 
both human rights and political freedom. The US is running its second largest trade deficit 
with China (totalling $18 billion) and the communist government has been resistant to 
narrowing the gap.61 Crucially, unlike institutionalists, democratists do not see China's new 
capitalistic advances as leading eventually to a more pluralistic regime. Rather they see 
China's economic success as strengthening a despotic, malevolent regime. As the US finds 
itself the only superpower in the world, democratists feel strong pressure should be put on 
the Chinese as they need the West far more than the West needs them, especially 
economically. Winston Lord, a long-time critic of communist China and now US Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated the democratist position. The end 
of the Cold War, "decreases the pressure to muffle consensus about unsavory governments 
for the sake of security."62 While China is not as important to the democratists as Russia, 
they see no long-term practical reason to support an authoritarian government which holds 
inimical values to those of the US. Democratists feel the US should take a hard line with 
China which may hasten the end of the regime and bring about the victory of democratic 
values expressed most poignantly by the Chinese students and workers in Tiananmen Square 
in 1989.
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Clinton’s policy towards China has been a great disappointment for democratists. Despite 
his campaign rhetoric, where he accused Bush of coddling the tyrants of Beijing, in practice 
democratists feel that Clinton has acted little differently. In May 1993, he granted China a one 
year extension of MFN status, while linking any future extension to improvements in human 
rights and Chinese adherence to arms control guidelines. This was an undoubted 
institutionalist victory, again as during the campaign Clinton had criticised Bush using 
democratist rhetoric. His volte-face is another example of the administration's overall 
institutionalist tilt. Further, as The International Herald-Tribune reported, "a decision [was] 
made quietly by the Clinton administration last month [September, 1993] to end the freeze on 
high-level exchanges with China. "63 This is a furtherance of the soft-line institutionalist 
policy illustrated by Clinton’s renewal of MFN. In fact ending the freeze on high-level 
exchanges goes as far if not further than the Bush administration dared go in the aftermath of 
Tiananmen in placating the communists. As Daniel Williams and R. Jeffrey Smith noted, the 
scheduled November 19th (1993) summit of Asian powers in Seattle heralded the first 
meeting of President Clinton with President Jiang Zemin of China. Jiang is considered an 
heir to the ailing Deng Xiaphong and the meeting marked the highest-level contact between 
the two countries since 1989. Williams and Smith stated, "officials say [it] is meant to end 
formally the Tiananmen era of chilly relations. "64 The Clinton administration’s increasing 
adoption of the institutionalist stance regarding China has been a great disappointment to 
democratists, and a further sign of their minority status, even within the neo-Wilsonian 
Clinton administration. In the end the President followed his institutionalist inclinations, and 
in the Spring of 1994 renewed MFN while cutting ties between renewal and China's human 
rights record.
Up until now, general democratist precepts, assumptions and policy prescriptions have 
been discussed. While these are essential to understand, there are of course variations within 
each school of thought as well as the inevitable differences between individuals. While it is 
the basis of this thesis that it is extremely useful to analyse schools of thought as a coherent 
whole, a narrower level of analysis is also needed, looking at majority and minority currents 
within each school of thought as well as looking at individual variations. At this level, it is 
useful to place the opinion-makers on an ideological line seen as a continuum. To do this one 
must look again at the general cluster of democratist policy prescriptions regarding five 
important issue areas in the new world order and compare them to individual policy 
prescriptions. Not only does this process help label individuals, it tests the value of the 
general policy prescriptions as well. The result of this process can be seen in Chart 2-2.
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Within the democratist school of thought there are two currents, the dominant moderate 
democratists and the hyper-democratists. Both follow the general democratist line, their 
differences are based on degree but they are large. These differences of degree centre around 
the questions neatly posed by Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington. Fukuyama noted 
that a belief in democratism, "begs the question of where and when to promote democracy 
and at what cost?"65 Huntington asked, "to what extent should the US attempt to make the 
institutions and policies of other societies conform to American values?"66 It can be seen by 
these questions that degree is the key division between the hyper-democratist and moderate 
democratist camps. Hyper-democratists are more likely to promote democracy more often, in 
more places and at a higher cost to the US than are moderate democratists. They see the 
replication of America's unique society and its values as not only desirable but essential to 
world stability. Moderate democratists are more likely to be cautious in choosing the 
instances to support democracy and are more likely to attempt to replicate Western rather than 
specifically American values in other societies. As their differences are those of degree, there 
is no neat dividing line between the two currents, but their differences are no less real for this 
fact.
Ben Wattenberg is an example of an adherent of hyper-democratism. His primary 
democratist work is entitled The First Universal Nation. Wattenberg believes that the US is 
the first of a new type of state that should be the prototype for the world. He believes that as 
all ethnic groups that have come to the US have been imbued with democratic values, these 
values are somehow both uniquely American and universal, and that the US pattern of 
democratic acculturation should be spread to the rest of the world. This is the bold and 
controversial hyper-democratist message. Indeed, Wattenberg described himself as a, 
"manifest-destinarian."67 This term originally described US expansion across the North 
American continent to the Pacific, a process accepted by many of that time as inevitable, and 
benevolent. Such imperialistic expansion was considered necessary by its proponents, as 
American values were considered superior to the cultures of the American Indians the 
pioneers encountered along the way. 68 Now the hyper-democratists feel that American 
values are superior to those of the rest of the world. In fact they are deemed so superior by 
the hyper-democratists, they feel it is necessary for the US to propagate their spread as a 
cornerstone of its foreign policy if it is to be successful in the new world order.
This striking and strident position leads hyper-democratists to disagree with moderate 
democratists about US policy towards America's Western European democratic allies.
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Wattenberg sees America's former allies as now its chief rivals. As Wattenberg bluntly put it, 
"American-style democracy, a way of life as well as a political system, is different from 
European-style democracy. "69 Here the hyper-democratists ironically agree with the neo­
realists with whom they have little in common. Both see American culture as largely distinct 
rather than part of a larger, 'Western' democratic tradition. Wattenberg observed, "American 
democracy has distinctive features...individualism, pluralism, opportunity, dynamism, and 
the absence of a rigid class structure comes to mind."70 He sees these characteristics as being 
unlike the European variation of democracy, which Wattenberg views as more corporatist 
and collective in character. Hyper-democratists see these differences as being the root cause 
of competition as to what sort of democracy the newly-emerging democratic states will adopt. 
Wattenberg pointed out, "The global contest will not concern whether, but what kind of, 
democratic values will be influential. "71 Hyper-democratists see the universal triumph of 
democratic values as so apparent and inevitable that they have moved on to the next arena of 
conflict, a conflict of ideas as to which specific cultural strand of democracy will most 
influence the world. This view of the Western European states as being as much rivals as 
allies dominates Wattenberg's thinking regarding America's Western European policy, and is 
evidence of his hyper-democratist orientation.
Regarding China, Wattenberg followed the predictable democratist line. He urged a 
confrontational policy towards China. He militantly observed, "If the Chinese Communists 
can prevail because they slaughtered their adversaries, they will have reinstated murder as a 
form of politics. "72 The Chinese economic boom poses problems for all democratists, but 
particularly for hyper-democratists, even beyond the obvious ideological threats. If force is 
still a widely used tool and authoritarian regimes can provide successful counter-models to 
democracies for states to choose from, then the triumph of democracy on a world-wide scale 
is not as self-apparent as hyper-democratists believe. For their belief system to retain 
intellectual validity, a state as powerful as China must cease to remain outside the family of 
democratic nations within a generation or so. This is the underlying reason for the hyper- 
democratists hard line towards China.
Wattenberg also followed the general democratist line regarding trade issues such as 
Nafta and Gatt. Hyper-democratists concur with moderate democratists in rejecting neo­
realist's zero-sum position on trade. Wattenberg was particularly enthusiastic about Nafta. 
and regional trading blocs in general. He felt that, "Ever-bigger blocs lead toward global free 
trade, which is good for all, not zero-sum. "73 Over this issue both hyper-democratists and
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moderate democratists agreed with institutionalists, though not with the same fervour as their 
Wilsonian cousins.
Hyper-democratism is a minority viewpoint within a minority creed. It is difficult to 
identify a single member of the cabinet or the International Affairs or Foreign Relations 
committees that is a hyper-democratist. Wattenberg illustrates that hyper-democratists tend to 
be doyens of think tanks/writers/academics, but are hardly policy-makers themselves. Hyper­
democratism lies at the fringe of the debate over America's foreign policy direction in the new 
world order. Its power, though quite limited, lies in the boldness and clarity of its position. 
Hyper-democratism provides a coherent, alternative neo-Wilsonian theory for those 
dissatisfied with the more mainstream foreign policy views of the day.
Moderate democratists, while staking out many of the same general positions as the 
hyper-democratists, do so with less fervour and, they would say, less recklessness. They 
would agree with A.M. Rosenthal's moderate democratist viewpoint that, "Mostly freedom 
fighters plead not for US troops, but for food, medicine, a political arm around them. "74 
Moderate democratists feel democracy is usually best promoted by non-military means. This 
sets them apart from the hyper-democratists who are more vague about when they would use 
force to promote democratic change. Caution towards military force and a more restrained 
embracing of democratic opportunities than hyper-democratists would countenance are 
hallmarks of the moderate democratists’ majority point of view within democratism. The 
moderate democratists surveyed on Chart 2-2 are Joshua Muravchik, Francis Fukuyama, and 
Graham Allison.
Like Wattenberg, Joshua Muravchik is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a 
prominent neo-conservative think-tank. Unlike his more doctrinaire colleague, Muravchik is 
a moderate democratist who more fully adheres to general democratist positions regarding the 
five crucial issue areas discussed in this thesis. Yet like Wattenberg, Muravchik saw the 
Western victory in the Cold War as being largely the result of the ideological triumph of 
democracy over communism. He stated, "Ironically we Americans, who possess a profound 
and successful idea [democracy], have rarely understood the potency of ideas."75 Muravchik 
concurred with Doyle's premise that expanding the democratic club of states is crucial for the 
successful expansion of America's security. He reasoned, "the more democratic the world, 
the friendlier America's environment will be, "76 as he believes that democracies rarely go to 
war with one another. Yet Muravchik disagreed with the hyper-democratists in that he did not 
view democracy as a specifically American concoction, available for easy export to the rest of
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the world. He argued, "nobody seriously advocates that democracy US-style can be 
encouraged abroad, much less expanded. "77 This is a crucial difference moderate 
democratists have with hyper-democratists, whether America has a specific form of 
democracy that is in some way in competition with other variants, such as European-style 
democracy. Muravchik believes that this is not the case, and that while democracy is a 
universal creed, each society will adopt its precepts to fit its peculiar culture. Muravchik used 
Japan as an example, "What the Japanese have, not surprisingly, is Japanese-style 
democracy rather than US-style democracy. This is exactly what they ought to have. "78 The 
Japanese political system has factions, emphasises loyalty and hierarchy and reflects other 
attributes of their culture, rather than merely replicating the American variant of democracy. 
Muravchik sided with the moderate democratists over the hyper-democratists regarding this 
crucial dividing question of whether American-style democracy can be successfully exported 
throughout the world.
Regarding Bosnia, Muravchik followed the standard democratist desire to punish the 
Serbs for their adventurism and human rights abuses. He was particularly disappointed with 
President Clinton for changing his hard-line democratist campaign rhetoric about Bosnia 
during the campaign into a less confrontational institutionalist stance once he was elected. 
Muravchik recounted that he joined with a group of neo-conservatives in supporting 
Clinton’s candidacy in a New York Times statement. "It praised him [Clinton], (too), for 
having 'taken the lead in urging international action - indeed, if necessary, the use of US air 
and naval forces - ...to prevent Serbia's nationalist communist regime from doing violence to 
neighboring peoples'."79 Muravchik came to the conclusion that President Clinton is 
generally an institutionalist and not a democratist, which explains his disaffection as 
Clinton's campaign rhetoric contained elements of both schools of thought.
Further, Muravchik believed President Clinton's democratist rhetoric was largely a ploy 
to shore-up his foreign policy credentials with the right-wing of the Democratic party, and as 
such he felt personally betrayed. For example, Muravchik is insensed that Secretary of State 
Christopher, "Shamefully, (he) testified in mid-May [1993] before the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee that 'there is considerable fault on all three sides' in Bosnia and 'atrocities by all 
three,' assertions that were at once contradicted - in a secret memo eventually leaked to the 
New York Times - by the State Department office charged with monitoring human rights 
abuses in Bosnia. "80 Muravchik saw this as especially heinous as the obscuring of ethnic 
cleansing by the Serbs deliberately invalidated a major impetus for democratist policy 
outputs, human rights considerations. That the Clinton administration could state that all three
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sides were to blame in the Bosnian conflict, implicitly asserted that as all three ethnic groups 
had suffered at the hands of the others in the war, there were no overall communal victims in 
Bosnia. This moral equivalency argument struck at the heart of Muravchik's democratist 
viewpoint that as the Serbs committed the vast proportion of human rights abuses in the 
conflict they were morally culpable and ought to be stopped, even if American military might 
was needed to do so.
Likewise Muravchik favours the hard democratist line regarding China. He believes that 
the Bush administration was responsible for crucial policy errors which compounded the 
tragedy of Tiananmen Square. He observed, "the policy of the Bush administration toward 
China has been so incomprehensible. The Chinese people demonstrated in the spring of 1989 
that a vast majority want to be free. They were thwarted by a clique of octogenarian autocrats 
who still hold a preponderance of the levers of coercion. What possible cause can we have 
for succoring this clique rather than using our leverage to help crack the desiccating facade of 
their rule?"81 Muravchik has consistently supported this activist attempt to confront China's 
autocratic rulers. He specifically noted that the MFN debate had a role to play in this process. 
Muravchik believed America, "must increase diplomatic and economic pressures on the 
Chinese government. "82 The Clinton administration’s about-face on MFN was another 
example Muravchik could point to as a sign of the President's betrayal of the democratist 
cause.
Muravchik has much more sympathy for the administration's Russia policy. This should 
come as no surprise for of the five issue areas analysed here, it is the sole area where the 
President has followed a strong democratist line. Even in his bitter exposition, "Lament of a 
Clinton Supporter," Muravchik grudgingly allowed, "I was heartened by the support he [the 
President] gave to President Yeltsin at the Vancouver summit."83 Like the President, 
Muravchik sees the Russian democratic experiment as an exciting development, and not 
primarily as a danger for the US. He stated, "'For our nation, this is the opportunity of a 
lifetime. Our failure to exert every possible effort to secure this [beneficial] outcome would 
be unforgiveable."84 This rationale, of seeing Yeltsin's fragile regime as an opportunity to be 
grasped rather than a danger to global stability, is the basis for both the general democratist 
advocacy of large-scale aid for Russia and for Muravchik's specific endorsement of the 
programme.
Francis Fukuyama, author of the controversial book, The End of History, espouses 
general moderate democratist views, though he also adheres to minority neo-realist positions.
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His stance on China follows the general democratist line, as well as proving a good critique 
of that arch neo-realist, Henry Kissinger. He observed, "The fact that Japan has been a stable 
democracy and an all-important capitalist trading partner since 1945, and that the communist 
regime in Beijing had just gotten through crushing the Chinese student's model of the statue 
of liberty under tank treads, counts for less [to Kissinger] than their underlying power 
positions in the global system. This is as stark and consistent an application of realist 
principles as one could imagine. "85 Here Fukuyama is criticising Kissinger for stating that 
close ties with the Chinese communists are essential to contain Japanese power in the Pacific 
region. Fukuyama is predictably democratist in noting it is the internal nature of regimes, the 
fact that Japan has been a valued American ally for 45 years and that China just crushed a 
student movement espousing democracy, that should be the pivotal indicator of policy, not a 
balance of power that takes as largely unimportant the very internal nature of a state. 
Fukuyama, on standard democratist grounds, rejected Kissinger's desire for rapprochement 
with the Chinese communists.
Fukuyama advocates the democratist position on aid to Russia. Disagreeing with 
Kissinger and Brzezinskis' views of the chances for the success of Russian reform, 
Fukuyama stated, "the policy question the US faces is whether we [his emphasis] want to be 
the ones to turn out the lights, especially when the new constitution adopted last December i 
[1993] at least clears the way for a hyper-presidential regime that has some chance of 
promoting economic reform and a moderate foreign policy."86 Fukuyama agrees with the • 
democratist notion that a failure to significantly support the Russian democratic experiment ; 
will lead to its failure, thus sharing the democratist conviction that American aid to Russia • 
could be pivotal to the overall success of the Yeltsin regime.
f
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Fukuyama also advocated a democratist position on Nafta/Gatt. He stated, "With the j 
passage of Nafta and the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the Gatt, the j 
foundations have been laid for another generation of economic growth in Latin America."87 
Unlike the neo-realists Fukuyama here looked beyond the immediate gains the Nafta and Gatt
I
agreements had for the US, seeing that a prosperous Latin America served American • 
interests. However he did not greet the agreements with the enthusiasm of an institutionalist, 
instead seeing them as an important but corollary aspect of the international scene. This lack 
of enthusiasm for trade issues is reflected in Fukuyama's scholarship, where Nafta and Gatt 
do not loom large.
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Yet Fukuyama also has a decided minority neo-realist orientation. Regarding the Bosnian 
crisis he did not call for the degree of intervention in the conflict most democratists favoured. 
He argued regarding Europe, "the existing stock of political capital should be husbanded for 
the serious potential threats of the future, and not wasted in fruitless threats and posturing in 
sideshows like the Balkans."88 Yet while Fukuyama did not embrace an interventionist 
policy in Bosnia, neither did he advocate the passive institutionalist course of the Clinton 
administration. He believed, "The international community's single most important failure 
was actually an error of commission rather than omission - that is, the placing of a UN arms 
embargo on all the combatants in the civil war, and the subsequent failure to lift it so as to 
give the Bosnian Muslims a chance to defend themselves. "89 Thus Fukuyama clearly 
adopted a rieo-realist stance regarding the Bosnian crisis.
Francis Fukuyama's general tendency to fail to stake out clear consistent opinions 
regarding the analysis of foreign policy is illustrated by looking at his views of the European 
security structure in the post-Cold War world. For example in February 1994 Fukuyama felt 
Nato ought not to be extended saying, "It is true that die world community does not have an 
effective instrument to promote order and security in regions like Eastern Europe today; but if 
the chance of escalation [of instability] is low, this lack will not be critical. "90 By June 1994 
he had changed his tune, urging die expansion of Nato to match the progress of democracy in 
Eastern Europe.91 Despite such chameleon-like analysis, it is possible to discern Fukuyama 
as having a general neo-realist position, if an unconventional one, regarding American policy 
prescriptions for Western Europe. He clearly has little truck for the institutionalist stance 
regarding Europe, observing that the Partnership for Peace plan, "serves to dilute the 
ideological meaning of die [Atiantic] community by opening it up to all comers. "92 Nor does 
he feel that Europe will eventually become a federal state of some sort, as many 
institutionalists predict. Fukuyama wonders whether the more ambitious goals of 
Euro-federalism will come to pass, rather than Europe remaining a Europe of states.93 It is 
also apparent that Fukuyama is not an advocate of the democratist position regarding Western 
Europe. He stated, "the Atlantic community has been based on tiiree tilings: ideological 
affinity, cultural identity, and strategic self-interest. In the post-Cold War era, only the last of 
these factors, strategic self-interest, will endure as a glue to hold the community together 
while ideological and cultural bonds decay. "94 Here Fukuyama refutes the democratist 
contention that common ideological bonds between Europe and the US still exist after the 
Cold War, and tiiat these democratic links will continue to undergird the alliance.
83
While Fukuyama ultimately espouses neo-realist views regarding Europe, in that he is in 
favour of Alliance expansion into Central Europe, he does not advocate the standard 
neo-realist position. Unlike most neo-realists, he does not believe the Alliance is in danger of 
splintering in the near future. He observed, "given the difficulty of eliminating public 
institutions representing entrenched interests, I believe that Nato as a political structure will 
be far more durable than many of its supporters fear. "95 Fukuyama also balks at the standard 
neo-realist contention that Nato's functions should be extended, on this point agreeing with 
the democratists, "Those who want to extend Nato's functions to include ethnic peacekeeping 
and the like seriously risk involving it in contingencies for which it is not particularly well 
suited, thereby unintentionally subverting its ability to execute tasks it is better able to 
perform. "96 While Fukuyama ultimately favours the central plank of the neo-realist policy 
preference for Europe, extension of Nato into Central Europe, he is not concerned with 
finding Nato a new mission as are most of those who advocate a neo-realist stance toward 
Europe.
Graham Allison, former head of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, not 
only adheres to the democratist position on Russia, he largely formulated the stance. Allison 
was an early supporter of Gorbachev. In the summer 1991 edition of Foreign Affairs he 
stated, "glasnost and democraticskayia touched the broad public because the reforms reflected 
American values. The prospect, however distant, of nearly 300 million more human beings 
enjoying freedom's benefits and the market's prosperity must gladden the spirit of America 
and must be fundamentally in this nation's enduring interests. "97 This strongly-held view led 
Allison to be the chief author of "The Grand Bargain," the sweeping democratist proposal to 
provide Gorbachev with Marshall Plan-style aid, conditional upon the continued growth in 
Soviet political pluralism and a coherent economic program moving towards a market 
economy. Allison estimated that such a program would cost $15-20 billion a year for three 
years. Allison, like almost all democratists saw the increased democratisation of the USSR as 
a golden opportunity for the US. Regarding Gorbachev's chance of success, Allison 
observed, "the odds of failure indeed appear higher than those of success. But with so much 
at stake, Western delay in trying to affect the odds on which way the Soviet future emerges is 
myopic."98 Allison's strong stand for vast aid for first the Soviet Union and then Russia 
became a hallmark of the general democratist position.
Allison is a strong supporter of the post-1945 liberal trading regime venerated by 
institutionalists. He said, regarding Gatt, the IMF, and the World Bank that they, "permitted 
the most rapid expansion of the world economy in history. "99 Allison favours a strong
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continuation of the international free trade system that he credits for the extraordinary post- 
World War II global economic boom. While all democratists value the free market and free 
trade, for them, as well as for Allison, the free market is largely a secondary consideration 
compared with democratic development. Allison observed, "While the successful economic 
performance of a society does not guarantee democracy, failing economic performance 
almost certainly guarantees the failure of democracy." 100 Here Allison affirmed the 
democratist view that successful economic performance does not necessarily lead a society to 
become democratic, a view in contradiction with that of the institutionalists. While moderate 
democratists accept that there is a link between the operation of a successful free market 
economy and the success of democratic politics, like Allison they see die causation as being 
one way, widi democratic development being the first and essential prerequisite for a state's 
success. Thus while Allison credits and values the international free trade system, trading 
concerns are for him of secondary importance. This democratist view is illustrated in his 
academic writings, which focus on Russia and only rarely venture into the realm of 
international trade.
Allison's views on European integration and Nato jibe with basic democratist views as 
well. Regarding the Community, Allison stated, "The EC has played a critical role in 
facilitating the transition to democracy in Spain, Portugal and Greece. It is also doing so in 
Turkey and the newly independent states of Central Europe. "101 Unlike the hyper- 
democratists, Allison does not see European Community democratising activities as a threat, 
but rather as a positive development. Like other moderate democratists, he believes that the 
EU and its member states share the same Western, democratic values and should be 
encouraged and supported to strengthen democratic bonds in the newly democratised states 
of Central Europe. This view distances Allison definitively from hyper-democratism. Allison 
is also a strong proponent of Nato, as are most moderate democratists. Regarding the need to 
reform Western European security structures in the wake of the Cold War, Allison observed, 
"the process should begin with the recognition that these alliances [Nato] have provided a 
longer peace, more sustained economic growth and greater freedom than the parties enjoyed 
under any earlier arrangement. Alliances such as Nato always had positive goals beyond 
defending against the Soviet threat. These goals should now be explained and extended. "102 
Like a majority of democratists, Allison sees the expansion of Nato, a US-led community of 
democratic states, to embrace out-of-area missions as the policy crucial to the success in 
reconfiguring Western European defence arrangements. As Allison noted and unlike neo­
realists, democratists have always seen Nato as more of a political organisation of like­
minded states rather than a military alliance held together by the fear of Soviet expansionism.
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Allison sees Nato as based on the political similarities of its members, it is entirely consistent 
that with the waning of the Cold War, he does not see the alliance as outdated. Again 
Allison's policy prescriptions coincide with general moderate democratist views on Nato. In 
fact, in a 1992 article, "Can the US Promote Democracy?" Allison posited the most detailed 
moderate democratist plan as to how to implement their policy preferences. Allison lists 57 
initiatives by which the US can promote democracy peacefully. These include increased 
funding for Radio Free Europe, and the National Endowment for Democracy. Allison also 
feels the United States should donate photocopiers, personal computers and faxes to the 
newly-emerging democracies of Central Europe. Likewise the US can plan exchanges with 
unions, businesses, churches, political parties, the independent media, and monitor Central 
European elections. All these initiatives stem from the neo-Wilsonian and particularly 
moderate democratist belief that increased contact with the West, and especially with the 
Western democratic culture, is essential if the Western values of democracy and pluralism 
are to find fertile soil in Central Europe. Allison has written nothing less than a handbook of 
practical initiatives for moderate democratists to embrace in their cautious opportunistic effort 
to democratise the world.
There are numerous criticisms of the general democratist viewpoint. Firstly, this is 
definitely a minority school of thought and has few significant political supporters. Ole Holsti 
and James Rosenau reported in the summer 1993 edition of Millennium on the results of the 
foreign policy leadership project. This is a survey of 2312 opinion-leaders that has taken 
place every four years since the presidential election of 1976, attempting to gauge the general 
mood on foreign policy of major American opinion-leaders in the press, the clergy, business, 
and academia as well as government. They found, "fewer than 1 in 5 [of those surveyed] 
favored intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries in support of a more democratic j 
world order. "103 As the precept of some form of 'intervention' (even if by largely economic 
and ideological means) in the affairs of other states to promote democracy is central to the } 
democratist creed, it is obvious democratist views have not found anything like majority > 
favour. Without adoption by opinion-leading elites, and especially the political elite who have 
the power to tum theory into practice, democratism may be doomed to be seen as interesting, 
but esoteric. As over the question of a vast increase in foreign aid to help Russia, 
democratists do not seem to acknowledge the domestic political limits on American foreign » 
policy. This is strange as democratists see the domestic level of analysis regarding decision­
making as crucial. Perhaps democratists' relative political irrelevance cuts both ways. Not i 
only has the school of thought yet to strike a popular chord among decision-makers, its • 
'outsider' status blinds its adherents from the political realities and limits imposed upon
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theory by the day to day governing of a state; its policies. Whatever the reason, democratist 
prescriptions, even if sensible and desirable, often seem to fly in the face of what is 
politically possible.
There is a moral question about democratism as well. Is it morally correct to try to mould 
other societies and cultures? Samuel Huntington is one of democratism's most prescient 
critics, both ethically and practically. As he pointed out in the Spring 1982 edition of Political 
Science Quarterly, "to intrude from outside is either imperialism or colonialism, each of 
which violates American values. "104 Huntington highlights a crucial paradox of 
democratism. It is a creed that can by its methods easily nullify the principles for which it 
stands. In promoting democracy, in exporting the American revolution to the rest of the 
world, democratists can only too easily use authoritarian tactics, coercion and other anti­
democratic means of 'persuading' other states to become more democratic. If this were to 
happen, democratists would seem to have missed the forest for the trees, to have forgotten 
that successful democracy is largely an organic political development that cannot be easily or 
crudely transplanted. If democracy is imposed by some sort of coercion, critics of 
democratism feel the United States would tragically lose some of what innately makes it 
democratic in the attempt to spread its creed. This apparent contradiction may be a stumbling 
block to democratism's political viability as a majority school of thought. The missionary zeal 
and desire to extend democracy world-wide are traditionally American, Wilsonian, left-wing 
attributes. Yet the semi-colonial imposition of American values that could easily result as 
practical policy from following a largely democratist foreign policy greatly dampens support 
on the American left for the democratist position. In uniquely and creatively linking the 
messianic, globalist, democratic zeal of the American left with the willingness to intervene in 
other states' domestic affairs, a traditional attribute of the American right, democratism has 
become an interesting and coherent intellectual hybrid. But this very fusion of left and right 
may disenchant many potential democratist decision-makers, who see democratism as futilely 
attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable.
Beyond its political limitations and potential intellectual contradictions, there are questions 
about whether democratism fulfills the ultimate political test of any school of thought; can it 
be implemented as a successful policy? In this case, is a democratist foreign policy practically 
possible? Many would say no. As Huntington stated in his excellent and influential article, 
"The Clash of Civilizations?" published in the summer of 1993, "Most importantly, the 
efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal 
values...engender countering responses from other civilizations." 105 The process of
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democratism does not involve merely an aggressive, confident United States inflicting its 
values on an inert, tabula rasa. A more subtle, complicated process is at work. Huntington 
feels democratism can easily lead to the "reaffirmation of indigenous values as can be seen in 
the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures. 
The very notion that there could be a universal civilization is a Western idea, directly at odds 
with the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one 
people from another. ”106
Like any self-contained cell, critics of democratism feel non-Western civilisations will 
forcibly reject Western notions such as the universal applicability of democracy. Tommy 
Thong-Bee Koh continues with the organic analogy, "Western democracy is a fragile flower 
that can not be easily transplanted to the soil of some Asian countries, such as China, that 
have no democratic tradition. "107 It is likely that such countries will see the American zeal 
for universal democracy as another thinly disguised attempt at imperial domination. Michael 
Richardson pointed this out in a neo-realist critique of democratism. Democratists, "apply 
what are seen by many Asian officials as alien Western principles that ride roughshod over 
national sovereignty and threaten the integration of the state. "108 Richardson is correct in that 
democratism poses an unapologetic assault on the state whose sanctity is crucial to the 
traditionally dominant neo-realist school of thought If one state (the US) can intervene in 
another to promote democracy, the sanctity and notion of sovereignty upon which the state 
system has rested since 1648, neo-realists contend, would be obliterated, heralding an era of 
major chaos, before another competing notion led to stability. Neo-realists see democratism 
as nothing less than a revolutionary challenge to the primacy of the state, the triumph of 
ideology over stability, and therefore greatly dangerous.
Critics of democratism would argue that even if all these political, ideological, and 
methodological problems could be dealt with, a strict following of democratism would lead to 
the problems of success. As Huntington observed, "In the Arab world, in short, Western 
democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. "109 The Algerian case is an extreme 
example of this problem. There is little doubt that the 1992 Algerian elections, if completed, 
would have led to the ascendancy of the FIS, the main Islamic fundamentalist party in 
Algeria. Yet such an election, which until halted was generally free and fair, would have 
quite possibly been the last in Algeria for the foreseeable future. The FIS is an avowed anti­
Western, anti-democratic party that was attempting to use democratic means to achieve 
coercive power. Even if the FIS had for some reason agreed to allow elections once in 
power, it is questionable as to whether it is in the interests of the US to promote elections that
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will almost certainly bring anti-Western and particularly anti-American forces to power in the 
Maghreb, an area important to the US’s geopolitical interests.! 10 This would certainly be the 
neo-realist argument against free elections in Algeria. Elections have not proven to be a 
panacea in other parts of the world either. As Michael H. Posner stated, "the Reagan 
administration stressed the holding of elections as a defining difference between US and 
Soviet alliances. Unfortunately the crises in Liberia, Guatemala, Serbia and Haiti have 
proved elections don't guarantee respect for human rights,"111 a claim democratists would 
like to make. (Though most would say that the link is durable only in established 
democracies which certainly none of these cases are.) Brutality did not end in Haiti with the 
election of Aristide, or in Angola with the election of dos Santos, nor with the triumph of the 
ethnic cleanser, Milosevic. In fact in the short run, elections probably led to an intensification 
of the brutality in all three cases. Elections do not magically end human rights violations, 
rather in established democracies their absence reflects the political cultural traits of toleration, 
of a 'loyal opposition' that are inimical to sustained brutality. Critics of democratism argue 
democratists place too much faith in the ability of free elections to solve deep-seated social 
problems. However many democratists would reply that their critics are not fully allowing 
for any subtlety in their argument, any taking into account of other factors in determining 
policy.
Despite these general theoretical criticisms and its lack of anything like majority support, 
democratism remains a viable major school of thought of American foreign policy in the new 
world order. It offers a coherent view of the new era, and a bullish triumphalist defence of 
the democratic values its adherents believe led to Western victory in the Cold War. It 
audaciously, amid all the fashionable talk of American decline and limits, argues for a robust 
extension of America, hoping to recreate the world in America's image to build a league of 
democracies that will make Kant's visionary title of 1795, Perpetual Peace, a reality. This 
mix of the missionary spirit as well as the calling for the export of values that almost all of 
America embraces, are familiar and potent themes for Americans in foreign policy. 
Democratism may be the relentlessly optimistic message that renews a country renowned for 
its relentless optimism.
I
i
89
Chart 2 - 2 Democratist Policy Regarding Five Key Issues
Majority
Democratist View 
Reached From the 
Givens
Interventionist Large-Scale Aid Hard-line Anti- 
MFN
Generally in 
Favour
Nato-firsters. No 
Nato Expansion
Issues Bosnia Russia China Nafta/Gatt Nato/Western 
European Policy
Fukuyama - 
Think Tank
Follows neo-realist 
line 
(-)
Pro
(+)
Pro
(+)
Pro
(+)
Follows neo-realist 
line 
(-)
Allison -
Democrat/
Academic
Pro
(+)
Pro
(+)
Pro
(+)
Muravchik -
Democrat/
Think-Tank
Pro
(+)
Pro
(+)
Pro
(+)
(+) consistent with (he overall schools of thought categorisation (-) inconsistent with the overall schools of thought categorisation
ENDNOTES
1) Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control; Global Turmoil On The Eve Of The 21st 
Century, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), p.x.
2) Ben J. Wattenberg. The First Universal Nation, (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 
p.196.
3) Graham T. Allison and Robert Blackwill, "America's Stake in the Soviet Future," 
Foreign Affairs, vol.70 no.3, (Summer 1991), p.93.
4) For a fuller discussion of the common values all democracies share see: Carl L. 
Becker, Modem Democracy. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941); The Idea of 
Democracy. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer, eds, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); R.S. Downie, Government Action and Morality: 
Some Principles and Concepts of Liberal Democracy, (London: Macmillan, 1964); 
Francis Fukuyama, "Liberal Democracies as a Global Phenomenon," Political 
Science and Politics, vol.24 no.4, (December 1991); David Held, Models of 
Democracy, (Cambridge: Polity, 1987); Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in 
Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace. Richard K. 
Betts, ed., (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994); Jack Lively, 
Democracy. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975); C.B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: 
Essays in Retrieval, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973); Lester B. Pearson, Democracy 
in World Politics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955); J. Roland Pennock, 
Democratic Political Theory, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Giovanni 
Sartori, TheTheorv of Democracy Revisited. (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House 
Publishers, 1987); Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America. J.P. Mayer and 
Max Lerner, eds, (London: Collins, 1968).
5) Francis Fukuyama, "The begining of foreign policy: America confronts the post-Cold 
War world." The New Republic. 17 August 1992.
6) Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1,"
Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol.12 no.3, (Summer 1983), p.213.
7) Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment." Foreign Affairs, vol.70 no.4.
(Fall 1991), p.5.
8) Doyle, op.cit.. p.217.
9) Wattenberg, op.cit., p.224.
10) Tommy Thong-Bee Koh, "This Way or That, Get on with Good Government," The 
International Herald-Tribune (IHT). 6 May 1993.
11) The Economist, "Russians Need Democracy," IHT. 26 April 1993.
12) Fukuyama, "Liberal Democracies as a Global Phenomenon," op.cit.. p.661.
13) Bruce Ackerman, "Yeltsin: Like Washinaton. Unlike Havel or Walesa." IHT.
5 April 1993.
14) Allison and Robert T. Beschel, Jr., "Can the US Promote Democracy?" Political 
Science Quarterly, vol.107 no.l, (1992), p.91.
91
15) Samuel Huntington, "American Ideals versus American Interests," Political Science 
Quarterly, vol. 97 no.l, (Spring 1982), p.20.
16) Jeane Kirkpatrick, "After Communism, What?" Problems of Communism, vol.41, 
(January-April 1992), p.9.
17) Stanley Hoffmann, "The American Style: Our Past and our principles," Foreign 
Affairs, vol.46 no.2, (January 1968), p.363.
18) For a fuller discussion of Thomas Paine see: Alfred Owen Aldridge, Man of Reason: 
The Life of Thomas Paine, (London: Cresset Press, 1960); Moncure Daniel Conway, 
The Life of Thomas Paine: With a History of his Literary, Political and Religious
Career in America, France, and England, 2 vols., (London: Puttnam, 1892); Citizen 
of the World: Essays on Thomas Paine, Ian Dyck, ed., (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1988); Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1976); Thomas Paine. The Thomas Paine Reader. Michael 
Foot and Isaac Kramnick, eds, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987); Audrey 
Williamson, Thomas Paine: His life, work, and times. (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1973).
19) Hoffmann, "A New World and Its Troubles," Foreign Affairs, vol.69 no.4.
(Fall 1990) pp. 121-2.
20) Doyle, op.cit., p.231.
21) Richard Nixon, Seize the Moment, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p.274.
22) Fukuyama, op.cit.. p.662.
23) Allison, "Testing Gorbachev," Foreign Affairs, vol.67 no.l, (Fall 1988), pp.31-2.
24) Wattenberg, op.cit.. p.l88.
25) Wattenberg, ibid., p.194.
26) Nixon, op.cit., p.299.
27) Fukuyama, op.cit.. p.659.
28) Fukuyama, ibid., p.664.
29) Wattenberg, op.cit.. p.197.
30) Allison, "Introduction and Overview," Rethinking America's Security, (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Co., 1992), pp. 15-16.
31) Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Council on Foreign Relations, 
vol.70 no.l, (1991), p.24.
32) Nixon, op.cit., p.26.
33) Fukuyama, "The begining of foreign policy," op.cit.
92
34) Krauthammer, op.cit., p.25.
35) Krauthammer, "Does Clinton See Where He's Headed?" IHT, 6 August 1993.
36) Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," op.cit.. p.29.
37) Brzezinski, "The US and International Security," Survival, vol.21 no.4,
(July/August 1979), pp. 180-1.
38) Richard Pierre Claude, review of Gregory Fossedal’s The Democratic Imperative. 
American Political Science Review, vol.84 no.3, (September 1990), p.1055.
39) Krauthammer, "The Main Event Is Moscow, and the Time is Now," IHT.
13-14 March 1993.
40) Stephan F. Cohen, "American policy and Russia’s future," The Nation, 12 April 
1993.
41) William Pfaff, "Redefining World Power," Foreign Affairs, vol.70 no.l, (1990/1), 
p.45.
42) Brzezinski, "America and Europe." Foreign Affairs, vol.49 no.l, (October 1970). 
p.15.
43) Nixon, op.cit.. p.113.
44) Nixon, ibid., p.119.
45) Nixon, ibid., pp. 122-3.
46) Allison and Blackwill, op.cit., p.93.
47) Fred Hiatt, "Stalled Rescue of Russia Needs New Approach, Experts Say," IHT.
2 March 1993.
48) Allison, "The Grand Bargain," Rethinking America's Security, p.376.
49) Thomas L. Friedman, "Summit Talks: Not Like the Old Days," IHT, 5 April 1993.
50) Friedman, idem.
51) Friedman, idem.
52) Their expansionists aspirations are best illustrated in an anecdote related by 
Representative Tom Lantos, a California Democrat, who is an influential member of 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee. When Lantos visited Moscow in April 1993 
he asked Rutskoi why his wall still displayed a large map of the Soviet Union. 
Rutskoi replied that the country was in a transitional state and that the map may 
eventually be accurate. See R. Jeffrey Smith, "US seeks to Mediate Ex-Soviet 
Conflicts," IHT, 6 August 1993.
53) Krauthammer, op.cit.
93
54) This similarity in policy with the Bush administration is noted by Don Oberdorfer and 
Ann Devroy, "The program is similar in size and many other aspects to that 
previously planned by the Bush administration." See Don Oberdorfer and Ann 
Devroy, "Clinton Seeks To Sell Aid To Russia as Investment," IHT, 2 April 1993.
55) Gwen Ifill, "Seven Nations Hasten Aid to Russia, Will Push for Growth and Trade," 
The New York Times, 11 July 1993.
56) Ifil, idem.
57) James Stemgold, "Its Official, G-7 to Meet in Japan on Aid to Russia," IHT,
27-8 March 1993.
58) R. Jeffrey Smith, op.cit.
59) Malcolm Mackintosh, "The role of the military in Russian foreign policy," Lecture, St 
Andrews University, Scotland, 1 December 1993.
60) Keith Bradsher, "China: Clinton's Balancing Act," IHT. 15-16 May 1993.
61) See Robert Elegant, "China: The Party's 'Mandate of Heaven' Is Fraying," IHT.
28 April 1993.
62) Michael Richardson, "Value Clash Looms for US and Asia," IHT, 3 May 1993.
63) The International Herald-Tribune, "Clinton to Expand Contacts With China,"
21 October 1993.
64) Daniel Williams and Smith, "New Clinton Policy: Warm Up to China," IHT,
2 November 1993.
65) Fukuyama, op.cit.,
66) Huntington, op.cit.. p. 14.
67) Wattenberg, op.cit., p.3.
68) For a fuller discussion of the principle of Manifest Destiny see: Reginald Horsman, 
Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism.
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981).
69) Wattenberg, op.cit., p.19.
70) Wattenberg, ibid., p.203.
71) Wattenberg, ibid., p.204.
72) Wattenberg, ibid., p.284.
73) Wattenberg, ibid., p.290.
74) A.M. Rosenthal, "Yes, Democracy in other lands is America's Cause," IHT.
23-4 January 1993.
94
75) Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy; Fulfilling America's Destiny, 
(Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1992), p.2.
76) Muravchik. ibid., p.8.
77) Muravchik, ibid., p.67.
78) Muravchik. ibid., p.68.
79) Muravchik, "Lament of a Clinton Supporter," Commentary, (August 1993), p. 15.
80) Muravchik. ibid., p.20.
81) Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, op.cit.. p.6.
82) Muravchik, ibid,, p.226.
83) Muravchik, "Lament of a Clinton Supporter," op.cit,, p.22.
84) Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, op.cit.. p.227.
85) Fukuyama, op.cit.
86) Fukuyama, "Against the New Pessimism," Commentary, (February 1994), p.28.
87) Fukuyama, ibid., p.26.
88) Fukuyama, "For the Atlantic Allies Today, a Fraying of the Sense of Moral 
Community," IHT. 6 June 1994.
89) Fukuyama, "Against the New Pessimism," op.cit., p.27.
90) Fukuyama, idem.
91) Fukuyama, "For the Atlantic Allies Today," op.cit.
92) Fukuyama, idem.
93) Fukuyama, "An American in Paris," New Statesman and Society, p. 15.
94) Fukuyama, "For the Atlantic Allies Today," op.cit
95) Fukuyama, idem.
96) Fukuyama, "Against the New Pessimism," op.cit., p.27.
97) Allison and Blackwill, "America's Stake in the Soviet Future," op.cit,, p.92.
98) Allison and Blackwill, ibid., p.94.
99) Allison, "National Security Portfolio Review," Rethinking America’s Security, p.51
100) Allison and Beschel, "Can the US Promote Democracy?" opxit, p.92.
95
101) Allison and Beschel, ibid., p.93.
102) Allison and Beschel, ibid., p.92.
103) Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "The structure of foreign policy beliefs among 
American opinion leaders - after the Cold War," Millennium, vol.22 no.2,
(Summer 1993), pp.243-4.
104) Huntington, op.cit., p.20.
105) Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, vol.72 no.3,
(Summer 1993), p.28.
106) Huntington, ibid., p.32.
107) Thong-Bee Koh, op.cit.
108) Richardson, op.cit.
109) Huntington, op.cit., p.32.
110) For a fuller discussion of the Algerian crisis see: Michael Collins Dunn, "Algeria's 
Agony: The Drama So Far, The Prospects for Peace," Middle East Policy, vol.3 
no.3, (1994); Khalid Duran, "The Second Battle of Algiers," Orbis, vol.33 no.3, 
(Summer 1989); Jonathan Farley, "The Maghreb's Islamic Challenge," The World 
Today, vol.47 nos 8-9; Claire Spencer, The Maghreb in the 1990's: Political and 
Economic Developments in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, (London: Brasseys, 
1993).
111) Michael H. Posner, "Here and There: Human Rights Should Be a Common 
Concern," IHT. 18 February 1993.
96
Chapter 3: The Neo-Realists
Chart 3-1: The Belief System of the Neo-Realists
1) Background: Hobbes
2) Goal: Promote national interests, stop the appearance of a 
hegemonic rival.
3) Assume: States have fundamentally different values. Ultimately, 
International Relations is a zero-sum game. They miss the end of 
Cold War stability. See increasing world contact as exacerbating 
world divisions. Do not see development as following universal
stages.
4) See state: Well represented by the billiard ball/rational actor theory, feel the 
structure of the world system is largely the key factor in 
determining a state’s foreign policy.
5) Key analytical 
orientation:
Military/Security/Geopolitical
6) Declinist/
Revivalist:
Declinist
7) World Structure: Multipolar
8) Preferred mode
of action:
Multilateral if possible, Unilateral if necessary.
9) Basis of force: American troops.
10) World Policeman: None, the balance of power is self-regulating.
ID Key areas and foci: US, Europe secondarily.
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12) Schurmann
classification:
Imperialists
13) General political 
supporters:
Primarily the Republican party.
14) Political actors: Dole, Gingrich, Lugar.
15) Bureaucratic
bastions of support:
DoD, CIA, The US security apparatus.
16) Policy cluster 
preferencetowards 
Western Europe/ 
European defence 
system:
Nato-firsters. Pro-Nato but fear it won't last. Wish to extend 
Nato membership to Eastern Europe but keep it as a primarily 
military alliance. Ambivalent towards European unity.
17) Policy cluster 
preference towards
Bosnia:
Non-interventionist, no vital US interests at stake. However, 
for a lifting of the arms embargo.
18) Policy cluster 
preference towards
Trade
(Nafta and Gatt):
Tactically favour both agreements.
19) Policy cluster 
preference towards 
Russia:
Against large-scale aid, as they fear renewed authoritarian rule 
and activation of vast capabilities. Want to enhance contacts with 
non-Russian States of former USSR.
20) Policy cluster 
preference towards 
China:
Evolutionary change favoured (MFN with possible conditions), 
feel it is too important to isolate.
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21) Academics:
22) Variations within 
the school of 
thought:
Buchanan - realist-isolationist; Nixon - realist-internationalist; 
Kirkpatrick - realist-internationalist with a democratist minority; 
Kissinger - realist-internationalist with an institutionalist minority.
REALIST-ISOLATIONIST (Minority)/ REALIST- 
INTERNATIONALIST (Majority); the difference is vast, 
yet same theoretical starting point.
The neo-realists see a very different world from that viewed by the democratists. For 
them the anarchic nature of the international system, characterised by its lack of authority 
over states, (the absence of world government) consigns the international system to being a 
Hobbesian jungle. It is to this English philosopher and not Kant, that neo-realists tum to 
affirm their philosophical background. In The Leviathan, published in 1651, Hobbes 
characterised the anarchic international system as itself leading to conflict. Without a supreme 
authority, states found themselves in the jungle, where they struggled to survive. Power was 
the motive force of Hobbes' international system for with it a state could ensure its survival 
in a lawless world. 1 To survive, states must constantly think of their immediate welfare.
Neo-realists still see the promotion of a state's immediate selfish interests as its supreme 
goal in foreign policy. Unlike democratists, neo-realists see no natural allies, just national 
interests. They acknowledge that the concept of 'national interest' is ambiguous and 
changeable. As that arch neo-realist Henry Kissinger commented, the national interest, "must 
be adapted to changing circumstances. "2 A hallmark of neo-realism is this tactical flexibility. 
As circumstances and not ideology or consensus determine policy, neo-realists pride 
themselves on promoting practical policy initiatives. Kissinger further illuminates the neo­
realist notion of strategic flexibility being the key to protection of national interests in his 
seminal thesis, A World Restored. Here Kissinger approvingly noted that the British foreign 
minister Castlereagh, "demonstrated his awareness that no policy, however successful, can 
be an end in itself."3 Ultimately, the only end for neo-realists is the practical consideration of 
a state's survival. The means to achieve this are virtually unlimited.
Though the concept of 'national interest' is slippery at best, it can be defined with some 
precision in practice. As Nixon stated regarding US national interests, "an American interest 
is vital if its loss, in and of itself, directly endangers the security of the US."4 Again, it is
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apparent here that the concept of national interest is rooted in the survival and protection of 
the state itself. Neo-realists feel that since 1945, American national interests compel the US to 
see that no rival hegemon appears to counter American power. While Secretary of State. 
Kissinger expressed this neo-realist tenet at a 1973 press conference regarding the Yorn 
Kippur war. "I stated that we will oppose the attempt by any country to achieve a position of 
predominence, either globally or regionally. ”5 In this case he was warning both Israel and 
Moscow, Israel not to opt for total victory over Egypt, and Moscow not to intervene to 
protect its Arab allies as the US would view this as a sign of a major escalation of the war 
and a marked shift in the regional balance of power. Beyond this general definition, national 
interest can also be defined by what it is not. Neo-realists believe that both democratists and 
institutionalists generally pursue policies that are not in the American national interest James 
Schlesinger, the former Secretary of Defence and head of the CIA, castigated democratists 
regarding their crusading zeal. He commented, "Do we seriously want to change the 
institutions of Saudi Arabia? The brief answer is no. Indeed in the Middle East the Islamic 
state that has most successfully embraced democratic processes is none other than Iran. "6 
Schlesinger neatly illustrates neo-realism's 'realistic' critique of democratism. Neo-realists 
see American national interests as being served by the survival of the Saudi royal family 
despite its despotism, as it is an old and valuable friend who has helped the US through its 
position as swing-producer of OPEC to keep US oil prices low. Whereas Iran, despite being 
an 'Islamic Republic' and relatively more democratic than King Fahd, has been a thorn in the 
American side since the Islamic revolution began in 1979. Schlesinger continued, 
"Traditional diplomacy would suggest that we not pick fights, but rather base our stance 
towards others on whether they are antagonistic or friendly toward us - and not on their 
internal arrangements. "7 Thus, neo-realists and democratists differ sharply over American 
support for friendly dictatorial regimes, with neo-realists contending that as long as they are 
friendly toward American interests they should be supported. For neo-realists the Hobbesian 
jungle does not allow the US the luxury of having only morally pristine allies. For them, 
American interests override desires for universal democracy as a goal of foreign policy.
Likewise, neo-realists believe that the institutionalists' multilateral views are too 
confining. To return to the Hobbesian jungle metaphor, to survive in the jungle a state must 
be quick, and unencumbered by anything as onerous as multilateral consensus. Kissinger has 
urged the Clinton administration not to follow the multilateralist path. "What it must not do is 
to permit its objectives and missions to be defined by invocations of international 
consensus. "8 Neo-realists see neither the wrongheaded fervour of democratism nor the 
overly- shackled stance of the institutionalists as holding the key to American foreign policy in
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the post-Cold war era. Rather, a sober evaluation of American national interests must always 
be the yardstick by which neo-realists feel any specific US policies are measured.
The neo-realists are the direct heirs of Schurmann's imperialists, the men who designed 
the Cold War system and led the US to unparalleled success after 1945. These men: Truman, 
Acheson, Vandenberg, Kennan, and Marshall shared many of the same foreign policy views 
as today's neo-realists. John Lewis Gaddis cogently explored the Truman administration's 
foreign policy beliefs in, "Containment: A Reassessment". He stated, "there is in Kennan's 
approach a set of propositions so obvious that they often escape notice: that there are limits to 
power; that there are no commitments without costs...that as strategy needs to be informed 
by policy, .so policy needs to be informed by a clear vision of the national interest."9 Neo­
realists see these basic tenets as still crucial to running American foreign policy, even with the 
end of the Cold War. For them, the end of the post-war era did not erase the verities taught to 
them by their imperialist forebears.
Unlike democratism, neo-realism is implicitly a declinist school of thought. As 
Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwartz pointed out, "Realists believe that the US can and 
should act as an ordinary great power. "10 Given the absolutely central position America 
occupied in the Cold War system this must be seen as a demotion. Indeed, Jeane Kirkpatrick 
urged the US to accept self-demotion. "We will need to learn to be a power, not a 
superpower. "11 The practical result of this declinist view is that neo-realists urge the careful 
selection and reevaluation of vital American interests in the post-Cold War era, as the US 
faces both internal and external limits on its ability to influence world events. John Gray 
echoed this neo-realist view. He believes that a successful foreign policy in the post-Cold 
War era, "entails an acknowledgement of the limits of American power as well as a 
judgement as to where American vital interests are at stake and where they are not." 12 The 
majority of neo-realists believe the United States should play an active role in the world, 
while at the same time recognising that American power has limits and should be used only 
when genuinely vital American interests are at stake. This declinist view is neatly summarised 
by Mettemich's classic neo-realist comment in A World Restored. "I remain true to my 
eternal principle that events which can not be avoided must be directed."13 Neo-realists, to a 
much larger extent than democratists, believe that circumstances themselves limit even a great 
power's options. Mettemich's belief that events which cannot be avoided must be directed 
will be returned to again when the neo-realist’s specific policy prescriptions are discussed.
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While some neo-realists see the US as the only great power left in the world, none view it 
as able to exert the type of world domination democratists claim is possible for the US with 
the demise of the Soviet Union. Nixon, while seeing the new world order as having only one 
superpower, also saw that superpower as having decided limits. This was his basic criticism 
of democratists, their inability to see American limits in a one superpower world. "Those 
who call for a global democratic crusade ignore the limits of our power. "14 Kissinger agreed 
with his former boss, "We haven't the resources for domination. "15 For many neo-realists 
the limits on American foreign policy initiatives are primarily the result of internal decline, 
rather than simply being the result of the world being too large and complicated a place even 
for a sole superpower to dominate. The neo-realist view toward burden-sharing is a case in 
point. Since the 1970s, America has called on its Nato allies to assume a greater proportion 
of the defence burden within the alliance. These calls for increased allied defence 
expenditure, vis-a-vis the US, are a direct result of what neo-realists feel is the relative 
economic decline of the US since the immediate post-war period. Increasing American 
economic difficulties have made the vast American commitment to Nato more painful as the 
years have worn on, prompting calls for increased European and Japanese support. This is 
an obvious sign of relative American decline, a position held by most neo-realists. As the 
arch declinist Paul Kennedy observed regarding the issue of burden-sharing within Nato, 
"burden sharing also implies sharing influence. "16 Many neo-realists take his point that if the 
US wants increased burden sharing, it must be prepared to give up a share of its 
preponderant power. Many neo-realists see relative American decline as the precursor of a 
multipolar world where the US will be just one of many powers, a world not unlike that of 
Castlereagh and Mettemich, a world where neo-realist principles are still valid.
Unlike democratists neo-realists believe nations have different values. If democratism is a 
universalist creed, neo-realism is very much a relativist, nationalist school of thought. 
Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, an outspoken neo-realist, criticised the 
democratist tendency in American foreign policy. "Our national vice is a tendency towards 
moralism in foreign policy, a kind of moral hubris which views the actions of others only 
through the prism of our own standards of conduct. "17 Like his mentor Henry Kissinger, 
Eagleburger does not feel that American moral viewpoints, grounded as they are in a specific 
historical, cultural, and structural situation, necessarily have universal validity. Neo-realists 
feel that this general failing in democratist thinking is a recipe for specific foreign policy 
disasters. The avowed isolationist and presidential candidate Pat Buchanan criticised the 
hyper-democratist Ben Wattenberg's universalist viewpoint. He criticised democratism's, 
"endless and seditious meddling in the affairs of nations where institutions are shaped by
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their own history, culture, traditions, and values, not ours. Democracy uber alles is a formula 
for permanent conflict and national bankruptcy." 18 If Buchanan is correct and foreign 
institutions of government are not generally amenable to democracy (due to their different 
cultural, historical, and structural positions in the international system), then the attempt by 
hyper-democratists in particular, and democratists in general, to spread the alien creed of 
democracy is inherently doomed to failure. It also means that world-wide resistance to 
democratist initiatives could lead to US participation in an almost endless series of wars that 
would both demoralise and bankrupt the nation.
Neo-realists go far beyond merely disagreeing with democratists over whether nations 
inherently have different values. They feel these different values lead to differing degrees of 
receptivity toward democracy. This view is further extrapolated in Samuel P. Huntington's 
influential article, "The Clash of Civilizations?". Huntington argued, "It is my hypothesis that 
the fundamental source of conflict in this new world won't be primarily ideological 
[democratist view] or primarily economic [institutionalist view]. The great divisions among 
humankind and the dominant source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the 
most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur 
between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate 
global politics. "19 This updating of the neo-realist creed not only argues for the non­
universality of Western democratic ideology, it stresses the fact that nation-state's different 
values are expressed in their being part of distinctive cultural groupings larger than their 
individual states. These cultural groupings, or civilisations, are likely to come into conflict 
along their respective fault lines. For instance, Huntington's thesis would explain the 
Bosnian conflict as the result of Bosnia being on the border of the Western, Islamic, and 
Slavic-Orthodox civilisations. Huntington turned the Wilsonian view held by both 
democratists and institutionalists that increased interactions between societies leads to 
interdependence and a global culture on its head. "The interaction between peoples of 
different civilizations are increasing, these increased interactions intensify civilization 
consciousness. "20 Neo-realists see interaction between societies as cementing differences, 
not similarities. It is hard to imagine a starker contrast between neo-Wilsonianism and neo­
realism than over this issue. From the notion of the non-universality of Western values 
logically flows the next neo-realist assumption, the idea that development does not occur 
according to a blueprint, in the same way everywhere.
While democratists and institutionalists would argue about whether democracy should 
succeed a market economy or vice-versa, both Wilsonian schools of thought implicitly
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believe that there is a general, universal route that states follow towards modernisation. This 
Wilsonian view is antithetical to neo-realist beliefs. Richard Nixon argued that as states still 
find themselves at different levels of development, the hyper-democratist's urge to 
universally democratise should be kept in check. Nixon stated, "Americans must recognize 
that a highly sophisticated, highly advanced political system, which required many centuries 
to develop in the West, may not be best for other nations which have different traditions and 
are still in an earlier stage of development."21 Most neo-realists do not even go that far 
towards the democratist view on development. Many more would agree with Huntington 
when he said, "Conceivably, democracy in the world could stem from a single source. 
Clearly it does not. "22 If neo-realists do not accept the democratist position that democracy 
comes from a single, universal source and that all states, given a certain level of 
development, will become democratic, neither do they accept the institutionalist variation of 
development theory. While accepting that economic modernisation leads to the destruction of 
traditional economic and political institutions, neo-realists do not believe that modernisation, 
particularly economic modernisation, is necessarily congruent with a single easily replicated 
Western model of development for all states to imitate. Huntington stated, "Economic 
development compels the modification or abandonment of traditional political institutions, it 
does not determine what political system will replace them. "23 For example, the frenetic pace 
of modernisation certainly played a part in the Shah’s ouster from power in 1979. However 
rather than modernisation leading to the replacement of a despotic regime with a democratic 
one, the collapse of the Shah led to the advent of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic 
revolution in Iran. The revolution came about at least partly as a reaction to the strains of 
modernisation, such as its bewildering economic dislocation. Indeed the backlash from the 
forced, harsh, lightning pace of Iranian modernisation was a principal cause for the 
emergence of the virulently anti-Western government of the Imams. Neo-realists feel that 
while institutionalists are correct in emphasising the revolutionary aspect modernisation plays 
in developing nations, a ’rational’ democratic outcome for all societies undergoing the 
modernisation process is never a foregone conclusion.
Neo-realists assume that power, the motive force of the international system, can be 
measured, if only generally and vaguely. A further distinguishing feature of the neo-realist 
school of drought is its adherents' propensity to see power as a relative phenomenon. This is 
antithetical to the institutionalist school which sees power as an absolute and not a zero-sum 
game. Trade is a key illustrative issue for both schools of thought regarding the notion of 
power. Neo-realists scorn the institutionalist view diat as all gain from free trade, its 
advancement should be self-evident to every state. Neo-realists would point to the fact that
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free trade, as it enables some states to do better than others, should never be adopted as more 
than a temporary tactic. For instance, if neo-realists felt that America's chief economic rivals, 
Germany and Japan, did better out of the Gatt talks than the US, they would feel that 
America should derail them, even if in absolute terms the US also benefited. For neo-realists 
the key point is that states do not exist in a vacuum. Power is relative and is the key to 
survival in the Hobbesian jungle. As Grieco observed, "driven by an interest in survival, 
states are certainly sensitive to any erosion in their relative capabilities. "24 Neo-realists 
believe that for a state to feel itself successful, by definition it must be more successful than 
others.
A final, unique assumption of the neo-realist school of thought is its controversial open 
yearning for the bipolar world. Lawrence Eagleburger put it most bluntly in a speech while 
Secretary of State to the Council on Foreign Relations, "My good friend Peter Tamoff [then 
head of the Council on Foreign Relations, now Assistant Secretary of State] was quick to 
take me to task in The New York Times for having demonstrated nostalgia for the Cold 
War...But today, Peter, I have a confession to make: I am truly nostalgic for the Cold 
War."25 (my emphasis). In light of all the obvious injustices wrought in the name of the 
Cold War era, that neo-realists should pine for it is a mark of how highly they value stability 
in the international system.26 Structurally the bipolar Cold War era is seen by most neo­
realists as more conducive to stability than the multipolar system which preceded World War 
II. Neo-realists see systemic breakdown with the end of the Cold War, with the new 
emerging international system being once again based on the more volatile multipolarity. 
William Pfaff, writing in The Los Angeles Times, saw the very fact of systemic breakdown 
leading to an increase in world anarchy. He glumly mused, "When international systems 
break down, a time of troubles follows. We have only entered ours. "27 James Schlesinger 
concurred with Pfaffs gloomy outlook, seeing trouble rising with the end of bipolarity. 
"With the end of the Cold War - and the passing of its unique disciplines - the world is 
becoming more rather than less anarchic."28 While imperial overstretch is a major fear of 
most neo-realists, many yearn for the simplicities of bipolarity, where American 
preponderance made American leadership inevitable. It is this lack of leadership in a new 
world order premised on multipolarity that is a major reason for the increased level of global 
instability, in the eyes of the neo-realists. As Huntington noted regarding Bosnia, "The 
security consequences of a multipolar world have been dramatically evident in the dismal 
failure of the major European powers to deal with the Yugoslav catastrophe on their 
doorstep. "29 Neo-realists do not miss the Cold War out of some warped nostalgia for the
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past. Rather they miss the bipolarity that they feel was a prime factor in attaining the 
international stability that they value so highly.
Joseph Grieco in his excellent article, "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation", outlined 
five basic neo-realist views regarding the state's role in the international order. Firstly, neo­
realists see states as still the major actors in world affairs, despite the rise of international 
organisations such as the UN and EU. The billiard ball theory of international relations, with 
the interaction of entities (balls hitting one another) still centred at the state level, is seen by 
neo-realists as generally accurately expressing the international political scene. Secondly, 
states behave as unitary rational agents. Despite the rise of fashionable theories such as 
bureaucratic politics, neo-realists still believe that states basically act coherently and can 
define their own best interests. As has been shown, this concept of the national interest is 
absolutely central for neo-realists. Thirdly and fourthly, states exist in a system of 
international anarchy predicated on power relations, which preoccupies them. Fifthly, and in 
direct contradiction to institutionalist assertions, neo-realists believe that international 
institutions have only marginal importance in the global system. Neo-realists still see the state 
and its interests as central to the study of international relations.
Neo-realists believe that the key to determining a state's foreign policy is divining its 
structural place in the international system. This can often be expressed in geopolitical terms. 
As Kissinger stated, "the perspective of nations differs with their obligations, their 
geography, their history, and their power. "30 For instance, neo-realists believe that the key 
to understanding relations between Lithuania and Russia will be generally the same no matter 
the ideology of either government. The crucial fact is that Russia is a large, great power and 
Lithuania is a small, relatively powerless state. For neo-realists, these geopolitical power 
realities matter far more than the belief systems of either the leadership of Russia or 
Lithuania. In opposition to the democratists, neo-realists value material power relations over 
ideology in the overall equation of power. In the neo-realists' structural view, only states 
with complimentary interests can pursue agreements, whatever the ideology or personal 
chemistry of the two leaderships. Former President Nixon, a neo-realist, illustrated this idea 
comparing his diplomatic style to that of George Bush. Nixon observed, "Bush believes, far 
more than I, in the effectiveness of personal diplomacy. He believes that if you have a good 
personal relationship, it helps on substance. I believe that unless leaders interests are 
compatible, a personal relationship doesn't mean a thing."31 Once again, this highlights the 
centrality of the notion of the national interest for the neo-realists. It is a concept at least partly 
determined for them by a state's structural position in the international system, as well as the
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structural nature of the system (the polarity) itself. As Mearsheimer observed, "the keys to 
war and peace lie more in the structure of the international system than in the nature of 
individual countries. "32 For neo-realists, it is largely the nature of the world order that 
determines an individual state's actions.
Neo-realists share similar views with democratists over what should be the preferred 
mode of American action in foreign policy implementation. However neo-realists are more 
reserved about the use of force to further American goals than are the optimistic democratists. 
David Gergen, formerly a senior adviser to President Clinton, noted that the US was, "likely 
to unshackle its sword only when truly vital interests are at stake. "33 Indeed neo-realists 
such as former Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger suggested as far back as 1984 that the 
US should only use force if absolutely necessary. Weinberger observed in a November 28, 
1984 speech, "We should only engage our troops if we must do so as a matter of our vital 
interest."34 Kissinger goes so far as to believe that dispatching troops should be a definition 
in itself as to what America's vital national interests really are. "American military forces 
should be employed only for causes for which we ourselves are prepared to pay. That indeed 
is a good working definition of American national interest."35 Yet though neo-realists are 
reluctant to use force except to defend perceived vital national interests, once decided, 
American forces are not to be encumbered by multilateral organisations. As Nixon stated, 
"When vital US interests are threatened, the US should act with the UN where possible but 
without it if necessary."36 National flexibility, a key factor in the international system for 
neo-realists, must not be abandoned in the pursuit of some multilateralist utopia. Neo-realists 
feel that the US should be reluctant to use force. However once the decision is made that a 
vital national interest is at stake and force is necessary, the US must be prepared to act 
unilaterally if it has to.
Despite being prepared to act unilaterally on the international stage to defend national 
interests, neo-realists would prefer to act within an informal concert of great powers if 
possible. This concert, be it for military or peaceful purposes, is similar to the Concert of 
Vienna so well described by Henry Kissinger in A World Restored. Neo-realists feel that the 
world is becoming increasingly multipolar. Thus it may hold more opportunities to use again 
such an informal great power structure as existed in the multipolar Mettemichean world. 
Unlike democratists, who believe international organisations should be forged around a 
common purpose growing out of a common ideology and values, neo-realists feel that 
informal international co-operation will arise organically due to shared global interests. As 
Charles Glaser stated a concert of powers, "increases the prospects for coordination that
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already exist as a result of a country's shared interests. "37 Huntington saw such an informal 
concert as already forming, based on the new global power structure. He saw the US as the 
chairman of the board of a great power directorate that has a shifting membership depending 
on the issue under discussion. Huntington said, "Global political and security issues are 
effectively settled by a directorate of the US, Britain and France, world economic issues by a 
directorate of the US, Germany, and Japan."38 Neo-realists see a concert of powers, united 
by shared national interests, as the most promising form of international co-operation to 
emerge in the new world order. They shun the more rigid international constructions of the 
institutionalists.
Neo-realists feel that the key area to focus on in the international system should be the 
United States itself, with Europe also being a large concern. As neo-realists believe that the 
national interest is the key to foreign policy, this nationalistic assertion is far from surprising. 
As Gaddis stated, "the chief objective of US foreign policy has been to maintain an external 
environment conducive to the survival and prosperity of the nation's domestic 
institutions...in this the US has differed little from other great powers: sovereign nations, to 
be secure, have always required climates in which their institutions could flourish. "39 It is 
instructive that Gaddis, a neo-realist, saw the survival of the nation's 'institutions' to be a 
central concern of American foreign policy, unlike the democratist Allison who saw the 
survival of the nation's 'values' as crucial. This standard concentration on 'America first' has 
been given a new twist in the new world order. Neo-realists have echoed President Clinton 
in seeing the interconnectedness between foreign and domestic policy. As Huntington stated, 
"the promotion of US strategic interests will involve not only foreign and defense policy but 
also domestic policy. "40 As its focus on the US remains central for neo-realists, increasingly 
they see the need to alleviate America's domestic ills as a source of enhancing American 
power. Nixon summed this point up saying, "to solve our problems at home enhances our 
leadership abroad. "41 Implicit in their desire to concentrate more on domestic matters with 
the end of the Cold War, is the neo-realist desire to rebuild America. Obviously if America 
needs to be 'built again' (the strict definition of the word rebuild) this neo-realist tenet shows 
their declinist tinge, although clearly they believe measures can be taken to arrest America's 
decline.
Neo-realists see Europe as the United States' second concern. For like their forebears, 
Schurmann's Imperialists, they remain committed Atlanticists. Gaddis fleshed out this 
historical affinity. "For the US, in the twentieth century, the most important requirement for a 
congenial international environment has been that Europe not fall under the domination of a
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single, dominant nation. Concern over die European balance of power dates back at least to 
the turn of the century. "42 While it is a central neo-realist belief to oppose the appearance of a 
rival hegemon around the globe, this is particularly true for them of the Eurasian landmass. 
Neo-realist reasons for valuing Europe are very different from democratist motivations. 
Mearsheimer stated the reasons for Europe's importance to neo-realists succinctly, "Europe's 
important geographic position, not to mention those raw power assets like manpower and 
GNP that it controls, make it hard to see how one can separate European security from 
American security. "43 Unlike democratists, neo-realists value Europe for what it possesses 
and how that relates to American interests, rather than for what it is ideologically. This is an 
excellent example of two different schools of thought generally agreeing on positions for 
entirely different reasons.
Unlike democratists, neo-realists do not see the US as the chief global policeman, the 
ultimate authority in the international system. For many neo-realists, Vietnam displayed die 
very dangers that the US could avoid by relinquishing the role of global cop. As Nixon stated 
in 1967 at the height of the Vietnam conflict, "other nations must recognize that the role of the 
US as world policeman is likely to be limited in the future. "44 Following this policy of 
limiting American commitments, Nixon began the negotiating process that eventually ended 
the war in 1975. Likewise he took the US off the gold standard, thereby removing the dollar 
as the single guarantor of the international monetary system. The Economist, summed up the 
'Nixon doctrine' precisely as the notion, "tiiat America could not act as world policeman."45 
Nor is this strongly held view merely the preserve of the realist-internationalist majority. If 
anything, realist-isolationists feel even more strongly about America not taking on the role of 
global policeman. Their champion, Pat Buchanan, put it bluntly, "We aren't the world's 
policeman, nor its political tutor. "46 If neo-realists feel that America should not be world 
cop, they unanimously feel die UN has no right to the job. For them the sanctity of the state 
is central and if the UN were to become world policeman, there would then be an 
international organisation with true primacy over all states. Jeane Kirkpatrick, a neo-realist 
and fierce critic of the UN's expansionary aims, has argued that, "The Charter bars the UN 
from interfering in the internal affairs of nations."47 If neo-realists feel that in taking the role 
of world policeman the US would be unwise, the idea of the UN in such a position is greeted 
witii even greater opposition, as UN authority would undermine the sanctity of the state 
which is a central neo-realist belief.
For neo-realists no world policeman is needed as the international system will maintain 
itself naturally through a balance of power.48 Kissinger cleverly stated the neo-realist case.
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Peace, he felt, "is the expression of certain conditions and power relationships. It is to these 
relationships - not to peace - that diplomacy must address itself. "49 The balance of power is 
seen by neo-realists as the mechanism that leads to general stability, if not to an absence of 
war. Once again this illustrates that the concept of stability is the key to the balance of power 
and this is crucial to neo-realists in general. It is a system that leads states to, "know few 
permanent enemies and few permanent friends. "50 This is because regardless of ideological 
affinities, balance of power politics leads states to always attempt to stop the emergence of a 
hegemonic power. While this is easily envisaged in a bipolar system where lesser states 
group around the two superpowers, such as when the Nato and Warsaw Pact countries 
grouped around America and the USSR respectively, it becomes slightly more complicated in 
a multipolar system; but the end result is the same. In the eternal effort to stop the emergence 
of a dominant state or states, two or more roughly equal alliances will form. As these 
alliances are predicated on power and not shared values as they are for democratists, neo­
realists see defections within alliances as common in a multipolar system. These defections 
help keep the system within balance as time passes and the great powers’ relative strength 
ebbs or flows. Thus as neo-realists believe all states follow their natural, rational interests, 
the balance of power becomes a self-correcting mechanism as states defect from alliances to 
correct the inevitable imbalances in power that occur over time with the rise and decline of all 
great powers. Neo-realists see the balance of power as the chief guarantor of stability of the 
international system.
Neo-realists' two key analytical orientations, the factors in the overall power equation that 
they most value, are firstly military power and secondly geopolitics. As noted earlier, neo­
realism is a structural creed with an emphasis on the idea that foreign policy outputs are 
largely the result of the geopolitical situation that states find themselves in. As Kissinger's 
neo-realist alter-ego Mettemich wrote to Castlereagh, "the strongest laws governing states are 
those of geography. "51 Neo-realists believe that geographical imperatives, which are 
timeless, override man's clumsy attempts at international law. As Kissinger scornfully noted, 
"Another dispatch [by Castlereagh] on 6 September, attempted to elucidate the legal position 
with respect to the revolution in Naples, as if the dilemma imposed by Austria's central 
location could be removed by the patient reiteration of the maxims of international law. "52 In 
direct contrast to democratists, neo-realists feel that the permanence of geography outweighs 
any shared values nation-states may transiently share, and as such is a more important factor 
in the overall power equation.
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For neo-realists it is power, particularly military power, that is the key to foreign policy 
analysis. As has been stated before, neo-realists feel military power is essential for a state to 
survive due to the anarchic nature of the international system. As Kissinger stated, 
"International Relations can not be conducted without an awareness of power relations,"53 
so central is it to neo-realist thought. As Kissinger wryly noted in an April 1958 Foreign 
Affairs article written in response to the Soviet launching of Sputnik, "Force by itself won't 
supply an answer to the challenge of the future; it offers the possibility that there will be a 
future."54 (my emphasis). To preserve the state, neo-realists put their faith in the tangible 
components of power, unlike the democratists. The tangible components of power: GDP, 
military strength, geopolitics, are not only less likely to swiftly change and are also easier to 
measure ip calculating the balance of power in a way intangibles like ideology and trade 
organisations are not. This emphasis on tangible components of power once again illustrates 
the essentially conservative nature of neo-realism. Kissinger recounted that after the Austrian 
disaster of Austerlitz, where Mettemich bowed to a public nationalist outcry to fight 
Napoleon no matter what the material disadvantages, he never again believed in anything but 
the tangible components of power. For Mettemich, "The disaster of 1809 had led him to 
believe that national elan was no substitute for a material base. "55
Neo-realists also believe that the interdependence caused by international trade is no 
substitute for the balance of power in preserving international stability. As Nixon observed, 
"If an issue affects vital national interests, a major power will throw even the strongest 
economic ties overboard in order to prevail."56 Neo-realists use history to bolster this 
contention. Despite a great degree of interdependence in la belle epoque and the inter-war 
period, World Wars I and II were not prevented. Indeed, much contemporary criticism by 
neo-realists of the last two Democratic Presidents centres on their over-reliance on economic 
instruments and their aversion to force. Samuel Huntington himself served under Brzezinski 
in Carter's National Security Council from 1977-8. Like Brzezinski he was a Democratic 
'hawk'. In reviewing Brzezinski's book, Weighing Power and Principle, Huntington stated, 
"Carter didn't see that at times the shedding of some blood may be necessary to avert more 
disasters. "57 This neo-realist criticism is often aired regarding the institutionalist 
administration of President Clinton. Here neo-realists agree with democratists that 
institutionalism's hesitancy to use force in the international arena may be a fatal flaw to their 
foreign policy initiatives. Despite all the changes in the international system, power, 
especially military force, is still seen by neo-realists to be the single most important 
component in the overall power equation.
Ill
The neo-realist school of thought has been traditionally dominant in International 
Relations study since 1945, and despite coming under sustained attack by neo-Wilsonianism 
especially since the early 1970's, probably still is. Its dominance can be seen in Chart 3-2. 
Whereas most of the democratists analysed were academics/joumalists, opinion-makers 
outside the realm government, all of the neo-realists studied are both opinion-makers and 
former policy-makers (Kissinger, Buchanan, Nixon and Kirkpatrick). Neo-realists control 
numerous bastions of power as well as having a strong hold on the public's way of looking 
at the world. The very terms most people (including academics) use to discuss foreign policy; 
'America', 'Britain', 'China', are implicitly part of the billiard ball theory of international 
relations, and thus are part of the neo-realist construct. As Holsti and Rosenau pointed out in 
their survey of American public opinion leaders, "a strong majority expressed the view that 
the nature of international affairs will continue to be dominated by traditional definitions of 
national interests."58 Yet despite this enduring power, neo-realists such as Henry Kissinger 
have long bemoaned the fact that an unfettered neo-realist foreign policy is unsustainable in 
the US, as it ignores the crusading, missionary streak so long apparent in the American 
psyche. He stated, "The drawback of this [neo-realist] approach was its dearth of emotional 
resonance among the American people. Though President Nixon frequently spoke of a 
structure of peace, structures are instruments that do not of themselves evoke commitments in 
the hearts and minds of a society - especially one imbued with America's tradition of 
exceptionalism."59 Despite Kissinger's best efforts, the US has remained traditionally 
opposed to the balance of power guiding American policy. While neo-realists have often run 
American foreign policy (witness Nixon and Kissinger), and neo-realist thought has until 
recently dominated International Relations discourse, it is questionable if a purely neo-realist 
American foreign policy is sustainable.
Neo-realism's bureaucratic bastions are in the Republican Party, the Department of 
Defence, the CIA, and the old Bush administration. Neo-realists dominate the Republican 
Party, as can be seen in Chart 3-2, where all three opinion-makers were and are staunch 
Republicans. This phenomenon will be looked at in detail in the concluding chapters of this 
work. Neo-realists dominate the CIA and DoD, as both organisations are symbols of the 
tangible components of power that figure so prominently in their thinking. It is not surprising 
that individuals working in such institutions would value a school of thought that gives their 
organisation such a central role in American foreign policy formulation and implementation. 
Nor is it odd that those who espouse the neo-realist doctrine should choose to work in 
agencies their ideological orientation leads them to believe are central to American policy­
making. The DoD and CIA have been bureaucratic bastions of neo-realist thought for many
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years. The DoD's continued neo-realist adherence can be seen in its strong objection to 
President Clinton's plan to help in establishing a UN rapid deployment force. According to 
Barton Gellman of The Washington Post, "It [the Clinton administration] rejects the call from 
Butros Ghali, for a UN 'rapid deployment force' for intervention in world trouble spots, an 
idea Clinton endorsed in 1992. The Pentagon, in the words of one official, threw 'a major 
dose of cold reason1 on broader proposals from the State Department and NSC staff. "60 On 
the issue of giving some increased military power to the UN, it is not surprising the Pentagon 
was opposed, as they were the bureaucratic group that actually would have lost a degree of 
power if such a plan had been implemented. Also, the Pentagon displayed its habitual neo­
realist suspicion of the UN. Doubtless many at the DoD genuinely thought any American 
cession of,authority would be detrimental to US interests, as it would obviously seem to 
followers of neo-realism. In the end, as questions of force are still largely the bureaucratic 
preserve of the Pentagon, its neo-realist argument carried the day on this issue. It had more 
bureaucratic weight with President Clinton than his like-minded institutionalist colleagues at 
NSC and State, who traditionally try to expand UN power. It is apparent that the DoD is still 
very much dominated by neo-realist thinking.
Regarding policy towards Western Europe and Nato, neo-realists tend to favour retaining 
Nato as the key Atlantic security structure, at least for an interim period. They see the OSCE 
(Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe), with over fifty members each with a 
veto, as both cumbersome and unreflective of the balance of power. Despite favouring Nato, 
American neo-realists are pessimistic about its long-term future with the demise of the Soviet 
Union. They expect minimally that the European role in Nato vis-a-vis the US will increase, 
making it ultimately an institutional vehicle for great power concerts rather than a symbol of 
American dominance. The neo-realists' policy towards Nato again implicitly illustrates their 
declinist orientation.
Despite continued advocacy of Nato as the key to the Atlantic alliance, few neo-realists 
feel Nato in its present form is likely to long endure. This is because of the classic neo-realist 
approach to alliances, that they are made because of common interests. As Kissinger stated, 
"We must confine our alliances to the purposes we and our allies share. "61 With this limited 
view of alliances as based only upon shared specific interests, it is easy to see why neo­
realists feel that Nato should have no greater political role. As Robert Hunter exhorted, "Nato 
should continue to focus on military issues and not try to expand its mandate."62 Neo­
realists feel Nato should not expand from the military into the political realm precisely 
because the various states in Nato have distinctly different political agendas. This is a major
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difference from the democratist view that the members of Nato have a common political
position based on their shared espousal of a democratic culture. For neo-realists differences
between the European and American pillars of the alliance are rooted in their different
structural position in the international spectrum. As Trevor Salmon noted, "it must be
accepted that the Americans and Europeans do have policy, perceptual and interest
differences."63 Structurally this is explained by the fact the US was a superpower in the
Cold War system, and that individual European countries were at best regional powers.
Further, Huntington believed there are cultural differences that divide rather than unite the
Atlantic alliance. He noted, "Western civilization has two major variants, European and
North American. "64 For neo-realists, these cultural differences limit policy commonalties
between the two pillars of the Atlantic alliance. Kissinger concurred,
"It was naive of Americans to take for granted that a federal Europe would 
be more like us, that a unified Europe would automatically help carry our 
burdens, and that it would continue to follow American global 
prescriptions as it had in the early postwar years of European recovery 
and dependence. That can't be so...American support for European 
unification was therefore an expression of self-interest even if it was 
paraded under the banner of altruism. "65
For Kissinger, the divisions between Western Europe and America were always there, and 
that with Europe's relative rise, symbolised by the increased vigour of the EU, relations 
between Western Europe and America were bound to be more equal and conflictual. Neo­
realists feel that this hidden, underlying change in power relations between the two was 
revealed for all to see with the end of the Cold War. As Gaddis stated, "Americans can not 
expect to maintain the authority the Cold War gave them on the continent for very much 
longer. "66 Ultimately neo-realists feel that the end of the Cold War has forced the 
reconfiguration of Nato at best and its abolition at worst, due to the lack of a common 
European-American military threat.
With the decline of the Soviet Union and the corresponding end of the military threat it 
posed, neo-realists see the thread that kept Nato together unravelling with the passing of 
shared military interests. Josef Joffe stated that, "The alliance now faces the greatest threat to 
its existence ever. Having 'won’ the Cold War, it has lost its foe and its role. "67 Without the 
shared interest of collective defence against the possibly adventurist, definitely despotic 
Soviet regime, neo-realists feel Nato has lost its raison d'etre. This assessment differs 
sharply from the democratist view that Nato can be a vital politico-military institution 
promoting European-wide democracy in the new world order. Joffe summed up neo­
realism's bleak assessment of Nato in the post-Cold War world, "If the Cold War is truly 
over, then the Atlantic alliance will not survive in its traditional shape...no alliance has ever
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lived past victory: logically the idea of alliance requires the idea of a foe and a threat. "68 
Neo-realists point to the already differing views toward key European issues favoured by the 
victors of the Cold War. For instance, like hyper-democratists, neo-realists see Eastern 
Europe as an area of competition between the United States and Western Europe. As David 
Roche, (the chief European investment strategist at Morgan Stanley) said, "The real 
battleground for political power, investment, growth and influence in the new Europe is the 
East. "69 Rather than seeing Eastern Europe as a golden chance to solidify fledgling 
democracies as democratists do, neo-realists see it largely as an economic market where the 
principal American foe will be its Nato ally, Germany. Nor do neo-realists see policy 
differences between the US and Western Europe as limited to the economic sphere. The often 
acrimonious accusations of blame in the wake of the Bosnian disaster have, as Jim Hoagland 
of The Washington Post observed, "demonstrated that American and European security 
interests no longer coincide as fully as they did during the Cold War, European officials 
argue. "70 Without the same degree of shared interests to pull the alliance together as 
happened during the Cold War, neo-realists generally believe its day as a symbol of 
American dominance of Western Europe is over. However, neo-realists do feel a two-pillar 
Nato may ultimately serve as a useful political vehicle for the concert of great powers they see 
that will come to dominate the world in the post-Cold War era. Therefore for now, neo- 
realists maintain their strong support for the alliance.
Regarding Bosnia, neo-realists were staunchly non-interventionist, as they saw no vital 
American interests at stake in the former Yugoslavia. While accepting that there had been 
humanitarian outrages in Bosnia, neo-realists did not believe that this was a reason for 
American intervention. Rather they believed that, "moral outrage is a poor guide to America's 
interests and goals."71 As the former Yugoslavia was not a centre for American trade or 
business and as it had little strategic significance, neo-realists felt that while the atrocities 
committed in Bosnia were appalling, they alone should not compel a massive and potentially 
dangerous intervention. As the debate over intervention in Bosnia raged in 1993, it was not 
surprising that the Pentagon, a neo-realist bastion, led bureaucratic opposition to 
intervention. As Thomas L. Friedman noted, "Having forced the Pentagon to begin taking 
steps to overturn the ban on homosexuals in the military, and preparing to force the joint 
chiefs of staff to cut $10 billion more from the military budget than proposed by Bush, 
Clinton is not in a strong position to ask them to get involved militarily in Bosnia - something 
to which they are intensely opposed. "72 While this point can be easily over stressed as 
ultimately the military has a long tradition of obedience to the President, however unpopular 
his policies are with the military (witness the fate of MacArthur), it is certainly true that due to
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lifting the ban on gays (the 'don't ask don't volunteer' compromise) and budget cuts, Clinton 
was not popular with the military. It is also true that the DoD has great bureaucratic power 
over issues of war and peace, power they tend to wield cautiously in the post-Vietnam era, 
being habitually reluctant to enter into any open-ended conflict. Almost to a man the Joint 
Chiefs and Colin Powell saw Bosnia as just such an open-ended commitment, replete with 
changing territorial boundaries, uncertain allies and enemies, and a vague mission. While 
Clinton decided not to intervene in Bosnia for largely institutionalist reasons, (due to a lack of 
allied consensus), he followed the neo-realists' desire to stay out of the morass of Bosnia. 
However political decision-makers who are neo-realists, such as Senators Dole and Lugar, 
were at the forefront of the allied attempt to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. They adhered to 
the standard neo-realist view that while America ought not to intervene in Bosnia, the 
Bosnians ought to be allowed to defend themselves against Serbian tyranny. For it was also a 
neo-realist contention that if tyranny remained unchecked in Bosnia it could lead to greater 
problems for the US in the future.
The standard neo-realist position on trade was a nuanced tactical favouring of both Nafta 
and Gatt. Neo-realists do not believe that free trade is the panacea that institutionalists see it to 
be, viewing it rather as useful in promoting the national interest in certain circumstances. 
Kenneth Waltz, an eloquent neo-realist argued, "whether free trade serves a nation's interests 
depends on its situation."73 This neo-realist view is underpinned by their belief in a zero- 
sum world. As Huntington observed, "The idea that economics is primarily a non-zero-sum 
game is a favorite conceit of tenured academics. It has little connection to reality. "74 For neo­
realists free trade is a tactic, not a deliverance. As Nixon noted, "it is an illusion that trade by 
itself will lead to peace."75 In fact, many neo-realists see trade competition as replacing 
military conflict as the battleground of states, as like military power, trade figures are also 
illustrative of a zero-sum world. Miles Kahler echoed this argument. He stated, "we should 
see changes in the international economy not as producing an inevitable resolution to age-old 
problems of interest conflict [as institutionalists do], but as intimately tied to that conflict."76 
Yet regarding the specific instances of Nafta and Gatt, it can be seen that the majority of neo­
realists favoured both pacts, seeing neither as leading to the relative diminution of American 
economic power. This is illustrated by the fact that neo-realists are generally members of the 
Republican Party, and it was the Republicans who ironically provided the backbone of 
support for President Clinton's near-perilous Nafta success, particularly in the House where 
the vote was close (234-200). Republicans have long been the party of business, a group 
expected to do better out of Nafta than America's blue-collar workers. This internal party 
dynamic undoubtedly affected Republican feelings about Nafta. In this case, the pro-business
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slant of the Republican Party reinforced the general neo-realist belief that the Nafta agreement 
would not do American economic power any long-term harm. Thus neo-realists supported 
Nafta and Gatt, but not unconditional free trade.
Neo-realists feel that the beleaguered Yeltsin experiment in democracy should be helped, 
but not too much. They have nowhere near the enthusiasm for a democratic Russia that 
democratists possess, nor are they optimistic about its future. As John Gray noted, "Western 
policy, under American leadership, would be wiser if it prepared for the likelihood, not the 
possibility, of authoritarian rule in Russia, without making a fetish of democratic 
institutions."77 This pessimism towards Russia's democratic chances leads neo-realists to 
advocate increased aid and security offers to the former Soviet satrapies of Eastern Europe, in 
case Russian reform fails. Kissinger holds the extreme end of this position, advocating 
increased aid to Eastern Europe, the Baltic states and Ukraine in an attempt to contain the 
effects of a Russian reversion to authoritarianism. Yet while most neo-realists would agree 
with Stephen F. Cohen's criticism of the Clinton administration, that it has shown, 
"excessive support for Yeltsin’s 'special regime', "78 most still feel Russia merits some 
American help. It is the neo-realist view that the US should mediate conflicts and provide 
political support and limited economic help only to those places in the former USSR where 
America has major interests. This would mean help for Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan 
because of their vast and untapped resources, and little help for Uzbekistan, Kirgyzistan, and 
Tajikistan where the US have few military or economic interests. But despite its low 
probability of democratic success, neo-realists feel Russia must be helped (at least 
marginally) in some way. Regarding aid to Russia, Cohen said, "[helpl of course we must. 
The main reason is that if Russia, with all its unprecedented potential for nuclear and ethnic 
holocaust, lurches into chaos or despotism, no international security will be possible. "79 
Neo-realists may believe Russia’s chance for democratic success to be slim, but they feel it is 
too important a state not to attempt to marginally improve Yeltsin's chances. But Russia's 
recurring regional assertiveness strikes neo-realists as a bad sign that it may soon again be 
inflicting its overbearing regional predominance on the former republics of the USSR. Neo­
realists fear Russia because a central part of their creed is not to believe that ultimately the 
professed ideology of the leadership in Moscow matters as much as the geopolitical reality 
that Russia is a great state and its former Soviet neighbours are minor states (except for 
Ukraine) in determining foreign policy outputs. This structural assertion leads neo-realists to 
be quickly suspicious of Russian actions and motivates their desire for the Clinton 
administration to be tougher with the Yeltsin regime about its increasingly adventurous 
policies toward the 'near abroad'. As Brian Beedham stated, "The new democracies of East-
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Central Europe, are already calling for protection against what they see as a returning tide of 
Russian power. Does the West go on telling them not to fuss? Clinton's people, on the far 
side of the Atlantic and with their eyes turned toward Asia, show signs of being tolerant of 
Russia's reexpansion."80 Neo-realists fear the recurring threat of Russian expansionism and 
want to focus American efforts more on protecting and stabilising East-Central Europe, the 
Baltic states and Ukraine, rather than overemphasising the chances for democratic success in 
Russia.
Like the institutionalists and unlike the democratists, neo-realist policy towards China 
encourages following a conciliatory line. This is due to China's geostrategic importance and 
booming economy. Neo-realists feel China is just too important to ignore or isolate as was 
the American policy for the early Cold War years until Nixon's historic visit. For the neo­
realists it is the power and importance of a region to the international system that matters 
above its internal characteristics. Twenty years later Nixon still advocated an 'open' policy 
towards China characterised by the renewal of MFN, a policy favoured by a majority of neo­
realists. He argued China should not be quarantined because it is, "a voice in the world that 
can't be ignored and a force in the world that can't be isolated. "81 For neo-realists, the 
'realities' of power compel the US to continue to engage China as the best way to integrate it 
within the international system and enhance global stability, regardless of its human rights 
abuses and anti-democratic regime. Again then, neo-realists agree with Clinton's soft-line 
policy towards China, but for different reasons.
Neo-realism contains two currents, the majority realist-internationalists and the realist- 
isolationists. The differences between the two currents are often so great that they do not 
follow even a vaguely general line in policy prescription as will be seen. However they begin 
from the same starting point, that the promotion of the national interest is essential and that 
foreign policy should concentrate on enhancing conditions in America itself. Robert Keohane 
cleverly defined the essence of the realist-internationalists by relating what they are not. He 
said they are, "critics of zeal [in International Relations as is espoused by the neo-Wilsonian 
schools of thought] without being advocates of isolationism. "82 The realist-isolationists have 
a long history as a permanent, if minority, view in American foreign policy. Many of 
Buchanan's isolationist adherents trace their creed back to Washington's farewell address, in 
which he urged the young republic to beware of entangling alliances, saying, "The great rule 
of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations, is, extending our commercial relations, to 
have with them as little Political [his emphasis] connection as possible. "83 The present 
isolationist incarnation, under the leadership of Buchanan, has made clear its controversial
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policy prescriptions in the new world order. David Gergen stated their general views 
succinctly, ’’bring home US troops; stay out of foreign wars; eliminate foreign aid; end 
support for the IMF and World Bank; treat Japan and Europe as economic predators and 
concentrate on ’America first’. "84 Of these general prescriptions realist-internationalists 
would agree only with the last wholeheartedly.
Realist-isolationists feel the world, particularly the Western world, has grown rich at 
American expense. While the US paid billions to defend them, so the argument goes, with 
their security problems solved, Germany and Japan were able to concentrate on their 
economic policies to the long-term detriment of the American economy and interests. 
Christopher Layne developed this theme, arguing that, "US military commitments in Europe 
and Asia should end. Maintaining them won't stop Germany and Japan from becoming great 
powers. By forcing them to finance their security, America can compel them to forgo trading- 
state policies that have enriched them at US expense."85 Realist-isolationists do not believe it 
is in the American interest to be the world cop, the pivot at the centre of a unipolar world, nor 
do many realists of either current believe it to be possible, as they see the world as becoming 
increasingly multipolar. Thus as a result of both choice and the changing world structure, 
realist-isolationists believe America should hasten the inexorable movement toward global 
multipolarity by withdrawing American troops from around the globe. The money saved 
from withdrawing US troops can then be spent on America itself, rather than to protect ally- 
competitors. The realist-isolationist policy towards the deployment of American troops 
overseas is antithetical to that of realist-internationalists, who see the defence of Western 
Europe as a major American interest. It is just one example of the myriad policy differences 
between the two currents within the neo-realist school of thought.
Pat Buchanan, Republican, noted columnist, television pundit and presidential candidate, 
is the standard-bearer for the realist-isolationist current. Buchanan espouses a strict 'America 
first' version of isolationism, and wants to radically limit America's involvement with the rest 
of the world. He advances an utterly pragmatic view of other states, taking the extreme plank 
of the neo-realist position about the lack of importance of the internal nature of other states. 
Buchanan exhorted, "Whether the man who rules in Bujumbura or Buenos Aires wears a 
business suit or a military blouse isn't our concern, so long as he does not make of his nation 
an enemy of the US."86 As Buchanan firmly believes that the US should not involve itself in 
the affairs of other states, he considers the democratist creed particularly anathema. Buchanan 
quoted John Quincy Adams in explaining his opposition to internationalism. He feels 
America should be, "the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the
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champion and vindicator only of her own. "87 To restore America (Buchanan is implicitly a 
declinist), he takes an extreme version of the neo-realist view that America should promote its 
own national interests above all else. Buchanan believes that the US should not really care 
about the internal nature of other states, so long as they do not directly oppose American 
interests. This is the essence of the realist-isolationist creed.
Regarding Nafta, Buchanan did not advance the majority neo-realist position in favour of 
the agreement. This example illustrates the fact that minority views of the schools of thought 
do not correspond to majority views in evaluating the charts of the individual opinion- 
maker's and decision-maker's policy preferences. Rather, Buchanan endorsed the minority 
isolationist position on trade. As the Washington Post editorialised, "The conservative 
columnist Buchanan, representing a decided minority within the Republican party, has taken 
to opposing Nafta as an attack on 'national sovereignty'. "88 As with other neo-realists, 
Buchanan believes firmly in the sanctity and central importance of the state in the international 
system. However, Buchanan's belief in the centrality of the state goes far beyond that of the 
realist-internationalists. While they feel free trade may be tactically in the interests of the US, 
Buchanan feared any trade deal as extensive as Nafta would erode the state's ability to 
'control' its own territory. Indeed in the aftermath of the Mexican economic debacle 
Buchanan charged that the close economic links between Mexico and the US have hurt 
America. He argued the Mexican bailout plan of the Clinton administration was a, "rip-off of 
taxpayers,"89 as it has tied the unpredictable Mexican economy even more firmly to the US 
than Nafta had. It is this close linkage which angered Buchanan. For him the loss of 
American control over its sovereignty outweighed any short-term economic benefit Nafta 
gave the US. As the Post reported, his view is a decided minority within the Republican 
Party. Yet Buchanan's minority view is expounded for specifically neo-realist reasons as he 
feared the erosion of national sovereignty over Nafta. For him strict sovereignty90 is a 
crucial element of American power.
Henry Kissinger, former academic, Secretary of State, National Security Adviser, 
international consultant, and dean of the American foreign policy establishment, propagates 
far more conventional neo-realist views than Buchanan. This is in large part because 
Kissinger crafted many of the tenets behind realist-internationalist policy prescriptions 
himself. There is no denying the centrality of Kissinger's thought to post-war American 
foreign policy in general, and neo-realist attitudes in particular. As Huntington has noted, 
"The new realism reached its apotheosis in the central role played by the balance of power in 
the theory and practice of Henry Kissinger. "91
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Kissinger's general views are voiced by his hero Metternich in his excellent book, A 
World Restored, which explores the policies of Metternich at the Congress of Vienna and 
afterwards. It is often difficult when reading Kissinger's view of Metternich to determine 
whether he is talking about the Austrian minister or himself. For instance in his description of 
Metternich one can easily see a description of Kissinger's general foreign policy style itself. 
"Hardenberg, the envoy of Hanover at Vienna, wrote the following analysis of Metternich's 
diplomatic methods at the height of the crisis of 1812: 'Endowed with a high opinion of the 
superiority of his ability...he loved finesse in politics and considered it essential. Since he 
does not have sufficient energy to mobilize the resources of his country...he attempts to 
substitute cunning for strength and character'."92 Kissinger also came to see his abilities as a 
temporary way to make up for what he thought to be America's declining position. Since he 
was in power in the early 70s, Kissinger has seen the world as multipolar, and has perceived 
the US as in decline. To promote American national interests (that is, for essentially neo­
realist reasons), many of Kissinger's pronouncements of the period have institutionalist 
overtones. These were made because Kissinger believed the world was moving towards 
multipolarity and it is a key neo-realist belief that processes that cannot be controlled must at 
least be directed. For instance, in his April 1974 address to the Sixth Special Session of the 
UN, while Secretary of State, he said, "We in this assembly must come to grips with the fact 
of our interdependence. "93 The lack of enthusiasm in this statement is matched by 
Kissinger's hard-headed acceptance of what he saw as an inexorable process.
While in office Kissinger devised a paradigm of the multipolar world he saw in the 
1970s, a series of interlocking triangles with the US at the centre as part of both the economic 
triangle (Western Europe, Japan, the US) and the military triangle (USSR, China, US). This 
tripolar scheme is now advanced in the 90s by institutionalists as well as influencing the neo­
realist Samuel Huntington's notion of the US as chairman of the board of a series of 
directorates whose members change according to the issue. For many, Kissinger's model of 
multipolarity, while premature in the 70s, has come into its own in the new world order. 
While Kissinger has an institutionalist minority tinge to his thinking, it is important to see it 
as engendered by strictly neo-realist beliefs. His advice to the new President in 1988 
dispelled any lingering doubts as to Kissinger's overall orientation, if there were any, as it is 
a classic definition of realist-internationalist beliefs. He stated, "he must focus American 
resources and energies on areas where precisely defined US national interests are at stake. He 
must not be reluctant to admit that there are important issues, even conflicts, in which the US
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has no special role to play because our vital interests aren't engaged. But he must not shrink 
from defending our interests. "94
Regarding large-scale aid to Russia, Kissinger adheres to the general neo-realist position, 
while disagreeing with both the Clinton administration and his former boss, Richard Nixon. 
Like most realist-internationalists, Kissinger feels Russia should be helped because of its 
importance to the international system's stability, and not due to Yeltsin's democratic 
tendencies, as democratists believe. Kissinger believes the reason the US should support 
Russia, "wasn't that he's [Yeltsin] a democrat, on which point the jury is still out, but that 
he's likely to pursue policy less dangerous to US interests than his most recent rivals. And 
that is a national security, not a moral judgement. "95 In his renunciation here of democratist 
beliefs that Yeltsin’s democratic tendencies are the reason to help Russia, Kissinger’s single­
minded focus on Yeltsin's relatively benevolent attitude towards the US vis-a-vis Vice 
President Rutskoi and Parliamentary Leader Khasbulatov, mirrors Buchanan's view that the 
US should judge a state by its policy towards the US above all else. However in considering 
offering even limited aid to Russia, Kissinger decisively distances himself from the realist- 
isolationists. Beyond this point Kissinger is not prepared to go. He opposes large-scale 
Russian aid unlike both the democratists and the Clinton administration. He criticised, "the 
Clinton administration in its overemphasis on Moscow politics."96 Unlike democratists, 
Kissinger is not enthusiastic about the chances for Russian democratic success due to its 
almost thousand year tradition (with the brief exception of Kerensky) of authoritarianism. 
Rather than overemphasising the chances for democratic success in Russia, Kissinger 
advocates the increased integration of Eastern Europe into the democratic fold. As Thomas L. 
Friedman noted, Kissinger has been warning in recent articles of, "the dangers of the West 
going overboard in rebuilding Russia, without reference to Russian history. If America aids 
Russia to the exclusion of other former Soviet republics, Kissinger argues, it could find itself 
in a few years having to deal with the resurgent imperialist-minded Russia of old."97
Kissinger's scepticism about Russian aid is opposed by the Clinton administration, who 
see in it the seeds of continuing the Cold War containment policy. As Jim Hoagland noted, 
"Warren Christopher [Secretary of State] firmly rejects published criticism of the plan 
[Partnership for Peace] by Kissinger, who argues that the Clinton administration's refusal to 
extend Nato into Eastern Europe because of concern about the Russian reaction gives 
Moscow a veto over Western security policy. "98 Kissinger's concern is that an 
overemphasis on the situation in Russia will enable the Yeltsin government to tacitly 
blackmail the West into following Russian policy wishes in an attempt to bolster the fragile
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Yeltsin government. In this instance, Kissinger felt the Clinton administration pursued on 
overly tentative policy toward enlarging Nato into Eastern Europe, which anchored Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the West by affording them Nato guarantees. Instead, in 
an effort not to alienate the Russian generals who saved Yeltsin from the October coup 
attempt, Clinton has offered the three states a half-measure called 'Partnership for Peace',99 
which ultimately provides no guarantee for Eastern Europe in the event that Russia returns to 
its expansionist ways. Critics of Kissinger's view, like Christopher, see it as threatening the 
delicate domestic balance in Russia, writing-off Yeltsin and simply extending the Iron 
Curtain eastwards rather than seeing in Yeltsin's democratic reforms the opportunity to forge 
a new era. Kissinger's support for Russian aid is lukewarm and limited. He does not want 
the US to become overly enamoured of Yeltsin, as he feels the democratists and Clinton have 
become, at the expense of other vital American interests in Western and Central Europe.
Along with Nixon, Kissinger was involved in dramatically opening relations with China 
in the early 70s. Like the former President, Kissinger believes China is too important to the 
international system to either isolate or treat as a pariah state. Kissinger's institutionalist 
minority views also come to the surface over China, as he believes that China's increased 
economic contact with the rest of the world will mitigate some of their government's less 
desirable tendencies. Regarding China, Kissinger observed, "our diplomatic and material aid 
to those who work for pluralistic economic and representative processes should be done 
openly. "100 In this case the former Secretary of State means support for Deng Xiaphong and 
his communist reformers, who are radically using market methods to integrate the Chinese 
economy into the world economic system. These are the same people who are seen by the 
democratists as the butchers of Tiananmen Square. Both in theory and in practice, Kissinger 
has endeavoured to open China through economics to the influences of the outside world, 
regardless of its communist leadership, in an effort to make China a great power committed 
to the international system. Kissinger hopes this dynamic will enhance order, rather than 
isolating China - making it a rogue state out to destroy the world system and the neo-realists' 
cherished concept of stability. Ultimately Kissinger advocated an institutionalist position on 
China as he stated, "President Clinton made a difficult but correct decision in extending MFN 
trade status to China and in decoupling that status from the objective of promoting better 
human rights in China." 101 It is his desire to wholly decouple trade issues from human 
rights concerns that indicates Kissinger's institutionalist policy preference.
Like most neo-realists Henry Kissinger was tactically in favour of the Nafta and Gatt 
trade agreements. However as he holds institutionalist minority views, his embrace of free
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trade goes beyond that of most neo-realists. As far back as his 1974 address to the UN 
General Assembly, Kissinger believed, "a new commitment is required by both developed 
and developing countries to an open trading system. "102 Over Nafta, Kissinger was far 
more enthusiastic than most of his fellow neo-realists, who were generally supportive of the 
deal. Just before the crucial Nafta vote in the House, Kissinger exhorted, "Almost once in a 
generation this country has an opportunity in foreign policy to do something that establishes 
the structure for decades to come. Nafta is the first and crucial step in this direction. "103 For 
Kissinger and institutionalists, the expansion of the liberal trading system is crucial to the 
success of the new post-Cold War world itself. In making this assertion Kissinger far 
distanced himself from most of his neo-realist colleagues, and confirmed his minority 
institutionalist views regarding free trade.
In the 35 years Kissinger has been writing in policy journals his deep ambivalence 
towards increased European strength, symbolised by its increased unity, has reflected the 
general realist-internationalist position. Kissinger initially saw increased European power as 
essential to American interests, yet now sees America's role in Europe as bound to decline. 
He remains pro-Nato, yet doubts its chances of survival in the new world order. While 
wanting Nato to be extended eastwards, he does not want it to expand beyond its essentially 
military character. These paradoxes reflect both Kissinger's specific thoughts and those of 
realist-internationalists in general towards Europe. Like most neo-realists Kissinger feels 
Western Europe, peaceful and not dominated by a single state, is a vital American interest, 
second only to that of defending America itself. While desiring Nato's spread eastwards, 
Kissinger feared the Clinton administration's 'Partnership for Peace’ scheme would not 
provide true protection for Eastern Europe (in the form of security guarantees), and would 
emasculate the most successful military alliance in history. He stated, "The partnership for 
peace will dilute what is left of the Atlantic alliance into a vague multilateralism. It would 
accelerate the trend towards European nationalism, and once Russia regains strength, 
European neutralism." 104 He felt having a twin-track Nato would wreck the cohesiveness of 
the alliance and that the plan's lack of real protection for Eastern Europe illustrated the 
Clinton administration's relative unconcern for Europe, a suspicion of many of the 
continent's diplomats. Thus when a revived imperialist Russia re-emerges, as Kissinger 
fears, Europe will become neutral as it is unable to count on a real American military 
commitment to Europe, "Kissinger's attack reflected the views of diplomats and Pentagon 
officials. "105 Pentagon officials, like most neo-realists, are troubled by the Clinton 
administration's focus on Asia and the Pacific at the expense of Europe. This highlights a key 
difference in focus between neo-realists, who concentrate on Europe, and liberal
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institutionalists, who are Asia- centric. In attacking the Partnership for Peace plan, Kissinger 
was in effect accusing Clinton of not putting enough weight on Europe.
Yet while Kissinger currently sees Europe as a neglected vital national interest, he himself 
has fears about European power and acknowledges that the American role in Europe is bound 
to decline with the end of the Cold War. Without the Soviet threat to cement the alliance, 
Kissinger feels the structural differences between the US and its European partners will lead 
increasingly to disagreements. As Kissinger prophesised as far back as April 1973, "The US 
has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests. These 
are not essentially in conflict, but in the new era neither are they automatically identical. "106 
Kissinger believes these differing interests, combined with increased European power vis-a­
vis the US, are bound to exacerbate tensions within Nato. He stated, "we can not ignore the 
fact that Europe’s economic success and its transformation from a recipient of our aid to a 
strong competitor has produced a certain amount of friction. "107 Kissinger feels the changes 
in relative power of the two pillars of the Atlantic alliance will transform it from a symbol of 
American preponderance to at best, a club of great powers. He observed a united Europe, "is 
likely to insist on a specifically European view of world affairs which is another way of 
saying that it will challenge American hegemony in Atlantic policy. "108 So while Kissinger 
wishes to preserve the alliance with Western Europe, he also fears its power potential. For 
instance, he envisages the EU as a possible bastion of protectionism, an outcome that would 
greatly hurt the American economy. He said, "The prospect of a closed trading system 
embracing the EC and growing number of other nations in Europe, the Mediterranean and 
Africa appears to be at the expense of the US and other nations which are excluded. "109 
Despite fearing European power, particularly its economic manifestations, Kissinger 
reluctantly endorses increased European co-operation. Regarding Europe, he stated that, 
"growing intra-European defense cooperation, possibly in the form of a European defense 
entity, should be endorsed." 110 This is in line with the neo-realist tenet to direct what cannot 
be avoided, in this case the increased European power that will change Nato into a great 
power club. Despite obvious reservations about growing European power, Kissinger and 
most neo-realists endorse both the continuance of Nato and a growing European role in the 
alliance to match its relative growth in power.
Kissinger also followed the general neo-realist line rearding Bosnia. Unlike the 
democratists, he did not feel the Bosnian conflict was largely a tale of Serbian aggression and 
Muslim victimisation. He observed, "As soon as Bosnia was declared an independent state, 
all the nationalities fell upon each other in a struggle for dominance."! 11 Kissinger saw the
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Bosnian war as being primarily a civil war, rather than a clear-cut case of Serbian 
adventurism. Thus it is not surprising that keeping, "American troops out of Bosnia was his 
bottom line."112 Yet while Kissinger spumed the democratist line regarding Bosnia, he also 
criticised the Clinton administration's institutionalist policy preference. Kissinger felt the 
administration's institutionalist penchant for multilateral solutions to international crises lead 
to the abdication of America's leadership role, as was the case in Bosnia. 113 While 
Kissinger was unwilling to advocate the exertion of massive American involvement in 
Bosnia, neither was he prepared to follow the passive institutionalist line in the conflict, 
which would set the precedent of holding American foreign policy decision-making hostage 
to the wishes of America's allies. It is for this unilateralist reason that Kissinger favoured the 
neo-realisfposition regarding Bosnia.
Jeane Kirkpatrick, academic at Georgetown and former US ambassador to the UN, is 
another realist-internationalist. As with most neo-realists, she has a declinist view of the 
American structural position in the world order. However she does not see this decline as 
necessarily a bad tiling. She stated in a 1992 article, "I do believe that the US will be relieved 
of some of the very extraordinary burdens that it has borne over the long period of the Cold 
War...And that is a very good thing."114 While this declinist view is a standard realist- 
internationalist position, her stance that a lessening of American global power will have 
deomestic advantages is a further confirmation of her overall realist viewpoint.
Regarding free trade, Kirkpatrick sees its benefits as overcoming protectionist views, 
putting her position in line with the standard neo-realist view. She argued that, "The large 
sucking sound heard around the world is of societies being sucked into the modernization 
process - as the global trading system sucked in Bill Clinton. It's not inevitable, but the fruits 
of modernization are nearly irresistable."115 In speaking of a modernisation process, 
Kirkpatrick is accepting a very un-neo-realist position, the neo-Wilsonian idea that there is 
one general road to development, in this case the institutionalist view that it is through 
economic, free market progress. Thus over trade, Kirkpatrick comes to a neo-realist policy 
stance through very non-neo-realist views. Yet her conditional support for free trade 
expansion, the standard neo-realist position, is clearly evident. As the quotation illustrated, 
Kirkpatrick observes the power of free trade, but does not overtly or unequivocally endorse 
its benefits. Kirkpatrick's wary acceptance of free trade as being part of the process of 
modernisation exemplified her general neo-realist stance regarding the Nafta/Gatt trade 
accords.
126
Her attitude to Europe, Nato, and European integration is more traditional. Firstly, she 
feels American power in Europe is bound to decline in the new era. "The US has in common 
with the Soviet Union the prospect of a significantly declining future in Europe."116 She 
feels this decline will be accompanied by a rise in the power of Western Europe, particularly 
through the EU. Kirkpatrick believes, "the EC will turn out to be the integrating institution of 
the new Europe." 117 Despite foreseeing a Europe with the US on the periphery, Kirkpatrick 
does not advise shaping Nato into anything more than a military alliance in an attempt to 
preserve American power, as the Europeans have never seen Nato in anything other than 
neo-realist terms, as an institution based on the shared interests of averting Soviet 
expansionism. She noted the, "American view of Nato as a multipurpose alliance of 
democracies [democratist view J, [is] a view Europeans have always resisted and are likely to 
continue to resist."118 Kirkpatrick feels the democratists* scheme to remould the alliance into 
a primarily political institution is doomed to fail, even if many Americans have thought of 
Nato in democratist terms, as Europeans have a much more neo-realist view of the alliance. 
In Kirkpatrick's view, this discrepancy in perception dooms any hope of changing Nato's 
essentially military character.
Kirkpatrick also adheres to the neo-realist line over aid to Russia. In keeping with the 
general neo-realist stance she believes that the Clinton administration is right to provide 
Russia with political, economic, and moral support. 119 However, also in keeping with neo­
realist dictates, Kirkpatrick is not sanguine about the prospects for the success of Russia's 
democratic experiment. She argued, "the prospects for democracy and development in the 
Soviet Union are exciting but not promising." 120 Neo-realists in general, and Kirkpatrick in 
particular, feel the Russian experiment in democratic reform is 'exciting' enough that some 
US aid should be given, but 'not promising' enough so that help should be quite limited.
Beyond her dominant neo-realist orientation, Kirkpatrick also holds a minority 
democratist viewpoint as can be seen in her activist advocacy for the Bosnian government. 
Kirkpatrick criticised the President's multilateralist position in Bosnia, stating, "In Bosnia, 
where the president has repeatedly promised more decisive action, the US position has folded 
once again in the face of UN and allied opposition. "121 Yet Kirkpatrick's position went well 
beyond the neo-realist critique of the administration's excessive preoccupation with 
multilateralism in the Bosnian crisis. She advocated direct American involvement in the 
conflict. Testifying before the Subcommittee on European affairs, Kirkpatrick stated, "I don't 
think that the use of American ground forces would be necessary to deal with this 
problem...! do believe that the highly focused, selective, limited and restrained use of US or
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Nato or EC or Franco-German, whomever is competent, airpower to enforce some of the 
provisions that have already been provided by the Security Council is appropriate. "122 These 
provisions included eliminating all hinderances to aid convoys, and enforcing the no-fly 
zone. Kirkpatrick also favoured securing the release of Bosnians and Croats held in 
concentration camps, and demanding the right of refugees to return to their houses, thereby 
negating ethnic cleansing. These conditions, Kirkpatrick felt, should be backed up by force if 
necessary. 123 Kirkpatrick felt the stakes were high enough in Bosnia to warrant limited 
American military involvement. As she stated, "I believe that the presence of another violent, 
expansionist, racist dictator in the heart of Europe is dangerous not only to his victims but to 
the peace and freedom of many others. "124 By comparing Milosevic to Hitler, Kirkpatrick 
underlined her sense of the importance of the Bosnian conflict for the US, a notion which 
drove her democratist advocacy of the Bosnian Muslim cause.
Kirkpatrick also favours a democratist course of action regarding China. She affirms the 
democratist premise that, "people and governments cannot live on pragmatism and profits 
alone - however enlightened the former or abundant the latter. "125 In saying this, 
Kirkpatrick rejects both the general neo-realist predilection for pragmatic tactics to be used in 
implementing foreign policy as well as the institutionalist obsession with profits. Kirkpatrick 
applies this general democratist critique of both neo-realism and institutionalism to her 
position on China. Regarding President Carter's policy of strengthening ties with China 
Kirkpatrick argued, "Why is it 'important that we make progress toward normalizing 
relations with the People's Republic of China'?...Is that more important than demonstrating 
the fidelity of our commitments?" 126 Here Kirkpatrick is referring to the American 
'commitment' to promote democratic movements both within and without China, such as 
bolstering the US commitment to the government of Taiwan. Thus Kirkpatrick has long 
espoused the hard democratist line toward China.
Former President Nixon was a realist-internationalist with conflicting minority views. 
These minority beliefs are illustrated in both his policy prescription towards Russian aid and 
his revivalist views. Nixon was a revivalist unlike the majority of his neo-realist colleagues, 
but like the democratists. His views about Russia were also more democratist than neo-realist 
in that he unequivocally favoured large-scale aid to Russia. He stated, "No other single factor 
will have a greater political impact on the world in the century to come than whether political 
and economic freedom take root and thrive in Russia and the other former Communist 
nations. Today's generation of American leaders will be judged primarily by whether they 
did everything possible to bring about this outcome. If they fail, the cost that their successors
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will have to pay will be unimaginably high. ”127 In fact, as Friedman noted two years ago, 
"it was Nixon’s speeches and articles on the issue that embarrassed Bush into taking more 
aggressive steps to help Yeltsin, through enactment of the $417 million Freedom Support 
Act. "128 Seen as one of the elder statesmen of the country, Nixon used his unique position 
as a former President to publicise his argument for large-scale aid for Russia. For him as for 
the democratists, the democratic success of Russia was essential for stability in the new 
world order.
Regarding policy towards China, the man who opened US relations with China did not 
change his mind. Unlike over Russia, Nixon's China views were classically institutionalist. 
Nixon acknowledged the moral question about the Chinese leadership but overrode it, 
believing engagement in the long-term will stabilise if not mellow the Chinese Communist 
party within the world system. He observed, "Today, China's economic power makes US 
lectures about morality and human rights imprudent. Within a decade, it will make them 
irrelevant. Within two decades, it will make them laughable. "129 Nixon believed, as do the 
institutionalists, that China's economic development will lead to its political liberalisation, 
and that this process would only be hindered if the US revoked China's MFN status. Nixon 
argued, "Economic freedom inevitably leads to political freedom. This happened in South 
Korea, Taiwan, Chile...It will happen in China, but only if economic freedom is not 
suppressed by frightened political dictators or sabotaged by shortsighted US policies cutting 
back on trade with China because of its human rights abuses." 130 Nixon's belief in the 
institutionalist notion that economic development drives political liberalisation predicated his 
advocacy of MFN status for China without conditions.
Nixon followed standard neo-realist views on trade being tactically in favour of both Gatt 
and Nafta. His support for Nafta was illustrated by his appearance with the other ex­
presidents at Clinton's side as he opened his final public relations drive to ensure its 
enactment. While agreeing with Clinton, Nixon was less vocal over trade matters than over 
Russia, reflecting neo-realism's conditional support for the free trade process. For example, 
Nixon's definition of interests - vital, critical, and peripheral - was centred on whether their 
endangerment would require the use of American military force to secure them. 131 Thus 
Nixon exhibited the neo-realists' propensity to see interests as being largely about military 
rather than economic considerations. This predilection was apparent in Nixon's neo-realist 
attitude toward trade issues, as he consistently placed them behind military security issues, 
such as Russia, in terms of his priorities.
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Over Europe, Nixon also generally towed the neo-realist line. As with Kissinger and 
Kirkpatrick, he expressed deep ambivalence over US policy towards Western Europe in the 
post-Cold War era. Yet his policy views towards Europe also had a democratist tinge. He 
acknowledged that the American role in Europe will decrease with the end of the Cold War, 
saying, "With the receding Soviet threat and advancing integration, Western Europe's need 
for close links with the US will precipitously decline. "132 He also agreed with the 
institutionalist and neo-realist position that Europe must have a greater say over its defence 
posture within the alliance. He stated, "While they understand the need for our nuclear 
guarantee and accept the voice that gives America in Europe's security decisions - they will 
object to a US policy that supports European political integration but demands a security 
relationship in which Washington retains its dominant leadership role. Our approach should 
welcome increased Western European self-reliance. "133 Nixon also agreed with most neo- 
realists that an integrated Europe poses possible dangers to America. Like Kissinger, he 
feared the Community's protectionist inclinations, saying, "a united Europe, with a greater 
GNP than that of the US, is becoming a 'fortress Europe'." 134 Finally, Nixon saw Nato as 
having a limited life-span, another neo-realist trend.
However unlike most neo-realists, Nixon did not just support Nato because nothing else 
exists, nor was he for purposely limiting its mandate to strictly the military sphere in Europe. 
"Today, no alternative security structure exists. Until a viable substitute evolves and proves 
itself, we would be making an irrevocable error in dismantling Nato or disengaging from 
Nato. In a period of massive instability in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, we should 
be exploring ways to preserve Nato rather than looking for ways to eliminate it." 135 Nixon 
wished to pursue an activist policy with regard to Nato that is more reminiscent of both 
democratism than the view of the neo-realists towards European security. For instance, he 
favoured Nato's expansion to deal militarily with out-of-area missions, an initiative that if 
adopted would transform the alliance and is a key neo-realist objective. Nixon believed that 
as it is, "the most successful regional alliance in history, Nato should become the focal point 
of cooperative foreign policy initiatives by the world's industrial democracies. "136 If seeing 
Nato as a great power club is a neo-realist notion, in Nato's centrality for his immediate post- 
Cold War European initiative, Nixon's plan also had some democratist overtones. Yet it 
retained its dominant neo-realist colouring as well. Despite favouring large-scale aid to 
Russia and seeing its democratic success as crucial for stability in the new world order, 
Nixon also favoured the eventual inclusion of the Eastern European states in Nato, which is 
the crucial element of the neo-realists' agenda for Europe. He said, "Because they share our 
values and because the current vacuum creates an incentive for adventurism, the Eastern
130
European democracies must be brought into Nato’s security sphere without granting them 
full partnership...In the longer term, Nato should develop formal security links with the 
Eastern European democracies. Our goal should be their full integration into Nato." 137 
Nixon's policy towards Europe was a mix of democratism and neo-realism, though 
ultimately he espoused the critical neo-realist view that Nato should extend into Central 
Europe.
Nixon's overall neo-realist leanings are confirmed when one looks at his stance on the 
Bosnian crisis. He shunned the institutionalist view that the conflict is primarily a civil war 
saying, "the cycle of violence began as a result of Serbian aggression against other former 
Yugoslav republics - aggression for which the US and its allies have consistently and 
repeatedly failed to exact a price." 138 It is not surprising that Nixon was critical of the 
institutionalist Clinton administration's response to the conflict. Nixon argued, "If the US 
had been willing to lead, a number of steps short of the commitment of ground forces - for 
instance, revoking the arms embargo - could have been taken early in the Bosnian crisis to 
blunt Serb aggression. Our failure to do so tarnished our reputation as an evenhanded player 
on the international stage. "139 While the quotation makes clear that Nixon never advocated 
the democratist policy prescription in Bosnia, of American military might being used to 
directly aid the Bosnian government, it is also apparent by his neo-realist advocacy of lifting 
the arms embargo that the former President was critical of the West's passive institutionalist 
response to the Bosnian crisis.
An attack of neo-realist precepts is made by both neo-Wilsonian schools of thought. 
Democratists point to the total lack of place for values and ideas in the neo-realist framework. 
Gaddis pointed out the fact that values and ideas are as omnipresent in the international 
system as the presence of conflict has been. Gaddis stated, "The simple persistence of values 
in politics ought to be another clue that one is dealing here with objects more complicated 
than billiard balls." 140 By concentrating on structural relations at the expense of ideas, and 
advocating the beguilingly simple billiard ball theory of the international system, democratists 
charge that neo-realists have oversimplified International Relations, leaving out the realm of 
ideology and other complexities in the international arena. Further, democratists charge that 
this conceptual error leads to practical policy mistakes. For advocates of neo-realism, there is 
always the danger of exalting technique over purpose. This has been a major criticism of the 
Nixon-Kissinger years. As Patrick Glynn shrewdly observed, the two master neo-realists 
have been accused of operating a, "policy of value-neutral managerialism."141 This criticism 
leads to a further existential reproof of the neo-realist position. For instance, despite the
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obvious tactical brilliance of Mettemich's policy, in the end he merely played the cards of a 
declining power well, he did not reverse Austria’s slow decline. There are limits to the gains 
to be made by exploiting the objective international conditions a policy-maker finds 
himself/herself in, however brilliantly done, if the statesman does not attempt to transcend 
such conditions.
A further existential argument can be made about Huntington's new formulation of the 
neo-realist creed in his article, "The Clash of Civilizations?" As William Pfaff has pointed 
out, if conflict is, "interpreted as collisions of civilizations, they are thereby transfered from 
the realm of the negotiable and solvable into that of a perpetual and unsolvable conflict...a 
conflict of civilizations has no solution. "142 In this instance, as civilisation differences 
cannot be breached by any act of policy, or in the short-term, is Huntington saying that these 
conflicts between civilisations are to be expected and beyond the power of mortals to solve? 
Neo-realists feel that such circumstances can be manipulated, but they cannot be changed. 
This conservative bowing to historical inevitabilities fatally weakens neo-realism for the more 
optimistic liberal neo-Wilsonians, who believe that genuine change within the international 
system is both desirable and possible, and that the prudent strategy is not always to accept 
international conditions as unchangeable.
Institutionalist critiques of neo-realism take a slightly different tack from democratists', 
emphasising the over-simplicity of the neo-realist model. Firstly, they criticise neo-realists 
for seeing the state as a coherent unit, and foreign policy decisions as not being the result of 
bureaucratic politics within the 'billiard ball'. As Nye and Keohane noted in their examination 
of Canadian and American sub-units of government, "certain governmental sub-units may 
discover that their purposes are closer to the purposes of particular sub-units of another 
government than they are to the goals of other agencies within the same government. "143 
For example, Nye and Keohane found that the American and Canadian military forces share 
interests not shared by civilians in either country. For institutionalists the validity of 
bureaucratic politics means that the 'billiard ball' rational actor theory of the state's decision­
making process is too simplistic, as it does not adequately explain the complexities of policy 
formulation.
Institutionalists also believe that in the new world order there are more balls on the table 
(to continue the billiard ball analogy) in the international system than merely states. As Nye 
pointed out, "Waltz's spare structural definition of system ignores international economic 
processes and institutions that can also have strong effect on states behavior." 144 Here the
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institutionalist Nye provided the classic critique his school of thought directs at the neo­
realist, Waltz. For Nye, states are affected by international institutions, particularly 
international economic institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and Gatt. In the case 
of many developing countries, these interactions with international organisations are crucial 
components of their foreign policies. Institutionalists believe international organisations have 
become too important to be excluded from the billiard table, as they are in neo-realist 
formulations. Thus institutionalists see important complexities omitted by neo-realists at both 
the sub-state and supra-state levels of analysis. Stephen Gill elaborated on this, pointing out 
that neo-realists are, "weak in explaining the social basis of power relations and the 
development of non-state organizations such as transnational companies, and other social 
forces which transcend national boundries,"145 such as international organisations, 
ideology, and economics. As Gill noted, neo-realists see power as the crucial element in the 
international system but do not either adequately value the components of power that cannot 
be easily measured (ideology, cultural cohesion, political stability, etc.), nor do they allow 
for the fact that components of power can reach beyond the boundaries of a single state.
Lastly, institutionalists believe that neo-realism's structural rigidity makes its proponents 
unable to see that major internal and external changes to states make 1996 more than simply a 
replay of earlier multipolar periods. As Jack Snyder noted, neo-realism, "exaggerates the 
inevitability that international conflict and national excesses will follow from the erosion of 
the bipolar division of Europe. Its assumption, that profound changes in the domestic 
character of countries since the interwar period will be readily reversed as a consequence of 
changes in the structure of the international system, is untenable. "146 By their overvaluation 
of the effect the international structure has on determining an individual state's foreign policy, 
neo-realists undervalue the changes in the international system, such as free trade leading to 
greater prosperity and the increased democratisation of in the world, which makes 1996 
unlike 1936. For Snyder, neo-realism's theoretical flaws are borne out in the fact that the 
world is safer now than during the time of the height of Soviet might. Whatever brush fires 
may rage, institutionalists see the international system as being more secure than during the 
Cold War, regardless of what neo-realists might believe. Yet despite all these neo-Wilsonian 
criticisms, neo-realism has proved remarkably resilient in the new era as has the state, which 
lies at the heart of its analysis.
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Chart 3-2 Neo-Realist Policy Regarding Five Key Issues
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Chapter 4: The Institutionalists
Chart 4-1: The Belief System of the Institutionalists
1) Background: Montesquieu
2) Goal: Promote economic prosperity through the spread of international 
institutions which advocate free-market policies.
3) Assume: Due to interdependence, capitalist states have common interests, 
this fact leads to international co-operation. Multilateral 
organisations facilitate co-operation in the world economic system 
(e.g. GATT, IMF, World Bank). Absolute rather than relative 
economic success is crucial for a state, so increased free trade is 
almost always welcomed. The capitalisation of the world is their 
pre-eminent goal, initially it can be without democracy. They see 
democratic change as predicated by the 'modernisation' of a state 
(its capitalisation) as development follows universal stages. 
Increased world contact between states is seen as leading to 
increased interdependence and co-operation.
4) See state: Billiard ball theory is too simplistic, especially with the increased 
importance of multinational corporations and international 
organisations in the world political arena.
5) Key analytical 
orientation:
Economic
6) Declinist/
Revivalist:
Declinist
7) World Structure: Multipolar (Tripolar)
8) Preferred mode
of action:
Almost always multilateral action, based on international
consensus.
i
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9) Basis of force: UN Security Council, and other international multilateral 
institutions.
10) World Policeman: UN
11) Key areas and foci: International Organisations, Trilateral powers 
(US, Europe, Japan), and Asia.
12) Schurmann
classification:
Internationalists
13) General political 
supporters:
Primarily Democrats (Liberals).
14) Political actors: Christopher, the Clinton administration in general.
15) Bureaucratic 
bastions of support:
State Department, and currently the Presidency.
16) Policy cluster 
preference towards 
Western Europe/ 
European defence 
system:
Especially favour better and increased ties with the EU, as they do 
not see it turning protectionist. Favour increased 
’Europeanisation' of Europe's defence both in and out of Nato 
(e.g. WEU). Want a more egalitarian Nato, modelled along the 
lines of JFK's 'twin pillars'. Favour increased European political, 
security, and foreign policy integration.
17) Policy cluster 
preference towards
Non-interventionist, unless there is an international consensus
to intervene.
Bosnia:
18) Policy cluster Strongly favour both, 
preference towards 
Trade
(Nafta andGatt):
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19) Policy cluster Foreign aid should be co-ordinated by multilateral institutions like 
preference towards the IMF and World Bank. Want to engage Russia in the Western 
Russia: economic community, favour increased trade over aid. For aid to
Russia, less pro-aid than the democratists and more so than the 
neo-realists. Unlike democratists, they want no easing of tough 
transition to the capitalist system.
20) Policy cluster Soft-line evolutionary change favoured (MFN under almost all 
preference towards circumstances), even more pro-MFN than the neo-realists. Want
China:
21) Academics:
22) Variations within 
the school of 
thought:
to delink MFN from human rights considerations.
Hoffmann, Keohane, Nye - institutionalists.
There is little variation, as there are no real ’supranationalists' 
(radical institutionalists who advocate and foresee world 
government), only 'moderate* institutionalists (who still see the 
state as central to the international system).
Although both are heirs of Wilsonianism, institutionalism has a different philosophical 
heritage than democratism. Institutionalists look to the eighteenth century French philosopher 
Montesquieu as their founder. They adhere to his view that, ’’The state of things in Europe is 
that all states depend on each other,”1 or in other words, institutionalists see the international 
arena as characterised by interdependence. Their primary goal is to promote economic 
liberalism through the use of international institutions. This view has a long pedigree in 
American political thinking. As Kissinger suggested, there has been a, "perennial American 
assumption that economic well-being automatically ensures political stability. "2 
Institutionalists see prosperity as the central factor leading both to general domestic stability 
and through stability to international peace. This view follows the common sense notion that 
people whose material needs are met are far less likely to become politically radicalised. This 
view explains the efforts of Herbert Hoover with European refugees after 1918-3 and the 
Marshall Plan after World War II.4 In both cases, the US did not want the economic 
devastation wrought by world war to radicalise Europe. In order to avoid this political crisis, 
America sought to attack the economic malaise afflicting Europe.
Far more than aid is required to make this institutionalist policy work. For 
institutionalists, free trade is the key to fostering both global economic prosperity and
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political stability. As Gaddis noted, "It has long been a central assumption of liberal political 
philosophy that if only one could maximize the flow of ideas, commodities, capital, and 
people across international boundries, then the causes of war would drop away. "5 Unlike 
neo-realists, institutionalists do not see free trade merely as an instrument to enhance a state's 
power, but as positive in and of itself. As President Clinton stated, "The habits of commerce 
run counter to the habits of war...People who raise each others living standards are less 
likely to become combatants. "6 It is this hard-headed calculation that lies at the heart of the 
institutionalist school of thought. As capitalism is seen by institutionalists as the most modem 
and most successful economic system present, it is not surprising that institutionalists see its 
extension as crucial to the growth of the economic prosperity that they believe is essential for 
a stable international system to emerge. Burman argued, "The fundamental principle which 
will best serve American interests is to take the lead in managing the extension of the 
capitalist system around the globe. "7 Institutionalists believe that in promoting capitalism 
they will stoke the central engine that propels the motive force of history.
Institutionalists are the direct heirs of Schurmann's internationalists, as their primary 
concerns are reflected by the internationalists’ policy prescriptions. As Schurmann argued the 
internationalists, "anticipated the great internationalization of the American economy 
following the end of the war. "8 Schurmann also revealed that his internationalists shared 
today's institutionalists core beliefs. He added, "the core belief of the internationalist cuirent 
was the need for international systems. "9 Beyond this shared central concern for international 
systems Schurmann's internationalists and today's institutionalists share a primary belief in 
the centrality of free trade in promoting prosperity and stability. Schurmann concluded that, 
"the key concern of the universalist [internationalist] current: (was) free trade fuelled by 
sound money. "10 As with the neo-realists, the institutionalists are the historical descendants 
of an element of Schurmann's classification system.
Institutionalism's key analytical orientation is clearly economic, almost deterministically 
so its critics would charge. It is certainly true that world economic processes are crucial 
inputs for subsequent institutionalist analysis and policy prescriptions, and that 
institutionalists view the economic variable in the overall equation of power as a pivotal factor 
in assessing a state’s overall strength. 11 One of the factors institutionalists cite as a reason 
for the relative rise of the economic variable in the overall equation of power (and the j 
corresponding decline in the relevance of the military variable) is the static nature of the ; 
military system in the Cold War era. Nye and Jones argued, "a strong case can be made that; 
in a world of nuclear stalemate, economic dimensions of power become more important." 12 J
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As the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers became lethal enough to threaten the very 
existence of life on the planet if they were used, these very destructive capabilities proscribed 
their use and, institutionalists would argue, their efficacy as an instrument of power greatly 
diminished. By the end of the Cold War, many institutionalists thought that the long-standing 
process first chronicled by Keohane and Nye in the early 70s, whereby economic variables in 
the overall equation of power became more important than military factors, had at last come 
to pass. As Sorensen suggested, "superconductors are becoming more important to the 
balance of power than supercarriers.''13 Institutionalists believe that as the law of 
diminishing returns came to characterise superpower nuclear competition, economic factors 
have become increasingly important in the overall power equation, and that this ongoing 
process has accelerated with the end of the Cold War.
Institutionalists believe that economic factors can be seen as the single most important 
variable in the overall equation of power in their effect on a state's domestic politics. The 
political truism has long been acknowledged that domestic economic concerns in democracies 
almost always outweigh military and international concerns for the electorate, except in times 
of extensive warfare directly involving the core interests of the state. Brzezinski suggested, 
"For the average citizen the imperatives of consumption [a chief institutionalist concern] are 
now more important than those of territory [a primary neo-realist concern], or ideology [a 
central democratist concern]." 14 Thus to win reelection, a political decision-maker must put 
domestic economic concerns in a central position in his/her conduct of foreign policy. While 
this has always been true, the 1992 presidential election provided a classic example of the 
importance of this process. 15 George Bush, despite an overwhelmingly favourable poll 
rating for his conduct of foreign policy, was defeated by Bill Clinton, who pledged to make 
domestic economic prosperity a central focus of his foreign policy. As Clinton supporter, 
E.J. Dionne,Jr., noted, "the way a nation's economy works is the central question - at times, 
the only question - for the electorates who send the diplo-military types to the summit 
meetings." 16 For institutionalists, economic considerations largely determine political 
outcomes in most democratic states.
A major difference between the institutionalists and their neo-Wilsonian cousins, the 
democratists, is over the question of American decline. Unlike the democratists, 
institutionalists are convinced declinists. They see American decline as partly engendered by 
the rise of the economic variable in the overall equation of power itself. Institutionalists
believe that this shift hurts the US as it is far more dominant in the military sphere than in the •!
economic, and thus the shift itself is bound to lead to a diminution of American power, j
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Stanley Hoffmann stated, "As John Zysman noted, the shift from military to economic 
influence hurts the US, insofar as others depend on American military technology, and in the 
economic realm a US deep in debt is far from the free giant it was after the war; our ability to 
extract foreign policy gains from economic power has dropped, and we depend increasingly 
on foreign sources for important products and technologies. "17 Thus institutionalists see the 
shift of the overall equation of power in favour of the economic sphere coinciding with 
American domestic decline, largely brought about by economic stagnation. These two factors 
are central to the institutionalists' declinist view.
To rectify American domestic decline, institutionalists offer a far different program from 
the realist-isolationists. While institutionalists agree with the realist-isolationists that America 
is in decline, to halt this process they urge more multilateralism and international contact and 
not less as the realist-isolationists advocate. To avoid permanent decline, institutionalists 
believe America needs an era of domestic retrenchment, thus collective security and an 
increasing reliance on international organisations, such as Nato and the UN, are essential to 
preserve some sort of order in the international system as the US sets about dramatic 
domestic reform. As Brzezinski argued, "US policy will have to strike a more deliberate 
balance between global needs for continued American commitment, the desirability of some 
development of US regional security responsibilities and the imperatives of America's 
domestic renewal." 18 Increased internationalism thus becomes a strategy to help keep the US 
both engaged in the international system while at the same time allowing America to retrench 
and deal with its domestic ills. This notion is an undergirding principle of the foreign policy 
of tlie Clinton administration.
With the increase of American involvement in and yet delegation of decision-making 
power to international organisations, goes a correspondingly decreasing American say in 
these institutions. As Bergsten commented, "The US has to make the difficult adjustment 
from hegemon to partner. "19 While institutionalists advocate America relying increasingly on 
international organisations, they readily acknowledge that due to decline, America cannot 
expect to have the same influence in multilateral institutions that it once had. For instance, 
institutionalists believe (unlike democratists) that for Nato to survive it must become an 
organisation modelled on President Kennedy's conception of 'twin pillars', with an 
increasingly assertive Europe playing a roughly equal role with the US in Nato decision­
making. With the US military commitment down to 100,000 troops, for institutionalists it no 
longer follows that the military head of Nato ought necessarily to be an American general. As 
believers in American decline, institutionalists are aware of the need for a lessening of US
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authority in international institutions, as other states take on an increasing burden in 
maintaining international structures.
Institutionalists see the world as generally multipolar and specifically tripolar, with Japan 
and Germany (or Western Europe) being the other poles of power besides the US. Obviously 
this structural analysis flows directly from the fact that economics is the key factor in 
institutionalism’s analytical orientation. Nye believes, "the world economy is tripolar and has 
been since the 70’s."20 It is not surprising that the three major economic powers of the post­
Cold War era are seen by institutionalists as the three powers of the world, so heavily do they 
weight economic might in determining a state’s overall power. As Bergsten stated, "The big 
three of economics will supplant the big two of nuclear competition as the powers that will 
shape much of the Twenty-first century. "21 By their tripolar structural analysis of the world, 
institutionalists make it obvious how greatly they weigh the economic variable in their overall 
equation of power assessment.
A belief in die fundamental change in the nature of the international system is a core tenet 
of institutionalism. Brzezinski argued, "Though America is today admittedly the world's only 
superpower, global conditions are too complex and America’s domestic health too precarious 
to maintain a worldwide Pax Americana. "22 So while like democratists institutionalists such 
as Brzezinski see the US as the sole superpower, unlike the democratists the institutionalists 
feel that changes in the nature of the international system itself limits American 
preponderance. Institutionalists believe that the relative power of the state itself is in decline 
in the international arena as more non-national actors (e.g. Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) and International Organisations (IOs)) gain power at the international level. To 
return to the billiard ball analogy, institutionalists believe that states are not the only balls now 
on the table.
A major assumption underlying the institutionalist school of thought is that due to 
interdependence, capitalist states share interests, and that these shared interests lead to 
increased international stability. 'Shared interests' is the catchphrase for institutionalists, just 
as 'shared values' is a crucial notion for democratists, and 'national interests' is an essential 
thought undergirding neo-realism. Bergsten illustrated this process. He argued that, "The 
extensive interpenetration of companies and financial markets throughout the three regions 
(US, Western Europe, and Japan) militates against a breakdown of cooperation."23 The key 
idea here is that as increasingly advanced industrial states have large economic interests in 
other large industrial states, the competition that neo-realists see as at the heart of the
149
international system is joined and to an extent superseded by the notion of co-operation 
present in institutionahst thinking. These shared economic interests militate against conflict, 
be it economic or martial. As Rosecrance suggested, "the interpenetration of investment [e.g. 
MNCs] in industrial economies provides a mutual stake in each other's success. "24 Burman 
illustrated how the process of interdependence leads to co-operation. He commented, "as 
other powers come to invest more and more in the US economy they develop less and less 
interest in damaging it. "25 For instance institutionalists believe that the more money Japan 
invests in the US, the more Japanese investors will want the American economy to flourish. 
As politicians in a democracy need to be mindful of the economic interests (including the 
business interests) of their people, it is unlikely that the Japanese government would pursue 
new policies that would actively attempt to harm the American economy. Thus 
interdependence creates interests that discourage conflict. This is a very different view of 
foreign investment from that of the neo-realists, who see increased foreign penetration as a 
threat to the autonomy of a particular state. However for institutionalists, it is just these 
private actors (businesses) whose shared interests are essential for curbing conflict.
Not only do institutionalists feel that interdependence will lessen the threat of international 
conflict, they also feel it will hasten increased global co-operation itself. Institutionalists 
believe that as states co-ordinate societal interdependence as a response to the 'new' 
transnational issue areas such as: the environment, AIDS, terrorism, monetary rates, and free 
trade, which cannot be effectively dealt with by a single state, the process will lead to 
increased policy interdependence. As Keohane and Nye reasoned, "the involvement of 
international organizations in them [transgovemmental relations], is generally stimulated by 
the activities of elites trying to cope with increased societal interdependence. "26 
Institutionalists see that as the new issue areas can only be successfully dealt with 
multilaterally, the interdependence that this creates will logically lead to the formation of new 
international organisations and/or increased levels of transgovemmental relations to deal with 
the new 'global' agenda. Institutionalists believe that organisational structures will follow in 
the wake of global issues that logically lead to increased co-operation between states. 
Increased interdependence will thus change the nature of the state, limiting its ability to act 
unilaterally by the very nature of the 'new' global issues it encounters.
According to institutionalists, this erosion of state authority will also occur at the sub­
state level. As the new global agenda will make the need for increasingly specialised 
governmental agencies apparent, states will have to go outside national parameters to receive 
current information on global issues. For example, the US Department of Health and Human
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Services will have to attend a WHO (World Health Organisation) seminar on the latest AIDS 
research, or the Department of the Treasury will speak directly to the Bundesbank about 
European interest rates. Institutionalists feel that this process is making the world both far 
more fragmented and complicated. Nye and Keohane note that one of the effects of this 
process is the further erosion of national sovereignty, as transnational coalitions form. They 
argued that one important result of increased interdependence, "is that subunits of 
governments are provided greater opportunities for transnational contacts and coalitions. "27 
These coalitions will form partly because of the great affinities that are likely to exist between 
individuals that meet as a result of this transnational process. For example, individuals that 
work for the Department of Health and Human Services are likely to have much in common 
with officials from the WHO. They share a concern for stopping the spread of disease, (as 
both have devoted their working lives to this cause, it is safe to assume that for them it is 
probably a higher priority than for others outside the field), and a technical understanding of 
medicine that laypeople would not possess. In many cases, these affinities will lead to shared 
sympathies (e.g. a common understanding of fighting losing budget battles with their 
executives, who would place health care as a lower priority than they are apt to) and even to 
informal shared bargaining positions vis-a-vis their executives. For instance, in the 60s an 
American military attache was concerned about the slow-down in negotiations to return 
Okinawa to the Japanese. As both he and his opposite Japanese number feared the effect the 
delay was having on US-Japanese relations, he helped his Japanese counterpart draft memos 
to Washington in such a way that they would be received by sympathetic American officials 
and the talks could be successfully concluded.28 Institutionalists believe that the increased 
interdependence brought about by the new global agenda will both facilitate increased 
international co-operation and accelerate the decline of the notion of sovereignty being 
indivisible.
Institutionalists, while recognising that increased interdependence can have adverse 
consequences (i.e. the exporting of stock market crashes that occurred in October 1987), 
generally think that the process of increased interdependence, for all its implications, is a 
favourable international development. An example of the beneficial aspects of 
interdependence institutionalists see, lies in their belief that the communications revolution, 
which made access to media coverage across state boundaries far more prevalent in the last 
decade, helped to topple the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe. Zbigniew Brzezinski 
developed the institutionalist argument, presciently saying in 1984, "in the age of transistors 
and mass communications totalitarian control can be pierced. "29 Institutionalists believe that 
increased communications interdependence helped lead to the decline of totalitarianism, that
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as subjects of totalitarian states were no longer dependent on the state for all of their 
information, a totalitarian regime would lose its essential control over its people. Brzezinski 
felt that this was precisely what occurred in Eastern Europe, saying, "With the numbers of 
VCR’s available to Eastern Europeans rapidly increasing, and despite official efforts to 
impose some controls, the traditional communist control over domestic mass communications 
was disintegrating,"30 by the late 1980s. The institutionalist view that increased 
technological interdependence has lead to a general decline in a state's sovereignty, a loss felt 
most crushingly by totalitarian rulers who depended on this sovereignty to control the flow of 
information to its inhabitants, is just one example of the general institutionalist belief that 
increased global interdependence is a basically favourable phenomenon.
A major reason institutionalists believe international organisations have changed the 
international environment is that unlike neo-realists, they believe states are motivated by 
absolute rather than relative gains in setting out their policy agendas. Institutionalists feel that 
this is particularly true in the economic sphere. As Hoffmann commented, seeing the world 
as a neo-realist zero-sum game is, "not an appropriate description of rational behavior on 
most of the economic or technical chessboards. "31 This is because electorates largely 
measure absolute rather than relative economic gains in deciding who to vote for. As Nye and 
Keohane argued, ’"doing better than the past’ is more important to governments than ’doing 
better than other countries’ in economic activities...The political processes domestically will 
certainly push governments towards a willingness to sacrifice relative power, if necessary, 
for the sake of real economic gains that can be translated into votes and jobs. "32
The Uruguay Round of the Gatt provided a good illustration of this process. Most econ­
omists predicted that the approval of the pact would add billions to the world economy. 
Relatively, the Third World stood to gain more out of the agreement than the G-7 states. 
However none of the advanced industrial states, many mired in recession, thought to reject 
the accord because relatively the Third World gained more out of it as a percentage of GDP 
than they did. Rather, they saw the opportunity to obtain crucial economic advantages for 
their countries, advantages that could spell the difference between victory and defeat at the 
next election. :
A central institutionalist assumption is that multilateral institutions facilitate the 
international co-operation that increased global interdependence has made so imperative. 
Institutionalists feel that this is particularly true of the world economic system where the Gatt, 
the IMF, and the World Bank are essential for the smooth running of the global economic
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order.33 Like neo-realists, institutionalists believe states use international institutions to 
further their own objectives. As Keohane and Nye stated, "International institutions have 
very little strength of their own: to be successful, they must help states attain their 
interests. "34 For instance, Joseph Nye believed that international institutions generally reflect 
the basic interests of their most powerful founding member, and that the founding of an 
international organisation leads to the semi-institutionalisation of the strongest founding 
state's power. Nye suggested, "international institutions and norms are another potential 
source of power, to the extent that they structure other countries in a manner that accords 
with that of the dominant power."35 For example Eastern European states such as Poland 
and the Czech Republic, in an effort to qualify for loans from the IMF, radically restructured 
their economies, through the use of shock therapy, from command economies to market 
systems. As the US was the strongest founding member of the IMF, it is not surprising that 
it generally reflects America's free market views. Thus the US was able to indirectly affect 
the economic policies of the new democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Institutionalists agree with neo-realists that states use international organisations for their own 
ends. In fact, institutionalists believe that partly because states' needs are met by international 
institutions, the most virulent forms of hyper-nationalism are contained. Brzezinski 
commented, "nationalism satisfied and controlled by multilateral arrangements becomes 
internationalism. "36 Yet institutionalists, unlike neo-realists, see the relationship between 
international organisations and states as more complicated than merely one whereby a state 
pursues its ends through multilateral means.
Institutionalists see tire relationship between states and international institutions as a two­
way process. Keohane and Nye commented on this critical difference between neo-realism 
and institutionalism, "At the broadest level the issue is whether states view institutions purely 
instrumentally - as a means to given ends - or whether they come to redefine their own 
interests in light of the rules or practices of the institutions."37 Institutionalists believe that 
international institutions are more than just instruments for states to use. Nye and Keohane 
cleverly illustrated how institutions can develop a life of their own. They suggested that, 
"Institutions that have become successful tend to create interests that support them: even if 
Nato and the Gatt could not have been formed de novo under the conditions of today, they 
were able to persist under these new conditions."38 If Nato were merely an instrument 
created for its component states to pursue their individual interests, which were primarily to 
defend Western Europe from Soviet attack, as this is no longer an immediate danger neo­
realists argue that Nato may shortly disband. However just the reverse has occurred, with 
much of the former Warsaw Pact clamouring to join. This example supports the
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institutionalist contention that successful international organisations are more than the sum of 
their parts. Institutionalists believe that international institutions are themselves actors in the 
international arena. Keohane and Hoffman cleverly reached this conclusion, using neo-realist 
analysis to illustrate what logically ought to be the situation in Europe in the post-Cold War 
era if international institutions did not exist or had only an instrumental value for states. They 
argued, "In an anarchic world of sovereign states, absent international institutions, the US 
would presumably balance against Europe in the world political economy, as Europe would 
balance against the US in the security realm.39 But international institutions change realities 
and expectations. "40 Institutionalists believe that international organisations, in promoting 
states' shared interests, have fundamentally altered the character of the international system 
from the Hobbesian jungle neo-realists envisage.
Another major institutionalist assumption is that, unlike the democratists, institutionalists 
believe capitalism and not democracy should be the pre-eminent goal in a state's 
modernisation. Indeed institutionalists support capitalising states, such as China, that as yet 
show no signs of democratic political organisation. Another illustration of the fact that 
promoting democracy is not the primary institutionalist goal, is that unlike the democratists, 
institutionalists believe that strong support for international organisations should not depend 
upon their having a democratic orientation. For example, institutionalists see the UN as a 
major actor on the international stage and strongly support it having an increased global role, 
despite the fact that many member states of the UN are dictatorships. Instead institutionalists 
believe American interests are best served by promoting the growth of the market economy 
across the globe, and that if this process comes into conflict with the support of a particular 
state’s evolution towards democracy, promotion of the market ought to take precedence. This 
is partly due to the fact that institutionalists believe that capitalism, particularly free trade, 
benefits all states.
As the promotion of capitalism is central for institutionalists, it is advocated even if it 
comes into conflict with democratic considerations. As Keohane argued, "In some countries, 
democratic institutions and modem capital may be compatible, but there is no guarantee that 
this will be the case everywhere. "41 A codicil should be added to Keohane's statement. That 
is, in the short run, institutionalists feel promoting capitalism and democracy can be at odds, 
but that in the longer run there is seen to be a link between the two. One of the reasons that 
institutionalists support the promotion of capitalism over democracy is precisely because in 
the long-term they see the free market leading to modernising states increased 
democratisation. Theodore Moran underscored the institutionalist belief, shared by Marxists,
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that economic factors largely determine the long-term political orientation of a state. 
Commenting on the tripolar world, Moran stated that, "success in multilateral trade 
agreements will likewise ease the pressure for more insulated neomercantilist blocs in 
Europe, Asia, and North America, and help build the economic ’substructure' to support the 
'superstructure' of ongoing political coordination among industrial democracies."42 It is 
curious that Moran here even uses Marxist terminology to implicitly affirm the link between 
the Marxist and institutional assumptions that economic processes largely drive social and 
political forces.
Institutionalists feel that although the promotion of capitalism will eventually lead to the 
adoption of democracy, an indeterminate time lag is to be expected. In line with Wilsonian 
universalism, institutionalists believe that there is a single path for a state to follow toward 
'modernisation', and that the adoption of a free market capitalist economy is the highest form 
of economic development. However institutionalists, unlike democratists, argue that there is 
an enduring link between capitalism and democracy. They feel that this process is inevitable 
because of the nature of the free enterprise system itself. As former Senator Timothy Wirth 
argued, "The educated, informed workforce and the habits of risk taking and independent 
thought necessary for economic success, cannot easily coexist for long with political 
repression and lack of freedom. "43 That is because the very attributes needed for success in 
capitalism; freedom of thought, the ability to adapt, and the propensity to take risks, are not 
qualities that are valued in a totalitarian state or dictatorship. Thus eventually institutionalists 
believe that dictatorships attempting economic reform will end up with a renewed dictatorship 
and economic retrenchment away from capitalism, or chaos at worst; or the political nature of 
the regime will become more pluralist to keep it in line with the newly-instituted free market 
reforms. Institutionalists point to South Korea as an example of where the latter process 
occurred, with its political power gradually shifting in the 80s from the military, so that now 
it is a bona fide democracy. Regarding China, a state with a Communist, totalitarian political 
system engaged in a program of rapid conversion to capitalism, Brzezinski commented, 
"Chinese communist leaders will have to face the fact that productively creative socio­
economic pluralism is incompatible with a system of one party rule that rejects political 
pluralism. "44 The difference in opinion between democratists and institutionalists over 
whether the US should principally promote capitalism or democracy is one of the major 
reasons the two neo-Wilsonian schools of thought ought to be considered as separate entities. 
Institutionalists try to square the circle in this debate, urging that all who wish to see genuine 
democratic advancement throughout the world should primarily support the expansion of the
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free market, even when the two notions come into conflict, as the market will eventually lead 
to democratisation.
Institutionalists believe that the realist conception of the state is in drastic need of an 
update. However, like neo-realists, institutionalists believe that the state remains the primary 
actor in the international arena. As Hoffmann argued, "The states remain the only legitimate 
public authorities and mobilizers of public resources, but the problems they face demand 
cooperative solutions."45 Institutionalists see neo-realism’s state-centric analysis of the 
international system as valid, however they do not feel it goes far enough. Institutionalists 
neither see states as the only significant actors in the international arena, nor do they view 
states as unitary, rational actors, as do neo-realists. It is here that the institutionalist concepts 
of transnational relations and transgovemmental relations come into play. The terms are 
neatly defined by Keohane and Nye, "'transnational' applies when we relax the assumption 
that states are the only actors, and 'transgovemmental' applies when we relax the assumption 
that states act as units."46 Institutionalists thus criticise the neo-realist concept that states are 
rational actors and have a large degree of autonomy. Keohane criticised neo-realist 
contentions about the state from a sub-national perspective, saying, "The national interest is 
not self-evident, even if everyone uses the term. Not only do sub-national interests affect 
national policy, judgements about the national interest among top officials will also vary."47 
Thus, as has been noted earlier in discussions about interdependence, institutionalists criticise 
neo-realist assertions about the nature of the state using a bureaucratic politics perspective. 
However as Hoffmann recognised, this is not the crux of the institutionalist assault on the 
neo-realist conception of the state. He argued that, "the target of foreign policy, for world 
orders sake, should be the external behavior, not the internal makeup of governments. "48 
Unlike democratists, institutionalists focus their criticism of the traditional concept of the state 
on the supranational level of analysis. They see the international system as capable of being 
described as an arena of transnational politics. Keohane and Nye expertly delineated the 
institutionalist position. They suggested "Institutionalist arguments focus neither on the 
structure of the international system, emphasized by neo-realism, nor on the interactions 
between domestic politics and international relations, on which liberalism [democratism] 
focuses. The principal focus of institutionalism is on international political processes. "49 By 
focusing on supranational factors in the international arena, the institutionalists formulate a 
unique critique of the standard belief in the centrality of the state in international politics.
In many ways then, the institutionalist view of the state is an uneasy compromise 
between the neo-realist conception of the state as supreme, and the democratist notion that it
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is at the lower, fragmented, domestic level that policy is generally formed through 
bureaucratic political tussles and local political considerations. As Keohane and Nye argued, 
institutionalism, "is consistent with aspects of realism since states are viewed, in both 
approaches, as the principal actors in world politics, and their relative power capabilities are 
considered to be crucial determinants of their behavior...However, institutionalists recognize, 
with liberals [democratists], that states are not the sole significant actors in world politics."50 
Institutionalists see the other significant actors on the world stage as being divided into two 
large sub-categories, international organisations and multinational corporations. As has been 
discussed earlier, institutionalists see international organisations as actors in their own right 
in the international arena. Institutionalists feel that organisations such as the UN, Nato, the 
EU, the IMF, the Gatt, the World Bank, the OECD, and UNCTAD, all play a significant 
international role. However, it is the great increase in power of the MNCs that is the single 
greatest reason institutionalists believe the international arena has been fundamentally altered.
There is no doubting the economic clout of the MNCs. As Keohane and Ooms pointed 
out, "the overseas output of American run enterprises alone was $120 billion in 1967, 
representing in effect, the world's third largest economy."51 Nye and Keohane further 
detailed the great financial power of MNCs, noting, "In 1965 some 85 business enterprises 
each had annual sales larger than the GNP's of some 57 voting members of the UN. "52 
Clearly a good many MNCs have greater financial wherewithal than most Third World states. 
Nor do institutionalists (unlike neo-realists) believe that these corporations are largely 
instruments of a particular state. They are in the business of satisfying their shareholders, not 
furthering the national interests of the state where their headquarters happen to be. They are 
in many respects corporations without states, as their officials’ primary loyalty is to the 
MNC, not any particular state. Institutionalists believe that the geometric proliferation of 
MNCs since the 1960s has radically altered the international arena, by greatly reducing state 
sovereignty. As Keohane and Ooms argued, MNCs are, "creating large and politically 
significant areas of activity not controlled by any government"53 Nye echoed this view, 
observing, "large governments are losing their ability to control private actors that work 
easily across international borders. "54 Institutionalists believe that the MNC is the final nail 
in the coffin of the mirage of state sovereignty. Nye and Keohane suggested, "We have just 
noted that transnational relations may make all states dependent on forces none of them 
control. "55 For institutionalists, as has been suggested, this is particularly true in the 
economic sphere.
157
However institutionalists do not believe that the MNCs will displace the state as the 
primary actor on the international stage any time in the near future. Rather they see the 
process as both more subtle and more complicated than this. Keohane and Ooms argued that 
the new world will be one in which, "the emergence of transnational relations in which the 
role of states is not so dominant as it may have been regarded in the past. For the foreseeable 
future, however, it is not the multinational business enterprise in itself that will be decisive 
for world politics but relations between enterprises and states."56 For example, for every 
case where MNCs successfully cajoled states into action to protect their interests (i.e. The 
United Fruit Company in Guatemala in the 50s, Union Miniere in Katanga in the 60s, ITT in 
Chile in the 70s), there are more where governments did not do what was in MNCs interests 
(i.e.. American agribusiness failing to stop the US from applying sanctions on the USSR 
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). Institutionalists, unlike Soviet critics of capitalism, 
do not see capitalist states as merely serving the interests of its dominant business class. 
Rather they see a subtle process whereby MNCs influence states and vice-versa.
For institutionalists the growing complexity of the international system no longer 
corresponds with neo-realism's simple models of both the state and the global arena. 
Institutionalists, as Nye argued, see "the growing complexity of world politics, with more 
actors and issues, "57 being relevant than are dealt with by neo-realism's spare paradigm. 
Rosecrance believed events have overtaken the rational actor model of the state. He argued, 
"That conception, of each state-unit acting like a little automaton, self-sufficient and 
autonomous, is belied by recent history, and it cannot last much longer. "58 Krause and Nye 
reminded us that models, to be useful in the social sciences, must roughly correspond to 
reality. They observed, "the world is complex and models must reflect the essential 
ingredients of reality to be useful. "59 Due to the increased complexity of the international 
system, symbolised by the rise of MNCs, institutionalists see neo-realist constructs, such as 
the billiard-ball conception of international relations, as being overly simplified and no longer 
relevant to successfully explaining the global arena. For them, the complexities of 
bureaucratic politics and especially transnational relations, must be included in any model of 
the international system if it is to approximate reality and be genuinely useful.
Institutionalism's preferred mode of action in the international arena is almost always 
action of a multilateral nature. This is in accordance with institutionalism's analysis of the 
nature of the issues affecting the international community, their belief that the world structure 
is multipolar, and their assertion that America is in decline. As Hoffmann argued, "A quest 
for world order inevitably leads to...multilateral rather than bilateral diplomacy."60 Nye
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asserted that this is largely due to the nature of the issue areas themselves. He suggested, 
"The US cannot escape from these transnational problems (drugs, terrorism, AIDS, global 
warming) and few of them are susceptible to unilateral solutions. "61 Institutionalists believe 
that the transnational nature of the emerging global agenda will only be successfully dealt 
with in a multilateral manner, and that this is becoming increasingly apparent to state 
decision-makers. As most institutionalists are tripolarists, they believe that to come to grips 
with the global agenda all the major poles of power need to be consulted. Brzezinski agreed, 
noting, "Consensual leadership, although still based on a central American role, is already 
becoming a fact."62 Thus a multilateral approach should be developed by American decision­
makers in the institutionalist view, because it jibes with the polar realities of world power.
Finally institutionalists, though still seeing the US as the single strongest state, believe 
that it is in decline and does not have sufficient power to pursue a successful unilateralist 
policy. As Professor Fuji Kamiya argued regarding the Gulf War, "The fact that America had 
to finance the war through international contributions was interpreted as signalling that there 
is a limit to America's ability to unilaterally lead the world."63 As America is in decline, 
particularly for institutionalists both socially and economically, it must bow to the reality that 
even American power is limited, and that a global multilateralist policy is required. Hoffmann 
added, "However, if the US addresses its internal problems, the resources it will need to 
raise will not be available for external purposes. "64 Thus a US intent on addressing its 
domestic problems will have neither the resources nor the focus to conduct an aggressive, 
unilateralist policy, such as the democratists advocate. The formula for renewal at home 
leading to a cautious, multilateralist foreign policy seems to have been generally adopted by 
the Clinton administration. As Daniel Williams and John Goshko reported, a Senior White 
House official said, "that unlike the Cold War, when Washington paid lip service to the 
notion of collective security, the new administration really believes in the concept. "65 Thus 
institutionalists see a variety of long-term trends; a change in global polarity, the rise of 
transnationalism, and the advent of American decline, predicating an American multilateralist 
approach to the problems of the international arena. Just how central multilateralism is 
conceptually for institutionalists will become apparent when their specific policy prescriptions 
are examined.
Institutionalists' three key areas of concern are with renewing the American commitment 
to international organisations, strengthening the trilateral alliance, and boosting the American 
presence (particularly economically) in Asia. As institutionalists believe that international 
organisations facilitate the world economic system, it is not surprising that they see
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wholehearted participation in such organisations as a crucial American interest in the post­
Cold War era. Gill felt that the US should, "be at the core of an emerging transnational bloc, 
whose national interests and key ideas are bound up with the progressive transnationalism of 
the global political economy. "66 Nye, who felt American policy under President Reagan 
became too unilateralist, urged the US to, "renew the American commitment to multilateral 
institutions that fell into abeyance in the 8O's."67
A second major institutionalist concern is that America strengthen co-ordination between 
the three major poles of power; the US, Japan, and Western Europe (especially Germany). 
Nye felt, "the task for the US as it enters the Twenty-first century will be to renew and 
update tliQ successful alliance with the great industrial democracies that has been so critical to 
the global balance of power for the past 40 years. "68 Institutionalists believe that increased 
trilateral co-ordination is essential as tripolarism accurately reflects the primary power 
distribution in the world today, and that only international institutions that reflect the realities 
of power can have true efficacy in the new post-Cold War era. It was to improve trilateral 
relations that Zbigniew Brzezinski devoted himself in the mid-1970s. His impetus led to the 
creation of the Trilateral Commission, which attempts to more closely link American, 
European, and Japanese business and political leaders. Chaired by Brzezinski, (Nye was also 
a member) the commission proved to be a protean institutionalist haunt, which, though ahead 
of its time, served as a type of talent pool for the Carter administration, of which both Nye 
and Brzezinski were members. It was the first real attempt to institutionalise the trilateral 
relationship that institutionalists find so important.
A final key area of institutionalist concern is Asia and the Pacific Rim, with its booming 
economy. In some senses institutionalists echo Schurmann’s nationalists in their Asia-centric 
orientation, and for largely the same reason, economics. It has long been a dream of 
American business to introduce the Asian and Latin American markets' billions of people to 
American goods. At last the time seems propitious for the dream to be realised, with the 
Pacific Rim booming and increasingly seeing the US as a crucial trading partner. As 
economics is the key analytical orientation for institutionalists, their turn toward Asia is 
hardly surprising. In yet another sign of its general institutonalist orientation, the Clinton 
administration has increasingly looked to Asia rather than to Europe as its primary foreign 
policy concern. As Stephen Rosenfeld noted, "With the summit of 15 Pacific Rim countries 
in Seattle, President Clinton audaciously positions the US for a fateful post-Cold War turn 
from Europe to Asia, from preoccupation with security to pursuit of economic advantage. "69 
While this may be overstating the case somewhat, certainly APEC can be viewed as a nascent
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international organisation, specialising in economics, or in other words, it is greatly to the 
institutionalists liking. Hobart Rowen, interviewing US Trade Representative Mickey 
Kantor, also noted the Clinton administation's turn in focus to the Pacific. He added, 
"Unspoken in his [Kantor*s] description of the future trade agenda is that Europe is the odd 
man out. Attention to Japan, China, Asia and the Americas has Washington looking west to 
the Pacific Rim, north to Canada and South to Latin America...[Kantor stated] ’God knows 
we have been too Euro-centric in the past, and haven’t recognized the opportunities in Asia 
and Latin America'. "70 If institutionalists generally advocate increased trilateralism, it seems 
they wish to become relatively ever closer to the Asian pole, even if it is at the short-term 
expense of the European pole.
Institutionalists feel that sanctions will increasingly take the place of force in the 
international system. Keohane and Hoffmann suggested that, "sanctions are likely to be the 
preferred policy instrument in Europe as well as elsewhere, of concerned governments 
seeking to end regional warfare. "71 This general prescription is in line with the 
institutionalist belief that economics ultimately drives domestic politics and thus a 
government’s foreign policy decisions. Institutionalists believe that if an aggressor state is hit 
hard by the international community with sanctions, it will either, due to domestic pressure, 
ultimately cease its aggression, or if it persists, be internally overthrown. If international 
force has to be used, institutionalists want it to be as part of as broad-based a multilateral 
coalition as possible. It is important to note that due to the obvious restraints collective 
security poses for decisive decision-making, institutionalists are not nearly as likely to 
advocate the use of force as are either democratists or neo-realists to punish an aggressor. It 
is a cornerstone of institutionalism that most problems can be favourably resolved without 
recourse to force.
Institutionalists see the UN as the global policeman, the guarantor of the post-Cold War 
era. As the UN is the primary global multilateral institution, institutionalist enthusiasm for it 
is hardly surprising. With the end of the Cold War, institutionalists were cheered when the 
previously hopelessly deadlocked Security Council (due to Cold War vetoes by the 
superpowers) began to become increasingly effective, especially in repelling Saddam 
Hussein from Kuwait. To some extent, proponents of the UN merely saw it as filling a 
power vacuum left by an increasingly introspective America. As Cox argued, "Since the US 
has no desire to serve as policeman...there is a compelling need for collective international 
action through the UN. "72 Some sort of order was needed, and as America seemed occupied 
by its own domestic ills, a multilateral strategy using the UN as global cop seemed possible.
161
Barton Gellman reported that the Clinton administration initially shared this feeling, "Its 
strategy is to share the military and financial burdens by encouraging the UN to become the 
world policeman that America does not want to be. "73 The Clinton administration, and even 
other institutionalists, have since cooled to the idea of the UN as global cop after the debacles 
in Angola, Somalia, and Bosnia. Still, many institutionalists feel that a properly financed UN 
will soon be seen as the best chance to fashion some sort of order out of the increasing chaos 
that is so characteristic of the post-Cold War era.
Currently institutionalism's political power in America is great, both with the public and 
in the corridors of power. Three key tenets of institutionalism; the multipolarity of the world 
system, thp belief the US is in decline, and the need to primarily pursue American economic 
advantages through foreign policy initiatives, are all broadly supported by the American 
public. As Holsti and Rosenau noted in their survey of 2312 American opinion leaders, 
"when asked to describe the contemporary international system, about 90% of respondants to 
the 92 leadership survey agreed that it was multipolar. "74 Horvitz added that the 650 affluent 
Americans who responded to a September-October 1993 poll constructed by The Times 
Mirror Centre for The People and The Press, "As a group, [they] believe the US now plays a 
less important role in the world than it did a decade ago, but should be first among equals as 
it shares global leadership with other nations. "75 Broad public support for institutionalist 
tenets is reinforced by the election of a President who, as a candidate, pledged to put 
American economic interests at the centre of his foreign policy. Yankelovich's analysis of the 
1992 presidential election concluded that President Clinton's victory signified that, "when it 
comes to setting actual priorities, support for democracy and other worthy foreign policy 
goals are subordinate to economic concems."76 Also, as will be analysed in chapter 5, much 
of the Clinton administration, for example Warren Christopher, not surprisingly shares the 
President’s overall institutionalist orientation.
Yet despite broad public support for institutionalist beliefs and the election of a largely 
institutionalist administration, it is difficult to name a single currently popular, institutionalist 
policy initiative. As Paul Lewis argued, the US is $1 billion in arrears for UN peacekeeping 
operations and that this, "reflects congressional hostility to the mounting cost and complexity 
of UN peace-keeping operations. "77 In November 1993, the Clinton administration devised 
a new set procedure regulating US participation in UN peacekeeping operations that sharply 
limits the possible deployment of US troops. There have been disputes between the US and 
the UN over dues payments, Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti.
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So why is a supposedly institutionalist administration, backed by public support, 
constantly bickering with the largest international organisation? The institutionalist school of 
thought is currently generally supported and politically popular, but when issues become 
specific (i.e. become policy prescriptions) almost immediately problems arise if the policy is 
not quickly successful, because both the administration and particularly the public have tittle 
fervour for the current form of institutionalism. As shall be shown in chapters 5 and 6, 
institutionalists in the post-Cold War era are not leading a new Wilsonian crusade, but are 
rather embracing lukewarm public support for a policy that currently seems to them to be the 
most expedient Decision-makers in the administration may be convinced internationalists, 
but the public they serve are as yet not. Institutionalism has yet to win the intellectual debate 
over whaf should be the general American orientation in the post-Cold War era, as the 
containment doctrine signified the qualified intellectual triumph of Schurmann’s imperialists 
in the Truman White House. As of now, institutionalism’s political and intellectual hold on 
the American public in the new world order is very precarious.
Institutionalism's bureaucratic bastions of support, are, in the long term, the State 
Department, and currently the Presidency. As The Los Angeles Times reported, a group of 
conservative democrats were unhappy with the liberal slant of many of the Clinton 
administration's appointees to the State Department As institutionalists are primarily 
moderate to liberal democrats, this is a good indication that the State Department is an 
institutionalist haven. As The LA Times reported, "The group [of conservative democrats], 
which includes a former Clinton campaign counsel, David Ifshin, have watched in increasing 
discomfort as the administration has been filling the State Department with moderate 
liberals. "78 The best example of this process is that Secretary of State Christopher (as shall 
be discussed in chapter 5) is an avowed institutionalist. As the institutionalist's forefathers, 
Schurmann's internationalists, also controlled the State Department, this is a remarkable 
example of how slowly orientations change in the large bureaucratic fiefdoms that comprise 
the American government. Schurmann argued, "The universalist [internationalist] current ran 
strong in the State Department, the agency of American government traditionally close to 
international business. "79 It appears that the State Department rank and file has not changed 
its general schools of thought orientation in the past 40 years, despite the notable careers 
there of Dulles and Kissinger.
Like their neo-Wilsonian cousins, the democratists, institutionalists favour increased 
American ties with Western Europe. They especially favour closer links with the EU, as long 
as it does not become more protectionist. A major reason institutionalists prefer the EU even
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more than democratists is because it shares institutionalism’s economics-first philosophy. 
Unlike the neo-realists, institutionalists favour increasing European integration warmly, 
seeing the EU as primarily a multilateral partner rather than a rival. Institutionalists, also 
unlike neo-realists, do not fear that Nato's efficacy is coming to an end. They feel the 
economic linkages that so bind Western Europe to the US will bolster continued politico­
military linkages such as Nato. As Hellmann and Wolf argued, "Economic interdependence 
between Western Europe and North America provides incentives for cooperative solutions, 
leading to the continued existence of Nato. "80 This is yet another example of institutionalists 
believing that economic processes largely determine political and military policies. The 
Clinton administration has very much adopted an institutionalist line toward Western Europe, 
unambiguously supporting both increased European integration and the continued importance 
of Nato. As The International Herald-Tribune reported, Chancellor Kohl grasped this slight 
change from the traditional American policy toward Western Europe, "Kohl stressed that the 
Clinton administration in contrast to its predecessors, supported plans for European 
integration in economic, political and military matters. "81 This unabashed support for 
increased European integration is a hallmark of institutionalist thinking and confirms the 
Clinton administration's institutionalist leanings.
Institutionalists wish to see an increased European defence role both inside and outside of 
Nato, particularly regarding the expansion of the WEU into something like the defence arm 
of the European Union. As Walter B. Slocombe, the current principal Under-Secretary of 
Defence for Policy, argued, "We regard the WEU as a complement, not a rival to Nato."82 
Institutionalists do not fear that the expansion of the WEU will lead to the obsolescence of 
Nato, which would predicate an American military withdrawal from the continent. Rather, 
the largely institutionalist Clinton Presidency has adopted a policy of strong support for the 
expansion of the WEU, as they see it as a multilateral tool to free US resources previously 
spent on the defence of Western Europe to instead combat American domestic problems. As 
institutionalists are declinists, it follows that they should advocate a lessening American 
defence commitment to Europe in order to concentrate on the President's ambitious domestic 
reform package. For the institutionalists, it is logical (and not to be feared or opposed) that 
the Europeans should fill the partial security vacuum left by an America that, with the end of 
the Cold War, wishes to arrest its domestic decline.
Finally, unlike democratists, institutionalists advocate a more egalitarian Nato, rather than 
seeing it as an instrument of US dominance. They envisage Nato at last resembling President 
Kennedy's conception of a 'twin pillars' arrangement, with the European stake in and
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decision-making powers both equal to the American commitment With the end of the Cold 
War, many believe Nato is moving in this direction. Among them are General Oakes, former 
Commander in Chief of Allied Air Control in Nato, who stated, "There is a significant 
watering down of the US leadership position. "83 Institutionalists believe that this process 
should be furthered. As Stephen A. Oxman, the former Assistant Secretary of State for 
European and Canadian Affairs argued, "we should continue to encourage our allies to take a 
greater share of the burdens of European security. We welcome the Maastricht Treaty's call 
for the development of a European security and defense identity, which can form the basis of 
the European pillar of Nato. "84 It is hardly surprising that institutionalists would want to use 
a long-established institution, the WEU, to embody the relative power shift towards an 
increased European role in its security.
To preserve institutional harmony institutionalists, despite favouring the eventual 
admittance of the Central and Eastern Europeans to Nato, want to go slow on admitting them 
until all the present Nato members agree to such a policy. This led to the Partnership for 
Peace initiative, which expressed the contentious goals of allowing Eastern Europe under 
Nato's security blanket, while at the same time stating that such a process would be slow as 
the entire alliance had to agree to such a radical change in the composition of Nato. For 
institutionalists institutional cohesion took precedence over the expansion of Nato. Instead 
institutionalists, such as those within the Clinton administration, want to concentrate on 
fostering an increased European defence role. As President Clinton stated in his first 
European speech in Brussels, the US, "will benefit more from a strong and equal partnership 
than from a weak one. "85 This idea of increasing American-European equality is the general 
basis for the institutionalist initiatives toward Western Europe.
The general institutionahst view of Bosnia was a belief that the US should not intervene 
there unless an international consensus called on it to do so. As with all other questions of 
force, institutionalists were inherently cautious. This caution was reinforced because Bosnia 
was not a key issue area for them, nor was it an area of extensive US business interests. As a 
candidate, President Clinton adopted democratist rhetoric over Bosnia, castigating President 
Bush for timidity and seeing the Vance-Owen plan as rewarding Serbian aggression. As shall 
be shown in detail in chapter 6, once elected the President rapidly adopted institutionahst 
precepts toward Bosnia, after his own more aggressive initiatives (to lift the weapons 
embargo on the Bosnian Muslims while threatening the Serbs with air strikes) found little 
support among the European allies. After allied objections, Chnton withdrew the plan, 
largely to avoid a damaging rift with America’s European allies. For institutionalists,
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maintaining ties with the European pole of power far outweighed Bosnia as a primary 
American foreign policy consideration. This is precisely what President Clinton told the 
Bosnian leader President Izetbegovic, "he [Clinton] added that there was simply no support 
among Western allies for air armed intervention in Bosnia at this time and that Washington 
was not inclined to go it alone. "86 Unilateral armed action in Bosnia would violate many of 
the institutionalists' core precepts. Not only would it open a rift with America's European 
allies, it would be a case of using force (which institutionalists are always comparatively 
reluctant to do), acting alone (a position institutionalists are generally against), and all for an 
area that was not seen as a primary concern. It is little wonder the largely institutionalist- 
oriented Clinton administration chose to generally withdraw from the Bosnian controversy 
following its policy rebuff from the Europeans, rather than break with so many 
institutionalist beliefs.
Institutionalists see increased global trade as a crucial issue area and were strongly in 
favour of Congressional passage of both the Nafta and Gatt agreements. Even though all 
three schools of thought generally favour Congressional passage of both Nafta and Gatt, 
neo-realists and democratists did not have the same depth of feeling about the trade issue 
institutionalists possessed. Institutionalists argued that Nafta and Gatt confirm a major shift 
in the American emphasis on trade that has taken place over the past twenty years. As Martin 
Walker noted, "In the course of a generation, the US has gone from being the world's most 
self-reliant economy into the world’s biggest exporter, with a GDP that is these days more 
dependent than Japan on exports. Japan exports only 9% of its GDP. Last year, the US 
exported 11.7% of GDP, and should exceed 12% this year."87 Institutionalists felt that both 
the Nafta and Gatt agreements are merely a logical response to this changing world. Free 
trade is at the heart of President Clinton's foreign policy. His adoption of the fervent 
institutionalist line on free trade confirms his general institutionalist orientation. As Lawrence 
Malkin reported in early February 1993, President Clinton, "urged Americans to 'compete, 
not retreat,' from world commerce and said trade would act as an engine of prosperity if the 
US and its partners opened their markets."88 For institutionalists, Gatt was a particularly 
crucial issue. A Gatt agreement, economists estimated, would increase world trade by $213 
billion by 2002. In the view of the Clinton administration, this increase was essential for the 
recession-plagued first world and important to help stimulate American economic recovery. 
Indeed as Clay Chandler and Daniel Williams argued, the two free trade initiatives were 
essential to President Clinton's notions of the new world order. They suggested, "Unlike 
President Bush's vague notions of a new world order centered on US-led security, President 
Clinton's new order is one of US-led free trade, a harnessing of foreign policy to domestic
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economic needs. "89 The granting of primacy to economics in foreign policy is, as has been 
illustrated, a hallmark of institutionalism and a centrepiece of the Clinton foreign policy.
Institutionalists advocate giving aid to Russia co-ordinated by multilateral institutions like 
the IMF and the World Bank. However they see trade and not aid as the crucial factor needed 
to integrate Russia into the Western economic community. Institutionalists are for more aid to 
Russia than the neo-realists, and less than the democratists. Like the neo-realists they 
advocate that the IMF employ the usual strict loan conditions it generally imposes when a 
state requests economic assistance. Institutionalists will only support Russian reform if the 
market system is introduced. They see the perils of the Russian situation, unlike the 
democratists, as largely resulting from economic and not political dislocation. The Clinton 
administration’s policy towards Russia has been a mix of democratism and institutionalism. 
There is a tension between the two over Russia. As Mark Frankland shrewdly observed, 
both Yeltsin and Clintons' policies toward Russian reform have, "zigzagged between two 
opposing solutions: preserving democracy and managing the market, or suppressing 
democracy to preserve the purity of liberal economics. "90 Democratists have supported steps 
toward the former view, institutionalist initiatives favour the latter. What to do regarding 
Russia's transition to capitalism divides democratists and institutionalists and supports this 
thesis' contention, that far from being the same school of thought, at times democratism and 
institutionalism espouse antithetical policies.
The President has placed Russia at the centre of his foreign policy agenda (as 
democratists advocate), while at the same time advocating that the IMF should provide the 
single largest amount of Western aid. President Clinton has also urged that continued 
progress towards the free market should be a condition for such aid continuing (as 
institutionalists advocate). The July 1993 Tokyo summit, where the G-7 promised the 
Russians $28.4 billion in aid, was largely an institutionalist initiative. Gwen Ifill reported that 
due to the unpopularity of foreign aid, "the proportions of assistance were adjusted [at the 
summit] to reflect more in loans from international lending institutions and less in direct cash 
from foreign governments. "91 Once again, domestic unhappiness with unilateral measures 
made a multilateral, institutionalist policy toward aid to Russia likely. It was the IMF, and not 
the American government, that provided the main resources for aid to Russia and the 
conditions that aid would be based upon. Institutionalists feel that without undergoing a 
painful radical restructuring of the Russian economy (i.e. using IMF funds to float the ruble), 
Russia will not be able to trade with the West and thus its position will stagnate or worsen, 
and its democratic political reforms will be doomed. This economics-first approach, a
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characteristic institutionalist view, is a crucial component in the general institutionalist 
approach toward aiding Russian reform.
Institutionalists are the strongest supporters of China's radical economic reforms. They 
generally favoured extension of MFN under almost all conditions, being even more pro- 
MFN than the neo-realists. The fact that Deng Xiaphong followed a path of economic over 
political reform, in line with standard institutionalist precepts, is a major reason 
institutionalists are so vocal in their support for Deng's policy. Conflicts over US policy to 
China present perhaps the starkest policy differences between democratists and 
institutionalists, as the argument underlying extension of MFN to China was really over 
whether economic or political factors should have pre-eminence in American foreign policy 
decision-making. Asian leaders grasped this key point as the Clinton administration struggled 
with extending MFN in the Spring of 1993. As Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of 
Singapore, noted, "the new US President would have to decide if his priorities were 
economics or politics. If it’s economics then he should not muddy the situation by lingering 
on the politics of democracy and human rights and pressing it [China] too hard because that 
would upset the economic growth that is on its way in East Asia. "92 China's economy, the 
second largest in Asia after Japan's, increased 11% in 1992 and increased its imports 22%. 
This booming new market was vital to cultivate if the Clinton administration's export-driven 
recovery strategy was to be implemented. Yet to some extent, Clinton had rhetorically boxed 
himself into a comer over China.
As a Presidential candidate, Clinton had accused China of gross human rights abuses 
(i.e. exports being produced by prison labour), and President Bush of coddling the tyrants 
who instigated the Tiananmen massacre. Yet as over Bosnia, Clinton's democratist rhetoric 
gave way to institutionalist policy. China is perhaps the best illustration of the Clinton 
adminstration's institutionalist, rather than democratist, general overall schools of thought 
orientation. In May 1993, despite his campaign rhetoric, President Clinton granted China a 
year's extension of MFN, but linked future extensions to improvements in China's human 
rights record and adherence to arms control treaties. These conditions were imposed largely 
to placate angry democratists who accused Clinton of betraying his own democratist 
campaign rhetoric. When asked his reasons for the extension, Clinton responded, "I have 
basically decided to extend MFN status for a year because I want to support modernization in 
China, and it's a great opportunity for Americans there. "93 Thus, in his statement, Clinton 
invoked both the institutionahst notions that modernisation is primarily predicated on the free 
market and not democracy, and that domestic economic benefits should be central to foreign
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policy formulation. Since May 1993 the Clinton administration's policy towards China has 
become even more institutionalistically oriented. As was reported in The International Herald- 
Tribune, "President Clinton has decided to greatly expand high-level exchanges with China 
in an effort to put relations on a 'sounder footing’. "94 This initiative included President 
Clinton speaking privately with the Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the APEC meeting in 
November 1993, by far the highest-level contact between US and Chinese officials since the 
Chinese democracy movement was crushed. This process culminated in May 1994 when 
Clinton chose to decouple human rights considerations from MFN renewal. To improve 
relations, the Clinton administration is relying on the institutionalist precept that increased 
contact between states leads to common interests emerging, which in turn promotes increased 
international stability. Over the critical question of China, the Clinton administration can be 
seen at its most institutionalist.
Unlike the democratist and neo-realist schools of thought, institutionalism contains no 
genuine minority current, as there are no real 'supranationalists', radical institutionalists who 
advocate and foresee a world government, in either opinion-making or decision-making 
circles. Instead, there are only 'moderate' institutionalists, who still see the state as central to 
the international system. As a result of not having a significant minority current, there is less 
variation in the institutionalist school of thought than there is in either neo-realism or 
democratism.
Stanley Hoffmann, Professor at Harvard in Government and the study of France, 
espouses institutionalist precepts without holding a significant minority view. The university 
where Hoffmann teaches, Harvard, is a centre of institutionalist thinking as Hoffmann, Nye, 
and Keohane have all worked there and often collaborated on joint institutionalist articles. 
Hoffmann advances the standard institutionalist declinist/multipolar world structural view. 
He envisaged a post-Cold War order where, "America's role as a tutor of Europe shrinks, as 
its weight in Nato decreases, as its priorities shift to its own internal problems,"95 the world 
will become increasingly multipolar. Hoffmann recognised the link between America's 
decline and the fact that a new multilateralist general foreign policy would best suit its needs. 
Nowhere was this process more apparent to Hoffmann than in Europe. In line with general 
institutionalist thinking Keohane and Hoffmann saw, "the EC is the central institution in the 
new post-Cold War Europe. "96 Institutionalists feel a major effort should be made to 
improve relations with this crucial power in the new world order. As with much 
institutionalist thinking, Hoffmann’s analysis tends to be more descriptive than prescriptive. 
This, while making policy-prescription analysis more difficult, does not make it impossible.
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For example, Hoffmann believed the new post-Cold War security system in Europe can be 
described as, "a mix of a much-reformed Nato no longer dominated by the US, a Western 
European defense organization, and an organization set up by the CSCE. "97 Implicit in this 
description is a recognition that an increased European defence role both in and out of Nato 
(i.e. the expansion of the role of the WEU) is likely, and thus should not be futilely opposed, 
particularly as institutionalists favour a more egalitarian Nato as a general precept. As with 
the neo-realists, some institutionalist policy prescriptions are predicated on a recognition of 
what they believe to be the objective structural conditions of the world system, conditions 
that lead to processes (i.e. the growing power of the EU) that should be managed as they 
cannot be overcome.
This descriptive process, implicitly illustrating opinion-makers’ policy preferences, can 
also be seen in Hoffmann’s attitude towards free trade. Regarding trade in the post-Cold War 
era, Hoffmann urged that, "policies should be aimed at preventing the breakup of the world 
economy into seperate blocs engaged in the varieties of economic war. "98 As Hoffmann 
believed this, it is logical to presume that he strongly favoured the Gatt agreement, as one of 
its avowed aims was to prevent the world economy becoming riven with protectionist blocs. 
As Hoffmann believed post-war free trade gains should be protected and expanded, it is 
logical to infer that he favoured the Gatt agreement, and also the Nafta accord, as long as 
Nafta did not promote protectionism within the North American trading bloc. This view, of 
course, gibes with the strong institutionalist predilection in favour of free trade in general, as 
well as both agreements specifically. Thus Hoffmann’s policy preferences matched general 
institutionalist precepts regarding both Western Europe and trade.
However Hoffmann did not follow the standard institutionalist position regarding 
Bosnia. Instead he criticised the West's policy stating, "Negotiations backed by no credible 
threat of armed force have turned into appeasement. "99 Hoffmann advocated a democratist 
policy in Bosnia, "The proper policy would have been to press the Serbs, by force if 
necessary, to stop using war and ethnic cleansing and to negotiate a fair settlement with their 
Muslim adversaries after a lasting cease-fire had been imposed. "100 This willingness to 
directly advocate the use of American military power to influence the Bosnian conflict was 
characteristic of the democratist viewpoint regarding Bosnia. Thus over this issue area 
Hoffmann is in opposition to his institutionalist colleagues.
Like his Harvard colleague, Robert Keohane is also an institutionalist with no major 
minority views. Keohane, a member of the council on Foreign Relations, was also editor of
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International Organization, a periodical concerned with one of institutionalism’s core issues, 
the role of international organisations in the global arena, which was dominated by 
institutionalist writers such as Hoffmann and Nye. Regarding Europe, as was noted earlier, 
Keohane, like Hoffmann, thought that the EU would be the central European institution in 
the new era. 101 As with Hoffmann, it is reasonable to conclude his policy prescriptions 
regarding Europe are institutional, advocating greater American ties with the EU. More 
concerned in his writings with the theoretical underpinnings of institutionalism than with 
advocating specific policy prescriptions, Keohane, nevertheless is, with Nye, one of the 
pioneers of institutionalist thinking.
As with both Hoffmann and Keohane, Joseph Nye is an institutionalist without minority 
views. Nye is a professor of Government at Harvard, served on the editorial board of 
International Organization (which his frequent collaborator Keohane chaired), and has served 
as Chairman of the editorial board of International Security. Beyond this impressive academic 
record, Nye served as Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Carter administration between 
1977-79. Currently he is Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security under 
President Clinton, where he has been a central player in US-Japanese relations. Like most 
institutionalists he is a democrat, who served on Brzezinski's Trilateral Commission in the 
1970s. Like other institutionalist pioneers such as Keohane and Brzezinski, Nye has seen the 
world as tripolar since the 70s (this was the key premise of the Trilateral commission). Yet 
while Nye’s policy prescriptions and belief in the tripolarity of the world reflect standard 
institutionalist views, his opinions about American decline do not.
Nye’s book, Bound to Lead, is a key to the revivalist argument. Like Brzezinski, Nye’s 
thesis centred on the changed nature of the international system itself. Nye’s thesis was that 
America is not in decline relative to other states, but that ’states’ themselves are losing power 
in the international system. Unlike most institutionalists Nye still felt, "The US remains the 
largest and richest power with the greatest capacity to shape the future. "102 Yet though this 
view is not the standard institutionalist position, the rest of Nye’s thesis corresponded exactly 
with the institutionalist notion that the state is not the only significant actor in the international 
arena. Nye argued, "The US is likely to remain the leading power, yet it will have to cope 
with unprecedented problems of interdependence that no great power can solve by itself."103 
For Nye then the debate over whether any other state can soon displace the US as the greatest 
power in the world missed the greater point that all states are increasingly losing power to act 
unilaterally in the international system, and that even the strongest state, the US, must usually 
seek co-operative solutions due to the fundamentally changed nature of the international
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system. Nye commented, "The US will remain the leading power, but being ’number one' 
won't be what it used to be. Many of the new issues in international politics - ecology, 
drugs, Aids, terrorism - involve a diffusion of power away from states to private actors and 
require the organization of states for cooperative responses. "104 While much has been made 
of Nye's revivalist argument, it is the second institutionalist notion of Nye's thesis, that the 
nature of the international system has fundamentally changed, which is crucial for 
understanding his overall schools of thought orientation.
Regarding Gatt, Nye held the standard institutionalist view that anything that promotes 
the extension of Gatt, and through it free trade, is in America's interests. Nye suggested that, 
"Institutions governing the international economy, such as the IMF and Gatt, tend to embody 
the liberal free-market principles that coincide in large measure with American society and 
ideology. "105 Nye believed that international institutions tend to embody the principles of the 
strongest state involved in founding the particular organisation. As institutionalists such as 
Nye feel that it is still in America's interest to promote free trade, Gatt, constructed in an era 
of greater relative American power, is still seen as an important instrument used to further 
unchanged American objectives. For this reason, Nye saw any extension of Gatt, such as the 
Uruguay Round agreement, as a positive development for the US.
Nye more explicitly followed the institutionalist tine regarding Europe. Nye believes a 
more egalitarian alliance serves American interests. He argued, "Sharing leadership with a 
strengthened Europe is a means of maintaining a beneficial institutional power resource. "106 
Specifically Nye urgeed strong US support for increased European integration, particularly 
through expansion of the role of the EU, to build an alliance system buttressed by the twin 
pillars of American and European power. He argued, "Over the long term, continued support 
for European integration remains the best strategy for a stable and prosperous continent 
capable of acting as a partner with the US. "107 Nye strongly adhered to the institutionalist 
view that not only does a relatively strengthened Europe pose no possible threat to America, 
its increased power is a sign of robustness within an increasingly multilateralist Nato.
After the heady days of the late 80s and early 90s, when it seemed that a new world order 
based on institutionalist precepts might effortlessly appear, there has been increasing criticism 
of institutionalism. Critics note that several of its basic precepts seem seriously flawed. 
Firstly, both democratists and neo-realists criticise institutionalism's reliance on collective 
security and multilateralism as its preferred mode of action. As Brian Beedham noted before 
the disasters in Somalia and Bosnia were wholly apparent, the commitment to collective
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security that had seen the UN through the Gulf crisis could prove to be a transient 
phenomenon. He observed, "The bigger problem is that it [the UN] may soon lose the brief 
cohesion that sent it into Kuwait and Bosnia and Somalia. It may no longer be able to act 
decisively and consistently." 108 Beedham's early worry has been proven correct. However 
at the best of times the apparatus of collective security inherently leads to problems regarding 
acting consistently and decisively. To act consistently, international organisations need a 
long-term political consensus. As a Washington Post editorial observed, such consistency is 
a rarity in the multilateral framework. It commented on US policy regarding the Bosnian 
crisis, noting, "The actual starting point of American policy appears to lie in the phenomenon 
called 'multilateralism1. This means consulting everyone - allies, even in a sense adversaries, 
national governments and International Organizations. It makes for an elaborate system of all 
checks and no capacity for movement and initiative. It takes the worthy purpose of 
consultation and converts it into a farcical invitation to doubters everywhere to paralyze 
American policy. "109 In an effort to maintain consistency and preserve multilateral unity, 
institutionalists inherently hamper their own ability to act decisively. Both neo-realists and 
democratists feel that institutionalism's firm adherence to multilateralism could cripple 
American foreign policy by generally removing the possibility of decisive action (that is, 
acting unilaterally). To act, to use force in a multilateral setting becomes so difficult as to be a 
rarity (i.e. The Gulf War was the first genuine case where all the members of the Security 
Council (except China) agreed on the use of force in 45 years). As a result institutionalists 
look to sanctions as their main instrument of coercion, with their debatable utility. Neo­
realists and democratists charge the institutionalists with underrating the efficacy of force in 
international politics, thus dooming themselves to impotence.
Critics also believe institutionalists overrate the role of economics in the international 
system. Like Marxists, institutionalists see economics as the basis for many social and 
political phenomena, and as a motive force of history. Also like Marxists, they are sometimes 
accused of being determinists. John Lewis Gaddis cleverly picked up on this argument, 
criticising Wilsonians as, "certain that they have exposed an engine that drives history 
forward, they never seem to ask whether there might be others." 110 Also, there is an 
existential critique of this economics above-all approach, articulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski. 
At its extreme Brzezinski reasoned that institutionalist policy merely exhorts the world 
towards greater materialism, a position that he and many others do not think should be the 
primary drive behind American policy initiatives.
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Critics of institutionalism believe that the flaws in institutionalist precepts help explain the 
failure of several key institutionalist bastions to perform as well as they had been expected to 
in the new world order. With the crises in Bosnia and Somalia making a mockery of Butros- 
Ghali's aspirations for the UN to become the global policeman, James Bone reported, "A 
dispirited UN secretary-general has told a closed meeting of the UN Security Council that he 
does not believe the UN to be capable at present of peace enforcement operations." 111 The 
UN, hopelessly underfinanced and beset by intractable international problems such as Bosnia 
and Somalia, has begun to try to scale back its role in the world. Neo-realists feel 
institutionalists have always overrated international organisations, which they see as little 
more than tools of states. Leslie Gelb cleverly alluded to the 'UN paradox', "Without US 
leadership and power, the UN lacks muscle. With it, the UN loses its independent 
identity. "112 In light of the UN's failures, it is generous to say that international institutions 
are obviously not yet ready to fully take on a world ordering role without the wholehearted 
support of the great state powers.
Likewise the EU, the centrepiece of institutionalist calculations about Europe, has not 
become anything like as cohesive as of yet, as institutionalists believed that it would be in the 
post-Cold War era. The furore over passage of the Maastricht Treaty alerted many around the 
world that increased integration was not the historical inevitability that it had been supposed. 
The crisis over increased integration was heightened by the ELTs failure to stop the fighting 
in Bosnia, a war which was ironically claimed by Jacques Delors to be the test of the ELTs 
greater foreign policy and security role in Europe. As Michael Brenner acutely noted, "Both 
the mentality and behavior [in the Balkans] were wholly alien to the world of reason and 
reasonableness inhabited by the Community Twelve." 113 One of the main reasons 
institutionalists favour increased contacts with the EU is that it exhibits an economics-first 
approach within its own organisation, for example, favouring economic threats, sanctions, 
over military coercion, as American institutionalists also advocate. The Bosnian war 
illustrated the drawbacks of such a stance. Initially the Serbs cared more about nationalism 
than their own economic well-being and as such were incomprehensible to the average 
Eurocrat. Sanctions only work if the aggressor places a great value on economic prosperity , 
relative to other goals. For an institutionalist, or EC Commissioner, economic prosperity is 
the crucial goal of initiatives in the international sphere. In applying sanctions, ; 
institutionalists threaten to take away from an aggressor what they themselves would value 
most. Sanctions do not work if an aggressor state, in this case Serbia, places a greater value 
on other priorities besides prosperity, such as religion, ethnic ties, nationalism, or ideology. • 
The Bosnian conflict showed both Western Europe and institutionalism unable to grasp the •
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limits of their primary instrument of coercion. Also, economic rates of growth in Western 
Europe and Japan have not matched their course since the 70s and 80s when institutionalists 
first envisaged a tripolar world. Ironically it is the United States that has achieved by far the 
highest rates of growth among the G-7 in the early 90s. Worse, at least in the case of 
Western Europe, its recession seems to be partly structural as the EUs safety net has to be 
paid for despite European productivity rates that lag far behind those of Japan and America. 
Even in their own (economic) terms, it is open to debate as to whether Europe and Japan can 
continue to gain relative power, predicated for institutionalists above all by economics, at the 
expense of the United States. The world structure may not be moving inexorably toward 
tripolarity after all.
Finally, neo-realists argue that institutionalists have an overly complex view of the world. 
It is certainly true that as institutionalists see the interactions between states, MNCs, and 
International Organisations as the crucial level of analysis in the international arena, they 
espouse an analytical view of the world that is more complicated than the state-centric neo­
realists envision. As Chart 4-2 illustrates, institutionalists often offer a more descriptive than 
prescriptive view of major policy issue areas. Complexity is the reason institutionalists are so 
reticent about making specific policy prescriptions. Institutionalism's attempt to construct a 
model that reflects the obvious complexity of world political processes is laudable, but not if 
it stops them from obtaining policy outputs. Without these outputs, institutionalism limits its 
own relevance and effect on world political processes. Still, despite such criticism, the 
institutionalist school of thought represents the dominant foreign policy view of the Clinton 
administration. At least for the moment institutionalist prescriptions seem politically in the 
ascendant.
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Chapter 5: The Schools of Thought Orientations of Central Legislative and
Executive Decision-Makers.
Now it is essential to classify the schools of thought orientation of major political actors 
both within Congress and the executive branch. This will be done by using precisely the 
same five policy areas as were used in classifying the academics in chapters 2-4. Once 
specific decision-makers have been placed in a schools of thought box, and the reasons for 
their classification have been analysed by comparing their specific policy preferences, it 
will be possible to analyse how the schools of thought orientation helps determine how 
overall American foreign policy outputs are arrived at. This will be done by tracing the 
specific classified decision-makers as they operate within the bureaucratic political 
processes that are the arena for the formulation of American foreign policy outputs. Having 
identified the overall American schools of thought preferences regarding Bosnia in chapter 
6 (the outputs), and knowing the schools of thought orientation of crucial foreign policy 
decision-makers (the inputs), it will be possible to analyse American political and 
bureaucratic processes which determine foreign policy outputs using schools of thought 
analysis.
(a) Specific democratist decision-makers in US foreign policy
i) Strobe Talbott - Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott, the former ambassador-at-large and Special Adviser to Secretary 
Christopher on the newly independent states of the former USSR, and now Deputy 
Secretary of State, is the first democratist to be analysed. Like the other democratist 
decision-maker to be discussed, former Senate Majority Leader Mitchell, Talbott is not 
wholly a democratist, having a significant institutionalist minority current. This minority 
institutionalist predilection can be seen in both his policy preference for Bosnia and 
position on MFN renewal for China. Over China, Talbott explicitly attacked the position of 
his democratist cohorts. As he stated while an editor of Time, regarding Congress' decision 
to impose conditions on MFN for China in the final days of the Bush administration, "Once 
again, those would-be statesmen on Capitol Hill are trying to micromanage American 
foreign policy and legislate morality in another country - something Congress does often 
and badly. "1 Here the soon to be Deputy Secretary of State attacked the legislation of 
morality regarding China, which is precisely what the democratists in Congress were trying 
to accomplish by levying conditions on the regime of Deng Xiaphong. Talbott followed
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this attack by asserting that, in true institutionalist style, if MFN was withdrawn the wrong 
people in China would be hurt, namely the entrepreneurs and emerging middle-classes, 
those most likely to spearhead a drive toward increased liberalisation in Chinese society. 
As Talbott affirmed, "curtailing MFN would hurt elements in China the outside world 
should be trying to help. "2 Thus Talbott advocated the classic institutionalist position on 
China.
The ambassador's stance on Bosnia was, unlike his China policy preference, hardly a 
standard defence of the institutionalist position. Rather it was a reflection of his 
fundamental democratist conviction that nothing should be allowed to jeopardise Yeltsin's 
radical experiment. As Talbott is the ideological godfather of the Russia-first impulse in 
the Clinton administration, that his Bosnia policy preference should largely be predicated 
by its subordinance to his advocated initiatives on Russia should come as little surprise. Yet 
Talbott did not always hold an institutionalist position on Bosnia. Before joining the 
administration, his comments while editor of Time magazine reflected a democratist stance. 
He observed, "before dismissing intervention altogether, Western leaders should remember 
how they dealt earlier this year with the first great threat of the new world order. Global 
outrage, combined with diplomatic and economic sanctions, did not dislodge Saddam 
Hussein from that comer of Greater Iraq better known as Kuwait. It took a massive 
multilateral expeditionary force."3 In noting that force, not sanctions, ultimately removed 
Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, Talbott revealed his initial anti-institutionalist position on 
the Bosnian crisis, as he hinted at advocating a democratist stance. However on becoming a 
member of the Clinton administration, his policy preference over Bosnia jibed with the 
President's in advocating the very institutionalist position he had earlier attacked. Talbott's 
strongest call for punishing Serb aggression in Bosnia consisted merely of an initiative to 
tighten existing economic sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs by sealing the border with 
Serbia proper more effectively.4 The reason behind Talbott's volte-face in advocating an 
institutionalist position on Bosnia lay in his fundamental advocacy of Russian reform.
Talbott's crucial democratist championing of Russian reform was his primary policy 
concern both by inclination and title, as bureaucratically he was Special Adviser to 
Secretary Christopher regarding the newly independent states of the former USSR. In that 
role he was instrumental in the crafting of the administration's democratist policy regarding 
Russia. As Cox stated, the ambassador believed, "The US thus had to abandon the restraint 
it had previously shown, increasing its stake in Russian reform and hope that this would 
make the reform process irreversible."5 Thus a possible cleavage over Bosnia had to be
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avoided at almost all costs for Talbott, who saw Russian reform as the crucial foreign 
policy issue facing the US. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott predicated his institutionalist 
Bosnia policy on his democratist Russia policy, which he had done so much to create. It 
was viewed by him and the administration as far more important in the overall hierarchy of 
foreign policy priorities.
Indeed Talbott displayed classic democratist predilections in explaining and justifying 
his views on America’s policy toward the Yeltsin regime. Like almost all democratists, he 
believed US aid could prove crucial to the survival of the Russian democratic experiment. 
Talbott stated, ’’Only with international help, marshalled by the US, could Russia, Ukraine, 
and the other former republics of the USSR make the transition from totalitarianism to 
democracy."6 Like most democratists, Talbott felt the neo-realist position on Russia could 
lead to a damaging self-fulfilling prophecy. He argued, "To put it bluntly: if we base our 
policies on the persistent presumption that Russia will regress rather than evolve, then we 
would have committed, in the final years of this century, a strategic blunder equal to the 
one committed in the opening years at Versailles and afterward."7 By comparing the neo­
realists' relatively passive position on Russian reform with the disastrous foreign policy 
inactivity of the Harding and Coolidge presidencies, Talbott illustrated not only his 
advocacy for an activist democratist initiative toward the former USSR, but also the central 
importance such a policy assumed for him specifically and for democratists in general.
If the reform process of the USSR is of central importance for Talbott, the success or 
failure of Yeltsin's reforms in Russia are viewed as the key to this process. Regarding 
Russia, Talbott stated, "What happens there will have a major, perhaps decisive, effect on 
the future of reform in all the former Soviet republics."8 Thus in the wake of the December 
1993 election, which saw Yeltsin's opponents gain control of the Russian parliament, 
Talbott followed the standard democratist course in blaming the IMF for failing the 
Russian people. As Cox noted, he angrily argued, "there had been too much imposed 
'shock' and not enough 'therapy' in Russia."9 Here Talbott again followed classic 
democratist thinking in placing democracy above economic considerations in evaluating 
American policy toward Russia. Talbott felt that the US-led IMF should have relaxed its 
strict conditions on borrowing so as to allow the Yeltsin government more aid, even if it 
did not meet all the usual economic conditions for such assistance. Talbott believed that the 
success of Russian democracy was too important to be threatened by the niceties of 
economic orthodoxy. Also, if Yeltsin fully imposed draconian economic strictures on his 
people, he would greatly increase the chance that his government would be overthrown.
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Talbott and most democratists felt that economic short-sightedness should not be allowed 
to stand in the path of the most crucial democratic experiment now going in the world.
As with Bosnia, Talbott's European policy prescriptions are also largely determined by 
his democratist commitment to Russian reform. As Gordon reported, a senior official at the 
State Department observed Talbott's stance regarding Europe as being, "that the worst thing 
to do would be to draw a new line across Europe which would preclude Russia from the 
security community." 10 Talbott's anti-neo-realist position on Europe is thus predicated by 
Russian fears of being left out of the new European security structure, which the inclusion 
of the Central European states into Nato would symbolise. In such circumstances, an 
isolated Russia would be more likely to turn to hyper-nationalist, anti-democratic solutions 
to its security dilemmas. 11 This scenario was precisely what Talbott wished to avoid as the 
success of the democratic Yeltsin regime was his foremost concern. In accordance with the 
democratist position on the expansion of Nato, Talbott felt any extension of Nato eastwards 
would definitely alienate Russia. Thus, democratists are more opposed to Nato expansion 
than are institutionalists. Talbott's decisive role in halting any agenda for the eastward 
extension of Nato rankled neo-realists, who believed a quick expansion of Nato was 
necessary to maintain continental security in the post-Cold war era. As Ives observed, for 
neo-realists, "The immediate charge against Talbott is that he persuaded President Clinton 
to overrule his boss, Warren Christopher, by keeping Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary out of Nato. If talk about a Soviet invasion of the West, was, in Talbott's words, a 
'paranoid fantasy' so, in his view, is talk of a revived Russian army marching West." 12 
Talbott correctly discerned that the Russian army was incapable of making a lightning 
thrust eastwards to reassert Russian domination over its former Warsaw Pact allies. As this 
was the case, the US could easily counter such a Russian drive, with or without a formal 
security arrangement with the Central European states. In short, even if the Yeltsin 
government gave way to an adversarial, nationalist regime, the West would still be able to 
defend the Central European states. As this was so, it was far more important, in Talbott's 
view, to do nothing that might lead to the destabilisation of the democratic Russian regime. 
As a democratist, Talbott believed that Russia's continued democratic nature was the best 
source of security for the central Europeans. As Talbott stated, "with each passing year, it 
becomes increasingly apparent that the proposition 'democracies don't go to war with one 
another' is not just a bromide - it's as close as we are likely to get in political science to an 
empirical truth." 13 This central democratist tenet then lies at the heart of Talbott’s 
prescription for American policy regarding the European security structure. In Talbott's 
view, a concentration on Russian reform would paradoxically provide the Central
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Europeans with more security than would formal Nato membership. This is due to the fact 
that democratists believe that if Russian democratic reform succeeds, the Central 
Europeans need not fear their massive neighbour to the east, as democracies do not make 
war against one another.
As befits most democratists regarding trade issues, Talbott favoured both Nafta and 
Gatt, yet this issue is not a central democratist concern, as it is for the institutionalists. In 
Talbott's case this was true by virtue of both his schools of thought orientation and his 
bureaucratic specialisation on Russia. As opposed to the institutionalist school of thought, 
Talbott acknowledged the frailties of the Gatt. He noted, "Gatt is the imperfect, sputtering 
yet indispensable engine of globalization."14 This specific statement perfectly encapsulates 
the general democratist position on trade issues. Like most democratists, Talbott did not see 
the Gatt as a panacea for global problems, as befitted a follower of a school of thought 
which ultimately values democracy over free market institutions, yet still viewed the 
extension of trade as an important initiative in the new world order. Also, unlike the 
institutionalists, Talbott feared that without Gatt, the tripolar economic structure of the 
world (with power clustered around Japan, the US, and Europe (Germany)) would 
increasingly lead to an unstable system of aggressive, protectionist trading blocs. The 
institutionalists value this tripolar diffusion of power, seeing it as the firm basis for global 
security, and not as a danger. Talbott observed, "By its nature, a tripolar world would be 
less stable than the bipolar one that existed when the US and the Soviet Union were 
squared off against one another." 15 Deputy Secretary of State Talbott thus saw regional 
trading blocs as having possibly pernicious as well as beneficial aspects. His pro-Gatt 
stance reflected the democratist position that free trade expansion is important and 
necessary but that it is not a cure-all for global problems and, in the case of regional trading 
expansion, can lead to negative, unforeseen consequences.
ii) George Mitchell - Senate Majority Leader
Like Talbott, former Senate Majority Leader Mitchell 16 is a democratist with an 
institutionalist minority current. Yet unlike the Deputy Secretary of State, Mitchell's 
majority democratist viewpoint can be seen primarily in his approach to economic policy 
questions, such as the MFN controversy with China and trade issues, and less in the 
security realm where he maintained an institutionalist position both on the Bosnian crisis 
and on the proposed structure of the new European security architecture.
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Regarding Bosnia, like his close political ally President Clinton, the Senate Majority 
Leader held a strong institutionalist position. Like most of those who held an institutionalist 
position on Bosnia, Mitchell believed containing the conflict to be a primary objective, a 
goal that would be threatened by the US unilaterally lifting the arms embargo. He noted, 
"Those horrors [of the war] will be multiplied thousands of times over if the war widens. 
Yet that will be the inevitable result of the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the 
US." 17 Here Mitchell used a humanitarian argument against those holding the democratist 
position on Bosnia, knowing full well that humanitarian concerns are of great importance 
for his democratist cohorts. Mitchell envisioned a conflict with even more barbarism than 
the war if the embargo was lifted, as a zone of instability was bound to spread. Mitchell 
feared that this would be a certainty, for the Russians would bolster the Bosnian Serbs with 
weaponry if the US came to the military aid of the Bosnian government. With both sides 
then having virtually unlimited stockpiles of weapons, Mitchell believed that war would 
likely spread throughout the Balkans and with it the savagery that characterised the 
conflict. Thus the Senate Majority Leader used democratist humanitarian arguments against 
democratists who wished America to actively side with the Bosnian Muslims in the war, in 
support of the less activist institutionalist position regarding Bosnia.
Mitchell also felt that acting in a unilateral manner regarding the lifting of the arms 
embargo against the Bosnian Muslims would cause the US great hardship in the 
international arena. He stated, "If we now unilaterally lift the arms embargo in the former 
Yugoslavia, we will be saying to every participant against those other sanctioned countries 
(Haiti, Iraq, Libya, maybe North Korea), you can jump out whenever you see fit. We will 
completely undermine the international effort through the UN and with our allies to use 
sanctions as a means of attaining universally accepted international objectives." 18 As with 
most of those who held an institutionalist stance on Bosnia, Mitchell was thinking in larger 
terms and of larger objectives that the Bosnian conflict itself. Here he questioned the 
continued efficacy of sanctions in general if the US unilaterally abandoned the arms 
embargo in the former Yugoslavia. If the US decided to flout the international community 
over Bosnia, why should not some other state do so over another international embargo not 
to its liking, for instance the Russians or the French over the Iraqi sanctions? Mitchell 
worried that the sanctions weapon, so crucial for institutionalists in their attempt to order 
the world, would be discredited generally if the US was to actively arm the Bosnian 
government.
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Mitchell also did not accept the neo-realist position on Bosnia, that the US should arm 
the Bosnian Muslims yet remain generally aloof from the conflict. He stated, "If this 
resolution passes [the Dole-Lieberman resolution to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian 
Muslims] and the embargo is lifted, the war will inevitably widen. There will be many 
more deaths, much more ethnic cleansing, and then it will be an American war, and we will 
be back here with requests to send Americans over there to do something about it. That is 
something we have been completely unwilling to do. "19 Mitchell played on the 
unpopularity of the democratist position on Bosnia, that the US should get actively 
involved in the conflict perhaps even by sending ground troops to aid the Muslim cause. He 
portrayed the far more politically popular neo-realist position as being unworkable, as even 
aiding the .Muslims militarily would not turn the tide of battle against the Serbs at such a 
late date. Mitchell agreed with the general institutionalist position on Bosnia that all lifting 
the embargo on the Bosnian Muslims would accomplish would be to bind American 
credibility to the lost Muslim cause. Eventually such a position would lead to either an 
ignominious American diplomatic setback or the US would be forced to intervene in the 
conflict with ground troops, which as Mitchell pointed out was a political stance almost no 
one in America advocated. As for many who held the institutionalist position on Bosnia, 
the former Senate Majority Leader felt the American line was the best of a bad lot of policy 
options.
Mitchell echoed the general institutionalist stance on Bosnia in feeling that the specific 
Bosnian war was far lower in the overall foreign policy hierarchy of priorities than were 
America's relations with Russia and the European allies. Regarding Nato, whose 
preservation is a democratist and neo-realist priority, Mitchell observed, "Many of those 
who are for this [Dole-Lieberman] amendment say they are for Nato but in fact support for 
this amendment will seriously undermine our relationship with our Nato allies."20 Like the 
President, Mitchell believed it was imperative that the US and the European allies agree on 
Bosnia policy, even if that policy was not the first preference of the US. Both President 
Clinton and Mitchell feared that the splits that would inevitably occur, if the US adopted 
the neo-realist and democratist cause and lifted the embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, 
would mean the end of the UN's new-found credibility as well as calling into question the 
survival of the Nato alliance itself. The European allies, fearing that an American lifting of 
the arms embargo on the Bosnian government would significantly increase the intensity of 
the conflict and subject their peacekeepers to unacceptable risks, had indicated that they 
would pull their troops out of Bosnia if the embargo was violated.21 This loss of face, 
coupled with the US acting unilaterally, would certainly threaten the foundations of Nato.
189
For Mitchell, as for those advocating the general institutionalist stance on Bosnia; Nato, the 
UN, and the international multilateral process they represent were simply too important to 
sacrifice whatever the merits of the neo-realist case on Bosnia.
Mitchell also felt that America's burgeoning relationship with Russia was too vital to 
risk over disagreements about the Contact Group's Bosnia policy. As Mitchell noted, "We 
have a lot of foreign policy interests, but I think most Senators would agree that among the 
highest is the new relationship with Russia and the former states of the Soviet Union. "22 
Regarding Bosnia policy, Mitchell highlighted a seemingly crucial flaw in overall 
democratist thinking. If most democratists believe that the American relationship with 
Russia, and its attempts to encourage Yeltsin's democratic experiment, is the most 
important foreign policy issue facing the US today, how could democratists justify 
advocating a Bosnia policy that placed this crucial American-Russian axis in jeopardy? 
Mitchell seized on this, noting, "This [the Dole-Lieberman amendment] will seriously 
undermine our relations with Russia."23 Again Mitchell used a democratist argument about 
the primacy of Russia for the US, to advocate an anti-democratist position on Bosnia. It is 
only when analysing the statements of Senator Joseph Biden that a convincing refutation of 
Mitchell's discovery of this seemingly major democratist flaw can be found.
The former Senate Majority Leader also maintained an institutionalist viewpoint 
regarding the European security structure. Again remarking specifically on the Bosnian 
controversy, Mitchell stated, "There is much about this debate that is deeply disturbing, but 
from my standpoint nothing is more so than the manner in which our allies have been 
treated with what can only be described as condescension and insult. We are told, in words 
demeaning to the British and French, that we simply have to tell them what to do."24 
Mitchell was disturbed because the recriminations flowing from the allied debate over 
Bosnia had led American neo-realists and democratists to urge the adoption of a unilateral 
Bosnia policy. This struck at the heart of Mitchell's institutionalist conception of European 
security as being guided by a genuinely multilateral consortium of European states and the 
US. Mitchell, in line with President Clinton and the general institutionalist view, wanted 
the Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own defence, and be proportionally 
accorded more of a say in the security decision-making process in multilateral institutions 
such as Nato. A unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would have implied for Mitchell a 
greater US involvement in the Bosnian conflict at a time when institutionalist policy 
regarding Europe was to limit the American stake in European security. Thus part of
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Mitchell's institutionalist Bosnia argument highlighted his institutionalist advocacy of a 
Europe with increasing and not decreasing responsibility for its own defence.
It is primarily over economic questions that Mitchell’s overall democratist orientation 
can be seen. Regarding trade issues such as the Nafta accord, Mitchell stated, "With the 
passage of this agreement, Congress affirms the leadership role of the US in this 
hemisphere and around the world."25 This statement illustrates Mitchell's democratist 
leanings on trade issues, as he stressed the political implications of the Nafta agreement as 
being paramount, rather than taking an economics-first approach, which is the central point 
behind the general institutionalist position on trade expansion. Mitchell affirmed the 
politics-first democratist viewpoint, saying, "Americans rightly have great faith in our 
democratic system, in the virtues of Jeffersonian democracy, and the importance of 
inalienable individual rights. From this individual freedom flows a vibrant economic 
freedom that provides opportunity and mobility. "26 As over his comments regarding Nafta, 
the former Senate Majority Leader illustrated his democratist belief that liberal democracy 
and not free-market economics is central to the causation argument about which is the 
substructure and which merely the superstructure in the world today. For Mitchell and 
democratists in general, the political nature of a state largely determines its economic 
system, and as over Nafta, it was the political considerations of economic policy that are of 
central importance. In the case of the Nafta accord, for instance, it was the political stability 
the free trade pact gave to Mexico, a state torturously moving toward genuine democracy, 
that was the central benefit of the agreement. Mitchell also rejected the institutionalist 
notion that economic power largely determines a state's overall strength. He observed, "The 
US - not Japan or Germany - was the model for change in Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Russia. Havel, Walesa, Yeltsin - they all looked to America. We symbolize and stand for 
fundamental freedoms."27 Mitchell thus affirmed the democratist notion that the triumph of 
democracy in the Cold War is fundamentally an American, and not just a Western victory. 
He also, in naming Germany and Japan, two states with world class economies and 
significantly less military and ideological power, confirmed the democratist view that 
economics, while important, is not the essential force driving world politics. In line with 
democratist thought, Mitchell favoured the Nafta agreement, but felt it was not the key 
catalyst for global ordering in the post-Cold War era in the same way that institutionalists 
believed it to be.
Regarding the MFN controversy with China, Mitchell emerged as a convinced 
democratist. This issue was of such importance for the Majority Leader that he publicly led
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the fight for conditions to be imposed on Chinese MFN status due to their appalling human
rights record during both the administrations of George Bush and Bill Clinton. As Barone
and Ujifusa noted, Mitchell, "on foreign policy differed sharply with Bush, criticizing his
conciliatory stand on China. "28 To this end Mitchell sponsored a bill, "imposing conditions
on the continued trade status enjoyed by China in the wake of the Tiananmen Square
massacre."29 Mitchell, horrified at the blatant murder of Chinese students by the
Communist ruling elite, advocated the democratist line that gross human rights violators
should not be economically bolstered or rewarded with increased American trade. This was
in line with his core democratist view that regarding foreign policy, the American
approach, "should be to shift our foreign policy's emphasis from exclusively protecting
'interests’ fo advancing our [American] ideals. "30 Mitchell, in agreeing with the standard
democratist position on China, believed that in resolving the MFN dispute more should be
taken into account than just noting narrow economic interests, as was advocated by the
institutionalists, and to a lesser degree, also by the neo-realists. For him the massacre at
Tiananmen Square was an affront to the US, as gross suppression of democracy and human
rights struck at the very core of what the democratist school of thought held to be most
sacred. Mitchell made his case against extending MFN to China in moral terms, stating, 
"The Chinese government is a Communist tyranny. It has a horrendous 
human rights record. It occupies the neighboring land of Tibet, supports 
the murderous Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, uses slave labor, illegally 
protects its market, and sells advanced weapons and technology to 
countries like Iran and Syria. Ever since Tiananmen Square, I have 
argued that we should firmly register our disapproval of China's 
behavior. "31
Mitchell was against delinking MFN renewal from human rights issues as the 
institutionalists advocated, as well as initially disapproving of even granting MFN with 
conditions to the Chinese as the neo-realists desired (until the political realities of the 
situation led him to side unsuccessfully with the neo-realists in a futile attempt to override 
the institutionalist argument) because, in standard democratist fashion, he objected to the 
very nature of the Chinese communist regime, and to what it represented.
Mitchell advocated supporting President Clinton's initiative to more vigorously support
Russian reform. As with the general schools of thought orientation of the Clinton 
administration regarding Russia, Mitchell's policy preferences were a mix of a dominant 
democratist impulse fused with an institutionalist viewpoint. This lesser institutionalist 
stance on Russia can be seen in the former Senate Majority Leader's belief that Russia 
should be substantially aided only after it had begun to put its own economic house in 
order. As Mitchell observed, "If the members of the CIS join the IMF and proceed with
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economic reforms leading to a market economy, the world community - including Japan, 
Germany, and the US - must be prepared to provide assistance, including currency 
stabilization and debt relief, to assist in the transition. "32 Not only did Mitchell here 
advocate sharing the burden of financially aiding Russia in a multilateral manner by 
including the economically powerful states of Germany and Japan with the US in his list of 
those who should lead the international community in galvanising economic support to aid 
the Yeltsin regime, he also identified currency stabilisation as a priority in this process. 
This is all in line with classic institutionalist thinking. However Mitchell’s overall majority 
democratist position on aiding Russian reform was based on his fervour for the initiative, 
which exceeded the more cautious institutionalist approach. In criticising President Bush's 
Russian policy, Mitchell stated, "The President first wedded his policy to Gorbachev's 
survival. Then he appeared reluctant to accept Yeltsin, despite his overwhelming popular 
mandate. Now the President wants to concentrate all attention on Yeltsin. Let's support 
democracy, not individuals and let's do it wholeheartedly."33 Mitchell felt that in tactically 
supporting personalities such as the neo-realist Bush administration attempted to do with 
both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the neo-realists missed the greater point that the US should 
support democracy in Russia itself. In order to do this America should, in Mitchell's view, 
engage Russia both more vigorously and broadly than President Bush was prepared to do, 
by disbursing some aid locally and not wholly through the centre in Moscow, as well as 
engaging local democrats, such as Anatoly Sobchak, the Mayor of St Petersburg, in direct 
dialogue with the US. Mitchell's belief in increasing and diversifying Russian aid to bolster 
democracy and not just individuals lay at the heart of his overall democratist policy 
preference regarding aiding Russian reform.
(b) Specific neo-realist decision-makers in US foreign policy
i) Joseph Biden Jr. - Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs
Senator Joe Biden, as Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on European and 
Canadian Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, offered what is by far the 
clearest expression of the democratist case on Bosnia in his report to the Senate upon 
returning from a fact-finding mission in April 1993, in which he visited Croatia, Bosnia, 
and Serbia and talked to Tudjman, Izetbegovic, and Milosevic. Yet as ringing a call to arms 
as, "To Stand Against Aggression," was,34 Biden is not a democratist. Rather his 
democratist stance regarding Bosnia was a minority position, as in all four other issue areas 
Biden is a convinced neo-realist.
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However over the Bosnia question Senator Biden provided the most salient example of 
the democratist stance on the conflict. Biden saw the Bosnian conflict not as a civil war, as 
some institutionalists believed it was, with both the Muslims and the Serbs sharing roughly 
equal blame for both the conflict’s genesis as well as the propagation of its horrors. Rather 
he viewed it as a clear cut case of Serbian aggression. As Biden caustically stated, "Is this a 
civil war? Only if you think Austrians and Czechs had civil wars in 1938."35 Biden's 
choice of the Anschluss and the Nazi aggression on the Czechoslovakian regime of Benes 
as like political examples to what was going on in Bosnia provided an interesting 
comparison. In all three cases restive local minorities within the state encouraged and were 
encourage^ by an expansionistic larger state to revolt against a fairly weak central 
government, with this rebellion being the pretext for the aggressive Germans and Serbs to 
attempt to dismember Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Bosnia, respectively. By comparing the 
Serbs to the genocidal Nazis, Biden left little doubt as to where both his sympathies lay and 
his blame for the conflict fell as well. In line with standard democratist thinking, Biden 
blamed the Serbs almost totally for the war in Bosnia.
Not only did Senator Biden see the war as a simple case of Serbian aggression, he 
believed the likely Serb victory in the conflict would have deleterious consequences for the 
rest of Eastern and Central Europe, whose ethnic minorities and secessionist tendencies 
became apparent after the thawing of the Cold War, particularly in the former USSR. As 
Biden noted, "What happens in Bosnia will form a prominent precedent: not for the abstract 
notion of a new world order but for political decisions looming in Russia, Ukraine, 
Georgia, and the Baltic states."36
Biden raised the spectre of increased ethnic conflict within the CIS being made more 
likely by the successful Serbian rape of the Bosnian state. It is at this point that Biden 
corrected the seeming flaw in democratist thinking, obliquely exposed by Senate Majority 
Leader Mitchell. It was not the democratists, but President Yeltsin, in Biden's view, who 
had advocated a theoretically flawed policy during the Bosnian conflict. For in strongly 
backing the Bosnian government, Biden felt the democratists were paradoxically 
supporting Yeltsin, which is a cardinal goal of their overall thinking, even if they did not 
realise it.
Biden untangled the puzzle, believing the US should actively intervene in the Bosnian 
conflict as, "any action that curtails the power and longevity of the Milosevic regime
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ultimately serves the interest of both Yeltsin and Russian democracy."37 In Biden's view 
this was due to two basic factors. Firstly, in supporting the secessionist Bosnian Serbs, 
Yeltsin opened a Pandora's box by implicitly encouraging his own restive minorities38 to 
believe that the inviolability of European borders, a precept that was maintained throughout 
the Cold War, was now obviously being discarded and they could seriously consider 
seceding from Russia itself. As the Russian republic stands to lose more than any other 
European state if its borders are open to question, due to the large numbers of ethnic 
minorities it contains, the Russian encouragement of the Bosnian Serbs could seriously 
come to weaken Yeltsin's hold on his own state.
Secondly, as Biden shrewdly noted, "Yeltsin's interest consists in defending himself 
against Russian reactionaries who are aligned with the Milosevic regime. Milosevic is not 
Yeltsin's ally but his enemy. "39 The earliest and warmest supporters in Russia of Milosevic 
were the nationalists of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the Communists, both of whom have 
exhibited obvious anti-democratic tendencies. Their support of Milosevic's aggression was 
consistent with their desire, certainly in Zhirinovsky's case, to reclaim portions of the 
former Soviet empire. A victory for Milosevic would further encourage these Russian 
reactionaries that they could reclaim parts of the old USSR with impunity. If such a policy 
were pursued, it is likely that in such a crisis atmosphere democracy would perish. It is with 
this linkage that Biden interestingly squared the circle regarding the democratists possible 
theoretical contradiction between their stated Russia-first attitude and their aggressive 
support for the Bosnian cause.
Given a democratist diagnosis of the Bosnian conflict which identified the Serbs as the 
chief aggressors of the war, and noted the possible dangers to the Russian democratic 
experiment if the Bosnian Serbs secessionist initiative succeeded, it was not surprising 
Biden offered such clear democratist policy prescriptions for the US to adopt in coping 
with the Bosnian quagmire. He was an early and consistent supporter of the 'lift and strike* 
option in Bosnia, that is, lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims and using 
American air strikes to shield the Bosnian government until the weapons given to them 
altered the military situation on the ground.40 But Biden's advocacy of the Bosnian cause 
took him even beyond this standard democratist policy prescription. In his 'ten point plan’ 
for Bosnia, Biden advocated: establishing a deadline for the turnover of all heavy weapons 
in Bosnia to the UN, the enforcement of no-shelling and no-fly zones by Nato, a relocation 
of UNPROFOR so it was militarily defensible, the punishment of war criminals in Bosnia, 
and the sending of an American ambassador to Sarajevo to underline the American
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commitment to the Bosnian govemment.41 Later Senator Biden would add to this list, 
proposing sending $50 million in American military aid to the Muslims in the form of 
weapons and ammunition.42 Finally, Biden urged active military support for the Muslims, 
saying, "The US must lead the West in a decisive response to Serb aggression, beginning 
with air attacks on Serb artillery everywhere in Bosnia and on Yugoslavian National Army 
units in Serbia that have participated in this international crime. Western forces should 
destroy every bridge across the Drina river by which the Serb authorities [then] continue to 
resupply the Bosnian Serbs. "43
Biden's aggressive prescription was designed to quickly even the material disparity 
between the Serb and Muslim forces, by destroying all links between Serbia proper and 
their allies at Pale, to destroy Bosnian Serb heavy weaponry such as artillery, which had 
been central to the Bosnian Serb successes, and to punish elements of the Yugoslav army in 
Serbia itself which had been directly involved in the fighting, in an attempt to deter any 
further incursions they might be tempted to make. Biden boldly resolved another possible 
contradiction in democratist thinking over Bosnia, disdaining the institutionalist view that 
appeasing the Serbs would save lives. As humanitarian concerns are of great importance to 
democratists, the charge that democratist policy prescriptions would lead to a great 
intensification of the fighting was one Biden could not afford to ignore. He resolved this 
apparent contradiction between humanitarian concerns and principle, by coming down 
firmly on the side of ideological purity. Moreover, Biden did so in a way which argued that 
in halting Serb adventurism by the use of military force, the US would actually save lives. 
Biden asserted, "the best means of averting a wider war is to defeat Serb aggression 
now. "44
Biden affirmed the democratist viewpoint that if the Serbs succeeded, adventurism by 
many states in the region was bound to ensue, which would ultimately cost more lives than 
would a resolute military response to Serb aggression. For instance, Hungary has irredentist 
claims on portions of Romania, Romania has similar claims on Moldova, and Albania has 
claims on Kosovo within Serbia itself. If the Serbs succeeded, Biden believed the law of 
the jungle Serb success would encourage, would almost certainly lead to further ferocious 
conflict in the region, and as such, it was in the humanitarian interest democratists so value 
to advocate that the US upheld principle and militarily challenged the Serb aggressors.
To further even the military odds in Bosnia, Senator Biden and other democratists 
agreed with the neo-realists that the embargo on the Bosnian Muslims had to be lifted.
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Biden starkly underlined the importance of lifting the embargo for both democratists and 
neo-realists, stating, "Lifting the arms embargo is the only feasible option that will permit 
the Bosnian government the opportunity to defend itself against the Serb irregulars, who 
are well armed with the legacy of Tito’s legions."45 This was Biden's response to all the 
institutionalist critics of the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, that 
whatever peripheral benefits in relations with the European allies or Russia flowed from the 
US following their institutionalist lead on Bosnia, the price to be paid would be a 
condoning and a confirming of the Serbian territorial gains made at the Bosnian 
government's expense. For Biden and the democratists, this was simply too high a price to 
pay as the precedent this would set of condoning aggression could ignite the ethnic 
tinderbox jn Central and Eastern Europe and would have possible calamitous effects on 
global stability itself, if Russia was destabilised. This is why democratists supported the 
lifting of the arms embargo with even more fervour than did neo-realists.
Senator Biden reserved the greatest measure of his vitriol about Western policy 
regarding Bosnia for America's European allies. Biden sarcastically observed, "Unless the 
West changes course, Milosevic and the barbarism he orchestrates will continue to operate 
under the shelter of Neville's umbrella. "46 By his caustic comparison of European policy 
toward Bosnia with the fainthearted and disastrous appeasement policy of Chamberlain in 
the late 1930s, Biden made clear his contempt for what he regarded as the Western 
European failure to put out the fire next door to them. As the Western Europeans were 
proponents of America continuing to embrace an institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia, 
his dislike for their views on Bosnia is understandable. The Senator's righteous indignation 
was also explicable by his democratist belief that the Europeans were hiding behind their 
peacekeepers in Bosnia. He stated, "I cannot even begin to express my anger for a 
European policy that is now asking us to participate in what amounts to a codification of a 
Serb victory."47 Biden said this in response to the European rejection of the American 
initiative to pursue a tougher line against the Serbs in the crucial month of May 1993, and 
when their proposal to establish a UN protectorate over the safe havens was tabled. Biden 
saw the UN operation, so strongly supported by the British and the French, as being merely 
a trap designed to keep the West from actively militarily aiding the Muslim cause, a trap 
that the Western Europeans and the Clinton administration were happily aware they were 
falling into, hence his claims of moral duplicity. For Biden, the disingenuous Western 
argument about Bosnia revolved around the peacekeeping role of the UN.
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Senator Biden saw the whole peacekeeping rationale used by the British and the French 
as a ruse to justify inaction in Bosnia, rather than as having genuine validity. He observed,
"If the limited UN presence now in Bosnia cannot defend itself against 
possible retaliation, then the time has come to remove these men and 
women from harm's way...In my discussions with relief workers 
throughout Bosnia, and with the government itself, it became clear that 
Bosnian civilians face a far greater threat of annihilation from Serb 
artillery attacks than from a lack of food or medicine. However well 
intentioned, the presence of UN relief personnel and peacekeeping 
forces, by inhibiting stronger Western action, now constitutes more an 
obstacle than a contribution to the humanitarian relief they were 
deployed to provide. "48
This was a classic democratist argument against the institutionalist advocacy of the merits 
of peacekeeping in Bosnia. Biden believed the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia failed on 
two counts. Firstly, they attempted to put a bandage on a hemorrhage, as at its best, UN 
humanitarian relief merely kept people alive so they could be either killed or subjugated by 
the Serb tactic of 'ethnic cleansing', in many cases. The humanitarian relief effort, in 
Biden's view, thus obscured the reality that only in militarily dealing with the main cause of 
the humanitarian disaster, the Bosnian Serbs, could the West hope to genuinely stem the 
flow of blood in Bosnia. Secondly, as the peacekeepers were lightly armed at the best of 
times, they functioned as virtual Serbian hostages, whenever the Serbs found the tactic of 
'detaining' them useful. For example, one of the reasons given by European powers as to 
why significant Western bombing of the Serbs was not used to protect the Bihac safe haven 
from blatant Serb disregard for the UN, was that UNPROFOR troops, then 'detained' by the 
Serbs, might suffer reprisals. Thus, in Biden's and the general democratist view, the 
peacekeepers came to symbolise the limits of Western concern for the fate of the Bosnian 
government, not its generosity.
Nor did Biden accept the administration's institutionalist argument that although it 
disagreed with its European allies about lifting the arms embargo, alliance unity must come 
first. As Biden bluntly said to Secretary Christopher at an April 1993 meeting of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, "We haven't done a damn thing."49 Following the general 
democratist stance, Senator Biden saw the Bosnian tragedy as taking precedence even over 
the continued survival of the Nato alliance. During an interview, an aide to Senator Biden 
responded to a question about the future of Nato in the post-Cold War era by saying that 
the West’s failure in Bosnia has had grave consequences in that, "Our inability to counter a 
lack of resolve of Western and US leaders, to protect the principle of unchanging borders, 
has signed the death warrant for Nato."50 It is not that Biden and the other democratists do 
not value Nato and hope for its survival, as they feel it is a crucial institution for them in the
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European security structure of the post-Cold War era. It is instead an indication of just how 
strongly democratists such as Biden felt about the need for American intervention in 
Bosnia, that they viewed it as the test case for the continued efficacy of Nato in the new 
era. If Nato could not decisively react to a case of blatant aggression on the European 
continent, so the democratist argument went, then its usefulness could never be relied upon 
again. For Biden and other democratists, differences in opinion with the institutionalists 
over Bosnia policy were not just principled disagreements, but betrayals of faith.
Over the MFN controversy with China, Senator Biden adopted a neo-realist line. 
Initially, Biden agreed with his democratist and neo-realist colleagues in the waning days 
of the Bush administration that human rights conditions ought to be linked to the renewal 
of MFN status for China and that if these conditions were not met, sanctions ought to be 
imposed.51 However when the matter came to a head during the Clinton administration, 
Biden retreated somewhat from his earlier stance. He came to believe, "it is fundamentally 
misguided to believe that Most-favored-nation status can catalyze fundamental change in 
Chinese government policies. "52 This statement is an explicit refutation of the democratist 
position on MFN regarding China as Biden stressed that the MFN weapon is not sufficient 
to radically alter China’s human rights policies, as democratists believe. However, Biden 
was unwilling to accept the institutionalist line, that the renewal of MFN should carry no 
conditions.
Instead, he adopted a neo-realist stance, suggesting that MFN be extended in 1994, but 
that further renewal should be tied to the more modest goal of limiting its arms sales to 
maverick states, such as Iran and Syria. An aide to Biden commented, "The Senator felt we 
ought to link one issue to MFN renewal, not human rights, but proliferation. We ought to 
try to get the Chinese not to sell missile technology to Iran and Pakistan."53 Biden felt that 
placing limited conditions on China's MFN status with strictures regarding arms sales 
would be far more practical than analysing the nebulous concept of its human rights record 
over a year. Also as Biden noted, it was in China's interest to comply with these limited 
conditions. Its $15 billion trade surplus with the US was ten times the rate of its earnings 
from weapons sales. Biden believed, "we [the US1 can present China with a stark choice: 
irresponsible arms trade with the world - or the continuation of a far more profitable trade 
with the US."54 So while Biden rejected the democratist view that MFN was a stick the US 
could use to fundamentally change the nature of the Chinese communist regime, he also 
refuted the institutionalist notion that MFN should not be used by America as a means to 
secure more modest changes in Chinese behaviour.
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Biden also followed the general neo-realist line regarding aid to Russia. Unlike the 
Clinton administration, Senator Biden does not see aid to President Yeltsin's regime as the 
single most important foreign policy issue confronting America today. Rather as an aide to 
Biden stated, "The most important issue is non-proliferation, to in the Senator's words, 
decrease the arsenals of Armageddon built up during the Cold War. Here obviously Russia 
is important. The Senator favors aid to Russia to help dismantle nuclear weapons, to ratify 
START 2, and go even further in dismantling the Russian nuclear arsenal. "55 To advance 
the cause of non-proliferation, Biden was a co-sponsor of the Nunn-Lugar bill, which gave 
assistance to Russia to both partially dismantle its nuclear stockpiles as well as adequately 
house Russia's restive military. The Nunn-Lugar bill was the policy centrepiece of the 
American neo-realists plan to provide limited, targeted aid to the former rival superpower.
Biden agreed with other neo-realists that such aid should be limited. He argued, "The 
urgent question is not whether we will provide billions to the post-Soviet Commonwealth 
in traditional development assistance. Money on that scale is not available, nor could it be 
used without enormous waste. "56 Unlike democratists who are revivalists, Biden 
specifically and neo-realists in general share the declinist view that as relatively the US is 
not in as strong an economic position as it was in the immediate post-1945 period, it is 
unable to provide aid to Russia on a Marshall Plan scale as the democratists would like. 
Nor does Senator Biden, as the above quotation demonstrates, have confidence in the 
Russian leadership to use large-scale aid wisely. Although Senator Biden wants to aid 
Russia, there are distinct neo-realist limits as to how far he desires to go in assisting the 
Russian experiment in democracy.
Senator Biden also follows the standard neo-realist position in advocating placing 
conditions on Russian aid. This position is illustrated by Biden's desire to place conditions 
on Russia's arms sales. Acting in response to the May 1992 announcement that Russia 
intended to sell sophisticated rocket engines to India despite the Missile Technology 
Control Regime, Biden offered an amendment to the US aid pledge to the former USSR 
that would, "require Russia, Ukraine and the other states to abide by international standards 
on non-proliferation. "57 If Russia persisted in violating the regime, Biden was prepared, as 
his amendment makes clear, to cut off all aid to the Yeltsin regime. The Senator's placing 
such a draconian condition on aid to Russia illustrates both his concern about weapons 
proliferation as well as his general neo-realist stance regarding aid to the most important 
Republic of the former Soviet state.
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The Senator also adheres to the sceptical neo-realist position regarding the global 
expansion of free trade. As an aide to Biden noted, both by inclination and committee 
assignment, Senator Biden is not overly enamoured with trade issues. While he did vote for 
both the Nafta and the Gatt accords, he favoured Nafta late in the political day.58 This lack 
of enthusiasm for trade issues does not lit the agenda of an institutionalist. Biden's 
hesitation about Nafta is encapsulated in his remarks on the Senate floor July 1, 1992 when 
he argued, "All three parties [Mexico, Canada, and the US] can gain, but only with 
stipulations on Mexican labor and environmental standards that ensure against a rush of 
northern industry to the south. No principle of efficiency would be served by abetting the 
rise of a low wage pollution belt across the Mexican border. "59 In the end Biden supported 
Nafta, but as this quotation makes evident, he feared the environmental and economic 
drawbacks to the accord, shortcomings both institutionalists and even democratists did not 
feel were important compared with free trade expansion.
Nor was Biden sanguine about the long-term survival prospects of Nato. His neo-realist 
view of the alliance, highly coloured by the Bosnia debacle, is that Nato's days are 
numbered. While Senator Biden favoured the President's institutionalist Partnership for 
Peace initiative60, he was not as optimistic as Clinton's men were about its significance. 
His negative neo-realist reaction to the chances of Nato's survival had both a general and a 
specific component. Generally, he followed the neo-realist maxim that without a common 
enemy to unify them, Western Europe and the US were likely to find that conflicting 
national interests increasingly divided them.61 Biden stated, "unless the Nato members can 
articulate a vision for a future role for Nato, the question of whether to expand to the east 
becomes merely an academic abstraction. "62 Thus Biden, while agreeing with the 
Partnership for Peace initiative, felt it largely missed the point about what was needed to 
rectify the alliance.
If Senator Biden had qualms about Nato's survival generally, they were confirmed for 
him by the role the Europeans played in the Bosnian crisis. He bitterly observed, 
"Perversely, the British and French have argued that if we lift the embargo [in Bosnia] we 
are going to perpetuate the bloodshed. They are idiots. And we are acting collectively as a 
free world like cowards."63 In his frustrated democratist zeal for Bosnia, Biden saw the end 
of the alliance. He angrily charged, "What the devil use is Nato? And I have been an 
absolute ardent, consistent, vehement supporter of Nato for its military as well as its 
political and economic reasons for 21 years in the US Senate. But if it cannot affect the
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carnage in the middle of Europe, what do we need it for?"64 Such anger at the failure of the 
alliance to reverse Serb gains in the Bosnia conflict predicated Senator Biden's sceptical 
neo-realist stance regarding the future of the alliance itself.
ii) Newt Gingrich - House Minority Whip
Regarding trade issues, the Speaker of the House has consistently advocated a 
neo-realist position. While eventually supporting both the Nafta and Gatt trade agreements, 
Gingrich supported the latter only grudgingly, preoccupied as he was with the neo-realist 
dictum that multilateral trade agreements must not be enacted at the expense of an erosion 
of national sovereignty. Gingrich’s grudging support for the Gatt agreement itself 
confirmed the basic neo-realist belief that the expansion of free trade is not the most crucial 
international imperative for the US, as it often has deleterious as well as beneficial aspects. 
Gingrich's policy position coincided with the standard neo-realist stance on the two free 
trade agreements, which was the most lukewarm support for Nafta and Gatt of the three 
schools of thought.
It is true, as Gingrich asserted in The Economist that, "he provided Clinton with the 
margin of victory, "65 regarding Nafta, as without the marshalled support of the largely 
free-trade House Republicans the accord would never have passed, as most House 
Democrats voted against the bill. It is over the question of approval of the Gatt accord that 
Gingrich's neo-realist scepticism about the unalloyed virtues of free trade can be seen. 
Regarding the Gatt agreement, the personal animosity which characterises the relationship 
between the two powerful neo-realist colleagues, Senator Dole and Gingrich, was held in 
check as they were able to work well together in limiting the American commitment to the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), which took over Gatt's role as arbiter and stimulator of 
global free trade expansion. As Horvitz observed, "Gingrich said that he was 'very, very 
concerned’ about prospects for [Gatt] ratification and declared that the president 'needs to 
agree' with Dole's suggestions,"66 regarding safeguards being included in the Uruguay 
round of the Gatt, which established the WTO. The WTO became a major sticking point 
which compelled the neo-realists to obliquely threaten to derail the entire accord.
As The Economist stated, this was particularly true in Gingrich's case, "It is concern 
over the WTO's powers that is giving Gingrich pause. He wonders whether it [the WTO] 
will always serve American interests. "67 Given the neo-realists' strong preoccupation with 
the notion of sovereignty, their fears about the WTO were well-founded. As Merritt noted,
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the WTO is a far more powerful organisation than the Gatt ever was, "The big change will 
be sharper teeth that the WTO will have to settle trade rows. Gatt panels require unanimous 
agreement, but a WTO’s panel's ruling will be able to be overturned only by unanimous 
vote."68 Thus no longer will a state be able to effectively veto any sanction the WTO 
imposes upon it, as was the case with the Gatt system. Furthermore, as there will be well 
over 100 states in the WTO, such an overriding of the panel’s decisions on trade disputes is 
not remotely likely. The WTO embodies another aspect which contradicts the neo-realists’ 
belief in a strict understanding of sovereignty. Every state in the WTO will be apportioned 
one vote, unlike the Gatt where voting was weighted, roughly based on the respective 
economic power of each state. Thus, in theory a combination of economically weak states 
like Mali, .Ghana, and Bangladesh can outvote the US on a WTO trade panel and compel it 
to change some aspect of its domestic trade policy.
This system goes against the grain of neo-realist thinking on two counts, as it fails to 
consider international power relations in establishing the structure of an international 
organisation, and places US domestic affairs theoretically in a partially subordinate position 
to an international organisation's dictates. Thus it is possible the national interest, the 
primary yardstick by which neo-realists attempt to gauge all foreign policy developments, 
would not always be served by membership in the WTO. Certainly, the partial ceding of 
economic sovereignty was alone enough to make neo-realists nervous. This was the 
rationale behind Gingrich's advocacy of Dole's reservations about the WTO.
In the end, President Clinton agreed to include the Dole safeguards into the Gatt 
formula, and both the then Senate Minority Leader and Gingrich supported the Gatt accord, 
which easily passed both in the House and the Senate.69 The safeguards, enacted in 
legislation formally separate from the treaty, put the WTO on notice that an American 
panel of retired federal judges would review WTO decisions and that if they found three to 
be 'unfair' in a six month period, the Congress would retain the right to abrogate the 
American commitment to the WTO, rather than waiting six months to do so as the treaty 
formally required. While the compromise was seen as window-dressing by most pundits, it 
was far more than this. It neatly encapsulated the neo-realist position on free trade 
expansion. Neo-realists, such as Gingrich, were aware that the foundation of the WTO 
could well be in the overall American interest, as many economists speculated that the trade 
disputes that were most likely to spring up in the wake of the global ratification of the 
Uruguay Round were likely to involve issues such as copyright infringement and computer 
programme protections, where the US stands to greatly gain.70 However, Gingrich and the
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other neo-realists were not prepared to accept that such a powerful supranational 
organisation would necessarily serve the American national interest.
The Dole safeguards made a panel of American judges the final arbiters of trade 
disputes, not a panel of foreigners. Thus, ultimately American trade policy still lay in the 
hands of Americans, not a powerful international organisation. As American sovereignty 
was safeguarded, Gingrich and other neo-realists could happily vote for an accord so likely 
to enhance American national interests. The entire Gatt controversy, and the response of 
neo-realists such as Gingrich to it, illustrated the underlying neo-realist tenet, that 
sovereignty must always be safeguarded, and that free trade expansion may be an 
opportunity, but must never be viewed as a panacea for American problems in the new 
world order, as trade expansion can well be a mixed blessing.
Regarding Bosnia, the Minority Whip also advocated the general neo-realist line. 
However he was less militant about his position than were Senators Lugar and Dole, the 
two other neo-realists to be analysed in this chapter. Early in the Clinton administration, 
Gingrich took issue with the democratist position on Bosnia, as, "he spoke skeptically of 
military intervention in Bosnia."71 Like many neo-realists, and in opposition to 
democratists, Gingrich did not feel that Bosnia was an important enough priority in the 
hierarchy of American national interests to justify committing ground troops to aid the 
Bosnian Muslims in the conflict. Also in common with the institutionalist position on 
Bosnia, the Minority Whip saw the conflict as a European concern, as Martin observed, 
"Gingrich said yesterday he was opposed to any substantial reconstruction and military aid 
to Bosnia on budgetary grounds, adding, 'It’s largely a European problem*."72
Yet despite the fact that Gingrich felt only limited aid to Bosnia was possible due to 
domestic constraints, as Bosnia was not a high enough foreign policy priority for the US, 
he did not rule out all aid or succour for the Muslim cause, in keeping with standard neo­
realist thinking. Gingrich also, like his neo-realist and democratist colleagues, viewed the 
Serbs as the aggressors in the Bosnian conflict and as possible destabilisers of the region. 
Unlike the institutionalists, he could envision circumstances where the US militarily aiding 
the Bosnian Muslims could contribute to stability in the region, and not necessarily further 
inflame the conflict. If further destabilisation of the Balkans occurred, the Minority Whip 
advocated a far more hawkish response than the institutionalists preferred. As Keillor 
noted, Gingrich announced, "Colin Powell (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) 
ought to be dispatched to tell the Bosnian Serbs: ’If you launch a general offensive - we
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would reserve the right to take you apart, and we would do it in three to five days'."73 As 
Gingrich has already stated (See footnote 71) that he did not agree with the democratists 
that US ground forces should be committed to the Bosnian war, this additional quotation 
illustrates that he was advocating the neo-realist policy preference of helping the Bosnian 
Muslims in ways short of the introduction of American ground troops, in this case by a 
massive show of air power to ’take out' the Serbs if they further destabilised the Balkans.
Thus while Gingrich shared several basic institutionalist opinions about Bosnia, such as 
that the Bosnian conflict was too marginal to American national interests to commit ground 
troops, nevertheless he followed the overall neo-realist policy stance on Bosnia in 
advocating limited aid to the Bosnian Muslims, seeing the Serbs as the aggressors in the 
conflict, and believing that if the Serbs should attempt further territorial advances they 
should be driven back by a massive display of American air power. Gingrich definitely held 
a neo-realist position on Bosnia, even if he was less committed to the Bosnian cause than 
the more fervent neo-realists such as Senator Dole.
While Speaker Gingrich agreed with his neo-realist colleague, Senator Lugar, that there 
should be some aid allotted to Russia to help it reduce its nuclear stockpile, he feels any 
further aid to the former superpower should be limited and tied to Russia's 'good' 
behaviour, that is, behaviour that is in the interests of the United States. Like Senator 
Biden, Gingrich worries what effect the demise of the USSR will have on the cause of non­
proliferation. He believes a lack of Russian assistance in this area should be met by a firm 
American response. As Friedman observed, "Just last week [February 1995], Gingrich 
declared that 'we should cut off all aid to Russia' if it sells nuclear reactors to Iran."74 This 
statement makes Speaker Gingrich's neo-realist position regarding aid to Russia clear. The 
Speaker sees the limited aid the US gives to Russia as conditional in a manner that both 
institutionalists and especially democratists do not.
Gingrich also maintains the classic neo-realist stance regarding relations with Europe. 
He agrees with the general democratist and neo-realist position, and opposes the standard 
institutionalist line, believing the US should continue to lead and dominate Nato.75 Also in 
line with neo-realist thinking, Speaker Gingrich advocates the quick admission of the 
Central European states into Nato, a process facilitated by the drawing up of a timeline for 
their admission, a step the Clinton administration has been reluctant to take. In the National 
Security Restoration Act, which is part of Gingrich's election-winning 'Contract with 
America', he urged, "that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia should be in a
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position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to the security 
of the North Atlantic area no later than June 10, 1999. "76 The act is merely the practical 
policy expression of Gingrich's general neo-realist commitment to the revitalisation of 
Nato.
(iii) Richard Lugar - Ranking Minority Member, Senate Subcommittee on European 
Affairs
Senator Richard Lugar, former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
in 1985-6, and the ranking Republican in the 103rd Congress on the European Affairs 
subcommittee, is generally considered to have been the most politically effective 
Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee from the mid-80s to the present day. 
Unlike Senator Helms (now Chairman of the Committee in the 104th Congress), Senator 
Lugar has maintained a practical bipartisan modus vivendi that has enabled him to remain 
politically influential even during periods of Democratic ascendancy in the Senate. But 
despite his bipartisan reputation, Lugar is a solid Republican, as his consistent neo-realist 
position on foreign policy matters attests to.
Regarding Bosnia policy, Lugar was a consistent critic of the institutionalist stance 
throughout the 103rd Congress. As Ramet stated, even during the early phases of the 
conflict, Lugar, "urged the Bush administration to take the lead in putting such [military] 
intervention on the UN agenda...The UN should authorize nation-states to use force (in 
Bosnia). Nato should draw up plans for a comprehensive use of force."77 Thus early on, 
Lugar's policy prescriptions regarding Bosnia had a democratist tinge, with their emphasis 
on American leadership in the efforts to help the Bosnian government, and their direct 
advocacy of the use of military force if necessary to defeat the Serbs. If the Serbs did not 
withdraw from their newly captured territory, Lugar argued its military machine, "should 
face sufficient military force to ensure its certain and sure defeat. "78 While Lugar later 
moderated his position on Bosnia, adopting a firm neo-realist stance, his impatience with 
Western inactivity in the face of Serbian aggression, and his belief that the Serbs were the 
villain of the Bosnian piece and were potential destabilisers of the region remained 
underlying assumptions of his policy prescriptions for the Bosnian war.
As with some who early on had advocated a democratist stance toward Bosnia, Lugar 
saw the window of opportunity for the American use of force close amid the cautious 
ditherings of the Bush administration. This did not mean, however, that Lugar resigned
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himself to the institutionalist position advocated by the new Clinton White House. As The 
Christian Science Monitor noted in its interview with Lugar, "The Senator would increase 
pressure on the Serbs by arming the Bosnian Muslims and he would do that unilaterally if 
the Europeans refused to go along. Although he sees no need for US ground forces, the US 
might have to play an active role in arming the Muslims, he says."79 Here Lugar espoused 
the classic neo-realist position on Bosnia. Having shunned his former democratist notion 
that American troops are needed to defeat the Serbs, Lugar now felt the Serbs could be 
thwarted through the US arming the Bosnian Muslims. Crucially, Lugar, following the 
standard neo-realist line, believed the Bosnian government should be armed with or 
without the approval of America's European allies. Citing a general neo-realist belief, 
Lugar felt,the US ought not to give anyone, even the European allies, a virtual veto over 
US policy prescriptions regarding the Bosnian conflict. In his defence of America's right to 
pursue a Bosnia policy unencumbered by multilateral constraints, Lugar adopted a clear 
neo-realist stance.
As with other neo-realists such as Senator Dole, Lugar was frustrated with both 
President Clinton and the European powers for what he saw as their overly passive policy 
toward Bosnia. Lugar believed the President did not see the geopolitical pitfalls of his 
institutionalist position regarding Bosnia. Lugar felt, "the Clinton White House has allowed 
the Bosnian crisis to become a 'free fall' that could spread the fighting to other parts of 
Europe. 'I don’t think they’re on the right track at all’."80 Senator Lugar disagreed with the 
institutionalist belief that the best way to contain the Bosnian conflict was to not arm the 
Bosnian Muslims. Rather, he agreed with his democratist and neo-realist colleagues that the 
inevitable Serb victory that would ensue if the arms embargo was not lifted would further 
adventurism throughout the Balkans, and would fuel further conflict, not end it. 
Throughout the 103rd Congress, Lugar maintained a strong anti-institutionalist position, 
feeling that the Clinton administration in its effort to contain the war by refusing to arm the 
Bosnian Muslims, had in fact increased the danger that the conflict would spread.
Nor did Lugar see the administration alone as following the wrong policy. Like 
Senators Dole and Biden, Lugar reserved most of his venom about the Bosnian conflict for 
Britain and France. As Horvitz observed, Dole and Lugar relentlessly called for Britain and 
France to, "remove their ground troops in Bosnia if they fear they will become targets of 
Serb reprisals should Washington begin air strikes."81 At the time of this quotation, Dole 
and Lugar were supporting the President's plan for crafting a tougher Western policy 
toward Serbia in May 1993. At this crucial juncture, unlike the Clinton administration,
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Lugar did not accept what was to become the perpetual European excuse against Western 
involvement in Bosnia, that their peacekeepers would suffer at the hands of the Serbs. In 
accordance with neo-realist tenets, Lugar urged the Europeans to remove their 
peacekeepers from Bosnia.
Further, as with most neo-realists, Lugar saw the European rationale for limiting
Western action in Bosnia as an untenable excuse used to justify the appeasement of the
Serbs. In a joint missive, Dole and Lugar argued,
'"The continuing war in Bosnia, can largely be attributed to the pursuit of 
half-measures on the part of the Europeans and the UN' as well as the 
UN-imposed embargo. The letter refers to Europe’s 'failed record' in the 
Balkans and suggests that inaction in Bosnia by Nato might require the 
US to re-examine its investment in the alliance...'Our allies have argued 
for the maintenance of a significant number of American troops in 
Europe as a means of preserving European stability. However, the 
inability of Nato to act effectively to contain and stop a major war on 
European soil is bound to raise grave doubts among both the American 
people and the Congress about whether the enormous yearly investment 
we make in Nato is reaping sufficient benefits'. "82
Here Lugar criticised the UN as being inept and vacillating over the Bosnian crisis, a stance 
entirely consistent with a school of thought which distrusts international organisations as 
either being too powerful and therefore a threat to a state's sovereignty, or as too weak and 1
thus not really helpful to a state pursuing its national interests through the organisation. 
More striking was Lugar’s advocacy of the standard democratist and neo-realist assumption 
that Bosnia was a test case of the continued efficacy of Nato, rather than viewing Bosnia as 
of little account compared with the alliance in the overall hierarchy of American foreign 
policy priorities, as did institutionalists. Senator Lugar directly linked questions about the
i
European response to Bosnia with the continued vitality of Nato itself. j
While neo-realists support Nato's continuation in the new world order, the above 
statement reflects general neo-realist pessimism about the continued usefulness of Nato in 
the new age, and should be read as a gloomy prognosis rather than merely as a threat to the 
European allies. Unlike the democratists, who see Nato as based on the shared values of the 
West, neo-realists have always had a more hard-headed view of the organisation, seeing it 
as an 'investment' in American security, rather than as a perpetual symbol of the friendship 
of states sharing common democratic bonds. For Lugar specifically and for neo-realists in 
general, the failed Bosnian test case called into question the continued viability of Nato in
i
the post-Cold War era. ’
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Yet although neo-realists such as Senator Lugar question the continued relevance of 
Nato in the post-1989 era, they are not for its abolition. This can be seen in the general neo­
realist position on European security, as neo-realists such as Lugar advocate the extension 
of Nato into Central Europe. Paradoxically for neo-realists, the extension of Nato is 
essential for the survival of the alliance itself. As Kaplan stated, Lugar’s telling sound bite 
on the future of Nato was, "Nato: Out of Area or Out of Business."83 That is, without Nato 
accepting the new mission as guarantor of Central European security, its continued survival 
is doubtful. This is in line with the standard neo-realist view of international organisations, 
that they exist to secure a group of states' specific needs and are established to deal with 
specific circumstances, and that if these circumstances change the organisation will not 
long surviye.
Such is the neo-realist view of Nato. It was created to contend with the specific threat of 
possible Soviet military adventurism, and that as that threat has waned (though not wholly 
disappeared in the neo-realist view) the raison d'etre for Nato has correspondingly shrunk. 
It is only with a new mandate as serving as military guarantor to the fledging democratic 
states of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic that new life can be given to the 
alliance. Thus Senator Lugar feels the Clinton administration is missing out on an historic 
opportunity to revitalise Nato. As Lugar stated, "If the object [of the Partnership for Peace 
Plan! was to impart a greater sense of security and stability toward the countries of Eastern 
Europe by meeting their political and psychological need for a road map to inclusion in the 
West, Partnership for Peace alone did not and cannot do the job. "84
As is the case with many other neo-realists who fear a resurgent Russia, Senator Lugar 
believes there may be a limited time period when the admittance of the more advanced 
Warsaw Pact states can be easily accomplished, so there should be little delay in their 
inclusion in the alliance. As Rosenfeld observed, Lugar wishes to, "Take the Poles, 
Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks off the 'side track' of Partnership for Peace and put them 
on the 'fast track' of a specific schedule for association and then full Nato membership. "85 
Lugar adhered to the standard neo-realist view that the institutionalists' advocacy of the 
President's Partnership for Peace initiative was a dangerous cul-de-sac retarding rather than 
catalysing Nato's eastward expansion, as it neither allowed for a specific timetable for the 
admission of the Central European states into Nato, nor did it initially lay down 
prerequisites needed to be fulfilled for inclusion in the alliance.86 Further, Lugar felt the 
delay the Partnership for Peace initiative signalled in the process of admitting the Central 
European states into the alliance threatened Nato's position as the premier European
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security organisation. As Lugar argued, ’’The Partnership for Peace proposal, however, 
rather than resolving the European-Atlantic debate in Nato’s favor, has served as an excuse 
or opportunity to revive certain European alternatives to Nato. "87 Senator Lugar felt that 
the lack of Nato revitalisation that the Partnership for Peace plan signalled could lead to the 
watering down of Nato's role in favour of European security structures such as the WEU 
and the Eurocorps, as well as the more multilateral OSCE (Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe). In keeping with general neo-realist and democratist views, and in 
opposition to the institutionalist Clinton administration, Lugar desired that Nato reform 
itself quickly so as to solidify its position as the pre-eminent security structure in Europe, as 
it was relatively much more susceptible to American wishes than were either the WEU or 
the OSCE, Lugar believed the Partnership for Peace initiative should be scrapped and 
replaced by a mechanism that both stabilised Central Europe and buttressed Nato itself in 
the post-Cold War era.
Lugar also advocates the general neo-realist stance on aid to Russia. On this foreign 
policy issue, Lugar joined with the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Sam Nunn, a Democrat, to push aid to Russia through the Senate. Yet Lugar and Nunn 
favoured giving increased aid to Russia for neo-realist rather than democratist reasons, as 
favoured by the Clinton administration, "he [Lugar] and Nunn have been influential 
advocates of additional aid to the former Soviet Union. They have framed the issue as a 
question of national security, arguing that any benefits derived from the end of the Cold 
War would dissipate if the republics of the former Soviet Union collapse economically."88 
If the democratists base their strong advocacy for giving aid to Russia on the hope that 
Yeltsin's democratic experiment will succeed, neo-realists such as Lugar base their support 
for increased but limited aid to Russia partly on their fear of further Russian collapse, 
leading to the demise of Yeltsin and the emergence of authoritarian rule in Russia. Lugar 
illustrated this pessimistic stance, saying, "signs reappear that Russia may, out of a sense of 
desperation, be moving in foreign policy directions not-so-strangely reminiscent of its more 
imperial predecessors. "89 Given this position, though they believe aid ought to be given to 
Yeltsin, neo-realists advocate giving Russia far less than democratists propose and 
targeting the aid to programmes that will be strategically in the American national interest. 
Not for neo-realists is there the democratists' rosy view of a real partnership with Russia 
based on sharing democratic values. Rather, as Cox noted, "Lugar declared that the US had 
'to get over the idea' that it was involved in a 'partnership' with Moscow. 'This is a tough 
rivalry' he insisted."90
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Neo-realists favoured limited aid to Russia to preserve American gains made at the end 
of the Cold War. Thus, they wish, for example, to retain the peace dividend of being able to 
cut military spending and enhance domestic initiatives, not for the global democratic cause 
or the misguided desire to be able to view Russia as an ally, not a rival, but because it is to 
the advantage of the United States. Russia will always be a great power, in the neo-realist 
view, and thus there would always be an element of competition in its relationship with the 
US, as another great power with different interests.91 According to neo-realists like Lugar, 
helping Russia served the American national interest, no more and no less.
It was of first importance to the neo-realists to dismantle as much of the former Soviet 
arsenal as possible, as a hedge against the possible emergence of a nationalist, 
authoritarian, expansionist leadership in Moscow. As this was the case, Nunn and Lugar 
were the political impetus behind the Senate’s enactment of the Freedom Support Act, 
which authorised increased aid to Russia.92 This aid was targeted specifically to meet 
American military concerns about the new Russia. The rationale behind giving Russia 
money and technical expertise to dismantle its nuclear stockpiles as had already been 
agreed under the START treaties, was simple, "If extreme nationalists regained control, the 
nuclear missiles might again pose a threat to the US. That is why it is urgent to begin 
dismantling the Russian and other ex-Soviet republic's arsenals even before the START 
treaty is ratified. "93 Thus, whatever became of Yeltsin's efforts at democratic reform, an 
American initiative to fund the removal of some of Russia's nuclear stockpiles was in the 
national interest, according to the neo-realists.
Neo-realists also advocate partially funding the resettlement of Red Army veterans who 
had been stationed in the Soviet Empire, especially in the Baltic states.94 These soldiers 
had threatened not to leave their bases unless homes were built for them in Russia, as many 
had nowhere to go with the collapse of the USSR. Lugar and Nunn successfully advocated 
giving US aid for this project, so the Russian army had no excuse not to withdraw from 
Central Europe and the Baltic states. Neo-realists reasoned it was in the national interest to 
do this, again especially if the generally pro-Western Yeltsin government was to give way 
to a more aggressive, nationalist successor, it would be unable to easily reclaim the military 
dominance of the former Soviet sphere of influence. Lugar's neo-realist policy prescriptions 
were predicated upon following the standard gloomy neo-realist assessment of the chances 
for Yeltsin to succeed with his democratic reform, as indicated by the fact that his 
initiatives would serve America's strategic interests whether Yeltsin survived or not.
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iv) Robert Dole - Senate Minority Leader
Senator Bob Dole was undoubtedly the most formidable critic of President Clinton in 
his first two years in office. While noted more for his domestic expertise, Dole has also 
consistently opposed the administration’s overall institutionalist foreign policy, cogently 
advocating the neo-realist point of view in the post-Cold War era. On no foreign issue has 
Dole's disagreement with the President been stronger than over American policy toward 
Bosnia.
Regarding Bosnia, the Senate Minority Leader (now the Senate Majority Leader in the 
104th Congress) was an early, consistent and fierce critic of the administration's 
institutionalist policy. As Dole stated on the Senate floor during his introduction of the 
Dole-Lieberman amendment, which if it had passed, would have forced President Clinton 
either to arm the Bosnian government or veto the $263 billion Pentagon budget to which it 
was attached, "For more than two years now the US has gone along with failed policies in 
the name of consensus."95 Here Dole cleverly affirmed the President's own explanation as 
to why he had not been more forceful during the Bosnian crisis, his championing of the 
institutionalist tenet that allied consensus on Bosnia outweighed all possible Western policy 
outputs. Dole turned this argument on its head, instead contending that this sacrificing of 
successful policy initiatives (after all it was President Clinton himself who said he did not 
agree with the Europeans regarding the arms embargo) was precisely the reason that the 
West's response to the Bosnian crisis had proved so dismal. Like Senators Biden and Lugar, 
the Senate Minority Leader believed that while the Clinton White House's specific 
institutionalist policy preference in Bosnia was misguided, it was merely the tip of the 
iceberg of the analytical problems that had arisen for the US and threatened, if not 
corrected, to inflict far greater damage on US interests throughout the world.
Like most democratists and neo-realists, Senator Dole believed the Europeans were 
even more to blame for the West's feeble response to the Bosnian crisis than was the 
Clinton administration. Dole, during the climactic debate over the Dole-Lieberman 
amendment on July 1, 1994, caustically attacked institutionalist proponents regarding 
Bosnia such as Senator Mitchell, who had admonished the Minority Leader for speaking 
critically of America's European allies, "Several senators have asked how we dare tell our 
European allies what to do, since they have troops on the ground. I think the real question 
is how dare we tell the Bosnians what to do. "96 In this heated exchange, Senator Dole 
revealed the neo-realist underpinnings of his Bosnian policy preference. Instead of
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worrying primarily about allied consensus, as institutionalists did over Bosnia policy, Dole 
saw the goal of multilateral harmony colliding with Bosnia's inherent right to self-defence 
over the issue of the arms embargo. Dole largely ignored what he saw as diplomatic 
niceties in favour of championing the principle that all states inherently have the right to 
defend themselves in the anarchic international system, and that this right was being denied 
to the Bosnian Muslims as a result of the UN arms embargo which denied them the chance 
of attaining military parity with the Serbian forces. The right of all states to self-defence is 
a cardinal neo-realist belief. Dole argued for example, that, "The arms embargo against 
Bosnia violates its inherent right to self-defense - a right which is recognized in, but not 
limited to, Article 51 of the UN Charter. "97 Ironically Dole used a reference point of the 
institutionalist school of thought, international law, specifically the UN Charter, to bolster 
his neo-realist case regarding Bosnia.
Nor did Dole accept the European peacekeeper rationale as a valid reason to limit 
Western involvement in Bosnia. Following the general neo-realist stance, Dole stated, "Get 
the [UN] soldiers out of the way. Pull 'em out’ Dole said in an outburst of frustration at 
European nations which cite the safety of their troops in Bosnia as an argument against 
tougher military intervention."98 Like Biden, the Senate Minority Leader saw the European 
peacekeeping argument as little more than an excuse to avoid taking the more rigorous 
action on Bosnia that both neo-realists and democratists advocated.
Dole also believed the UN's operational supremacy during the Bosnian crisis was part 
of the reason for the West's failure of policy during the conflict. Dole has the instinctive 
neo-realist dislike of international organisations that try to function as foreign policy actors 
themselves, rather than merely serving as a conducive arena for states with common 
interests to co-ordinate foreign policy, as most neo-realists would want. As Rosenfeld 
observed, "Dole wants a more assertive policy in which America is the 'predominant' 
player, 'first among equals', not just 'one of equals'. He reserves special animus for an 
ostensibly overreaching UN, to which, he declares, President Clinton has 'subcontracted' 
American independence. "99 Dole felt the President allowed the UN to supersede American 
interests in places like Somalia and Bosnia, where American freedom of action had been 
subordinated to an , overly ambitious UN, which had been disastrously encouraged by the 
institutionalist Clinton administration to see itself as the global policeman. Senator Dole's 
world view, in accordance with both democratist and nationalist neo-realist thinking, has 
the US at the centre of any attempt to fill the role of global cop. The UN, without an army
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at its disposal, was shown to he all too dependent on the whims of the Security Council 
over Bosnia, and has proven to be far from an autonomous power, so Dole believed.
Frustratingly for the now Senate Majority Leader, the UN was allowed by the President 
to eclipse the one international organisation that could have made a difference in the war, 
Nato. As Nato has always been led by the US, symbolised by the fact that the military head 
of the alliance has always been an American general, and as it has the military wherewithal 
which neo-realists feel is still an essential part of international diplomacy, it has long been a 
favourite instrument of the neo-realist school of thought. That the institutionalist Clinton 
administration would subordinate Nato to the UN in the Bosnian crisis is a telling sign for 
neo-realists such as Senator Dole of institutionalism's consistent undervaluing of the 
military component of power in the overall scheme of international relations. As Dole 
stated during the Senate debate on the Dole-Lieberman amendment, "As for those who say 
that this amendment will have a negative impact on Nato, it seems to me that Nato has 
already suffered significant damage... Nato’s credibility has suffered because of decisions to 
subordinate Nato to the UN in Bosnia - allowing UN officials to have control over Nato 
forces." 100
The dual key mechanism the West used in threatening limited force in Bosnia through 
the use of air strikes was so often vetoed by UN officials such as Akashi as to have little 
impact on the conflict. For neo-realists it was the worst of all possible worlds, the UN still 
did not function effectively in Bosnia as it lacked the political consensus of the states in the 
Security Council, yet by its thrusting itself to the forefront of the Bosnian war, with the 
blessings of both the European allies and President Clinton, it negated the one multilateral 
organisation, Nato, neo-realists such as Dole warmly advocated being used in the Bosnian 
conflict.
As is true for most neo-realists, the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo was central to 
the then Minority Leader's Bosnia policy preference. Dole ruled out the democratist policy 
line on the grounds that the Bosnian leadership itself did not desire American troops so 
much as a chance to defend itself. Dole argued, "the Bosnians aren't asking us to invade. 
They don't want our troops. They only want the means to effectively defend themselves and 
their country." 101 Knowing that the democratist policy preference of massive American 
troop involvement in Bosnia was unpopular as Americans feared that the US might get 
bogged-down in some Vietnam-style quagmire, Dole cleverly portrayed the neo-realist 
policy preference of lifting the arms embargo as the policy option least likely to drag the
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US into a major conflict in the Balkans, even less likely than institutionalist prescriptions. 
Dole argued, "The bottom line is that the arms embargo is immoral and illegal and so, our 
choice is clear: support the Bosnian's fundamental right to self-defense and lift the embargo 
- or support sending thousands of US troops to partition Bosnia. "102 Here Dole 
interestingly fused majority neo-realist thinking with minority isolationist views. In 
contradiction to Senator Mitchell, who supported the administration's institutionalist line on 
Bosnia, Dole believed that the Clinton White House's commitment to help police any 
agreement the contact group eventually brokered was more likely to lead the US into war in 
the Balkans. For instance, if the deal came unstuck with US soldiers already on the ground, 
then the neo-realist policy position was that the US should arm the Bosnian Muslims and 
do little mpre in the conflict. Dole, while obviously responding to US public opinion with 
this argument, nevertheless challenged the institutonalist position that lifting the embargo 
would increase the chances of direct American involvement in the Bosnian war.
For Dole the neo-realist advocacy of unilaterally lifting the embargo was central to his 
Bosnian policy preference. This is illustrated by the fact that in his first remarks after the 
landslide Republican victory in the November 1994 midterm elections, Dole said, "In 
particular, the arms embargo on Bosnia should be lifted entirely. "103 It was obvious that 
Dole intended to use the new-found Republican majority in the Senate to press for the 
successful adoption of the Dole-Lieberman amendment, and to attempt to change the 
overall orientation of American foreign policy regarding the Bosnian crisis from an 
institutionalist stance to a neo-realist position.
Dole also holds a neo-realist stance on the question of the future US role in European 
security. Dole observed, "Nato's influence has been marginalized because of a failure to 
define a clear and independent role in the post-Cold war era. Moreover, Nato has been 
weakened by its willingness to allow Russia to dictate the terms of our security relations 
with former Warsaw Pact countries, like Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. "104 For Dole, this example of Russian intransigence merely confirmed his 
worries about the nature of the Yeltsin regime and confirmed neo-realist efforts to expand 
the alliance. As Dole observed, "Russia continues to threaten prospective Nato members 
over an alliance expansion, thereby confirming the need to enlarge Nato sooner rather than 
later. "105
As over Bosnia, the Senate Majority Leader is critical of the Clinton administration's 
institutionalist policy. Dole believes the malaise in the alliance goes well beyond its misuse
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in the Bosnian debacle. Like his neo-realist colleague, Senator Lugar, Dole is pessimistic 
about Nato's long-term prospects, especially in the wake of the President's indecision about 
whether to advocate expansion of the alliance eastwards, symbolised by the 
administration's adoption of the Partnership for Peace initiative. Senator Dole correctly sees 
concerns about the Russian bear lurking behind the White House's European policy. Dole, 
in common with the general neo-realist viewpoint, criticised the President for failing again 
to adopt an unfettered foreign policy regarding European defence issues, a concept so 
cherished by neo-realists. If President Clinton's Bosnia policy was a hostage to the 
European allies, the UN, and Russia, as Dole saw it, so his policy on Nato expansion is a 
captive of the administration's concerns about the Russian democratic experiment. Dole 
agrees with the neo-realist viewpoint that both in practice and in principle the US must not 
allow any other state to control general policy initiatives such as the expansion of Nato into 
Central Europe, a policy that if not enacted, Dole believes could soon lead to the end of the 
alliance itself.
Dole is also a neo-realist regarding trade issues. While supporting both the Nafta and 
Gatt accords, particularly over the latter, Dole feared aspects of the accord, specifically that 
the powers of the WTO threatened American sovereignty. As over Bosnia, Dole became 
the chief critic of the institutionalist administration regarding the Uruguay Round. Like 
most neo-realists, Dole saw the Gatt agreement as potentially of great advantage to the US. 
As Horvitz noted, "Long a free trade advocate, Dole wavered in recent weeks [over Gatt] 
while pressing the White House for political concessions." 106 Beyond politics, the root 
cause of Dole's vacillations on Gatt were the sovereignty questions the newly-formed WTO 
posed. Like Gingrich, Senator Dole felt the WTO was not necessarily in the national 
interest, "Dole said he wanted legislation outside the Gatt accord to 'extricate us from the 
WTO, if we are getting adverse decisions. That's the big sticking point'."107 Unlike the 
institutionalists, the Senate Majority Leader does not see international organisations as a 
good in and of themselves, as is illustrated by the fact that Dole was not ready to sign on to 
the WTO until he was assured that the US could quickly leave the organisation if it felt it 
was being treated unfairly. In short, Dole was not prepared to abandon American economic 
sovereignty for some possible long-term economic benefits, as befits his neo-realist 
orientation. In the end, Dole was successful in obtaining his concessions from the 
President, and he voted for the Gatt accord.
While Senator Dole's overall orientation is obviously neo-realist, he curiously 
advocates the institutionalist position regarding the MFN controversy with China. As far
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back as the Bush administration, Dole voted against abolishing MFN status for the Chinese, 
or even placing conditions on its renewal, despite its human rights record. Throughout the 
time of the Clinton administration's torturous climbdown from its hawkish campaign 
rhetoric over China, Senator Dole maintained a consistent institutionalist stance. When 
President Clinton finally adopted the institutionalist policy preference and delinked MFN 
renewal from human rights issues, Dole ironically agreed with him. In the run-up to this 
policy flip-flop, as Cornwell stated, "The President, Dole advised, should simply declare it 
was wrong to link trade expansion to progress on human rights. "108 Here Dole struck at 
the heart of the MFN debate, arguing the institutionalist line that trade issues and human 
rights concerns should always have been considered separately. Over American policy to 
China, one finds one of the rare occasions where the President and his chief tormentor 
found little to disagree about.
The same cannot be said about American policy to Russia, over which Senator Dole 
sharply disagrees with the President. The Majority Leader criticised President Clinton for, 
"defending, denying and rationalizing Russia's misdeeds."109 Among them, Dole counted 
the brutal attempt to extinguish Chechen secessionism, interference in the US-North 
Korean nuclear agreement, the programme to sell arms to Iran, and the pressure put on the 
governments of the 'near abroad' states, such as Moldova. For Dole these examples are 
telling signs that Russia is returning to its adventurist ways. He argued, "We must face the 
fact that geopolitical rivalry with Russia did not end with the demise of Soviet 
Communism." 110 Senator Dole sees Russia as as much enemy as ally due to its differing 
geopolitical interests with the US over the litany of issues listed above. For this reason 
alone, he adheres to the neo-realist position that aid to Russia should be extremely limited.
The Senate Majority Leader also, in contradiction with democratist thinking, sees 
President Yeltsin as an impediment to Russian democracy. He believes Yeltsin, "has moved 
toward authoritarian rule and has lost the political support of virtually all reform-minded 
Russians,"111 and that this process has been exacerbated by the Chechnya crisis. Given 
this belief, it is easy to understand why Dole thinks President Clinton's democratist 
initiatives regarding Russia are dangerously misguided. As Dole stated, "I don't agree with 
their [the Clinton administration's! Russia-first policy, which has turned into a Yeltsin-first 
policy. "112 Thus Dole believes that even by democratist standards, the Clinton 
administration's policy regarding Russian aid is wrong as it is being used to support an 
essentially non-democratic regime. Senator Dole believes there is a resurgent Russia, 
increasingly asserting itself around the globe, as it begins to shake off the after-effects of
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the demise of Communism. 113 As this state has obviously conflicting interests with the 
US, Dole is wary of buttressing the Yeltsin regime.
(c) Specific institutionalist decision-makers in US foreign policy
i) William Perry - Secretary of Defence
While it is to be expected that Secretary of Defence William Perry shares the overall 
schools of thought orientation of his boss, President Clinton, what is slightly curious are the 
strong neo-realist minority views of the head of the Pentagon.
For example, even though Perry ultimately espoused the institutionalist point of view 
regarding Bosnia, he did so for largely neo-realist reasons. The Secretary of Defence is 
emblematic of a minor flaw in schools of thought analysis, as his neo-realist 'givens’ lead 
to, paradoxically, institutionalist policy outputs. While there are no other leading 
decision-makers chronicled in the thesis who hold Secretary Perry's position, nevertheless it 
is significant. As Perry stated, using neo-realist terminology, "In Bosnia today we have still 
more limited interests, and therefore our use of military force is correspondingly more 
limited...But what are the national interests of the US in this war? It does not involve our 
supreme national interest...our national survival does not hinge on its outcome."114 Perry 
agreed with the standard neo-realist position that Bosnia was not enough of an American 
national security interest to justify large-scale military involvement, as democratists 
advocated. But he did not concur with the general neo-realist line that Bosnia was still 
important enough, as the first ethnic conflict to break out in Europe since the end of the 
Cold War, to merit US interest to the point of unilaterally lifting the arms embargo. He 
disagreed with the neo-realist policy position based upon a different calculation of 
American national interests. He believed the fundamental American interest in Bosnia is to 
prevent the violence from spreading, and that lifting the arms embargo was not the best 
way to further this goal. 115 Thus Perry arrived squarely at the institutionalist stance 
regarding Bosnia. His different idiosyncratic reading of the givens underlying neo-realism 
reminds one that even a successful social science tool, like schools of thought analysis, can 
never completely map every ideological impulse of every decision-maker.
Secretary Perry's minority neo-realist orientation can also be seen in his stance on 
American relations with Russia. Here Perry is far more sceptical of the Yeltsin regime than 
is usual in the Clinton administration. He argued, "What Russia and some of its
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neighboring states are trying to do today in terms of reforming their political and economic 
system has a very uncertain outcome." 116 His pessimism about the prospects for successful 
Russian reform predicates his cautious neo-realist policy preference regarding aid to the 
former superpower. As in Perry's mind there is, "the small but real danger that reform in 
Russia might fail and a new government arise hostile to the US,"117 he is prepared to 
hedge his bets regarding America's defence posture toward the Yeltsin regime. For 
example, the conclusion of a classified September 1994 document by the Pentagon urged 
the US not to push for further nuclear reductions than previously negotiated, and to scale 
back American nuclear stockpiles at exactly the same rate the Russians do in their 
implementation of the START 1 and START 2 treaties. 118 While Perry is prepared, in 
accordance with the standard neo-realist line, to provide aid to Russia along Nunn-Lugar 
lines, 119 that is as far as he is willing to go in fostering Russian reform. His sceptical 
neo-realist outlook stands out in an administration of Russia-firsters.
The Secretary of Defence's policy prescriptions regarding Europe are more in line with 
the general thrust of the Clinton administration. Writing with Secretary of State Christopher 
in opposition to Speaker Gingrich's 'Contract With America' plank that calls for the quick 
admission of the Central European states into Nato, Perry and Christopher reasoned, "the 
bill unilaterally and prematurely designates certain European states for Nato 
membership...Our present steady and deliberate approach to Nato expansion is intended to 
ensure that each potential member is judged individually."120 Beyond seeing the neo­
realist initiative as 'premature', here Perry also feared that singling out some states (like 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) for quick Nato admission will create new 
divisions in Europe and actually exacerbate instability as states left outside Nato, from 
Romania to Russia, will feel isolated and neglected by the West. Perry believes in the 
general institutionalist view that regarding the expansion of Nato, it is imperative not to 
draw a new East-West line as existed during the Cold War.
ii) Lee Hamilton - Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Lee Hamilton, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as the 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on European and Middle Eastern Affairs in the 103rd 
Congress, has been one of President Clinton's staunchest allies on Capitol Hill. This is 
borne out by the fact that both of them share a strong institutionalist orientation in foreign * 
affairs. ?Ti
*s
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Congressman Hamilton supported the President's institutionalist stance on the Bosnia 
crisis. In fact, Hamilton advocated an institutionalist position early in the administration, 
even when the President was considering taking stronger action. Then Hamilton argued, "I 
don't think you will find support among our allies for a very broadened, extended air war. 
What you are now seeing discussed, and discussed very urgently, are more limited uses of 
air power, which I would support. I don’t think we want to broaden this war. I don't think 
we want to make it an American war." 121 Hamilton here staked out some underlying 
institutionalist precepts that guided his choice of policy prescriptions throughout the crisis.
Not only did he accurately predict that the European allies would not support a massive air 
war in Bosnia, implicit in his comment is the notion that if they did not do so, the US ought 
not to act alone. This anti-unilateralism is a core institutionalist belief. Also Hamilton 
feared the escalation of the war, a prospect he equated here with a more vigorous American 
response to the conflict, as was advocated by both the democratists and the neo-realists. 
Hamilton urged President Clinton to adopt the institutionalist viewpoint during the critical 
month of May 1993, when the European allies rejected American initiatives for tougher 
action against the Serbs, "when Bosnia's militarily dominant Serbs resisted [the Vance- 
Owen plan], putting pressure on President Clinton for US military action during the spring 
of 1993, Hamilton suggested that more time was needed to allow diplomacy and economic 
sanctions to work. "122 The Chairman's reliance on sanctions is a marked institutionalist 
trait, as was his fear that military action in Bosnia would have more drawbacks than j 
benefits.
Hamilton based his overall institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia on the same 
calculation of the hierarchy of political priorities that motivated President Clinton to adopt j 
the institutionalist stance. In an article written by Hamilton and Claiborne Pell, then
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, they stated, "If Washington lifted the 1
?
embargo unilaterally, that strategy [the institutionalist policy of the Clinton administration! j 
would fall apart, opening a serious rift in the alliance. And relations with Russia would • 
suffer, since Moscow would find itself under great pressure to provide arms to the i 
Serbs." 123 Like Dole, Hamilton saw the arms embargo as the crucial element in America's j 
overall response to the Bosnian crisis. However, unlike his neo-realist colleague, the i 
Chairman felt the embargo should not be lifted unilaterally, as doing so would seriously j 
damage the alliance as well as harming America's warming relations with Russia. Here ; 
Hamilton's inclinations coincided wholly with the views of the White House. j
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Congressman Hamilton went further, and outlined the way in which the lifting of the 
embargo could lead to a wider war. If the US ignored multilateral pressure and lifted the 
embargo to aid the Bosnian Muslims, what was to stop the Russians from doing the same 
thing and abetting their Slavic Orthodox brethren, the Serbs? In such a situation, Hamilton 
saw the danger of a far wider and more damaging conflict, as both Russia and the US 
would invest so much diplomatic capital in the war that almost inevitably one or both great 
powers would be sucked into the Balkan conflict. In advocating an institutionalist policy 
regarding Bosnia, Hamilton believed that his neo-realist and democratist Congressional 
colleagues misunderstood the delicate balancing act that the institutionalist policy of the 
Clinton administration was trying to preserve, and that far greater calamities would befall 
the West if the overall thrust of American policy was reserved.
Hamilton has adopted an institutionalist policy regarding Russia as well, though his 
advocacy is less straightforward than were his Bosnia policy preferences, as on this 
question he also has democratist aspects to his position. As is true for many democratists 
regarding Russia, Hamilton is not happy with the performance of the IMF and its attempt to 
aid the Yeltsin regime. As Congressman Hamilton stated, "International financial 
institutions, which provide large amounts of cash and project assistance directly to the 
Russian government, should respect political realities, and not impose impossible or 
humiliating conditions on Russia."124 This implicit criticism of the IMF, written in the 
aftermath of Russia’s disastrous December 1993 elections, was not the usual institutionalist 
viewpoint. Hamilton continued in the democratist vein, "We will have differences with 
Russia on the pace of reform, but our interests are not served by penalizing reformers," 125 
which is what undoubtedly would happen if the IMF failed to deliver the aid promised to 
Russia, due to its failure to meet the usual strict economic conditions the Fund imposes. As 
an initial portion of the political credibility the Russian reformers had with the Russian 
people was bound up in the perception that they would be able to deliver tangible benefits 
to Russia by adopting a pro-Western policy, Hamilton was correct in seeing that their 
political standing would be disproportionately harmed if Western aid failed to materialise. 
Hamilton agreed with the democratists that, "The single most important foreign policy 
question on the desk of President Clinton is the future of economic and political reform in 
the [former-sic] Soviet Union,"126 and that this question was sufficiently important to 
suspend the IMF's usual monetary conditions. Hamilton believes that economic short­
sightedness should not be allowed to get in the way of Russian reform.
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Nevertheless, the Chairman is ultimately an institutionalist regarding aid to Russia. 
Hamilton stated his central policy formulation regarding Russia as follows, "the US and the 
international community should keep focused on the direction, not the speed of reform. The 
priority now is to keep reform moving forward - even if at a slower pace. "127 The crucial 
point here is that while Congressman Hamilton agrees with the democratists that questions 
about shock therapy, and the general speed of reform should not obscure the primary goal 
of keeping the reformers in positions of power, he agrees with the institutionalists that 
’reform' must keep moving ahead, albeit in fits and starts. As 'reform' for Hamilton has an 
economic and not a political basis, he ultimately is an institutionalist, if an odd sort.
Hamilton's belief in the economic basis of reform can be clearly seen. Hamilton 
observed, "I, for one, will find it very difficult to support aid for Russia if the central bank 
there continues to pour dollars and credit into supporting these inefficient state-run 
industries." 128 Thus Hamilton places definite economic conditions on Russia if it is to 
receive continued aid, a central institutionalist precept. Hamilton continued, "If you have 
hyperinflation, it does not matter if you supply them $10 billion or $1 billion." 129 As 
ultimately Hamilton believes that the economic policies of the Russian government are the 
central indicators determining the amount of aid that the West should give to the Yeltsin 
regime, his overall schools of thought orientation regarding Russian reform can be seen to 
be institutionalist.
Hamilton's policy preference regarding the Nafta and Gatt accords was more 
straightforwardly institutionalist. While Hamilton did not concentrate on trade issues 
during his tenure as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, "he could be a force for 
the Democratic free-trade position that goes back to Cordell Hull." 130 Congressman 
Hamilton consistently maintained this free trade institutionalist position. When pressed to 
list President Clinton's foreign policy successes, Hamilton replied, "the Clinton 
administration has had some 'remarkable successes' on foreign policy, especially in passing 
the Nafta." 131 This response was an indication of how important trade issues were for the 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in particular and the institutionalist school of 
thought in general.
Likewise Hamilton offered the standard institutionalist argument about why the passage 
of Nafta was important for the US, relating the foreign initiative to domestic conditions, as 
it is a core institutionalist belief that governance can no longer be easily divided into 
foreign and domestic policies. Hamilton argued, "Latin America buys more than 40% of its
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imports from the US, and it has great potential for growth. Many Latin American countries 
seek to negotiate Nafta-type agreements with the US. Closer trading ties will mean 
increasing US exports and jobs. ”132 Hamilton advocated what would traditionally be 
thought of as a foreign initiative for largely domestic reasons, that the increasing free trade 
era dawning on the Western Hemisphere that Nafta is ushering in, will redound to the US’ 
domestic economic advantage, in terms of job creation. Hamilton, like President Clinton, 
believed that economic interdependence, a cornerstone of institutionalist thinking, meant 
that benefits that accrued to America's trading partners through the Nafta agreement would 
ultimately benefit the US as well. For example, Mexico’s increasing purchasing power will 
lead to a rising demand for American exports, and thus the whole process is beneficial for 
American interests, and not a mixed blessing as neo-realists generally believe trade accords 
to be.
Congressman Hamilton also followed the standard institutionalist stance regarding 
China, advocating renewal of MFN and a delinking of trade and human rights issues. As 
Friedman noted, "The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee expects China to 
meet President Clinton's human rights demands as a condition to renewing trade benefits to 
Beijing. If it does, he said, the administration should stop threatening China with sanctions 
and use other means to promote human rights.” 133 It is palpable nonsense that China's 
human rights record markedly improved over the 1993-4 time span, when MFN renewal 
was supposedly tied to China making progress on human rights issues, nor did the 
Chairman offer evidence to bolster his assertion. 134 Rather he was providing political 
cover for his ally, the President, to follow an institutionalist course and delink trade issues 
from human rights concerns. Hamilton also adopted the standard institutionalist viewpoint 
in saying, "Economic freedom may bring political freedom."135 This is further evidence of 
his general economics-first institutionalist approach to development, believing that 
ultimately economic reform directs political change, and not vice-versa. In China, this 
meant retaining MFN to economically bolster entrepreneurs and the rising middle-class, 
those that are most historically likely to engender political reform. As on so many other 
issues, Congressman Hamilton agreed with the institutionalist thrust of the administration’s 
foreign policy.
iii) Warren Christopher - Secretary of State
The American Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, is bureaucratically placed to be a 
central, if not the central, actor in developing overall American foreign policy. Yet if the
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Secretary of State has individual views on the critical issues facing America in the new 
world order, they are largely immaterial, for as the schools of thought analysis both here 
and in chapter 7 will illustrate, he has become little more than an apologist for the 
President's institutionalist viewpoints.
While there is little doubt the Secretary of State himself is an institutionalist, his 
rhetorical flip-flops and policy U-tums reflect the administration’s failure to bridge the gap 
between candidate Clinton’s aggressive rhetoric and his genuine institutionalist orientation, 
exhibited more clearly once he was safely ensconced in the White House. Nowhere is this 
charge more readily apparent than regarding American policy toward Bosnia. President 
Clinton came to Washington advocating a tougher policy stance against the Serbs than 
President Bush had pursued. Here Christopher did have an impact, as Miller noted, 
’’Secretary of State Christopher has also endorsed President Clinton's determination to 
emphasize diplomacy and sanctions, rather than military action, as the appropriate response 
to post-Cold War 'aggression' (as in the former Yugoslavia)." 136 Here the Secretary of 
State was advocating a policy that viewed economic coercion as likely to be more effective 
than military action, in line with general institutionalist thinking.
This reliance (neo-realist and democratist critics would say over-reliance) on economic 
measures to force the Serbs to negotiate in good faith remained a hallmark of Christopher's 
thinking throughout the Bosnian conflict. In May 1993, after the Serb rejection of the 
Vance-Owen plan, when so many in Washington, including the President, were considering 
adopting a tougher stance with the Serbs, Christopher stated, "In response to the Serbs' 
ruthless aggression, the US joined our partners in the Security Council this weekend in 
passing a resolution that will dramatically tighten existing sanctions." 137 Even with the 
evidence that sanctions had not led the Serbs to accept the Vance-Owen plan, Christopher 
saw the toughening of sanctions, rather than the application of military force, as the logical 
next step in ratcheting up the pressure on an intransigent Pale. This devotion to sanctions as 
the prime diplomatic instrument in the international arena is a unique institutionalist trait.
For the Secretary of State, the key interests the US had in the war were, as Palmer and 
Walker observed, "in preventing any widening of the war and in maintaining the credibility 
of Nato. "138 This latter preoccupation assumed an even greater importance for the 
Secretary of State as the conflict continued. For Christopher, Nato credibility hinged on 
retaining a multilateral consensus above all else, as belief in multilateralism is another 
central institutionalist precept. As Christopher remarked, "the problem was at heart, a
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European one. ’This is a multilateral problem and it must have a multilateral response,' 
Secretary Christopher told a committee of the House."139 Here Christopher avowed two 
institutionalist analytical viewpoints. Firstly, as he saw the problem as primarily a 
European responsibility, he felt the US ought to take a back seat in decision-making 
regarding the Bosnian crisis. The logic that flowed from this position that America should 
merely support what ought to be a primarily European initiative in Bosnia, lead directly to 
his acceptance of their peacekeeping argument, which effectively limited Western aid to the 
Bosnian Muslims. Secondly, the Secretary's belief that only a multilateral response to the 
conflict was appropriate ruled out for him all democratist and neo-realist initiatives 
regarding Bosnia, as they were based on a more positive view of the chances for unilateral 
policies proving successful. Christopher's determination to keep the alliance together on 
Bosnia, whatever the moral cost, sometimes reached ridiculous extremes. As Anthony 
Lewis, a noted New York Times columnist, and democratist, scornfully observed, 
"Christopher did himself mortal damage when he said all sides in Bosnia were guilty of 
human rights violations, thus ignoring the role of Serbian leaders as inciters of 
genocide." 140 For Christopher the institutionalist imperative of keeping the multilateral 
consensus going on Bosnia overrode asking real questions about who was perpetrating the 
vast majority of human rights abuses in the war.
Regarding aid to Russia, Christopher agrees with the President in advocating a 
democratist response to helping the Russian regime. The Secretary follows the standard 
democratist line in viewing Russia's reform experiment as the major priority of US foreign 
policy during President Clinton's term of office. As Christopher stated, "Helping ensure the 
success of this process [Russian reform] is our highest foreign policy priority." 141 In 
helping this process along, the Secretary of State insisted that the reason Russia was so 
important for the US was that its successful transition to becoming a market democracy 
would radically alter the whole of international affairs. As the Secretary of State observed, 
"Even at a time of belt-tightening in the US, President Clinton has taken a series of 
courageous steps to support reform in Russia and the former Soviet Union. He has made 
this case to the American people because of his conviction that nothing is more important 
to the security of Europe and North America than the success of economic and political 
reform in Russia." 142
Unlike the neo-realists, Christopher believes a lasting change in the relationship with 
America's former enemy is possible, and that this metamorphosis will favourably alter all 
global strategic calculations. By bolstering the Yeltsin government, Christopher believed,
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"we can help turn our most dangerous enemy into an enduring partner."143 This 
partnership, in accordance with democratist thinking, will be built on the shared democratic 
values of the two states. As democratists fundamentally believe that democracies do not go 
to war with one another, it is easy to see why those, such as Christopher, who hold 
democratist views regarding aid to Russia, see the Yeltsin government’s reform programme 
as such an exciting opportunity. For if the Russians become a genuine, stable democracy, 
the US and Europe need no longer fear a state with 20,000 nuclear warheads.
At critical times during the past two years, Secretary of State Christopher has remained 
true to his democratist orientation regarding Russia. During the conflict between President 
Yeltsin and the unreconstructed Russian Parliament, Christopher publicly supported 
Yeltsin, citing a democratist rationale. Christopher argued, "The US does not easily support 
the suspension of parliaments. But these are extraordinary times... The parliament and the 
court were vestiges of the Soviet Communist past, blocking movement to democratic 
reform. "144 In deciding to support Yeltsin over Khasbulatov by portraying the Chairman 
of the Russian Parliament as a man impeding democratic reform, Christopher affirmed his 
democratist viewpoint regarding Russia. In fact, Christopher saw the benchmark for the US 
suspending aid to Russia as being, "if Moscow reversed its democratic course. "145
In carrying out the reforms themselves, the secretary felt the Russian people, not the 
IMF, should be central in deciding the pace of reform. Christopher noted, "How the 
Russian people shape and carry out their reforms is, of course, for you [the Russians] to 
decide." 146 For Christopher economic questions about the pace of reform were secondary 
to the political fact that the impetus existed in Russia for reform in the first place. It was 
this impetus that Christopher wanted above all else to help preserve.
The Secretary of State adheres to an institutionalist policy regarding questions about the 
European security structure in the new world order. Christopher, like other institutionalists 
but unlike democratists and neo-realists, is an EU-firster, seeing in the European 
supranational organisation the key to the continent's defence future. As Christopher noted, 
"I applauded the steps Europe is taking towards integration and affirmed our support for a 
strengthened EU,"147 during consultations with various European leaders. For the 
institutionalists, the relative growth of power of the EU is not something to fear, but rather 
is an opportunity for the US to safely decrease American military commitments to the 
continent. Christopher implicitly affirmed this declinist institutionalist analytical 
perspective in calling for increased burden-sharing in the alliance, he noted, "The US will
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maintain its military commitments and responsibilities in Europe. But President Clinton 
and I must be able to show the US Congress that the allies are doing the same. Sharing 
must be a visible Nato principle: sharing of burdens, sharing of responsibilities, sharing of 
decisions." 148 Unlike neo-realists and democratists, institutionalists such as the Secretary 
of State were willing to cede some authority over European security decision-making in 
exchange for an important but lessening American involvement on the continent. The 
savings this course of action would produce could be used to combat American decline at 
home, for instance, by using such savings to reduce the crippling federal budget deficit. As 
a result of this declinist strategy, Christopher stated, "The US welcomes the development of 
a European security and defense identity,"149 as this was the only way such an American 
strategy could be implemented while maintaining an acceptable military level of 
preparedness on the European continent. .
Another sign of Christopher's EU-firster, institutionalist orientation is that he ultimately 
did not believe a timetable should be adopted by the West for Nato's eastward expansion. 
As chapter 7 will note in further detail, Christopher initially favoured a quick expansion of 
Nato, but was overruled by the President and the Secretary's supposed subordinate, Strobe 
Talbott. 150 As on other occasions, Christopher merely abandoned his earlier belief and 
became a convinced institutionalist on this point. Christopher's volte-face does tie in with 
his democratist policy preference regarding Russia. As the Secretary argued, "Swift 
expansion of Nato eastwards could make a neo-imperialist Russia a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. "151 Here Christopher illustrates the institutionalist policy preference regarding 
European security, which is partly predicated on the belief that Russian reform must take 
precedence over the speedy expansion of Nato. This also jibes with his democratist views 
regarding Russia, that the success of Russian reform is the crucial challenge in international 
relations today. Nothing, such as Nato's eastward expansion, must be allowed to jeopardise 
the pro-Western government of Boris Yeltsin.
Yet while Christopher's democratist inclinations regarding Russian reform rule out 
adopting the neo-realist policy preference regarding Europe, which is for quick expansion 
of Nato, he does not adopt the democratist policy plan for Europe, which is for no 
expansion at all. Rather he adopted the institutionalist advocacy of the Partnership for 
Peace initiative, which allowed that Nato will expand eastwards, but not in the short term. 
Crucially, no timetable was announced regarding the 'when' of Nato expansion when the 
partnership was established. As Christopher observed, "The January [1994] summit should 
formally open the door to an evolutionary process of Nato expansion. This process should
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be non-discriminatory and inclusive. It should not be tied to a specific timetable or criteria 
for membership.” 152 In the end, the Secretary of State adopted the institutionalist position 
regarding European security, hoping not to offend Russia and yet to encourage the 
fledgling Central European states. Neo-realists critics of the Secretary and the initiative said 
that as with most compromises, it succeeded in satisfying no one and offending everyone.
The Secretary of State also advocated an institutionalist position regarding trade matters 
in the new world order. Consistent with his overall institutionalist orientation, Christopher 
stated, "President Clinton and I have placed economic policy at the heart of our foreign 
policy."153 Trade policy was considered especially important by the secretary. As 
Bradsher noted, "Christopher and Robert Rubin the [then] head of the National Economic 
Council [he is currently the Treasury Secretary] have tended to ally themselves with 
Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen,"154 a man noted for his advocacy of free trade. Indeed 
the Secretary of State strongly favoured both the Nafta and Gatt accords. Regarding Nafta, 
Christopher commented that it, "is one of the great opportunities of this generation." 155 
This high praise for the agreement is consistent with the standard institutionalist position on 
free trade expansion, that it is an unmitigated good, a stance not taken by the other two 
schools of thought. Along with Russian reform, free trade expansion formed the other 
major priority in foreign policy for both Secretary Christopher and the Clinton 
administration as a whole.
A sign of how important trade relations are for Christopher is his about-face over China 
policy. As Manning noted, at the beginning of the administration, Christopher held 
democratist views regarding China. He then noted, "Our policy will seek to facilitate a 
peaceful evolution of China from Communism to democracy."156 This emphasis on 
political factors regarding US-China relations rather than concentrating on the economic 
aspects of the relationship indicated the democratist viewpoint. The Secretary also seemed 
to view China's human rights violations as a major factor in its relationship with the US, 
another democratist characteristic. As was noted, "On China, Christopher said the US could 
not ignore continued reports that Beijing was exporting sensitive military equipment and 
abusing human rights." 157 However, when pressed to make a clear choice between trade 
expansion and upholding human rights principles, the Secretary of State opted for the 
institutionalist course of action. As Miller observed, "Secretary of State Christopher has 
encouraged President Clinton to follow his own inclination and elevate trade and 
economics as foreign instruments and to focus on Asia and Latin America as regions where 
these instruments will yield impressive gains for Washington. "158
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Thus, there was a conflict between Christopher's institutionalist orientation regarding 
trade expansion and his early democratic murmurings regarding China. The latter were 
dropped, as Christopher adopted the institutionalist position regarding MFN extension, 
showing the priority of trade expansion for Christopher in particular and institutionalists in 
general. As Williams reported, at the time of the crucial decision over whether to renew 
China's MFN status in May 1994, "Christopher suggested that China's human rights failures 
can be addressed with measures short of revoking China's MFN status...Christopher's 
presentation appears designed to break the link between trade and human rights that has 
hung over Chinese-American relations for five years." 159 Here Christopher honestly 
conceded that China had not compiled with American conditions on MFN renewal for 
1994, but urged the president to both renew MFN and delink trade from human rights 
issues anyway, all because of the imperative of the huge Chinese market. The Secretary’s 
turnabout on China, while it can be read as an unprincipled and desperate attempt to get his 
President off a large political hook, can also be seen as an illustration of just how important 
Christopher's institutionalist advocacy of expanding free markets is for understanding his 
overall foreign policy orientation.
iv) Anthony Lake - National Security Adviser
Like Christopher, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake is also an institutionalist, 
though his policy prescriptions illustrate that there is more variety in his views than in the 
Secretary of State's regarding the standard line of the Clinton administration. Like Perry, 
Lake is not a maverick within the administration, but neither is he merely an advocate for 
the President's policy prescriptions. For example, regarding the future of the European 
security structure, Lake hews to a neo-realist policy preference despite being a member of 
an institutionalist administration. Regardless of the early Russia-first orientation of the 
Clinton White House Lake has maintained, "strong support for Nato's eastward expansion, 
against those counseling deference to Russian sensibilities," 160 such as Deputy Secretary 
of State Talbott. While Lake also believes the success or failure of Yeltsin's democratic 
experiment is of primary importance for the United States, he does not feel that this should 
determine American policy regarding the revitalization of the alliance. By this neo-realist 
stance, Lake illustrates that he is not afraid to contest a collectively held truth of a majority 
of his colleagues in the administration.
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This does not mean that Lake is indifferent to the significance of Russia’s attempt to 
become a democratic state. As for a majority of others in the administration, Lake favors a 
democratist policy regarding American support for Russian reform. This policy flows out 
of Lake's broader goals. In his famous 'Enlargement Speech' of 21 September 1993, 
Anthony Lake provided the context for his democratist support of Russian reform. He 
stated, "Throughout the Cold War, we contained a global threat to market democracies, 
now we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to 
us. The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement - 
enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies. "161 At the time, the 
'Enlargement Speech' was hailed as the definitive word regarding the Clinton 
administration's foreign policy, the 'big idea' so many had been calling for. Since then it has 
begun to be seen for what it is, a rhetorical cul-de-sac. Lake’s speech and subsequent 
clarifications contain almost no specific policy prescriptions which, as this schools of 
thought analysis has made clear, is a key distinction between rhetoric and genuine sub­
ideological constructs being implemented as concrete policy. However, the one practical 
policy prescription that grew from Lake's overly touted speech was his democratist policy 
preference regarding aid to Russia.
Beyond Lake sharing democratist enthusiasm that the end of the Cold War brought 
exciting opportunities for the US to extend democracy, he also shares the democratist 
precept that politics drives economics, and not vice-versa. He observed, "Democracies 
create free markets that offer economic opportunity." 162 Thus for Lake the Russian efforts 
at reform begun under Gorbachev have followed the correct order for successful 
modernization to occur, with their emphasis on political rather than economic changes. 
Beyond his affinity for their methods, as for democratists, National Security Adviser Lake 
sees Yeltsin's efforts at reform as a central issue for American foreign policy. He argued, 
"Nothing is more important to the long-term security of the US than the successful 
transformation of Russia and the former Soviet republics into democratic nations that 
respect the rule of international law and the rights of their people." 163 In practice Lake has 
acted on the democratist premise that the success of Yeltsin's Russia is crucial to global 
stability. Despite the coup attempt against Yeltsin and the unfavorable December 1993 
elections, "Lake never deviated from full support of Yeltsin." 164 Critics of the 
administration feel that America's support for Russian reform has become unconditional 
support for Boris Yeltsin. For Lake and others who advocate the democratist policy 
prescription regarding Russia, support for Yeltsin is imperative as he is the only bulwark of
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Russian democracy, that despite his flaws President Yeltsin is the only genuine hope for 
the stabilization of the second Russian revolution.
Lake also tows the standard administration line regarding trade issues, avowing 
institutionalist policies. Lake saw support for Nafta as leading to enhanced economic 
opportunities within the US, in line with the institutionalist precept that foreign and 
domestic issues can no longer be separated. He argued, "We began last year with the hard 
fight for Nafta, which already has increased our exports to Mexico by nearly 20% and 
produced tens of thousands of new, better-paying jobs. "165 Lake also strongly favored the 
Gatt accord, citing it as a pivotal vote in post-Cold War American history. Lake stated, "I 
believe th^t the Senate vote on Gatt [tomorrow] is a watershed event much like the vote on 
the League of Nations at the end of World War I and the ones on the Marshall Plan after 
World War n"166 By comparing the Gatt vote with such seminal events in American 
history as the vote on the League of Nations and the Marshall Plan, Anthony Lake made 
clear his strong belief that trade issues ought to be an absolutely central aspect of American 
foreign policy, a commonly held institutionalist stance.
Lake also adhered to institutionalist precepts regarding the MFN controversy with 
China. Indeed by the time the climactic moment of May 1994 arrived, "All of President 
Clinton’s top advisers back[ed] extension of China's low tariff trade status despite Beijing's 
uneven human rights performance. "167 However Lake, with his overall institutionalist 
orientation, went far beyond this. In the months leading up to the President's decision to 
delink MFN consideration from human rights concerns, Lake met Chinese Ambassador to 
the US, Li Daoyu, in an attempt to provide political cover for the administration flip-flop 
on China. This was done by successfully suggesting sending an American envoy to China 
to press its government to pledge to improve its human rights record. 168 While the 
mission, predictably, met with little success it speaks volumes about Lake's commitment to 
the administration's new institutionalist policy regarding China. Aware of the political flak 
the President would run into for his about-face and the restraining effect such criticism 
might have had on Bill Clinton, Lake attempted to provide him with enough political 
camouflage so that the administration, while swallowing hard, would shift its China policy 
to a more sustainable institutionalist vein. It is a mark of Anthony Lake's loyalty to the new 
policy that he was prepared to attempt this transparent ruse to deflect criticism from the 
President, and make, if only a little, the administration's policy shift more palatable.
The prime example of Anthony Lake's ability to disagree in a nuanced manner with the 
general White House line, yet remain firmly within the Clinton administration's schools of 
thought fold, was his advocacy of a more vigorous institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia 
than the administration implemented. Lake presented the standard White House arguments 
against pursuing a democratist or neo-realist policy regarding Bosnia. He observed, 
"Throwing our full military might behind the Bosnian Government forces would require 
putting at risk more than 100,000 American ground troops in a conflict that poses no 
immediate threat to our security...Similarly, washing our hands of the problem by 
unilaterally lifting the arms embargo would be a profound mistake,"169 in that it could lead 
to sanctions efforts against Iraq and Libya coming undone. Lake felt the US could neither 
act unilaterally to lift the arms embargo nor impose a military solution in Bosnia, following 
institutionalist precepts. Yet beyond this general institutionalist policy preference was a 
nuanced difference between his brand of institutionalism and the more passive strain 
advocated by Secretary Christopher.
Lake's more hawkish institutionalist line had as its point of departure the un­
institutionalist notion that the Serbs were the primary villain of the Bosnian piece. He 
believed, "The Serbian-dominated federal army stoked the flames of war as several 
republics of the country [Yugoslavia] - Slovenia, Bosnia, and Croatia, - sought 
independence. "170 Thus Lake did not agree with the standard institutionalist view that the 
international community should refrain from taking sides in Bosnia, as all ethnic groups 
were to blame for the civil war. Lake espoused an institutionalist policy prescription 
regarding Bosnia not because the Serbs were seen as only equally culpable as the Croats 
and Muslims for instigating the conflict, but because both Russia and Western Europe 
mattered more to the US in the overall hierarchy of foreign policy priorities than the 
admittedly wronged Bosnian Muslims. Regarding Bosnia, Lake argued, "But while we 
have clear reasons to engage and persist (in facilitating a peace accord) they do not 
obliterate other American interests involving Europe and Russia." 171 This sober 
calculation was the key factor behind Lake's advocacy of an institutionalist policy 
regarding the American response to Bosnia.
Yet while Lake accepted that any Western response to the Bosnian crisis must be 
implemented in a multilateral manner, and that multilateralism would generally lead to a 
more cautious policy outcome than would ensue if a state acted alone, he urged a 
heightened military response to the Serbian flouting of the international will. Lake stated, 
"In Bosnia, we have not seen all the progress we would like, but when diplomacy has been
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married to military power, positive movement has been the result." 172 This more martial 
institutionalist position was predicated on Lake's belief that the Serbs were, at root, to 
blame for the Balkan instability caused by the breakup of the Yugoslav state. While 
Anthony Lake believed the US should proceed to deal with the Bosnian crisis in a 
multilateral fashion, and in true institutionalist style accept a multilateral policy outcome 
that was not its first choice, within this multilateralist framework America should 
genuinely push for stronger measures against the Serbs. This was because the Serbs only 
acquiesced with international demands, as in the confrontation over Gorazde, when 
confronted by allied military will. Lake’s nuanced differences with Christopher illustrate 
the fact that schools of thought analysis is ultimately about discerning decision-makers’ 
propensity to advocate similar policies within a common cluster (as Lake and Christopher 
do), rather than being a process that claims that all such actors must always advocate the 
exact same policy prescription if they share the same school of thought. As the Lake case 
illustrates, foreign affairs is too complicated for this to be the case.
iv) President Clinton
As will be discussed in much more detail in chapter 7, it is no surprise that the 
President's specific schools of thought policy preferences in each of the five key issue-areas 
analysed coincide perfectly not only with the executive branch’s foreign policy 
prescriptions, but also mirror overall American foreign policy outputs as well. This is an 
expression of just how powerful an actor the President can be in formulating American 
foreign policy. This great significance of the President makes correctly classifying him 
essential to the operation of a schools of thought analysis of American foreign policy 
outputs.
Bosnia is one example of where candidate Clinton's rhetoric did not match President 
Clinton's general institutionalist tendencies. As Hendrickson noted, "the Democratic 
challenger’s [Clinton] foreign affairs agenda was far more ambitious than that of the 
foreign policy president himself." 173 During his campaign, Bill Clinton tended to accuse 
President Bush of being too passive regarding foreign affairs, of reacting to events rather 
than controlling them. This activist rhetoric came back to haunt him, as throughout his 
administration the President has consistently advocated institutionalist positions regarding 
foreign affairs, often the least activist of the three general schools of thought. For example, 
during his October 12, 1992 Presidential debate with President Bush, Clinton argued, "'I 
think we should stiffen the embargo on the Belgrade government, and I think we have to
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consider whether we should lift the arms embargo on the Bosnians since they are in no way 
in a fair fight with a heavily armed opponent bent on ethnic cleansing.' While always 
opposing intervention with ground troops, Clinton called for air strikes against the 
Serbs." 174 Thus Bill Clinton advocated the democratist 'Lift and Strike' option for Bosnia, 
but with an important reservation. Again during his 1992 presidential campaign, he stated, 
"If the Serbs persist in violating the terms of the current cease-fire agreement, the US 
should take the lead in seeking UN Security Council authorization for air strikes against 
those who are attacking the relief effort."175 It is curious that even here, where the 
President's rhetoric was obviously tougher than events would later make it prudent to be, 
his chief concerns were still institutionalist, highlighting a conviction that the Security 
Council h^s the power to authorise action in Bosnia, not the US itself, and that military 
action should not be taken to help the Bosnian Muslims directly, but only to support UN 
humanitarian efforts. While President Clinton's rhetoric did change over Bosnia, the core of 
his institutionalist policy can be seen even during his days on the hustings.
The President's institutionalist policy preference regarding Bosnia can be most easily 
illustrated over the critical question of whether to lift the arms embargo. President Clinton 
left little doubt that he thought the European allies were incorrect in their contention that 
the embargo ought not to be lifted. In an interview with William Safire, the President 
described his failure in May 1993 to induce the European allies to lift the embargo as, "the 
biggest single disappointment I've had as president." 176 Yet he still did nothing to 
unilaterally to aid the Muslim cause. This is a vivid illustration of how committed to 
multilateralism, a cornerstone of institutionalist thinking, the President is.
This reliance on multilateralism has been a consistent component of President Clinton's 
foreign policy viewpoint since the beginning of his administration. At the time of the New 
York Primary, April 1, 1992, Clinton addressed the Foreign Policy Association in New 
York, saying, "it is a failure of vision not to recognize that collective action can accomplish 
more than just a few years ago - and it is a failure of leadership not to make use of it."177 
This strong advocacy of the merits of multilateralism was specifically followed during the 
Bosnian war. In the crucial month of May 1993, the President, "made an ironclad pledge to 
avoid unilateral intervention, saying the US 'is not about to act alone and should not act 
alone’ in the Balkans." 178 By doing this, the President effectively gave the European allies 
a veto over American initiatives in Bosnia. When Safire, "asked about his lack of 
leadership on Bosnia, he [the president] responded: 'There is a security council. And some 
people on it have a veto. And the people on it who have a veto have vetoed what I think is
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appropriate to do in Bosnia’. "179 Nowhere has there been a purer affirmation of the 
administration's institutionalist policy preference for Bosnia than in this statement. 
President Clinton so strongly believed in the necessity of a multilateral solution to the 
conflict that in his view, those on the Security Council always had a veto over his policy, 
even before he gave them an ironclad guarantee he would not act unilaterally in Bosnia. 
When pressed about the possible efficacy of unilateral action in Bosnia, Prentice and 
Brodie noted, "the President said: It would kill the peace process and harm relations with 
our Nato allies, undermine the partnership we are trying to build with Russia over broad 
areas and undermine UN embargoes."180 In true institutionalist fashion, the President saw 
these other priorities as outweighing any inclination for the US to go its own way on the 
Bosnia crisis by lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims.
Despite his strong institutionalist stance on Bosnia, the crisis caused the President to 
lose faith in the strongest institutionalist organisation, the UN. As Rodman stated, "the 
year-long gestation of Presidential Defense Directive-25 is a history of ambitious plans to 
expand the role of the UN as a global policeman." 181 While never implemented, PDD-25 
was an indication that the Clinton administration was at least considering advocating 
making the UN the global policeman, in accordance with general institutionalist thinking, 
by placing some US troops under UN command and supporting Butros-Ghali’s initiative for 
the UN to obtain its own rapid deployment force, perhaps the first step on the road to the 
UN genuinely possessing an army.
All this failed to come to fruition, partly due to the Bosnian crisis. As the institutionalist 
position on Bosnia became increasingly unpopular due to its failure to end the conflict, the 
President criticised the UN, a leading institutionalist organisation, even as he adhered to the 
institutionalist notion that the UN operationally should have primacy over Nato during the 
crisis. As the President stated, "If the American people are to say yes to UN peacekeeping, 
the UN must learn when to say no. "182 While bashing the UN might make for good 
politics, it helped discredit the very approach the President was still determined to follow in 
Bosnia. For if the UN had overreached itself in Bosnia, as many thought it had, it had done 
so with the blessing of the institutionalist Clinton administration. The Bosnia crisis 
increased President Clinton's disillusionment with the UN, but not with an overall 
institutionalist approach to the Bosnian conflict.
The President also adheres to an institutionalist policy regarding European security. As 
Ginsberg noted, the President, "sees a strong Europe as good for the US," 183 definitively
235
ending any equivocation regarding a stronger Europe that has beset American presidents 
for decades. President Clinton publicly affirmed his institutionalist EU-first strategy, 
stating, "We also want Europe to be strong. This is why America supports Europe's own 
steps so far toward greater unity - the EU, the WEU, and the development of a European 
defense identity. "184 This strategy should be seen as crucially linked to the President's 
desire to vigorously concentrate on economic reform, as institutionalists believe foreign 
and domestic policies ought not to be developed in isolation. Only with a stronger 
European defence identity could President Clinton strategically safely reap the benefits of 
the peace dividend that resulted from the end of the Cold War, and plough this benefit into 
domestic initiatives. The President accepted that following an institutionalist strategy 
regarding Europe meant a relative diminution of American power on the continent. The 
President believed, "The US should be ready to relinquish some of its leadership 
prerogatives; as the president envisaged it, the US role should be 'to tip the balance...not to 
bear every burden',"185 much as British diplomacy had operated in Europe in the 19th 
century. The President accepted this lessening of American power in Europe as the 
necessary price for pursuing his reformist strategy at home.
Regarding the future of Nato, the President kept to the institutionalist line. While a 
candidate for President, he argued that a more egalitarian Nato served American interests. 
The President stated, "In Europe, we must maintain our ties to Nato, even as the Europeans 
play a stronger role both within Nato and in the evolution of future security arrangements 
for the continent. "186 This was in keeping with his general institutionalist viewpoint 
regarding Europe, that the Europeans should be encouraged and expected to bear a greater 
security burden for their own defence, and thus must be accorded a greater leadership role 
as well. The President's strategy for the expansion of Nato, embodied in the Partnership for 
Peace scheme, also bore the institutionalist stamp. As President Clinton remarked, "The 
question is no longer whether Nato will take on new members, but when and how. "187 
Unfortunately for the President, his deliberate lack of clarification about the 'when' and 
'how' of expansion failed to mollify either the Central European states, eager for quick 
admittance to Nato, or the Russians, who would be happiest with a scenario entailing Nato's 
demise at best, or its permanent non-expansion at worst. The President chose the 
institutionalist middle-way regarding Nato expansion, and predictably, was attacked as 
being both too bold and too timid.
Regarding aid to Russia, President Clinton has been at his most activist, pursuing a 
consistent democratist policy preference. As a candidate, Clinton believed, "The Bush
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administration has been overly cautious on the issue of aid to Russia." 188 This was a 
mistake the President was determined not to repeat. At the heart of President Clinton’s 
vigorous support for Russian reform was the democratist notion that the, "fate of the world 
will be in doubt until stable democracies rise from the debris of the Soviet empire. "189 It is 
obvious that someone holding this view would make aid to Russia the security priority in 
his/her foreign policy. As Cox noted, "the Clinton strategy was less economic than 
political...US policy was taken to mean, and certainly was perceived, as a 'Russia-first' 
policy." 190 All this was in accordance with standard democratist precepts.
The President saw helping Russia become a stable democracy as having several 
tangible benefits for the US. Firstly, such a transformation would save American money in 
the long-term. As President Clinton observed, "A small amount spent stabilizing the 
emerging democracies in the former Soviet empire today will decrease by much more the 
money we may have to commit to our defense in the future."191 Implicitly, this statement 
reveals a strategy based on the democratist idea that if Russia becomes a stable democracy, 
as democracies do not war with one another, the US need no longer fear Russia, and can 
redirect military expenditure back into domestic reform, which is the general reason the 
President was elected in the first place. American help for Russia thus relates paradoxically 
back to the domestic-first priorities of the Clinton administration.
Secondly, in keeping with overall institutionalist administration's desire for the US not 
to be the global policeman, a democratic Russia would have a constructive role to play in 
global ordering. As Cox observed, "in Clinton's version of the new world order, in which 
the US was neither willing or able to act as 'world cop', a secure and integrated Russia had 
several important parts to play," 192 such as serving as a barrier against hyper-nationalism 
in the other CIS states, and as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism in the former 
southern Soviet republics. President Clinton felt these benefits to be so important, that 
along with free trade expansion, aid to Russia became the major foreign policy priority of 
his administration. An example of this is that when asked by the Wisconsin press about 
why the public did not see him as a strong leader, the President stated, "I immediately 
organized the G-7 nations to support President Yeltsin when he was in (sic) the ropes last 
spring...we had a major role in the preservation of democracy in Russia." 193 This 
statement is an illustration of how important President Clinton considers aiding the Russian 
democratic experiment, that he feels it the best example of his leadership abilities.
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Trade expansion is the other major priority of the administration, and here the President 
again follows a consistently institutionalist policy. Even more than regarding Russian 
policy, Clinton felt President Bush had neglected the economic aspects of foreign policy, to 
the detriment of the US. While a presidential candidate, Clinton stated, "America must 
regain its economic strength to play our proper role as leader of the world...This has been 
the [Bush] administration’s most glaring foreign policy failure." 194 President Clinton felt 
this was particularly true regarding free trade expansion, despite Bush’s efforts as a founder 
of the Nafta initiative.
In accordance with general institutionalist thinking, Clinton began his term, "By 
defining his presidency as an effort to promote economic growth and trade 
liberalization. "195 Underlying this priority regarding trade expansion lay several basic 
institutionalist precepts. The President agreed with the institutionalist notion that foreign 
and domestic policy were so interconnected that overall policies had to take account of both 
realms. This was particularly true regarding trade expansion. As Clinton noted, "our first 
foreign policy priority and our first domestic priority must be one and the same, a 
revitalized economy, for we can not be strong abroad if we are not strong at home."196 
Thus the President views the foreign policy initiative of free trade as essential for domestic 
revitalisation, which is reflected again in how the US is perceived abroad. The President 
also agrees with the institutionalist belief that in the new world order, increasingly it is 
economics and not military might that is paramount in determining a state's overall power. 
As Friedman noted, the President remarked, "Trade, as much as troops, will increasingly 
define the ties that bind nations in the 21st century. "197 These beliefs: that as economic 
factors will matter increasingly regarding the overall equation of power in the next century, 
and as both states and policies within states must reckon with an interdependent world 
where domestic and foreign initiatives can no longer be separated, form the institutionalist 
theoretical backdrop for the President's consistent and aggressive pursuit of expanded free 
trade opportunities for the US in the new world order.
The President's commitment to free trade expansion can be vividly illustrated by the 
debate on Nafta ratification. Before being elected President, Clinton had given Nafta only 
lukewarm support in the neo-realist vein, "Clinton had stipulated during the campaign that 
the side agreements [regarding environmental matters and workers rights] were his price 
for the support of the trade pact." 198 Yet after his election, President Clinton fervently 
pursued an institutionalist policy regarding the expansion of free trade. In the debate 
President Clinton incurred large political penalties due to his support of the accord. As
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Woodward observed, "Clinton knew that backing it [Nafta] would alienate organized labor, 
a key part of the Democrats' constituency, and hurt his chances in big union states such as 
Michigan and Ohio...But Clinton believed in free trade." 199 It is a striking example of how 
deeply the President was committed to free trade that he was willing to accept such obvious 
political damage within his own party as a result of the Nafta debate, yet still decide to 
strongly favour the agreement. The amount of time the White House lobbied Congress to 
push for the ratification of Nafta is another illustration of how vital free trade was for the 
administration. As Ifill remarked, "The strategy [regarding Nafta] consumed nearly all the 
time of the president and his lieutenants for 56 critical days."200 This vast time expenditure 
underscores the priority trade expansion assumes for the institutionalist President. While 
the Gatt accord did not generate the political heat, and thus require the intensive political 
intervention of the Clinton White House that Nafta did, it was no less a priority for 
President Clinton. As the President stated, "The congressional vote on the Gatt will be the 
defining decision for America as we head into the next century. "201 This is an illustration 
of how importantly the President viewed trade expansion to the overall prosperity and 
success of the US in the new epoch.
President Clinton's policy U-turn on MFN status for China also reflected his strong 
overall institutionalist orientation. As a candidate for the presidency, Clinton adopted a 
democratist stance in attacking President Bush's record on China. Clinton argued that 
despite Deng Xiaphong’s massacre of Chinese students in Tiananmen Square, "The [Bush] 
administration continues to coddle China."202 Clinton continued the attack, "When China 
cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrators, exported advanced weapons to radical 
regimes, and suppressed Tibet, Mr. Bush failed to stand up for our values."203
Yet this democratist campaign rhetoric gave way to an institutionalist policy regarding 
China. In May 1994, President Clinton renewed MFN status for China, and announced the 
delinking of human rights conditions from future consideration of China's MFN status, in 
accordance with institutionalist policy preferences. The President, as Friedman sardonically 
observed, "on Thursday gave what was surely the most eloquent defense of the Bush 
administration's China policy ever uttered at the White House. "204 Yet Clinton's 
institutionalist turnabout regarding China was consistent with his overall goal of expanding 
American access to markets. In the conflict that arose over this seeming contradiction, 
President Clinton chose the economics-first institutionalist policy preference that marked 
the rest of his thinking on foreign affairs. As Friedman stated, "three numbers told the 
story: $33 billion in Chinese exports to the US, $9 billion in US exports to China - worth
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almost 150,000 American jobs."205 It is not too much too say that without changing his 
mind over China, President Clinton himself would have sabotaged the economics-first, free 
trade thrust that he had made a cornerstone of his foreign policy.
It would seem on initial glance that as the President’s foreign policy preferences in the 
five critical issue areas analysed perfectly match the overall American policies in these 
areas, a schools of thought analysis of American foreign policy would begin and end with 
an examination of the orientation of the President. Yet the American foreign policy-making 
process is not that simple. While the President is the central, and at times dominant, actor in 
determining American foreign policy outputs, as chapter 7 will illustrate, he is not the only 
relevant figure in need of analysis if the process of American foreign policy-making is to be 
understood. As chapter 7 will explore, particularly if a Presidential policy is deemed to be a 
failure by the Congress and the American people, such as the Clinton administration's 
institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia, there is every likelihood it will be overturned, 
particularly if the Congress generally espouses a different schools of thought orientation 
from the executive branch, as it has a thought-out policy preference to take the place of the 
executive's failed initiative.
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Chart 5-1 Specific Democratist Policy-makers Regarding Five Key Issues
Majority
Democratist View 
Reached From the 
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Interventionist Large-Scale Aid Hard-line
Anti-MFN
Generally in Favour Nato-firsters, No 
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Issues Bosnia Russia China Nafta/Gatt NatoZWestern 
European Security
Talbott - Deputy Follows Pro Follows Pro Pro
Secretary of State, 
Democrat
institutionalist line 
(-)
(+) institutionalist line 
(-)
(+) (+)
Mitchell - Former Follows Pro Pro Pro Follows
Senate Majority 
Leader, Democrat
institutionalist line 
(-)
(+) (+) (+) institutionalist line 
(-)
(+) consistent with the overall schools of thought categorisation (-) inconsistent with the overall schools of thought categorisation
Chart 5-2 Specific Neo-Realist Policy-makers Regarding Five Key Issues
Majority Neo-
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Non-Interventionist, 
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Issues Bosnia Russia China Nafta/Gatt Nato/Western 
European Security
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Pro
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Pro
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Pro
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Pro
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Pro
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Pro
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(+)
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Pro
(+)
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Biden - Former
Chairman of Senate
European Affairs 
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Democrat
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Pro
(+)
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(+)
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Chart 5-3 Specific Institutionalist Policy-makers Regarding Five Key Issues
Majority 
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Chapter 6: The Overall Schools of Thought Orientation of the Clinton
Administration Regarding the Bosnian Crisis.
The Bosnian crisis is an ideal case study for illustrating how schools of thought analysis 
of post-Cold War American foreign policy initiatives works. This is due to the fact that the 
Clinton administration’s Bosnian policy was really the result of the intersection of three 
policies (US-Russian, US-European, as well as US-Balkan initiatives) that have already been 
delineated in the analysis of the schools of thought in chapters 2-4.
To analyse how the American foreign policy process works using schools of thought 
analysis, it is necessary to first determine which schools of thought the Clinton 
administration adhered to regarding its policies towards Russia, Europe, and then Bosnia. 
After the overall administration’s policies are identified, it will be necessary to chart the 
individual and bureaucratic interplay that transforms individual decision-maker’s schools of 
thought orientations and molds them into American foreign policy initiatives. It will also be 
necessary to examine the groups within the executive and legislative branches that oppose 
them, as will be shown in chapter 7.
Having delineated and analysed both the macro-level (overall American policy) and the 
micro-level (individual decision-makers’ schools of thought orientations) of schools of 
thought analysis, a short survey of the bureaucratic political interplay that leads to the overall 
American institutionalist response to the Bosnian crisis will be illustrated in chapter 7. 
Finally, chapter 8 will look at the efficacy of schools of thought analysis itself, as a tool for 
analysing the post-Cold War era.
(a) General administration policy regarding Russia
The Clinton administration's overall policy regarding Russia has been a mix of a 
dominant democratist orientation with some minority institutionalist impulses. President 
Clinton has long been a proponent of significant aid to Russia. As long ago as the New York 
Primary, he advocated the US constructing a $6 billion fund to stabilise the ruble and urged 
the major Western states and financial institutions to postpone Russian debt repayment. 1 
After his election, Clinton continued his democratist stance toward Russia, despite significant 
opposition.2
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This democratist orientation had direct policy implications. Firstly, the US contributed a 
significant amount of bilateral aid to Russia. At the Vancouver summit in April 1993, 
President Clinton offered President Yeltsin an aid package worth $1.6 billion, which 
included a $50 million enterprise fund to encourage the creation of small businesses in 
Russia, material and expertise to repair the Russian oil pipeline system, a $95 million 
privatisation fund for the nascent Russian banking industry, $700 million in agricultural 
credits enabling the Russian government to purchase grain on easy terms, and $215 million 
to help finance the dismantling of the Russian nuclear arsenal as was mandated by the 
START treaties.3 Over tire period 1992-3, Russia received more than half the US aid to the 
former Soviet Union. In 1993, in addition to the Vancouver summit aid, the US pledged $3 
billion more with the G-7 at the Tokyo summit, as well as an additional $2.5 billion in 
technical aid and humanitarian assistance.4 American leadership moves to increase 
multilateral aid contributions at the Tokyo summit were agreed to be crucial. As Strobe 
Talbott, then the administration’s roving ambassador to the former Soviet Union noted, the 
Clinton strategy was to emphasise, "we will do all we can to help, but we will not do it 
alone. We will show our leadership by taking the initiative, but we will do so largely in order 
to leverage much greater amounts of money from the international financial institutions and j 
from other industrialized democracies."5 Thus while the Clinton administration has |
emphasised multilateral institutions in its policy regarding aid to Russia (a seemingly 
institutionalist stance), as it was increasingly the driving force behind sustained aid to Russia 
its economic initiatives can be characterised as more democratist than institutionalist.6
I
Despite the Clinton administration's mix of democratist and institutionalist initiatives 
regarding sending economic aid to Russia to bolster Yeltsin's regime, there has been a great : 
deal of non-economic support for President Yeltsin that confirms America’s overall ! 
democratist policy toward Russia. America has consistently, and publicly, been strongly j 
supportive of Yeltsin at every crucial domestic juncture he has faced over the past few years. I 
Indeed as Philip Zelikow noted, "Clinton has wholly cast America's lot with Yeltsin, despite i 
having criticized Bush for too strongly and lengthily attaching American interests to ! 
Gorbachev. "7 This strong political and diplomatic support reached its peak during the failed j 
October 1993 coup by parliamentary leaders, led by Khasbulatov and Vice-President j 
Rutskoi. During the crisis the US found itself in the difficult position of endorsing the j 
shelling of a sitting parliament. Yet Talbott explained the administration's position, using ; 
paradoxically democratist language to justify the Clinton stance. That is, in this case, it was j 
in the interests of those who wished to further Russian democracy to support attacking the ' 
usually perceived repository of modem democracy, the parliament. Talbott explained, "For ?
1
us, the relevant question - the answer to which would determine the degree of our support - 
was whether Yeltsin was resorting to democratic means in his effort to resolve the crisis. The 
answer was yes."8 As Yeltsin had shown restraint in dealing with parliament, as his attempt 
at negotiations with Khasbulatov which had been brokered by the Patriarch of the Orthodox 
Church in Moscow illustrated, and as he called for new parliamentary elections and a 
referendum on a new constitution to replace a parliament elected under a Brezhnev-era 
system, the Clinton administration believed that in supporting Yeltsin they were furthering 
genuine democratic reform in Russia. Nor did this support for reform waver after the 
disastrous December 1993 parliamentary elections, in which the Communists and ultra­
nationalists (the latter being led by the crypto-fascist Vladimir Zhirinovsky) won a majority of 
the parliamentary seats at the expense of the radical reformers clustered around Yegor Gaidar. 
Despite the blackening of reform prospects, the Clinton administration did not cut its losses 
and abandon large-scale aid initiatives as many neo-realists and even some institutionalists 
advocated. As Michael Cox stated, ’’one result of the December 'wake-up call' was to cause 
initial confusion followed by a resolute White House defence of its original strategy. "9 This 
staunch defence of administration policy, despite the serious December electoral setback, is a 
crucial sign of the importance with which President Clinton viewed Russia, an importance 
that is a cornerstone of the democratist belief in the efficacy of a Russia-first policy.
This Russia-first policy of the Clinton administration was confirmed by words as well as 
deeds. As Talbott stated, "From the beginning of his presidency, President Clinton made 
clear that support for reform in the NIS [Newly Independent States] would be the number 
one foreign policy priority of his administration." 10 Oberdorfer concurred, noting, 
"President Clinton has repeatedly identified Russia as among his highest foreign policy 
priorities." 11 Leslie Gelb, a veteran columnist and former State Department colleague of both 
Anthony Lake, the National Security Adviser, and Warren Christopher, the Secretary of 
State, also accepted that the Clinton administration had a Russia-first outlook saying, "To the 
extent that the Clinton administration has national security priorities, they revolve around 
Russia. "12 So rhetorically, politically, and diplomatically the Clinton administration's policy 
toward Russia can be seen to be democratist, as its primary characteristic was a Russia-first 
attitude which is the cornerstone of democratist thinking on Yeltsin's attempts to bring about 
radical reform.
The underlying reason for President Clinton's democratist view of Russia sprung from 
his desire to concentrate on domestic initiatives. As Friedman observed, the President, "sees 
this issue as an adjunct of his domestic agenda. At its crudest, the White House logic goes
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like this: No Russian reform, no American defense cuts, no chance for the Clinton 
administration to deliver on its pledge to halve the budget deficit in four years, no dealing 
with the deficit, no reelection."13 This analysis highlights the crucial role the Russian issue 
played for the Clinton administration, and its desire to concentrate on the American domestic 
agenda. Even this, the administration's foremost foreign policy concern, was seen largely in 
terms of the President's domestic policies, particularly the desire to reduce the budget deficit 
by making substantial cuts in the military budget. It also illustrated President Clinton’s 
contention, first made during the primaries, that there are no longer real divisions between 
foreign and domestic policy. 14 Thus ironically, even Clinton's activist democratist stance 
regarding Russia can be seen as a largely defensive effort to protect American reform at 
home. ,
So what were the implications of the Clinton administration's democratist Russian policy 
regarding American initiatives toward the Bosnian conflict? The Russia-first policy intruded 
upon and partly determined American policy toward Bosnia. The Russia-first policy meant 
that the administration went to great lengths to avoid any crisis with Yeltsin that would force 
him to either look weak by meekly submitting to American dictates or that would lead to a 
direct confrontation with the Russian regime, as both these outcomes would almost certainly 
work to the advantage of President Yeltsin's ultra-nationalist foes.
Both these dangers were all too apparent to Clinton in Bosnia. For a start, as Williams 
observed, "The US regards the Muslims as the victim of Serb aggression, while the Yeltsin 
government sees the conflict as a civil war in which the Serbs, Muslims and Croats share 
responsibility for the problems and the horrors. "15 In the very contrasting interpretations of 
the conflict, lay the seeds of a possible Russo-American confrontation over Bosnia. 
American public opinion, and that of a majority of its decision-makers as well, saw the 
conflict as a clear-cut case of Milosevic and Karadzic ruthlessly wishing to create a Greater 
Serbia from the rubble of the former Yugoslavia, and as men who were ready to use almost 
any means, including ethnic cleansing, to achieve their ends. This viewpoint clashed with 
Russian public opinion, which generally favoured their Orthodox religious cohorts, the 
Serbs, at the expense of the largely Muslim Bosnians and the largely Catholic Croats. This 
innate difference in apprehending the nature of the conflict 16 was one of the internal tensions 
that was present throughout President Clinton's handling of the Bosnian crisis.
Fundamental differences of opinion between the US and Russia over the Bosnian conflict 
had become part of the administration's institutionalist rationale for its policy. President
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Clinton felt that without close co-operation with the Russians over Bosnia, the real 
differences between America and Russia were likely to lead to a far greater crisis. Gelb's 
observations confirmed this analysis. He stated, "On Bosnia, for example, he [President 
Clinton] always wants to make sure that Russian interests are fully taken into account and 
that the Europeans are on board. In fact, he always has Russia’s fate foremost on his 
mind. "17 Supporters of the administration's institutionalist line on Bosnia pointed to the fact 
that any time it appeared that the US might act unilaterally in the crisis, in accordance with 
democratist and neo-realist views and in opposition to institutionalist precepts, the Russians 
angrily upped the diplomatic ante. For example, qs the International Herald-Tribune reported, 
when the Americans indicated that they might unilaterally lift the UN arms embargo against 
the Bosnian Muslims, Russia stormily announced its intention of aiding the Serbs and 
Bosnian Serbs. "Russian legislators responded angrily Friday [13 May 1994] by deciding to 
lift the arms embargo against Serbia if the US or any other country begins supplying arms to 
Bosnian Muslims." 18 While President Yeltsin did not explicitly endorse the confrontational 
stance taken by the Russian legislature, his about-face on the Partnership for Peace initiative, 
where he quickly changed his position regarding the admission of Central European states 
into Nato after the strong denunciation of such a course by the Duma, illustrated that he was 
susceptible to pressure from right-wing nationalists in the legislature. 19 It is not too much to 
say that the Clinton administration's democratist Russia-first policy set the stage for its 
institutionalist response of advocating a low level of involvement in the Bosnian crisis. This 
is due to the fact that it ranked Russian goodwill and support for President Yeltsin far above 
the sufferings of the Bosnian Muslims, and even above the precedent of ignoring the 
Helsinki Final Act regarding the inviolability of European territory, in its overall hierarchy of 
foreign policy priorities. 20
(b) General administration policy regarding the security and political architecture of Europe.
Unlike the Clinton administration's policy toward Russia, which was a mix of majority 
democratist and minority institutionalist strands, its policy regarding the security and political 
architecture of Europe was unambiguously institutionalist. Among other things, this meant 
that unlike the Nato-firster democratists and neo-realists, the institutionalist Clinton 
administration did not see the European Union (EU) as a possible rival to either Nato or 
American power, as institutionalists do not fear that a strengthened EU will make Nato 
irrelevant. Rather, the administration was actively encouraging European efforts to assume an 
increased defence role and greater political integration. As President Clinton noted, the US, 
"will benefit more from a strong and equal partnership than from a weak one. "21 Stephen A.
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Oxman, then the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs, elaborated 
on this institutionalist theme, "we [the US] should continue to encourage our allies to take on 
a greater share of the burden of European security. We welcome the Maastricht Treaty's call 
for development of a European Security and defense identity, which can form the basis of a 
European pillar of Nato."22 Unlike its predecessors, the Clinton administration had no 
schizophrenic reaction to increased European integration and enhanced defence capabilities, 
as it saw these developments as wholly positive rather than viewing them with a mixture of 
support and trepidation.
The reasons for the administration’s wholehearted support for increased European self­
sufficiency also fit into the institutionalist means of thinking. Unlike its predecessors, the 
Clinton administration's policy was genuinely multilateralist. As Michael Brenner stated, 
"The outlook of the Clinton administration is somewhat different [than Bush’s tenure]. For 
one thing, it has a stronger desire to see the Europeans assume a larger share of common 
responsibilities. Candidate Clinton struck a theme that has become a benchmark for his 
administration's foreign policy: Multilateralism should be the hallmark of allied cooperation 
in the post-Cold War era. "23
This multilateralist policy illustrated a recognition of America's declining role in Europe, 
another institutionalist belief. As General Oakes, former Commander-in-Chief of the US Air 
Force in Europe stated regarding the American presence in Nato, "There is a significant 
watering down of the US leadership position. "24 As the US role in Europe declined, the 
Clinton administration clearly hoped increased European political and defence efforts would 
fill any security vacuum that might develop. As with the Clinton Russia policy, the 
administration's policy toward Europe related back to its concentration on domestic affairs. 
As US troop levels in Europe edged down toward 100,000, America hoped to use 'the peace 
dividend' to bolster US domestic reform.25 As part of this process, an increased European 
role meant that the US could lessen its commitment in Europe to promote domestic initiatives 
without destabilising a vital American interest. Once again, Clinton’s foreign policy stance 
was largely predicated on his desire to concentrate on the domestic ills of the US.
Policy-wise, the American institutionalist stance meant support for the expansion of the 
Western European Union (WEU), the defence arm of the EU, as well as support for the 
fledgling Eurocorps. As Pfaff noted, there was a declinist tinge to this policy. "As the 
Clinton administration has said that it wants to back off from the costs of leadership, Clinton 
and his people, against Washington establishment resistance, have told the Europeans that the
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Eurocorps [comprised of Belgian, Spanish, German, and French units! is welcome, and that 
if the WEU can take over bigger responsibilities for Europe's defense, that is fine. "26 Nor 
has US support for an increased European defence role been entirely passive. As was 
reported, "To give political effect to Europe's greater security role, the allies agreed in 
principle to make available Nato military resources to the WEU. "27 To allow Nato to give 
wherewithal to the WEU was a startling sign, in contrast to its predecessors, of how 
comfortable the Clinton administration was with the expansion of integrated European 
defence capabilities.
Not only was the administration amenable to the possible relative lessening of its role in 
Europe at.the expense of greater European self-sufficiency, it was markedly hesitant to 
expand Nato into Central Europe.28 The result of this hesitation was the Partnership for 
Peace initiative, a halfway measure that affirmed Nato's intent to allow Central European 
states to join the organisation, without setting a specific timetable for this expansion or, until 
1995, outlining a clear set of standards that had to be met before leading to new 
admissions.29 Stephen Oxman's endorsement of the scheme indicated the main reason 
behind it, to avoid antagonising Russia. "It [the Partnership for Peace plan] will also create a 
truly integrated Europe, without drawing lines which exclude some countries. "30 Oxman's 
comment is an implicit criticism of the American neo-realist contention that Nato should 
quickly admit Central European members such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
possibly Slovakia. The administration disagreed, saying such an expansion was bound to 
threaten and antagonise Russia. The Partnership for Peace initiative was a telling sign of the 
primacy of Russian policy over European policy that is a hallmark of the Clinton 
administration.
The administration feared that the acceptance of Central European states into Nato could 
provoke a strengthening of the Russian nationalist position at the expense of President 
Yeltsin, as he would be seen by the Russian people as unable to avoid Western domination, 
as symbolised by the expansion of Nato to the Russian frontier. It would also enhance 
traditional Russian fears of encirclement.31 Paradoxically, the administration felt the risk of 
Russian domestic destabilisation that the expansion of Nato might provoke would actually 
lessen the security of the new Central European members. American sensitivity to Russian 
nationalist feelings was illustrated by Ottaway and Maas, who reported, "the US decision to 
ban the sale of sophisticated America aircraft or other weapons to Eastern European nations 
was made to avoid antagonizing Russia and upsetting the regional balance of power. "32 This 
ever-present fear of destabilising Russia highlights clearly the primacy of Russian concerns
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over Central European fears of renewed Russian domination in the Clinton administration's 
hierarchy of priorities. Indeed, a large part of the rationale for Clinton's institutionalist policy 
toward Europe was the dominance of both domestic and Russian concerns over European 
initiatives.
While European policy was not as important to the Clinton administration as its Russian 
policy, it was still a greater priority than American policy regarding the Bosnian conflict. As 
Jehl noted, "Clinton, for his part, declared the partnership [The Partnership for Peace plan] 
as one that would be more important to the future shape of Europe, 'than whatever is or isn't 
done with the tragedy of Bosnia at this late date'."33 The Clinton administration's Bosnia 
stance cart be partly seen as a policy based on the belief that both Russian concerns and 
alliance unity superseded anything taking place in the Balkans. There was a significant 
European dimension to the administration’s institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia, that 
whatever the merits of the Bosnian Muslim cause, alliance unity came first. Even the manner 
in which the crisis was institutionally dealt with reflected the primacy of Europe over Bosnia 
for the Clinton administration. As Gompert observed, "The US deferred to the European 
wish that trans-national coordination take place in EC-US channels instead of Nato. "34 To 
use the EU rather than Nato as the primary institution for dealing with US-European relations 
during the Bosnia crisis meant a larger European role in the affair, as Nato is far more 
dominated by the US than the EU, in which the US is not a member. It is just one sign of 
many that throughout the Bosnian crisis the European point of view of the Bosnian affair, 
and its prospects for harming the alliance, took precedence over Bosnian Muslim concerns, 
and indeed, over the entire affair itself. The Clinton administration's policy during the 
Bosnian crisis becomes explicable when seen as part of the interconnection of US-Russian 
and US-European policies, and as the least important of the three relationships.
(c) General administration policy regarding Bosnia.
Despite some rhetorical vacillations, American foreign policy regarding Bosnia under the 
Clinton administration has been consistently institutionalist throughout its tenure in office. 
Before detailed analysis of the overall institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia is possible, a 
brief and very general overview of the concrete American actions in this labyrinthine conflict 
is necessary.
The multiethnic35 republic of Bosnia seceded from the rump Yugoslav state in April 
1992, and war began almost immediately, even before it was recognised by the EU and UN.
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This recognition was a strong point in the American neo-realist case for greater American 
activity to help the Bosnian Muslim cause, for under the UN Charter, every state is 
guaranteed the right of self-defence. This point looms large when considering the effect of 
the arms embargo, which will be further discussed. The war pitted the mostly Muslim 
Bosnian government against Bosnian Serb rebels, who had refused to take part in the 
multiethnic elections held on the eve of Bosnia’s secession. The Bosnian Serbs were 
substantially aided by Serbia proper, who had retained the lion’s share of the Yugoslav 
army's mostly Serbian officer corps and the vast preponderance of its heavy weaponry, 
particularly its heavy artillery and tanks. This aid took the form of some direct military 
intervention by the Serbian Serbs as well as a great amount of military aid which proved 
decisive in, the early days of the conflict, when the Bosnian Serbs scored their most decisive 
gains.36
As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton, denounced Serb aggression and took the Bush 
administration to task for its lukewarm involvement in the crisis. As Tucker and Hendrickson 
noted, "the Clinton administration came to office highly critical of its predecessor's record, 
particularly the Bush administration's failure to work toward lifting the arms embargo. "37 As 
Cohen stated, when a candidate, Clinton, "denounced Serb acts of 'genocide' and called for 
decisive US action in Bosnia."38 This was the militant, decidedly un-institutionalist attitude 
toward Bosnia that President Clinton brought to the White House.
The President, despite a lack of public support for his militancy39, proposed to the allies 
that they remove their peacekeepers from Bosnia and as a group lift the arms embargo against 
the Muslims, which had been imposed on all of Yugoslavia in 1992, so as to give them a 
chance to defend themselves against the better armed Serbs. Air strikes were also to be 
threatened to compel the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw from territory they had acquired through 
the morally repugnant practice of ethnic cleansing. This was the 'Lift and Strike' initiative 
that Secretary of State Christopher took with him to the European capitals in May 1993.
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Chart 6-1: A Timeline of Key Diplomatic Events in the Bosnian Crisis
- Warfare between Muslims and Serbs starts - March 1992
- Bosnia recognised by the EU - April 1992
- Candidate Clinton denounces Serbs, calls for an increased 
American role in the conflict - Summer 1992
- Collapse of the Vance-Owen plan favoured by the Europeans - May 1993
- Clinton endorses 'Lift and Strike' policy, as Christopher tries to get European allies to 
concur - May 1993
- Europeans reject American proposal of tougher action against the Serbs, Clinton 
abandons 'Lift and Strike' - May 1993
- Safe havens initiative, with enclaves guaranteed by the UN - May 1993
- After marketplace bombing in Sarajevo, a partial Western success achieved by 
threatening Nato air strikes to protect Sarajevo and Gorazde - February-April 1994
- Muslim-Croat federation brokered by the US - March 1994
- Contact Group endorses 51-49 Bosnia split - May 1994
- Gore breaks Senate tie regarding the Dole-Lieberman amendment that would have 
unilaterally lifted the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims - July 1994
- Failure to enforce Contact Group plan against Bosnian Serbs - July-September 1994
- Bosnian and Croatian Serbs all but take Bihac safe area, this leads to Contact Group 
recriminations - November 1994
- New 'take it or leave it' plan by Contact Group would lift sanctions on Serbia proper if it 
recognised and policed its borders with Croatia and Bosnia - February 1995
- 'New' plan proposed by US and Russia to other Contact Group members would 
gradually lift sanctions on Serbia proper if it incrementally implemented principles that 
keep Bosnia intact, without any formal recognition being required - March 1995
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The European refusal to accept the American proposal for air strikes and a greater aiding 
of the Bosnian Muslims, and the Clinton administration’s reaction to it, was without doubt a 
diplomatic turning point of the war. The European allies, particularly Britain and France, 
unanimously and publicly rejected the Clinton initiative in favour of maintaining their 
peacekeepers in Bosnia, under UN command. They preferred to attempt to resuscitate the 
Vance-Owen plan, jointly brokered by the EU and UN, which would partition Bosnia and *
sustain some Serbian gains made by aggression. Faced with a possible allied crisis over } 
Bosnia, the Clinton administration retreated to a firmly institutionalist position, stating that I
though the US disagreed with the Europeans about taking a harder line with the Serbs, the 
US would not act unilaterally, even to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government.
For the administration, alliance unity overcame doubts about Europe's Bosnian policy. It is
1
an overall position the Clinton administration has kept to this day.
i
While not diverting from their overall Bosnian policy, the French and British, partly as a 
sop to the Americans, orchestrated the UN construction of safe areas in May 1993. The US 
pledged to use air power if necessary to protect the UN peacekeepers guarding six Bosnian 
towns (including Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Bihac) that were designated safe 
havens by the UN Security Council. The plan was an indication that the UN and the
J
Europeans, while not wishing to actively aid the Muslims, would at least limit their 
sufferings through continued humanitarian assistance as well as offering some geographical 
security.
The safe havens plan was still part of an overall institutionalist policy in that it was 
enacted by the multilateral UN, and as Sciolino pointed out, was not, "aimed at rolling back j
the territorial gains of the Serbs, "40 who by then controlled roughly 70% of Bosnia. It aimed j 
at managing the conflict, but not by expanding the US role in it to punish Serbian aggression, 
as American democratists and neo-realists desired. Sciolino also agreed that the acceptance of } 
the safe haven policy, and the Clinton administration's decision to abide by European 
concerns and drop their more hawkish policy was a major climbdown. "The acceptance of 
the creation of safe areas is a turnabout in policy for the Clinton administration. During his »
tour of Europe only two weeks ago, Secretary of State Christopher said that such areas 1
would essentially put the Muslims into ethnic ghettos and thus reward 'ethnic cleansing' by J
Serbian nationalists. "41 As the crisis progressed, the Clinton administration would often be !
hamstrung by critics who pointed to his earlier more militant remarks belying a more cautious 1
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and subdued current American policy. In other words, the President had to deal with a 
credibility gap.
The spring of 1993 also saw the collapse of the Vance-Owen plan. Karadzic, the Bosnian 
Serb leader, agreed to it provisionally, while in practice his usually pliant parliament 
overturned his acceptance in May 1993. It is extremely likely that Karadzic's initial signature 
to the plan was little more than a diplomatic ploy, and that he knew the self-styled Serbian 
Parliament at Pale would reject the deal. However, the final nail in the coffin to the plan was 
delivered by none other than the Americans in the spring of 1993. Firstly, the administration 
rejected a Security Council resolution that was designed to demonstrate the international 
community's full support for the Bosnian peace plan, as the administration did not want to be 
seen to be involved in rewarding Serbian aggression. As Cohen noted, "the so-called Vance- 
Owen map never won clear support from President Clinton and was ultimately abandoned 
precisely because it was deemed to be morally abhorrent. "42 As Paul Lewis cogently 
observed, part of the reason for the American rejection of the Vance-Owen plan was the 
President's hawkish stance on Bosnia during the presidential campaign, "President Clinton 
criticized the Vance-Owen plan in his election campaign as rewarding the Serbs for 
aggression. "43 While the events of May illustrated that the administration was moving 
towards a firmly institutionalist-based policy on Bosnia, the American rejection of the Vance- 
Owen plan showed that the President was still somewhat a prisoner of his own tough 
rhetoric and was not prepared, at the time, to go as far as were the British and the French in 
sanctioning a fragmentation of Bosnia into cantons which might well lead to the actual 
dismemberment of the state. Nor was the US as quick to reward Serbian aggression in the 
interests of ending the war. The scuttling of both the Vance-Owen plan and the Clinton 
administration's more hawkish proposals in the spring of 1993 left the allies united behind 
institutionalist precepts but without a tangible peace plan.
Matters continued to drift through the winter of 1993 and into the spring of 1994. The 
war itself had by now ground largely into a stalemate, with the Bosnian Muslims unable to 
roll back the initial Serbian gains, while the Serbs were unable to eradicate the Bosnian 
government army, which by now had a manpower advantage over the Bosnian Serbs, while 
still being far inferior in weaponry. The UN, US and European allies did experience one 
success during this period. By threatening Nato air strikes against the Serbs besieging first 
Sarajevo and then Gorazde in February 1994, the West was able to more or less stabilise the 
situation in both safe areas, with a minimal use of force, though Nato fighters were involved 
in combat for the first time in the history of the alliance. However, as will be discussed in
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more detail later, it is important to note that this very limited use of military power and the 
tougher stance toward the Bosnian Serbs and Serbian Serbs did not signal an overall change 
from the policy advocated by American institutionalists, as no one in the administration 
suggested doing anything other than protecting the safe havens, which was itself an 
institutionalist initiative. The President wanted to strengthen the multilateral institutionalist 
response to the crisis not to change policy direction in the form of increasing support for the 
Bosnian Muslims, as American neo-realists and democratists would have wished.
Emboldened by its limited success, the administration was able to broker a new Muslim- 
Croatian alliance in March 1994. Initially the Muslims and Croats had been allies against a 
perceived combined attack, masterminded by Milosevic, as both had seceded from the rump 
Yugoslav state. However, Tudjman, the leader of Croatia, and Boban, leader of the Bosnian 
Croats, switched sides and attacked the primarily Muslim Bosnian government, as they 
feared a complete Serb victory could well lead to the partition of Bosnia, and the Croatians 
were determined to acquire and safeguard the portions of Bosnia that were primarily Croatian 
in ethnic content. Fierce fighting ensued, particularly around the Bosnian city of Mostar. The 
Clinton administration was able to induce the Croatian government and Bosnian Croatians to 
again ally with the Bosnian government. In exchange for agreeing to a loose Croatian- 
Muslim confederation, the US and Russia promised to give Tudjman full diplomatic backing 
in his struggle to reunite Croatia, by restoring its rule over the Croatian Serb area known as 
the Krajina. Also the administration promised to lift the economic sanctions that had been 
imposed on Croatia when it had joined the Serbs in attacking Bosnia. Yet this diplomatic 
bolstering of the Bosnian government was limited, and should not be seen as a change by the 
Clinton administration from its institutionalist policy. The contact group's peace plan was to 
confirm the overall institutionalist thrust of the administration's policy toward Bosnia.44
In May 1994, the contact group of the great powers concerned with the Bosnian conflict 
(comprising Russia, the US, France, Germany, and Britain) proposed a peace plan for 
Bosnia that, as the International Herald-Tribune observed, was eerily reminiscent of the 
Vance-Owen plan advocated by the European powers just a year previously. "They [the 
European delegates within the contact group] said they were particularly pleased that 
Secretary of State Christopher had explicitly agreed to endorse the 51-49 division of territory 
- the most important plank of a plan issued by Europe last year. The communique said a US- 
brokered Muslim-Croat federation would have to be set up within the 51 % target, not within 
58% of the territory as agreed previously by the Muslims and Croats."45 The Clinton 
administration was now agreeing to the exact percentage division of territory it had found
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morally repugnant just a year before in the Vance-Owen plan. Also, rather than fighting 
diplomatically for Muslim-Croatian claims to 58% of Bosnia as they had implied they would 
at the time of the formation of the Muslim-Croat federation, the Clinton administration 
ultimately sided with the European and Russian wish to endorse giving just 51% of the 
territory to the combined Muslim and Croatian forces, in an attempt to entice the Serbs to sign 
the pact. The contact group peace proposal illustrated just how strongly institutionalist the 
Clinton administration's policy toward Bosnia had become. In it, one can discern that making 
the deal enticing for the Bosnian Serbs had become a priority, whereas the American rejection 
of the Vance-Owen plan had attacked the Europeans for rewarding aggression. A year on, 
ending the war by at least partly appeasing Bosnian Serb and Serbian Serb objectives had 
displaced any notion of rolling back the Serbian aggressors' victories. Thus ending the war, 
an institutionalist priority, had taken on a new precedence over aiding the Bosnian victims of 
aggression. Secondly, over the matter of the 58-51% controversy over the percentage of 
Bosnian territory the Muslims and Croatians would receive, the US sided firmly with the 
Europeans over the Bosnian Muslims, despite promises made at the time of the Bosnian- 
Croatian federation to fight their comer in the contact group. Following institutionalist 
precepts, alliance unity easily took precedence over Bosnian Muslim claims.
Tied into the contact group plan was a clause that indicated that despite all the agreeable 
aspects of the initiative designed to lure the Serbs into an agreement, the contact group's 
patience was wearing thin. The plan was described by the contact group as a take it or leave it 
offer. That is, if either side refused to sign the pact, a diplomatic penalty would be paid. For 
the Bosnian Muslims, refusal to sign would lead to a lifting of economic sanctions imposed 
on both the Bosnian Serbs and on Serbia proper, which were having a significant impact on 
their economies. In the end, the Bosnian government reluctantly agreed to the plan. If either 
the Bosnian Serbs or the Serbian Serbs refused, it was agreed that there would finally be a 
lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims and possibly increased sanctions 
imposed against both Milosevic and Karadzic. It was at this point that a significant schism 
occurred between the Serb leaders. Milosevic, who by the pact could acquire and receive 
international sanction for most of his territorial designs, agreed to the plan, feeling that a 
lifting of sanctions would greatly bolster the Serb economy. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs 
however scorned the initiative, incurring the wrath of both the contact group and the Serbian 
Serbs themselves. In exchange for a minor lessening of sanctions against Belgrade, 
Milosevic himself blockaded the Bosnian Serbs, who were heavily dependent on the Serbian 
Serbs for materiel. From a Western perspective the best thing that can be said about the
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contact group initiative is that to an extent, it divided the Serbian Serbs from the Bosnian 
Serbs.
Meanwhile the US domestic scene grew restive about the administration's policy toward 
Bosnia. As shall be illustrated when bureaucratic political analysis is wedded to schools of 
thought analysis, neo-realist Republicans like Senator Bob Dole of Kansas and Democrats 
like Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware combined in Congress to oppose the administration's 
institutionalist policy. This process culminated in a July 1st, 1994 Senate vote on the Dole- 
Lieberman amendment, which would have lifted the arms embargo against the Bosnian 
government. Vice-President Gore's vote broke a 50-50 tie on the bill, but for its legislative 
victory the administration was forced to pay a considerable political price. To persuade 
wavering Senators to give the contact group plan time to work, the President was forced to 
make concessions and endorse the Nunn-Mitchell amendment. The amendment stated that if 
the peace plan was not accepted by the Bosnian Serbs by October 15, the US would once 
again attempt to convince its Security Council allies to multilaterally lift the arms embargo, 
and that if they remained adamantly opposed, by November 15, the administration would 
unilaterally lift the ban. At last a time limit had been placed on US diplomacy in the Bosnian 
crisis. These administration concessions are not to be viewed as a change in overall American 
policy, but rather the reverse. They were desperate inducements made by the Clinton 
administration to give the institutionalist contact group plan time to work, for if the Dole- 
Lieberman amendment to the defence appropriation bill had been enacted, it would have 
meant both the end of President Clinton's institutionalist Bosnia policy and would have 
called into question the primacy of Presidential decision-making over the Bosnian crisis 
itself. The Nunn-Mitchell concessions should be viewed as an illustration of just how 
desperate the administration was to retain the thrust of its institutionalist policy.
Yet with the Bosnian Serb rejection of the plan, the hollowness of Western threats was 
once again exposed. As Cohen wryly stated, "The Bosnian Serbs rejection was supposed to 
lead quickly to tighter trade sanctions on Serbia, a stricter enforcement by Nato of the 
weapons exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde and the establishment of similar 
areas around the Muslim-held towns. But nothing has happened. "46 When it became 
apparent that the mixture of blandishments and threats the contact group concocted in the pact 
was not going to work, all the members retreated on carrying out the punitive aspects of the 
pact against both the Bosnian Serbs and Serbian Serbs, which of course would have 
embroiled them more deeply in the overall conflict.
270
The very fact that the plan had been largely favourable to the Serbs was a strong 
indication of the great desire of all members of the contact group to end the struggle, from 
their point of view, relatively painlessly if dishonourably. The Bosnian Serbs shrewdly saw 
this institutionalist precept of the West wanting to avoid entanglement in the conflict as being 
at the heart of the entire plan, and thus correctly reasoned that the contact group would not 
apply genuinely punitive measures against anyone, as they would not wish to become more 
significantly involved in the Bosnian crisis at this late date.
Nowhere can Western reluctance to increase its involvement in the Bosnian crisis be 
better seen than in the controversy as to the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian 
government, with France, Russia, and Britain flatly contradicting their earlier contact group 
pledge to punish the Serbs in this manner if they failed to sign the pact. In the end, the 
Izetbegovic government saved the West, particularly the Clinton administration, from further 
embarrassment. "In one dashing sleight of hand, President Clinton is saved from 
embarrassment at home and from bitter rows with Russia, France and Britain. Those 
countries do not have to pull out their peacekeepers in humiliation...and all because President 
Izetbegovic said the Bosnian government was willing not to have the arms embargo on his 
Bosnian forces lifted for six months."47 The Bosnian Muslims, at last getting significant 
illegal arms through contacts in Zagreb, could well have faced an increased Bosnian Serb 
onslaught before new arms could have reached them in significant numbers from the West to 
turn the tide of battle in their favour. Also at this juncture, President Izetbegovic worried that 
a lifting of the embargo would heal the rift between Milosevic and Karadzic, if Milosevic felt 
the overall balance of power in Bosnia was significantly changing. Again in the short run, 
Milosevic could reinforce Karadzic to a far deadlier extent than the Bosnian Muslims could be 
armed by the West. These battlefield considerations saved President Clinton from fulfilling a 
distasteful dual commitment, as both the Nunn-Mitchell amendment and the contact group 
pact itself had backed him into lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian government, in 
the former case unilaterally if necessary. Yet the failure of the contact group to significantly 
punish the Bosnian Serb refusal to join the peace initiative, and the near crisis averted in the 
contact group, prophesied the divisions that were to occur over the Bosnian Serb offensive 
around Bihac.
The Bihac crisis of November 1994 further highlighted both Western weakness and 
divisions over Bosnia. A briefly successful military advance by the Bosnian V Corps from 
the Bihac pocket was met by a fierce counterattack in which the Bosnian Muslims not only 
lost all the territory they had so fleetingly recaptured, they also lost effective control of the
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entire Bihac enclave. Augmented by forces loyal to the Bosnian Muslim rebel Abdic, as well 
as the Milosevic-dominated Krajina Serbs in Croatia, the Bosnian Serbs were able to attack 
the V Corps from three sides. The Bosnian Serbs also managed to best Western diplomacy. 
Despite some urgency from the Clinton administration, the contact group was unable to agree 
on a tougher policy toward the Bosnian Serbs, despite their incursion into the Bihac safe 
haven, which in theory was supposed to be protected and guaranteed by the UN. While Nato 
did launch several air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, the contact group failed to agree on a 
coherent military policy for punishing the Bosnian Serbs, despite their flagrant defiance of 
the UN. At the end of the day, the Clinton administration, realising that it had entirely failed 
to convince its contact group partners of the necessity of air strikes to save Bihac, went along 
with the European's newly-evolving policy of altering the heretofore unalterable take it or 
leave it pact, by possibly allowing the Bosnian Serbs to unite in a confederation with Serbia 
proper, in exchange for acceptance of the original 51-49% plan.
That the administration would go along with a European initiative to sweeten the contact 
group pact and generally ignore the blatant Bosnian Serb humiliation of the UN at Bihac, 
highlights how far President Clinton was prepared to go to adhere to an overall central 
institutionalist precept regarding Bosnia; alliance unity came first in the overall hierarchy of 
American foreign policy priorities. While this general narrative exposes a gradual softening 
of American support for the Bosnian Muslims, it also makes clear that at least from May 
1993, the Clinton administration pursued an overall institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia 
and that, pundit criticism to the contrary, this policy was internally consistent in that it placed 
both Russian and European concerns about Bosnia over the fate of the unfortunate state 
itself.
Ironically, after the Bihac crisis began, the strongest international actor likely to lift the 
arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims was the resurgent Republican Congress of Newt 
Gingrich and Bob Dole. After their stunning mid-term election gains in November 1994, 
which saw the GOP turn a 256-178 minority in the House into a 231-203 majority, and a 56­
44 deficit in the Senate into a 54-46 advantage, the largely neo-realist Republicans held 
control of both the houses of Congress for the first time since the 1950s.
Senator Dole, long a neo-realist proponent of lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian 
Muslims as well as advocating a greater US commitment to the Bosnian Muslim cause, 
chastised the European allies, the UN, and Russia in the aftermath of the Bihac debacle. His 
increased authority, as shall be illustrated when bureaucratic political analysis is wedded to
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schools of thought analysis in chapter 7, was a key component of the overall struggle for 
control of American policy regarding the Bosnian crisis.
Before continuing with a more detailed analysis of the overall American policy regarding 
Bosnia, three general comments are necessary. Firstly, it is essential to note the centrality of 
the embargo issue to the whole of the Bosnian conflict. Without the lifting of the embargo, 
the Serbs had a locked-in military advantage. As The Economist noted, regarding Serb 
military superiority, "the Serb forces are more professionally organised and led, having 
inherited virtually intact the general staff of the Yugoslav army. (Secondly) the Serbs together 
outgun their adversaries 4-1 in tanks, 2-1 in guns and more than 10-1 in aircraft. "48 The UN 
arms embargo, introduced in September 1991 against the whole of Yugoslavia, had been an 
effort to control ethnic bloodshed in a rapidly disintegrating state. Its great effect on the 
Bosnian conflict was one of its unintended consequences. The Serb military superiority was 
an established fact. If the embargo was not to be lifted, institutionalist critics rightly 
reasoned, the Bosnian government stood no chance of military success and would thus be 
either militarily destroyed or forced to agree to almost any peace terms the West and the Serbs 
could cobble together. Surprisingly institutionalists agreed with much of this analysis but felt 
that a lifting of the arms embargo would lead to a spreading of the war and could result in far 
more being lost than merely the Bosnian Muslims' right to self-defence, for example the 
unity of the alliance itself, as well as the chance for Russia to make a successful transition to 
democracy with Western help.
A second general comment it is necessary to make about the Bosnian conflict is the 
striking consistency of the British and the French position. The European allies were leery of 
any diplomatic or military provocation of either the Bosnian Serbs or the Serbian Serbs, as 
European peacekeepers, who comprised the vast majority of the UN force in Bosnia 
(UNPROFOR), would be at risk, either to Serb military retaliation, or as hostages.49 While 
there is a dispute as to how effective the UN's humanitarian programme was, its political 
significance as a major factor in determining British and French Bosnia policy cannot be 
overrated. As Malcolm cogently stated, "The political consequence of placing this small and 
lightly-armed UN force in Bosnia was, however, that they now function as hostages, making 
the Western governments extremely reluctant to adopt any policies which might invite 
retaliation by the Serbs against these vulnerable troops."50 For example during the Bosnian 
Serb assault on the UN safe haven of Bihac several hundred peacekeepers were detained, in a 
successful effort to deter substantial Nato air strikes. While consideration for their nationals 
undoubtedly played a role in the French and British hesitance to get tougher with the Serbs,
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as Colin Smith noted, in many ways the British and French peacekeeping argument became a 
useful excuse for doing little to alter the military facts on the ground in Bosnia, as significant 
intervention would have been contrary to the general British and French desire to uphold 
institutionalist precepts in Bosnia, by limiting their involvement in the conflict. As Smith 
shrewdly observed, there had developed, "a certain symbiosis between the President and his 
two main European allies in Bosnia, Britain and France. London and Paris blatantly 
exaggerate the effectiveness of their soldiers’ humanitarian role, and use the prospect of Serb 
retaliation against them as an excuse for not taking decisive military action."51
This somewhat facile peacekeeping argument lay at the heart of most European objections 
to any increased Western stance against Serb aggression, and was the major rationale as to 
why the British and French were opposed to lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian 
Muslims. They feared that this would lead to a more general war that would spell the end of 
the UN humanitarian mission in Bosnia, and might well lead to military reprisals against the 
UN peacekeepers. Yet to a large extent the Europeans hid behind their peacekeepers so as to 
further their chief institutionalist aim of containing the conflict. However as Smith highlights, 
the Europeans were not alone in using sophistry to further their policy. It was President 
Clinton who seized upon the European peacekeeping argument as the reason for his refusal to 
lift the arms embargo.
Throughout the crisis the President said that he advocated lifting the embargo, but that he 
was sensitive to the peacekeeping arguments of the Europeans, who unlike the US had 
troops on the ground in Bosnia. By upholding the central institutionalist tenet of 
multilateralism, President Clinton pledged not to act alone in suspending the embargo, thus 
implicitly but directly linking America's Bosnian policy to the European peacekeeping 
arguments against lifting the embargo. If the embargo became the key factor surrounding the 
West’s Bosnia policy, so the peacekeeping argument of the Europeans against lifting the 
embargo became the rationale for the very limited direct Western diplomatic support the 
Bosnians received throughout the crisis. Yet this contentious argument hid the very real 
institutionalist policy adhered to by both the Clinton administration and the Europeans; their 
first priority was to limit the conflict rather than provide succour for the wronged Bosnian 
Muslims. The Europeans hid their overall policy behind their peacekeepers, but the Clinton 
administration certainly hid its institutionalist thrust behind the Europeans.
The third general point to make about overall American policy regarding Bosnia is that 
despite its firm support for an institutionalist policy, the administration became increasingly
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sceptical about the efficacy of the UN, the central, global, multilateral institution. Time after 
time the UN compelled restraint by Nato after Serb violations of UN directives. For instance, 
as Paul Lewis stated regarding the Serb incursion into the allied safe haven of Gorazde in the 
Spring of 1994, UN leniency toward the Serbs led to a growing rift with Nato and 
particularly the US.
"The policy dispute began in April when Akashi [the ranking UN official 
in Bosnia] blocked plans by Nato for air attacks on Serbs surrounding 
Gorazde after the Serbs failed to meet an ultimatum to withdraw. Last 
week, [end of April 1994] Akashi publicly criticised the [Clinton] 
administration for refusing to send peacekeeping troops to Bosnia, and 
said that since the US withdrew its forces from Somalia after suffering 
casualties there, Washington had become 'afraid, timid and tentative'.
Then, on Saturday, a senior military officer and a senior civilian official 
with the UN in Sarajevo said the Bosnian government had greatly 
exaggerated the damage and casualties in Gorazde in the hope of 
encouraging Nato to attack the Serbs. The officials' comments made it 
clear that the two top UN officers in the former Yugoslavia, Lapresle of 
France and Rose of Britain, also had opposed the Nato air strikes, urging 
that they would turn the Serbs against the peacekeepers, force the UN to 
end its operations and prolong the war. "52
This vignette represents almost all of the seeds of dissent that led to a widening rift between 
the Clinton administration and the UN that erupted as the Bosnian crisis progressed.
Under the dual key operational plan constructed by Nato and the UN for use during the 
Bosnian crisis, only UN commanders could call in air strikes, and until the autumn of 1994, 
they alone chose the targets to be hit. Also operationally until the autumn of 1994, the UN 
commanders would warn the Serbs when Nato was about to strike, which of course greatly 
limited the effectiveness of any such action, which in practice had little more than a pinprick 
effect, and as the siege of Bihac illustrated, gradually led to the elimination of any deterrent 
effect air strikes may have once had on the Serbs.
American neo-realists in Congress found this operational arrangement incomprehensible, 
and the bureaucratic expression of the UN's tentativeness to seriously threaten the Serbs. 
They also objected because the operational plan effectively bound the US to European and 
UN policy dictates, and eliminated any possible role for unilateral American initiatives, an 
operational cardinal sin for both democratists and neo-realists.
While the institutionalist Clinton administration did not object to the dual-key operational 
procedure with the UN per se, they increasingly regarded the UN as feeble and incompetent, 
and saw it as a barrier to an effective multilateralist policy. For example, Akashi held Nato 
back from bombing Serb forces around Gorazde, even after they failed to meet a deadline for
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pulling back their forces three kilometres from the city as the UN had mandated, as he argued 
they were withdrawing, if slowly. The Clinton administration saw the failure to promptly 
reply with air strikes to this technical violation of a UN directive as yet another example of 
the Serbs besting the international community in a test of will, whereas the UN perceived the 
situation as a victory and the use of air strikes as an unnecessary provocation. The 
administration was not as prepared to ignore Serb violations of UN resolutions as were the 
UN and the European allies who led UNPROFOR. Differences over Gorazde highlighted the 
split between the European allies and the UN on one side, who were concerned primarily 
with the security of the UNPROFOR forces, its humanitarian mission, and a desire to contain 
the war and bring it to a close under almost any circumstances; and the Clinton administration 
on the other, which while prizing international consensus still largely saw the Muslims as the 
victims of the conflict and wanted a marginally tougher international response to Serb 
transgressions.
The Gorazde example illustrated that the rhetorical aspects of Western differences on 
Bosnian policy got increasingly out of hand, thereby weakening the international 
community's efforts and policy in the eyes of all, most importantly the Serbs. Akashi's 
intemperate remarks about the US did the Clinton administration political damage, as they 
were grist for the mill of American neo-realists such as Senator Dole, who disliked UN and 
European primacy over the international decision-making process regarding the Western 
response to the Bosnian conflict. Such a direct verbal attack upon the US by the UN's 
representative could not be condoned, even by the institutionalist Clinton administration. The 
increased rhetorical differences between the US, the Europeans, and UN officials, called into 
question just how stable the international consensus was over Bosnia, as allied consensus 
was the administration's central selling point for its institutionalist Bosnia policy. These 
rhetorical attacks on the US also reinforced the suspicions of those advocating a neo-realist 
policy in Bosnia, that the UN officials were themselves hopelessly pro-Serb. For example, 
that senior UN officials should blame the people of Gorazde for overstating the damage to 
their city, inflicted by temporary Serb flouting of the UN resolutions regarding safe havens, 
struck many who were neither neo-realists nor democratists as being a case of blaming the 
victim.
Neo-realist and democratist decision-makers in the US encouraged the public belief that 
the UN would do almost anything to end the conflict quickly, which in practice meant 
sanctioning the Serb aggressors victory in the war. For example, as Paul Lewis noted, "US 
officials complain that Akashi is too conciliatory toward the Serbs. The envoy says he has a
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personal 'friendship' with Karadzic and calls him 'a man of peace'. "53 Such ludicrous 
statements further galvanised neo-realist critics of the Clinton administration, as they called 
into question American deference towards the UN and the European allies' initiatives 
regarding the Bosnian crisis. If Akashi's judgement was so flawed, why should the US 
harness its policy to an operational procedure that revolved around his determinations about 
the usefulness of air strikes?
Nor was Akashi the only hate-object for both Clinton administration officials and critics 
of American policy. Lt. General Rose, the British commander of UN forces in Bosnia, also 
involved himself in criticism of the American position. As Roger Cohen noted, regarding the 
contact grQup plan, "The map, prepared by the US and four other countries as part of a peace 
agreement, is regarded by Rose and the British officers who surround him as unrealistic, ill- 
conceived and unfair to the Serbs."54 In a state such as the US, where civilian control of the 
military is so total as to often preclude any public statement by a serving officer that would be 
critical of government policy, such a diatribe was culturally misjudged. The notion of a UN 
officer criticising the US for being unfair to the Serbs alienated almost all of the democratists 
and neo-realists in Congress, who viewed the Bosnian conflict as being the result of Serb 
aggression in the first place. Increased rhetorical disagreements between UN officials and the 
US helped transform a marginal difference over policy into an outright cooling of even the 
institutionalist Clinton administration's enthusiasm for viewing the UN as a possible 
candidate for the role of global policeman.
It is important to remember that while the US advocated a marginally more aggressive 
approach to the Bosnian conflict than its European allies, its policy was still very much 
within the institutionalist context. For example, even though the safe havens policy was to be 
bolstered by the threat of US-led Nato bombing, the overall thrust of the policy remained 
institutionalist. For in addition to adding muscle to the safe havens plan, as Williams and 
Marcus noted, "The Clinton administration's more aggressive approach to the Bosnian 
conflict involves two tracks: threatening Serb forces with air attack unless they stop the 
'strangulation' of Sarajevo, and pressing the Muslims to accept a proposed partition of 
Bosnia."55 The goal was to threaten the Serbs to the negotiating table, but the outcome of the 
talks would still be predicated by an institutionalist recognition that in order to end the war, 
the Serbs would be allowed by the West to gain from their aggression, and the Muslims 
would not be aided in their efforts to roll back Serb territorial gains. And as stated above, a 
cumbersome operational procedure was established for controlling any air strikes that would 
be launched to protect the safe havens. As Whitney observed, "Under the procedures it
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established last summer, Nato will not drop a single bomb unless the UN commander on the 
scene asked it to, and then only if the UN Secretary-General, Butros Butros Ghali, concurs 
in the request. ”56 Thus air strikes were to occur only if multilateral agreement was reached 
on such a decision, through the auspices of the UN. The procedure itself illustrated the 
institutionalist thrust of the Clinton administration, concentrating as it did on multilateral 
controls on force through the use of an international organisation. So while the administration 
may have been slightly more bellicose in its policy regarding the Serbs than the Europeans, 
as the safe havens example illustrates, both were still well within the overall institutionalist 
rubric.
Part of the reason for the Clinton administration’s hesitation in proclaiming its adoption 
of an institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia was that unlike its European allies, it could 
never wholly reconcile the conflicting priorities between furthering humanitarian concerns 
and upholding international justice. While the European allies and the UN clearly opted for 
the former, the President and his advisers never reconciled the fact that during the Bosnian 
crisis, these two benign ends were mutually contradictory. Engelberg shrewdly observed 
this, stating that America’s indecisive Bosnia policy largely derived from, "two contradictory 
desires: he [President Clinton] wants to bring the swiftest possible end to a war that has 
already taken more than 100,000 lives [as of November 1994, the figure was over 200,000]. 
But he also wants to set an example that aggression does not pay, and thus he is unwilling to 
allow the Serbs to keep the territory they have seized in a year of 'ethnic cleansing’."57
Ultimately, American democratists and neo-realists regarded justice as a higher priority in 
Bosnia than satisfying short-term humanitarian needs, while institutionalists believed the 
humanitarian dimension of the problem was more salient than abstract notions of justice 
being served. True to form, the President came down on the side of the institutionalist 
position. Hoagland discerned that this was a victory for the European conception of the 
conflict, stating, "In the end, the European view of Bosnia has prevailed. The French, 
British, and others treated Bosnia as an insoluble problem in which outsiders could do no 
more than comfort the wounded and feed the starving. "58
This triumph of the institutionalist conception that in Bosnia humanitarian needs took 
precedence over questions of justice can be seen in the Clinton administration's adoption of 
the contact group initiative, which was partly predicated on the idea that a speedy end to the 
conflict would greatly ease humanitarian suffering, even though the Serbs would be unjustly 
rewarded for their aggression. As Cohen illustrated, "In drafting and backing a new map for
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a territorial settlement in Bosnia, the Clinton administration has taken a extraordinary step: It 
has formally backed the handover to Serbs of towns in which tens of thousands of Muslim 
civilians were killed, put in prison camps or evicted. "59 By the spring of 1994, with its 
acceptance of the contact group plan for peace in Bosnia, it was obvious that the Clinton 
administration had resolved its dilemma in favour of the primacy of humanitarian needs.
Still, unlike the European allies and the UN, the administration was far from comfortable 
with its decision. This lack of comfort was largely the result of the almost unique American 
emphasis on morality in its foreign affairs, as well as the fact that America's Bosnia policy 
was in sharp contradiction with many of candidate Clinton's statements. This lack of comfort 
with the primacy of humanitarian needs over the precept of justice is reflected in the Clinton 
administration's institutionalist policy, that by its multilateralist nature, would spread the 
responsibility for an initiative the President knew would be sharply attacked. Also, the 
institutionalist tenet that the US would take on a relatively smaller global role than during the 
Cold War, suited both the President's overall global specific goals over Bosnia, as its 
secondary status in the crisis made any discomfort over its decision to pursue a non-activist, 
institutionalist policy seem less momentous. The administration's institutionalist policy 
enabled it to ward off both domestic criticism and obscured its less than decisive resolution of 
the conflict in Bosnia between humanitarian needs and justice.
Another reason the Clinton administration opted for an institutionalist policy in Bosnia 
was that the crisis was a low priority compared with domestic policy. This fact alone 
politically ruled out adopting the democratist stance on the conflict, which of the three 
schools of thought was by far the most interventionist and activist. If American public 
opinion was leery of the Clinton administration's cautious and passive institutionalist 
initiatives on Bosnia, it was downright opposed to democratist prescriptions which advocated 
America, unilaterally if necessary, going beyond arming the Bosnian Muslims and becoming 
militarily involved in directly fighting the Serbs.
Throughout his presidency, Bill Clinton adopted a strikingly anti-democratist position 
regarding Bosnia. As Walter Slocombe, the principal Deputy Under-Secretary of Defence for 
Policy, flatly stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "President Clinton has 
rightly concluded that US interests do not justify sending US ground troops to intervene [in 
Bosnia] to force a solution. "60 Bosnia was certainly not a state of extensive economic or 
political importance to the US, or one in which America had a long-term historical interest.
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Its general geopolitical insignificance politically ruled out the adoption of a democratist 
stance on Bosnia and made the selection of an institutionalist frame of reference more likely. 
Further, the Bosnian crisis raised the spectre of LBJ, another Southern reformist democrat 
who wished to concentrate on his ’Great Society' reforms, only to have Vietnam ambush 
both his domestic programme and then his presidency. As Gelb observed, "he [President 
Clinton] would rather risk looking weak in Haiti, Somalia, or Bosnia than divert time and 
resources from his domestic agenda. He must dwell daily on the peril of repeating LBJ's 
experience. "61 Bill Clinton, even more than was usual for a chief executive, was interested 
in and knew he had been elected to, deal with America's pressing social ills, such as 
controlling the deficit, and reforming both the health care system and the welfare state itself. 
Regarding, Bosnia, the democratist policy prescriptions were the only options that could 
embroil the President in a quagmire that could threaten his reforms politically, as a Vietnam- 
style situation in Bosnia with significant American casualties would prove immensely 
unpopular at home. Given the clearly stated priorities of the Clinton administration, it is easy 
to discern why it clearly and consistently eschewed democratist policy options over Bosnia, 
as they were the only initiatives that could imperil its main domestic-first thrust.
As such, the administration's choice of an institutionalist policy for Bosnia makes 
increasing sense. Whether it was damned or supported, the President's policy was a 
consistent and coherent response to the crisis, contrary to accepted conventional wisdom. 
The President's overall institutionalist desire for Europe to shoulder more of its own security 
burden dovetailed nicely with his specific Bosnia policy. As Pfaff concluded, "Like President 
Bush, President Clinton called the Yugoslav crisis a European responsibility and said the US 
would back whatever the Western Europeans decided to do about it."62 As Bosnia was 
objectively a low priority in the US hierarchy of interests and entailed only dangers and not 
opportunities from the administration's point of view, it is not surprising that the Clinton 
White House was happy to follow the lead of its European allies, particularly as its 
subordinate role in decision-making regarding the Bosnian crisis was congruent with its 
overall institutionalist European policy in general. A democratist stance on Bosnia was never 
seriously considered by Washington because such an initiative ran counter to the general 
domestic priorities of the administration, and anyway would have been politically impossible 
to sustain. The President never seriously considered risking so much for objectively so little.
If an activist Bosnia policy did not mesh with the Clinton administration's domestic 
priorities, neither did it coincide with Washington’s foreign agenda. As stated above, the 
Clinton White House pursued a democratist policy regarding Russia and institutionalist
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initiatives regarding both Europe in general and Bosnia specifically. The final and decisive 
reason Washington adopted an institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia is that to do otherwise 
was seen as imperilling American initiatives toward Russia and Europe, both of which were 
regarded as more important to the US than was Bosnia.
While adherence to general international law precepts has been cited by the administration
as a major reason for its institutionalist policy toward Bosnia, in reality it has been little more
than a public cloak for defending the President's institutionalist initiatives. While respect for
international law is definitely a cornerstone of institutionalist thinking, it has hardly guided
Washington's Bosnia policy. As former Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Oxman
explained somewhat disingenuously, regarding the administration's failure to unilaterally lift
the arms embargo on the Bosnian government,
"It is no secret that the administration's preferred policy in Bosnia this 
spring [in 1993] was to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian 
government and to support that lifting with interior air strikes. That 
policy would have required a resolution of the UN Security Council 
because the embargo had been imposed by the Security Council. Despite 
our strenuous efforts we were unable to secure agreement on this 
approach. "63
What Oxman failed to mention is that Bosnia was recognised as a sovereign state by the UN, 
and as such it had the right, under the UN Charter, to self-defence, a right effectively 
nullified by the UN arms embargo. Also, the embargo had been placed on the whole of the 
former Yugoslavia, rather than specifically on the Bosnian state. Oxman’s dubious legal 
defence of administration policy is thus an excellent example of Washington using the facade 
of international law to defend its institutionalist, but not legally driven initiative.
Likewise, the President's successful if limited response to the Sarajevo massacre of
February 1994, when a Serb mortar blast killed 68 in the Bosnian capital, was to move to 
strictly enforce the safe havens zone around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Beyond this point the 
President claimed he could not go, due to strictures imposed upon the US by international 
law, 'restrictions' which squared with Washington’s policy of limiting its involvement in 
Bosnia. As Horvitz noted, "President Clinton said he had consulted with US allies Saturday 
and Sunday [5-6 February 1994] about the possibility of retaliation, but he then cited 
restrictions under international law that would prevent unilateral action. "64 CNN had 
provided graphic images of the massacre, which temporarily increased pressure upon the 
administration to act in some way against the Serbs. The President, fearful of being pushed 
toward democratist initiatives, thus used the international law argument to deflect calls for 
American military action against the Serbs. Rather than viewing support for the precepts of
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international law as driving President Clinton’s institutionalist Bosnia policy, it should be 
regarded as a largely convenient political cover the administration utilised to further initiatives 
which were largely predicated on averting a rift with either the European allies or Russia.
For it is over the determination of the Clinton administration to avoid a fatal schism with 
either the European allies or Russia that one finds the primary rationale for its institutionalist 
position on Bosnia. This can be seen in that its cardinal principle in almost every instance of 
the Bosnian crisis has been to act in a genuine multilateral manner, which is a hallmark of 
institutionalist thinking. As Hoagland observed, "Containing the war in Bosnia and 
containing their own sharp divisions over that war have become the principal policy 
objectives ^of the US and its most important European allies. Bosnia is no longer about 
Bosnia. Bosnia is about allied unity."65 Indeed both the Bush and Clinton administrations 
have been prepared to set aside policy differences with the Europeans, even when they have 
felt them to be wrong. This is an illustration of just how pivotal the priority of allied unity has 
been for the Clinton administration. As Gompert noted, "Under both administrations, the US 
has been prepared to do more [than the Europeans], including use force, but not instead or 
over the objectives of its allies."66 This tenet of multilateralism - right or wrong - was clearly 
enunciated by Warren Christopher, who stated that, "President Clinton had set principles on 
US policy toward Bosnia, the first of which was that, ’we will not act alone’. "67 Nowhere 
could a clearer statement of the administration's objections to the unilateralist policy 
prescriptions of the neo-realists and democratists over Bosnia be made.
The Clinton administration consistently followed its multilateralist policy towards Bosnia 
throughout the crisis. This was most crucially illustrated by its decision in May 1993 to give 
up on the notion of effecting any real activist effort in Bosnia, in deference to the wishes of 
the European allies. The primacy of a multilateralist, institutionalist policy giving preference 
to European views on Bosnia can be seen in every Western initiative since then. As Anthony 
Lewis noted,
"’It's the end of an era', a veteran diplomat said, 'the era of American 
leadership and power in Europe.' He was commenting on President 
Clinton's acceptance of the European plan to set up 'safe havens' for 
Muslims in Bosnia. Just two weeks ago, on his European tour, Secretary 
of State Christopher rejected the safe haven idea. It would confine 1.2 
million Muslims to the equivalent of ghettoes he said, and effectively 
ratify Serb conquests elsewhere in Bosnia. Now [25 May 1993] 
Christopher said the US was agreeing to the idea because Russia, Britain,
France and Spain wanted it. President Clinton said, 'At least we're 
together again'. "68
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It is hard to believe that President Clinton and Secretary of State Christopher altered their 
harsh judgement about the safe havens in fourteen days. Rather, it is more likely, especially 
taking the President's comments into account, that they felt allied unity took precedence over 
whatever Bosnian policy the West ultimately decided upon.
Certainly the question of the embargo was the most important and telling example of the 
administration's institutionalist priority of maintaining allied unity over Bosnia, even at the 
cost of possibly getting the specific Bosnian policy wrong. As The New York Times 
observed, "The Clinton administration has always presented lifting the arms embargo as its 
preferred response to the Bosnian crisis, while Europe has favored partition and asked for 
large numbers of US troops to help enforce it..But the administration, for the sake of Nato 
solidarity, has resisted congressional pressures to lift the arms embargo unilaterally. "69 Thus 
even though the Clinton administration agreed with its congressional neo-realist critics, like 
Senator Dole, that the arms embargo should be lifted, it was not prepared to do so without 
the multilateral consensus of the Western allies. While both neo-realists and institutionalists 
agree specifically that it would be best for the arms embargo to be lifted from the Bosnian 
Muslims, the administration's decision not to act unilaterally to do this was the crucial point 
of difference it had with both the neo-realists and democratists over general Bosnia policy. 
Multilateralism was at the heart of the Clinton administration’s Bosnia policy, as they viewed 
it as the best way of keeping the Western alliance together, Bosnia crisis or no.
Of course, such a policy baldly stating that, while disagreeing with current Western 
policy, the US was prepared to go along with the Europeans over Bosnia, was bound to lead 
to fierce criticism in a state accustomed to leading and not following Western opinion. As 
Gordon noted, "the Clinton administration in effect gave the Europeans a veto over its 
proposals to arm the Muslim forces and protect them with airstrikes."70 This stance made 
both unilateralist schools of thought, but especially the neo-realists, nervous, as they 
strenuously advocate never shackling a state's foreign policy, as it is determined by the 
national interest, to the dictates of any extra-national body. While it is obvious that much of 
the opposition the Clinton administration faced in Congress over its Bosnia policy was 
reflective of partisan political concerns, it is also equally clear that in disagreeing with the 
largely neo-realist Republicans, such as Senators Dole and Lugar, the administration was 
highlighting a basic difference of opinion over fundamental principles about American 
foreign policy in the post-Cold war era.
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Nor were the European allies the only states the President wanted to keep on side during 
the Bosnian crisis. The administration was also concerned with keeping Russia in the contact 
group and viewed it as a key element that needed to be taken into account if an international 
consensus was to be reached over the Bosnian crisis. Due to the administration’s democratist 
fervour about Russia, there is little doubt that it regarded the stability of the Yeltsin regime as 
far more important than the outcome of the Bosnian conflict. As Hendrickson observed, "The 
maintenance of that concert [with both the Russians and the EU], in the end, remains of far 
greater moment for European order and American interests that the precise disposition of the 
Bosnian civil war. "71 President Yeltsin, whether to gain an advantage over the US regarding 
the contact group's policy toward Bosnia or out of genuine political need, warned the US 
against actively aiding the Bosnian Muslims. As Engelburg and Gordon stated, Yeltsin, "told 
the administration that tough action against the Serbs could further jeopardize his position 
with the Russian parliament."72 This was especially critical in the Duma, where the majority 
of delegates were anti-Yeltsin, being followers of Zhirinovsky or unreconstructed 
communists. Both groups it was feared, would enrage public opinion against Yeltsin for 
failing to come to the aid of Russia's Slavic Orthodox brethren, the Bosnian Serbs.
The Russian government was particularly worried about the US lifting the arms embargo 
on the Bosnian Muslims. As Barber noted, "Russia warned the US against lifting the UN 
arms embargo on the Bosnian government. 'If each of the great powers unilaterally supports 
its clients, it could result in a war, not just a war in the former Yugoslavia but a global 
confrontation,' said foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev. "73 Certainly Russia made it clear that 
the American lifting of the arms embargo could lead to the end of both the contact group and 
any chance for international consensus regarding Bosnia. Thus, by a mixture of threats about 
its potential weakness as well as its potential fervour about backing the Serbs, the Yeltsin 
government was able to influence the Clinton administration's overall institutionalist Bosnia 
policy, a policy characterised by its reliance on multilateral approaches to the conflict as well 
as its clear choice of alliance unity and a desire to augment Russian stability, even at the 
expense of its preferred policy in the conflict.
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Chapter 7: Political Analysis of the American Response to the Bosnian
Crisis Using Schools of Thought Analysis
Having discussed American policy regarding Bosnia using schools of thought analysis, 
and having classified crucial political decision-makers involved in formulating and opposing 
the overall institutionalist stance, it is now necessary to analyse the political process that led 
to the overall American policy. This policy can be outlined through a schools of thought 
examination of the interaction between the White House and Capitol Hill during the first two 
years of the Clinton administration. This chapter will analyse how overall American foreign 
policy outputs regarding Bosnia were derived in the time of the 103rd Congress (January 
1992-Novpmber 1994), by assessing the relationship between the executive branch and the 
Congress involved in foreign policy-making and classifying each branch's overall general 
schools of thought orientation. While not every bureaucratic player will be analysed, a clear 
and accurate picture will emerge regarding the collective schools of thought priorities of the 
executive and legislative branches of the American government.
i) The schools of thought stance of the executive branch during the 103rd Congress
As was noted in detail in chapter 6, the executive branch maintained a strong 
institutionalist stance throughout the Bosnian crisis. This point is affirmed by the fact that of 
the five individual policy-makers classified in chapter 5 who work in the executive branch, 
(Clinton, Christopher, Perry, Lake and Talbott) all individually preferred the institutionalist 
position regarding the Bosnian crisis. It is now necessary to examine how this overall policy 
output was arrived at in the executive branch, looking again at each of the five individual's 
commitment to his school of thought priority, and then at their personal and bureaucratic 
power within the executive branch.
An institutionalist stance on Bosnia fitted in well with Secretary Christopher's personal 
preferences, yet these proclivities are not what drove the man. The Secretary came to his job 
with the reputation of having, as Barone and Ujifusa noted, "A gift for painstaking 
negotiation and an abhorrence of violence. "1 These traits dovetailed well with the 
institutionalist position on Bosnia, which saw negotiations and sanctions, not military force, 
as the appropriate tools needed to end Serb adventurism. It came as little surprise that 
Christopher favoured the Vance-Owen plan, drawn up by his former boss and mentor at the 
State Department, Cyrus Vance, another statesman often criticised for undervaluing the 
military aspects of power by the neo-realists.2
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Yet ideological fervour was not Christopher's most outstanding personal characteristic. 
Rather, as Leslie Gelb, the columnist who worked closely with Christopher at the State 
Department, noted, Christopher is, "not a policymaker and has no known policy agenda...he 
thinks case by case."3 Secretary of State Christopher emerged as a competent technician, 
rather than as an ideologue eager to stamp American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era 
with his overall schools of thought views. It is Jim Hoagland, of The Washington Post, who 
came closest to accurately probing the essence of the man. Hoagland stated, "A lawyer, 
Christopher took the president on as his client and has been willing to argue whatever case 
the president wanted argued, no matter what his own views were. "4 While Secretary 
Christopher undoubtedly held institutionalist views regarding the Bosnian crisis, a sign that 
he did not play the instrumental role in setting the overall institutionalist direction of US 
policy regarding Bosnia is that he simply lacked the ideological commitment for the role.
As the 103rd Congress progressed, Christopher did not assume the major role in foreign 
policy-making many other Secretaries of State have obtained throughout American history. 
Christopher started the administration in a bureaucratically strong position, as the Secretary 
of State is traditionally the dean of American foreign policy formulation, second only to the 
President in bureaucratic clout. Modem Secretaries of State such as Acheson, Dulles, and 
Kissinger have played major roles in American foreign policy formulation. Beyond this, 
Christopher had served in government before, as for example, under Lyndon Johnson as 
Deputy Attorney General, and under Carter as Deputy Secretary of State, where he made a 
name for himself by negotiating the release of the American hostages with Iran.5 Thus, 
Christopher came to the administration with federal government experience, unlike many on 
the Clinton team, giving him a large bureaucratic advantage in that he was used to the unique 
culture of the capital city. The Secretary also had a relatively close relationship with President 
Clinton.6 An example of this close tie is that Christopher was co-chairman of the Clinton 
transition team, and headed the search that led to the selection of A1 Gore as Vice-President, 
tasks normally assigned only to highly trusted aides.
Yet Secretary of State Christopher has proven to be a bureaucratic loser within the 
Clinton administration, and has wielded far less power than had originally been thought 
likely. Most put this disappointing bureaucratic record down to the personality of the 
Secretary himself. As Williams noted, "he [Christopher] has long insisted that his main 
problem is communication,"? but most observers felt it went much deeper than this, to the 
core of the man himself. As Anthony Lewis reported, The Times of London put it well,
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"Christopher may have qualities, but dynamism, creativity, vision and leadership are not 
among them."8 Woodward concurred, describing Christopher as, "A small man, with a 
wizened face and a* hesitant voice, Christopher was known for his caution and ability to 
lawyer any problem to death. "9 While caution and painstaking attention to detail may be 
admirable qualities for a lawyer to possess, they help little in winning bureaucratic arguments 
in the rough-and-tumble world of Washington politics.
While Christopher held a major bureaucratic power position within the administration, 
and while President Clinton valued his loyalty, he lacked the ideological fervour for 
bureaucratic political success. He also failed to master his brief at the State Department. 
While Secretary Christopher’s unassuming loyalty was an asset in his relations with the 
President, his lack of dynamism was a factor in his inability to bind together a seriously 
divided State Department. The Secretary of State’s personality was the key reason he was 
unable to dominate American foreign policy-making during the first two years of the Clinton 
administration.
The results of Christopher’s bureaucratic failure are plain to see. Secretary Christopher 
was unable to win policy battles at the cabinet level, or quell dissent even within the State 
Department At first it appeared that the cautious Christopher would fit in well running the 
State Department, which has a bureaucratic reputation for staid circumspection. As Tony 
Lake, a former State Department official and now National Security Adviser wryly observed 
about the bureaucratic culture of Foggy Bottom, "for many political appointees, the problem 
[with State] is explained by the adage 'There are old diplomats, and there are bold diplomats, 
but there are no old, bold diplomats'. "10 Beyond the Secretary's personal caution meshing 
with State's bureaucratic circumspection, Christopher and the State Department shared a 
general institutionalist orientation. As The International Herald-Tribune reported, a group of 
conservative Democrats, "which includes a former Clinton campaign counsel, David Ifshin, 
have watched in increasing discomfort as the administration has been filling the State 
Department with moderate liberals. They contend that the tilt of the department contradicts 
Clinton's campaign promise that he would be a 'new kind of Democrat'." 11 These moderate 
liberals, as was illustrated in chapter 4, generally tend to be institutionalists, like the Secretary 
himself. Yet despite these affinities, "in the department there is a general agreement that there 
has not been such public protest by those charged with carrying out a policy since the height 
of the Vietnam war," 12 as there has been over Bosnia.
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The revolt against the administration's Bosnia policy was centred at the middle and lower 
levels of the State Department. As Jon Western, one of four mid-level staffers who quit the 
department over Bosnia policy stated, "The dissent is not confined to the European bureau. 
I’ve covered or been associated with the Yugoslav issue since the outbreak of hostilities. In 
my time, I have met one, possibly two people, in the department below the level of assistant 
secretary who believe in the policy." 13 This wholescale revolt had a democratist, rather than 
a neo-realist schools of thought focus, as the moderate liberals who comprise much of the 
State Department were unlikely to find common cause with the neo-realists, who are 
primarily Republicans. As Marshall Freeman Harris, the chief State Department adviser on 
Bosnia noted, while resigning, "I can no longer serve in a Department of State that accepts 
the forceful dismemberment of a European state and that will not act against genocide and the 
Serb officials who perpetuate it. "14 This democratist indictment of the administration's 
institutionalist Bosnia policy signalled that the Secretary of State could not keep order, even 
in his supposed bureaucratic stronghold.
Nor did Christopher fare much better at the cabinet level. Most agree that President 
Clinton personally dominated the Secretary of State. As Friedman and Sciolino noted, 
"Another thing that strikes foreign visitors is how President Clinton alone conducts the 
[foreign policy] meetings from the American side, while his aides seem rather intimidated. 
His secretary of state and national security advisor speak only if called upon by the 
president. "15 This is surely a graphic sign that the President, at least publicly, did not value 
Christopher's independent judgement.
This increasing lack of confidence in Christopher by the President can be seen in several 
bureaucratic instances. As Christopher’s White House critics noted, "he has failed, most 
recently with the Haiti crisis, to project an image as a strong Secretary of State. With the 
exception of the Middle East, they say, he has essentially ceded policy portfolios to 
subordinates or other government agencies. "16 In other words, the Secretary failed at the 
most basic level of bureaucratic politics, to protect and expand his bureaucratic ’turf. For 
example, during the Haitian crisis, Secretary Christopher was not included in a key meeting 
to discuss Jimmy Carter's Haitian plan unlike National Security Adviser Tony Lake, 
Secretary of Defence William Perry, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John 
Shalikashvili, and Strobe Talbott 17 Christopher's exclusion from the decision-making 
process of an issue so obviously within his bureaucratic responsibility was a telling sign of 
his increasing irrelevance regarding American foreign policy formulation.
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Likewise, the President himself publicly undermined his Secretary of State. As Devroy 
reported, "President Clinton will wait until the end of the year [1994] to decide whether his 
administration's much-criticised performance in international affairs merits the replacement of 
Secretary of State Christopher or other members of his foreign policy team, according to 
senior officials and outsiders who have talked to the president." 18 The White House did not 
even bother to issue the customary denial of this scathing report. That Christopher was put 
on 'probation' regarding his very bureaucratic survival as Secretary of State was the most 
damning indication that he was not the bureaucratic locus behind the executive branch's 
institutionalist policy preference regarding Bosnia
William Perry found himself in a quite different bureaucratic political position than
Secretary Christopher. However while the Secretary of Defence is a major bureaucratic
player in the American government, the President's overall institutionalist orientation meant
that the Pentagon was organisationally not as important as it would be under a neo-realist
chief executive. Thus Perry came to the job knowing his general bureaucratic position would
be less advantageous than that enjoyed by powerful Secretaries of Defence like Robert
McNamera, Caspar Weinberger or Dick Cheney .The initial signals seemed to suggest that
Perry's personality would not be a bonus in his dealings with the President. Yet it proved his
chief bureaucratic strength. For Secretary Perry mastered his brief, unlike Secretary
Christopher at State. As Lancaster noted,
"uniformed leaders say, he [Perry] has restored a sense of order and 
discipline to the Pentagon, streamlining the department's policy shop by 
eliminating 2 of the 6 Assistant Secretary jobs and conducting crisp, clear 
meetings fiat begin on time and often end with a decision. In the process, 
he has helped repair the Clinton administration's sometimes prickly 
relationship with military leaders, who chafed under Aspin's lax 
management style and perceived habit of limiting major decisions to a 
small circle of civilian aides." 19
Secretary Perry's popularity at the Pentagon also stemmed from the fact that he had long been 
a part of its bureaucracy. He was Aspin’s chief deputy, and first served as a technical 
consultant to the DoD in the 1960s, and later as Under-Secretary of Defence for Research and 
Engineering under President Carter.20 Perry benefitted from being a long-standing member 
of the DoD, and his appointment was well-received by the Pentagon bureaucracy as it saw 
his tenure as signalling that at last 'one of us' was rightly running the armed services, as 
opposed to the 'outsider' institutionalists, such as Secretary Aspin. Perry's bureaucratic 
triumph within the DoD enhanced his status with President Clinton, who had reason to be 
pleased that his cultural and bureaucratic troubles with Defence had at last been contained.
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Yet as is so often the case, the personality aspect of bureaucratic politics cut both ways 
for Secretary Perry. While the President was grateful to him for partially quelling the dissent 
in the Pentagon towards the administration, the very qualities that made Secretary Perry 
successful at running the Pentagon limited his relationship with the President. Perry's 
popularity at the DoD was based partly on the fact that he is not an intimate of the President. 
Yet this lack of intimacy limited Perry’s overall bureaucratic power. As Freedland observed, 
Perry was the President’s fifth choice to be Secretary of Defence (after Aspin, Inman, Nunn, 
and Rudman), hardly a ringing personal endorsement.21 Nor did Perry have the easy 
personal access to the President that is so often indicative of a strong personal relationship 
with the chief executive.22 The major reason for this personal distance was precisely because 
Perry was not a Clinton man, and was somewhat bureaucratically distrusted as not having the 
President’s interests as his top priority. Secretary Perry was perceived by the Clinton 
administration as having been partly ’captured’ by the DoD bureaucracy.
That Perry should be captured by the Pentagon bureaucracy was not a strange 
phenomenon. As Halperin argued, "The pressures on Cabinet officers from their 
subordinates, as well as from outside pressure groups, is so great that they often come to see 
themselves as their department's representative to the President. "23 Regarding Bosnia, as 
has been shown in Chapter 6, Secretary Perry agreed with the President's institutionalist 
stance over the arms embargo, but for largely neo-realist reasons. This anomaly can be 
explained by his adoption of the Pentagon's bureaucratic culture regarding American military 
intervention. In general, the Pentagon has been against new military commitments for the US 
and has opposed post-Vietnam American military intervention.24
In reaction to failure in Vietnam, if an interventionist strategy becomes policy, the DoD 
has argued that the military force employed must be overwhelming, to ensure swift victory. 
These conditions were singularly lacking in Bosnia, where the Pentagon saw civil war and 
quagmire instead of a case of clear-cut Serbian aggression. The DoD feared that incremental 
military involvement advocated as the dominant neo-realist position, through the arming of 
the Muslims and utilising possible air strikes to protect the Bosnian government before the 
weapons arrived, could lead to deeper American involvement in a Vietnam-style quagmire. 
Secretary Perry embraced this departmental position which, though it coincided with the 
President's policy, was determined more by intra-bureaucratic interests and processes.
The reason that Secretary Perry was easily co-opted by his department was that he 
exhibited little ideological fervour of his own. As Drew recounted, Perry is, "essentially a
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technical man, with no real policy-making or political experience, or practice as a public 
communicator. Perry was solid but colorless as Lake and Christopher.”25 While Secretary 
Perry was definitely a player regarding the Bosnia crisis, as his skillful mastering of his brief 
enhanced his power status, his lack of ideological zeal, symbolised by his co-option by the 
Pentagon over Bosnia, and his lack of personal closeness to the President meant he was not 
the principal architect of America’s Bosnia policy. Nevertheless, he was a bureaucratic 
political force militating against any change in the administration’s position on Bosnia.
Like Christopher and Perry, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake was in a position 
of significant bureaucratic political power due to the fact that he held the last of the three 
major governmental positions devoted to foreign policy in the Clinton administration. As 
National Security Adviser he was the senior official most closely tied bureaucratically to the 
President Therein lay the power and limitations of Lake’s unique office.
The National Security Adviser (NSA) has a dual function, he alternatively manages the 
foreign policy process as well as serving as a source of independent advice for the 
President.26 In his function as coordinator of the foreign policy process, the NSA 
administers National Security Council meetings by setting their agenda, briefing the President 
prior to each meeting, and controlling the preparation of material for each meeting.27 The 
NSC members are by law the President, the Vice-President, the Secretaries of State and 
Defence, the NSA, and any other officials the President desires to attend the meeting. The 
Clinton administration rarely used the formal NSC apparatus, prefering the informality of the 
Principals’ Committee, which was composed of the NSC core members. This bureaucratic 
shift in reality cost Lake little power, as he simply coordinated foreign policy informally, at 
his mid-week lunches with Secretaries Christopher and Perry. Needless to say, Lake’s role 
as overall coordinator of the administration’s foreign policy was a significant source of 
bureaucratic power.
Ironically, the agency created in 1947 to resolve bureaucratic rivalries has become another 
bureaucratic bastion. As Lord noted, "with the administration of Richard Nixon the NSC 
adviser and his staff became for the first time a powerful and independent bureaucratic 
actor.”28 The NSC staff and NSA are not only part of the executive branch, but also part of 
the President’s personal staff. As such, they are not subject to review by the Congress. Thus 
the NSA is the only one of the three major foreign policy actors serving under the President 
in the executive branch not subject to Congressional oversight. This lack of a Congressional 
check on the NSA is a major source of his/her power. "As the Tower Commission concluded
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in 1987, the NSC adviser and his staff are supposed to provide ’advice from the President's 
viewpoint unalloyed by institutional responsibilities and biases...the President is the National 
Security Adviser's only constituent'."29 This lack of bureaucratic responsibility to other 
agencies and Congress has made the NSA very powerful, and as the Iran-Contra scandal 
attests to, very controversial.
Thus the key to the NSA's power, even more than for the other executive branch foreign 
policy actors, is his/her relationship with the President. Lake's structural position in the 
government lead to another of his bureaucratic advantages, that of physical closeness to the 
President. As DeParle observed, "Lake alone sees President Clinton on a daily basis. "30 
This proximity to the President was even more bureaucratically important in the Clinton 
administration than is usually the case. As a top administration official argued, "Because the 
President is not involved in foreign policy as much as other Presidents have been, Tony is in 
a unique position. He is the only one who sees the President every day. That puts him in a 
very strong position to be the interpreter,"31 of foreign policy issues. Nor were Perry and 
Christopher likely to attack Lake’s prerogative. As DeParle argued, "Lake gains an additional 
edge from the colorless qualities of his would-be rivals, Christopher and Perry. "32
But unlike Christopher and Perry, Lake did not have an independent Cabinet power base. 
The NSA's very bureaucratic closeness to the President is also a limitation on his/her 
bureaucratic power. The growth in the power of the NSA has been a symbiotic process, 
whereby the President himself has accrued greater power through independence from the 
foreign policy bureaucracies at State and Defence. As Lord argued, "the result [of the creation 
of the NSC] has been to lessen the President's dependence on his [cabinet] advisers by 
giving him greater control of the policy process and a staff that can effectively represent the 
presidential perspective in national security matters."33 The NSA is thus even more 
dependent on the President than the other foreign policy actors in the executive branch, and 
serves as the President's specific emissary in bureaucratic battles. As Menges observed, at 
the time of its creation, the NSA was to be the President's eyes and ears, assuring that his 
directives were carried out by the foreign policy bureaucracy.34 While Lake undoubtedly had 
real bureaucratic power in the Clinton administration, in the end, "the NSC is and must 
remain essentially a surrogate for the President. "35 The President is more master than servant 
of the NSA. This lack of an independent power base was a severe bureaucratic limitation of 
Anthony Lake's power.
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Nor did Lake’s personal characteristics make it likely that he would confront foreign 
policy issues as an equal with the President, as Kissinger and Brzezinski nearly did during 
their powerful tenures as NSA. Like Perry and Christopher, Lake was a team player who 
valued consensus highly. During the Carter administration, like Christopher, Lake served as 
one of Secretary of State Vance’s top aides, as director of policy planning in the State 
Department. As Heilbrunn argued, "Still haunted by memories of the warfare between Vance 
and Brzezinski when he worked in the Carter White House, Lake has sanctified the notion of 
collegiality into a mantra. "36 This is not the description of the man who was likely to be the 
dominant force behind American foreign policy. As DeParle observed, "He [Lake] is by 
design the most obscure member of the Clinton foreign policy team. ”37 Thus like Secretaries 
Christopher and Perry, although Lake was in a strong bureaucratic position by virtue of his 
structural role within the Clinton administration, his collegial temperament did not earmark 
him as the driving force behind American foreign policy outputs.
Nor did Lake enjoy a close personal relationship with President Clinton, compared with 
either Secretary of State Christopher or Deputy Secretary of State Talbott. As a high-ranking 
administration official observed, "Tony always gives you the impression that he is not that 
sure of his relationship with Bill Clinton. I can see it in meetings; he is nervous of it. "38 
Lake, who became a top foreign policy adviser to Bill Clinton during the campaign, 
nevertheless came to the job late, and was not considered a 'true believer' in the President as 
was Secretary Christopher. While there were no reports of friction between the President and 
his NSA, neither were they close personally. Thus despite Lake's bureaucratic advantage of 
seeing the President every day, his physical proximity to the President was not matched by a 
personal closeness.
Nor did Lake exhibit real schools of thought fervour about the Bosnian crisis. As chapter 
5 illustrated, Lake is an institutionalist both generally and regarding Bosnia specifically. 
While Lake was not as committed to the administration's overall Bosnia policy as others like 
the President, he publicly despaired of the other schools of thought policy preferences. 
Regarding Bosnia, Lake stated, "while we have clear reasons to engage and persist [in 
working for a peace accord] they do not obliterate other American interests involving Europe 
and Russia, and they do not justify the extreme costs of taking unilateral responsibility for 
imposing a solution."39 This aversion to unilateral action in deference to allied considerations 
placed Lake firmly in the institutionalist camp on Bosnia. Yet Lake was not happy about the 
UN's lack of military resolution in the face of Serbian provocation. As Heilbrunn argued, 
"Lake has managed to appear more hawkish than the administration [regarding Bosnia] and
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yet completely loyal to it. "40 What Lake desired was a more muscular form of institutionalist 
policy in Bosnia. For example, he championed the threat of Nato air-strikes to deter Serb 
attacks on the safe havens of Sarajevo and Gorazde. Lake ultimately desired a revamping, but 
not a fundamentally altered, institutionalist policy in Bosnia. Lake's hesitations regarding 
Bosnia made it unlikely he was the central executive actor behind the administration's 
institutionalist policy. However his advocacy of a more hawkish brand of that policy made it 
also unlikely that he favoured a fundamental schools of thought change in overall American 
policy regarding the Bosnian conflict.
Thus although Anthony Lake had a strong structural position within the administration as 
NSA, he was not the foreign policy actor primarily formulating administration policy. In his 
desire for bureaucratic consensus, his passion for anonymity, his lack of personal closeness 
to the President, and his halfhearted support of the Clinton White House's Bosnia policy, 
Lake illustrated that he was not the driving force behind administration policy. However nor 
was Lake's influence negligible. In his bureaucratically important role as NSA, Lake was 
likely to support attempts to make the West's Bosnia policy more muscular through the 
increased use of air-strikes, while remaining committed to the administration's overall Bosnia 
policy.
Nor was Strobe Talbott the key figure moulding the executive's institutionalist policy 
preference regarding Bosnia. However, unlike Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State 
brought both a strong personality and a clearly defined ideological vision to the foreign policy 
arena. Talbott's personal bond with the President was strong, as is evidenced by the fact that 
the two men shared digs at Oxford when both were Rhodes Scholars in the late 1960s. As 
Adams stated, "he [Talbott] is one of the few people with instant access to the Oval Office - 
better than Warren Christopher, his ostensible boss."41 As access to the President and an 
official's relationship with the executive are two crucial aspects of bureaucratic political 
power within the American system, Talbott was well placed to exact influence on American 
foreign policy as a whole.
Yet there were significant bureaucratic limitations on Talbott's power. Before he was 
Deputy Secretary of State, Talbott was ambassador-at-large to the CIS states, and he was still 
thought of primarily as a Russian expert rather than as an actor crafting overall American 
foreign policy. While Talbott's personality and strong democratist convictions greatly 
affected US policies regarding aid to Russia and questions about European security, he had 
little direct impact on the administration's institutionalist Bosnia policy.42
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While Talbott bureaucratically won battles with Christopher and Aspin over the 
Partnership for Peace Plan, as it affected America's Russia policy, he had little direct power 
regarding other issue areas, such as Bosnia. Talbott's influence regarding the conflict was 
largely indirect, as he has played a major role in setting the administration's democratist 
Russia-first policy, which, as was illustrated in chapter 6, neatly coincided with the White 
House's hierarchy of priorities that partially motivated its institutionalist Bosnia stance.
Talbott’s bureaucratic power was also limited in the sense that as Deputy Secretary of 
State he was in too junior a bureaucratic position to actively drive the Clinton administration's 
overall foreign policy. Given his unique relationship with the President and his clear 
democratist orientation, Talbott probably maximised the amount of bureaucratic power that 
can be retained by someone not of cabinet-level status. However, as for Talbott being the 
driving force behind overall American foreign policy, he was simply too junior an official to 
be considered for the role. For the part of chief instigator of the administration's 
institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia, one must look to Bill Clinton himself.
But was this not the President that was supposed to concentrate on domestic affairs? Just 
because it is true that Bill Clinton spent little time on foreign affairs does not mean he did not 
dominate American foreign policy-making. The standard perception of a President inattentive 
to international affairs is largely correct As Hoagland noted, in the first ten full months of his 
presidency, "The president has chaired just eight full NSC meetings...or about one a 
month. "43 An even more significant bureaucratic indication of the President's lack of 
concern about foreign affairs is the fact that, as Sciolino noted, "Even the ever-cautious 
Christopher summoned the courage to tell Clinton point-blank that he has to become more 
engaged in foreign policy by spending at least an hour a week with his national security 
advisers. "44 Apart from an intensive involvement in the promotion of free trade, as was 
evidenced by his leadership regarding the Nafta treaty, the President did not devote much 
energy or attention to foreign affairs.
This lack of focus on foreign affairs mirrored candidate Clinton's pledge to spend the 
bulk of his time as president on domestic reform, as opposed to the conduct of President 
Bush. As Barone and Ujifusa stated, "No president has entered office with more ideas and 
proposals about domestic public policy. "45 This is reflected in a White House pamphlet 
issued to celebrate the achievements of the administration's first 100 days. Of 27 
accomplishments listed, only 1 related directly to foreign affairs.46 Yet this domestic-first
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approach of the Clinton presidency strongly influenced the administration's overall 
institutionalist Bosnia policy. As Engelberg and Gordon noted, "With President Clinton 
elected on a platform of domestic change, clearly he wasn’t going to entertain the option of 
'going in [to Bosnia] in a major way' an official reasoned. "47 Thus the President's domestic 
priorities directly affected his administration's institutionalist Bosnia policy, which advocated 
the least amount of American involvement in the conflict of the three major schools of 
thought. This is a strong indication that despite the President's lack of attention to foreign 
affairs, he personally was still firmly in charge of the executive branch’s foreign policy 
outputs.
From both a personal and a bureaucratic standpoint, Bill Clinton emerged as the dominant 
actor in the executive branch regarding foreign policy formulation. The President’s 
personality was reflected in the overall style of foreign policy-making in the White House, 
with both its emphasis on collegiality and in the difficulties Clinton had in genuinely 
delegating responsibilities. This latter point is illustrated by the fact that the men the President 
picked to help make foreign policy around him, such as Secretary of State Christopher, were 
self-effacing and easily bureaucratically dominated by the gregarious President. As Gelb 
noted, "None of this trio [Christopher, Aspin, Lake] seeks the limelight. All will fit 
comfortably with the Clinton plan to make policy in the White House. "48 Sullivan 
concurred, shrewdly seeing that in the choice of picking such an unprepossessing Secretary 
of State, the President himself wished to control foreign policy. Sullivan observed, "His 
appointment of the empty suit, Warren Christopher, as his secretary of state was a sign that 
he [Clinton] was not prepared to delegate foreign policy to anyone who could rival his power 
or intelligence. "49
In fact it was the fatal combination of President Clinton's lack of attention to foreign 
affairs coupled with his dominance of the foreign policy-making process, that many critics 
pointed to as the major reason for the administration's oft-criticised foreign policy outputs. 
As Flora Lewis noted, "Christopher is a decent intelligent man, but he lacks drive and a sense 
of how to make the world's gears work. He could be a good Secretary of State for a 
president who wanted to be a foreign policy activist and needed only a loyal executive officer 
to carry out instructions. But President Clinton pledged to give priority to domestic affairs. 
He resents having to spend too much time on complex foreign issues. "50 For critics of the 
President, it was bureaucratically the worst of all possible worlds. Bill Clinton proved 
personally unable to turn foreign policy-making over to a strong Secretary of State, so he 
could concentrate on the domestic reform programme that led to his election. Instead, he still
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dominated the policy outputs for international affairs, without giving them the time they so 
obviously warranted.
The very bureaucratic foreign policy formulation process of the administration itself 
reflected the dominance of the President in conducting international affairs. Friedman and 
Sciolino assessed the bureaucratic nature of how the executive branch obtained its foreign 
policy outputs. According to them, there were several levels of foreign policy bureaucracy 
working within the administration. At the lowest level were the Interagency groupings for 
different issue areas, such as Russia, Iraq, and Haiti. Meetings at this level were conducted 
by Assistant Secretaries of State, Defence, and Treasury, who prepared policy option papers 
for the Deputies' Committee. The Deputies’ meeting, attended by the Deputy Secretaries of 
State (Talbott), Defence, and Treasury sent their policy recommendations to The Principals 
Committee, which was comprised of the Secretaries of State and Defence (Christopher and 
Perry), the Permanent Representative to the UN (Albright), the National Security Adviser 
(Lake), the Director of Central Intelligence (formerly Woolsey), and usually the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Shalikashvili), who made recommendations which were sent to 
President Clinton.51
This process was designed to produce consensus, with each committee sorting out its 
bureaucratic differences before passing a unified position on to the next level of policy­
making. This was precisely what the President had in mind. As Gelb stated, "he [President 
Clinton] almost always urges them [top aides] to think broadly and act cautiously within a 
consensus. "52 One of the President's powers is the ability to arrange the bureaucratic foreign 
policy decision-making process to suit his personal idiosyncrasies. As such, the exact 
decision-making procedures regarding foreign policy vary President to President. As Rubin 
argued, "Each succeeding administration expanded the number of challengers to State's 
primacy [in foreign policy decision-making]. Ike elevated the CIA; Kennedy, his White 
House staff; Johnson, the Defense Department; Nixon, the National Security Advisor. "53 
The President has the power to not only determine the number of players in the foreign policy 
game, but also to construct the foreign policy decision-making process itself. Clinton's 
bureaucratic process ruled out the administration adopting bold or risky foreign policy 
initiatives, for instance advocating the democratist stance on Bosnia, as risky positions by 
definition will almost never lead to consensus within the cautious world of bureaucracies, 
predicated by its belief in standard operating procedures, which makes for conventional 
policy-making.
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The Washington Post noted the Clinton administration’s bureaucratic policy-making 
process made consensus too high a priority. It observed for example that, "it is quite another 
[thing] to let the drive for consensus and universal support take precedence over the need 
finally to choose a course that will of necessity create enemies."54 Thus, the bureaucratic 
policy-making process of the administration mirrored its external institutionalist proclivity to 
attempt to attain consensus at almost any price.
This desire for consensus reflected the personality of the President himself, and is 
another indication that he was the primary actor determining the executive branch’s 
institutionalist Bosnia policy. The President was consistently accused by his critics of not 
standing for anything, of valuing consensus over both fixed principles and even good policy. 
It was charged, the President was, "so open to suggestion as to be practically an empath,"55 
like the Woody Allen character Zelig, who assumed the opinions and mannerisms of all those 
he met.
This criticism was largely unfounded. The President, as has been illustrated, brought a 
strong institutionalist orientation to crafting foreign policy. Yet it is true that he valued 
consensus far more than ‘conviction politicians’ like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. 
That his bureaucratic foreign policy decision-making process reflected traits in Bill Clinton's 
personal character is a strong sign that he was central to foreign policy formulation within the 
executive branch.
Like President Carter before him, Bill Clinton was accused of being unable to delegate 
responsibility, even regarding an area such as foreign policy where he had a secondary 
interest. As Greenstein stated, "Another of Clinton's traits is a predilection to take on large 
numbers of personal responsibilities, so much so that it is difficult for his administration to 
move on more than on track at a time. "56
This propensity can be seen in the administration's overall bureaucratic method of 
obtaining foreign policy outputs. In the Clinton administration's decision-making structure, 
the ultimate decisions about policy were made only at the highest level by President Clinton 
himself, who thus assumed the role of key bureaucratic actor in the decision-making 
structure, instead of one of the cabinet officials, as has sometimes occurred in American 
history.57 Yet as former President Nixon remarked, "No secretary of state is really 
important. The president makes foreign policy. "58 •
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Nixon was correct about the vast power of the presidency making it possible for the 
executive to dominate foreign policy-making in the executive branch, and indeed overall as 
well. Certainly regarding the executive branch, this was the case with President Clinton. 
Indeed as was noted in chapter 5, it is no mistake that the President’s specific policy 
preferences regarding Bosnia, Russia, and Europe perfectly reflected administration policy 
and overall American foreign policy as well. This result merely confirmed that President 
Clinton himself played the major bureaucratic role in concocting the administration’s overall 
institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia.
ii) The schools of thought stance of the legislative branch regarding Bosnia during the
103rd Congress
Next, it is important to determine the overall schools of thought orientation of the 103rd 
Congress, by identifying the crucial actors responsible for the formulation of Congress’ 
schools of thought policy preferences. While the analysis here does not include every major 
foreign policy actor in the House and Senate, enough are discussed so that an overall 
Congressional schools of thought orientation can be discerned.
a) The House of Representatives
i) Newt Gingrich
Newt Gingrich, the House Minority Whip during the 103rd Congress, brought solid neo­
realist credentials to discussions about the Bosnia crisis. No one could doubt Gingrich’s 
general ideological fervour, or his personal presence in key bureaucratic battles during the
early days of the Clinton administration. As Barone and Ujifusa observed, Gingrich,
"has come out something like an American Gaullist: a nationalist who 
believes in American exceptionalism and a strong military, a cultural 
conservative who believes that liberal values are destroying the lives of the 
poor, a market capitalist who celebrates technological innovation and 
considers high-tech and traditional values happy companions. All these 
beliefs run counter to the beliefs of the baby boom liberals who have 
dominated the thinking of the House for most of the last 20 years and now 
of the Clinton administration and against them Gingrich has been an 
insistent, impolite and persistent battering ram. "59
As Politics in America noted, rhetorically Gingrich, "has made a career as a scourge on 
Democrats."60 However, the Minority Whip’s partisanship extended far beyond rhetorical 
broadsides against the Democrats. His style was increasingly replicated among the House
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Republican membership to the point that even before the 1994 midterm elections, Gingrich 
supporters dominated the Republican leadership in the House.
Yet Gingrich was not a major player in setting the Congressional overall schools of 
thought orientation during the first two years of the Clinton administration. This is due to 
several factors. Firstly, the then minority whip was just not that involved in the foreign 
affairs debate, concentrating instead on the domestic shortcomings of the Clinton 
administration, such as its failure to produce a politically viable health care plan. It was only 
towards the end of the 103rd that Gingrich became more involved in foreign policy debates, 
such as his role in the passage of the two free trade expansion pacts.
Secondly, Gingrich was in the minority party in the House, which unlike the more 
deliberative Senate, does not allow filibusters that make accommodation between the parties 
essential to passing almost all pieces of legislation. As the Democrats held a considerable 
majority in the House (256-178 with one independent member) during the 103rd Congress, 
they could easily ignore the Minority Whip’s neo-realist disagreement with the administration 
and House Democratic leadership over Bosnia.
Thirdly, and most importantly, as Barone and Ujifusa observed, "The House, in foreign 
affairs, which Hamilton [Lee Hamilton, then Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee] 
came to see as something like Columbus, Indiana [his hometown] in commerce: graced with 
fine architecture, but off the beaten track; with its share of strong intellects, but largely 
ignored in favor of the more glamorous (and treaty-ratifying and appointment-confirming) 
Senate. "61 Simply put, the House has far less institutional power regarding foreign affairs 
than the Senate, and that this bureaucratic restriction is bound to inhibit the practical effect all 
its members, including Gingrich, have on determining the overall legislative schools of 
thought preference.
This limiting of the House’s role in the arena of foreign policy formulation, had been .the 
intent of the founders, who gave to the Senate the power to ratify treaties and approve 
executive foreign policy appointments, and enshrined this right in the Constitution. They did 
so because the founding fathers felt the House, whose members are elected every two years, 
was too susceptible to public opinion to be involved as a major participant in foreign policy­
making, which required long-term thinking about policy initiatives. Thus, despite his 
undoubted ideological commitment to neo-realism and his institutional savvy, during the 
103rd Congress Gingrich was little more than a leader of a minority party in an elective
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chamber that had little bureaucratic relevance for foreign policy decision-making compared 
with the bureaucratic might of the executive branch. Still, Gingrich's relevance regarding the 
schools of thought orientation of the Congress grew, as he became the new Speaker of the 
House, and thus the single most important representative in the lower chamber.
ii) Lee Hamilton
Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee as well as head of the 
European and Middle Eastern subcommittee during the 103rd Congress, had far more impact 
on foreign policy-making than his legislative colleague Newt Gingrich. While impeded by the 
same bureaucratic constraints regarding a representative's relevance for foreign policy 
initiatives as the Minority Whip, Hamilton was a genuine influence on foreign policy-making 
in the new era. However, his power was based more on his close contacts with the Clinton 
administration than on playing a major role in determining the overall legislative schools of 
thought orientation. As was illustrated in chapter 5, Hamilton's institutionalist views almost 
perfectly matched those of the Clinton administration, and he was a key supporter of the 
President in the 103rd Congress. A major reason for Hamilton's power regarding foreign 
affairs was this shared schools of thought orientation with the President, which enabled him 
to amass far more relevance than a Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
normally would be able to attain. This bureaucratic clout is illustrated by the Chairman's 
close links with his fellow Democratic institutionalist, Warren Christopher, who frequently 
sought his opinion on the key foreign policy issues of the day.62 While, as has been 
observed, Christopher's bureaucratic power was more limited than the average Secretary of 
State, Hamilton made the most of the connection. Thus, Hamilton parlayed a shared 
institutionalist affinity with the Clinton administration into an important, if informal, 
consultative role with the White House regarding foreign policy-making.
Hamilton's personality also augmented his power base within the House to an extent. 
Unlike Gingrich, the Chairman had assumed a non-partisan manner, which had won him 
respect in both parties, though like his friend Secretary Christopher, he was sometimes 
criticised as being too inoffensive and neutral to successfully push his own institutionalist 
foreign policy agenda. As Politics in America observed, ''the calm and measured Hamilton 
tends to be overshadowed by more activist members [of the Foreign Affairs Committee]."63 
Thus Hamilton’s personality tended to cut both ways regarding his accretion of power 
involving foreign policy-making. His caution was criticised as a factor impeding the forceful 
advancement of Ids institutionalist views. Also the bureaucratic strictures on House members
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regarding involvement in foreign policy-making cannot be overestimated. Beyond an ability, 
with the Senate, to limit funding for foreign policy initiatives, even influential members of the 
House such as Hamilton have little direct influence on overall American foreign policy­
making. Hamilton’s power regarding foreign policy initiatives in the 103rd Congress lay in 
his informal influence with his like-minded institutionalist colleagues in the Clinton 
administration. Hamilton found himself no longer Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee in the 104th Congress. Still, given the informal basis of Hamilton’s power, he 
remained somewhat influential within White House circles, even if his already limited role in 
setting the legislative schools of thought orientation has been further diminished.
b) The Senate
Before individual Senators are assessed regarding their role in forming the legislative 
schools of thought orientation of the 103rd Congress, some general bureaucratic comments 
about the nature of the Senate’s specific decision-making process would be helpful, beyond 
again noting that the Senate has far more of a role in foreign policy-making than the 
House.64 Firstly, the Senate was politically divided throughout the 103rd Congress, in a 
way in which the bureaucratically more compact executive branch can institutionally never 
be. This difference has an institutional basis, as there are simply more players involved in 
creating the Senate’s overall schools of thought orientation than will ever exist in the more 
exclusive executive branch. This political division was not just between Republicans and 
Democrats. The 103rd Congress, though, "Nominally Democratic, (it) does not have a 
working Democratic majority on most issues, and the Democrats with only 56 votes fell well 
short of the 60 needed to shut off a filibuster. "65 Thus, without compromising with 
Republicans, Democrats were unable to advance any foreign policy initiatives, as the 
Republicans could obstruct any critical vote by talking the issue to death without fear of 
having their filibuster overridden. This system made compromise much more essential than 
in the House. This trend toward moderation was bolstered by the ideological makeup of the 
upper chamber, as the Senate was generally less partisan and more moderate than the lower 
chamber. About 25 of the Democrats in the Senate were liberals, with around 25 Republicans 
affirmed a solidly conservative agenda. That left half the votes, and the bulk of the political 
power, with the moderates of both parties. 66 This moderate tilt of the Senate made radical 
foreign policy initiatives, such as the democratist prescription for Bosnia, unlikely to emerge 
as the foreign policy choice of the chamber.
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i) George Mitchell
As was discussed in chapter 5, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell adopted on 
overall democratist schools of thought orientation, though regarding the Bosnian crisis his 
institutionalist minority views were exhibited. Barone and Ujifusa noted this ideological 
schism in Mitchell, stating, "there is a tension between Mitchell's down-the-line liberalism 
and President Clinton’s 'new kind of democrat’."67 Thus, it is not surprising that Mitchell’s 
ideological stresses were reflected in his schools of thought orientation regarding American 
foreign pohcy in the new era. Mitchell adopted the democratist majority line in the post-89 
era, while retaining elements of the more mainline Democratic institutionaEst position on 
issues such as Bosnia and trade expansion. This ideological contradiction, while possibly 
limiting the former Majority Leader’s clout regarding the Congressional response to the 
President's free trade initiatives, was not a drawback regarding Bosnia. Mitchell was a key 
player in deflecting Senator Dole's neo-reaEst initiatives regarding Bosnia, and thus helping 
to ensure the continued primacy of the administration’s institutionaEst policy initiatives.
Along with conflicting ideological impulses regarding foreign poEcy, Mitchell’s
bureaucratic power was further hindered by his low-key style. Like Lee Hamilton in the
House, MitcheU won a reputation as an even-handed figure as he, "acted Eke the federal
judge that he used to be. "68 However unlike Hamilton, Mitchell's more left-leaning ideology
was viewed with trepidation, even within a Democratic party split between old-style liberals
and newer, more conservative 'New Democrats’, mainly from the south and west. These
new Democrats had reservations about MitcheU's old-fashioned New England liberaEsm (he
lives in Maine), and his non-aggressive style was thought to be a EabEity, especiaEy in
contrast to Minority Leader Dole's assured and combative manner.69 That Mitchell was able
to overcome these ideological and personal drawbacks and emerge as a key figure in
determining the overall Congressional schools of thought policy preferences regarding the
Bosnia crisis is an indication of both the bureaucratic power the Majority Leader wields in the
Senate, and how this power is expanded in foreign affairs debates when his/her schools of j
thought orientation coincides with that of the executive branch.
• ?
4
Mitchell became Senate Majority Leader in 1988, and soon used this top position to make j 
himself a major participant on almost every issue that the Senate dealt with.70 This was
particularly true as the Majority Leader traditionaEy directs legislative strategy regarding key j
$
biUs. After the election of President CEnton, Mitchell's position became if anything more i 
important, as he was expected to generaUy steer most legislation (they did disagree strongly ,j
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about China’s MFN status) favourable to the President through the treacherous waters of the 
Senate. As the President and Mitchell shared an institutionalist policy preference regarding 
Bosnia, it became Mitchell's task to thwart any Congressional attempt to unify around 
policies inimical to President Clinton's institutionalist policy predilection, such as the Dole- 
Lieberman amendment which would have lifted the arms embargo against the Bosnian 
Muslims and effectively scuttled both the President's supremacy in crafting Bosnia policy 
and ended the period when American policy reflected an institutionalist thrust regarding 
Bosnia as well. While it was not in the realm of political possibility for Mitchell to ignore the 
strong neo-realist revolt in the Senate against the President's handling of the Bosnian crisis, 
as shall be illustrated later in this chapter, he was able (just) to preserve the President's policy 
by keeping most Democrats (who were, after all, mainly institutionalists) in the fold and 
persuading Democratic neo-realists, such as Senator Biden, to initially vote with the White 
House. Mitchell’s crucial institutionalist input into the overall Congressional schools of 
thought orientation was not significant enough to insure that the President's Bosnia policy 
met with broad consensus in Congress. Rather, it helped keep Congressional opinion 
divided, and in so doing, ensured the ultimate supremacy of the Clinton administration's 
institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia during the 103rd Congress. The Majority Leader 
shocked many by retiring after the 103rd Congress.
ii) Joe Biden
Senator Joe Biden was one of the few key decision-makers in the Senate espousing the 
democratist policy preference regarding Bosnia. Even those such as George Mitchell and 
Strobe Talbott, who held overall democratist viewpoints, disagreed with Biden's fervent 
commitment to reverse the military successes of the Serbs. Thus, while Biden's strong 
ideological belief was evident, unusually, this may actually have been a hindrance to his 
successful pursuit of his democratist goals regarding Bosnia, as he was so patently politically 
out of step with both the Congress and the American people in general.
Harries pointed out an example of the political impotence of the democratist cause, 
noting, "In June of this year [1993], the House voted to kill the National Endowment for 
Democracy, the agency created during the Reagan years to promote democracy abroad,"71 
and a key bureaucratic institution which democratists had hoped would increase its role of 
fostering democracy in the new world order. That the democratists were unable to prevent its 
abolition is a clear indication of their relatively weak political presence. Biden's democratist
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predilection regarding Bosnia was definitely a minority viewpoint. If his views were to be 
relevant during the Bosnian debate, he would be forced to compromise.
Senator Biden's personal character helped advance his democratist viewpoint regarding 
Bosnia. As Cramer noted, observers, "praised his [Biden's] ’oratory' but wondered whether 
there was any thought behind the waves of stirring words. "72 Politics in America concurred, 
observing that Biden’s charisma did not quite eclipse his reputation as somewhat of a political 
lightweight. It stated, "(Biden has] the talent and charisma to be an influential Democrat for 
decades to come. He is personable, conciliatory, and an impressive orator. Yet a question 
remains: Does he radiate more heat than light?"73
While Biden’s prodigious gifts were partially offset by questions about his intellectual 
seriousness, in the case of the Bosnia debate his skills were successfully exploited. Biden's 
character did not make him much of either a legislative strategist or a drafter of laws. "With 
his glib tongue and preference for action, his strength is at the podium, not the bill-drafting 
table."74
During the time of his rhetorical alliance with the neo-realists in the 103rd Congress, 
Biden’s strengths were catered for. While neo-realists such as Senators Dole and Lugar 
plotted legislative strategy and drafted the Dole-Lieberman amendment, Biden was utilised as 
a spokesman in the Senate for the anti-Clinton position on Bosnia, where his rhetorical skills 
were exhibited. For example, Biden's report on his fact-finding mission to the Balkans, "To 
Stand Against Aggression," was a brilliant diatribe against the President's Bosnia policy.75 
Senator Biden published his report to Claiborne Pell, thus ensuring it maximum publicity. 
Biden's communication skills were cleverly exploited to the benefit of the anti-Clinton 
coalition in Congress regarding the American response to the Bosnian crisis.
Biden used his bureaucratic position as Chairman of the European Affairs Subcommittee 
as a personal pulpit to attack the administration's Bosnia policy, often lecturing Secretary 
Christopher about American inaction over Bosnia in the full glare of television cameras. With 
the Democrats defeated in 1994, Biden no longer held his pivotal post Yet with his 
reputation for eloquence and being 'good copy' for the media, Senator Biden's personal 
talents continued to make him a powerful foe of the administration's institutionalist Bosnia 
policy.
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iii) Richard Lugar
Senator Lugar, the ranking Republican on the European Affairs Subcommittee during the 
103rd Congress, is a perplexing figure for the schools of thought paradigm. While as chapter 
5 attests, he is a solid neo-realist on a wide range of foreign policy issues including 
Bosnia,76 as time has progressed Lugar increasingly questioned the wisdom of the thrust of 
the Dole-Lieberman amendment, seeing in it a diminution of presidential authority that would 
hurt the US both now and in the future. So while Lugar generally agreed with his neo-realist 
colleague Senator Dole about the short-comings of the administration's Bosnia policy, he 
came to question the neo-realist legislative strategy he formerly supported in the 103rd 
Congress,^ valuing broad historical precedents that stod to be lost regarding presidential 
primacy in foreign policy-making if a version of the Dole-Lieberman amendment were to be 
enacted, over concerns about the specific merits of the Bosnian case.
As a result of his personal abilities, Lugar managed to retain a large amount of power 
over Congressional foreign affairs decision-making despite some bureaucratic setbacks. 
Lugar, who was Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee from 1985-86, lost control of 
the chairmanship due to both Republican defeat in the Senate in 1986 as well as the 
machinations of Jesse Helms, noted Republican anti-communist firebrand, who used his 
seniority over Lugar to become the ranking Republican on the committee. Nevertheless, 
Lugar maintained his high profile regarding foreign affairs, "in the 1990's, after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and as Helms became less active and fired much of his activist staff, 
Lugar again became influential. "77 Lugar was able to remain more prominent than Helms on 
the Foreign Relations Committee due to both Helms' increasing lack of vitality after major 
heart surgery and the lack of relevancy of his one-note anti-communist philosophy, which 
after the failed August Coup became increasingly outdated. Lugar’s reputation as an articulate 
conservative capable of genuine bipartisanship made him, "his party's de facto leader on the 
broad fronts of agricultural policy and foreign affairs. "78 His success in remaining a Senate 
leader regarding foreign policy was a testament to his perceived personal skills, rather than to 
Lugar holding a leading bureaucratic position, as he once had.
Still Lugar, as the ranking Republican on the European Affairs Subcommittee in the 
103rd Congress, was both personally and bureaucratically well-placed to play a key role in 
determining Congress' overall schools of thought orientation regarding Bosnia. A solid neo­
realist, he closely collaborated with Senator Dole in supporting the Dole-Lieberman 
amendment which so nearly scuttled the administration's institutionalist foreign policy thrust
regarding Bosnia. So it came as a shock that, in the 104th Congress, Senator Lugar appeared 
to be backing away from advocating Congressional action to lift the embargo on the Bosnian 
Muslims. As The Economist noted, "Lugar criticised Dole’s Bosnia and peace-powers 
initiatives because they would 'tie-up the president's ability to take action'."79
This change in position was not without practical cause. In April 1995 Lugar formally 
announced his bid for the presidency. While at the time many felt he had little chance to win, 
a large number of observers believed Lugar could well end up as Secretary of State in a new 
Republican administration. 80 Lugar’s change of position was also in line with the standard 
neo-realist Republican view that Congress should let the President take the lead in 
formulating American foreign policy. 81 While this volte-face may be largely strategic, a case 
of not wanting to hand-cuff the possible Republican President in 1996, and while Lugar did 
not clearly state that he would vote against his neo-realist ally Senator Dole over a new 
initiative to lift the embargo, clearly Lugar moved from being a strong supporter of the 
former neo-realist strategy in the Senate to an undecided position over whether such a plan 
should be attempted again in the 104th Congress. While Lugar’s neo-realist schools of 
thought orientation remained constant, his loyalty to Dole’s neo-realist legislative strategy did 
not.
iv) Bob Dole
Senator Dole became the focus of neo-realist efforts in Congress to reverse the Clinton 
administration's institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia. As the statements in chapter 5 
indicate, there was no doubting Dole’s neo-realist ideological fervour about the Bosnian 
crisis. He consistently and actively sponsored efforts to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian 
government, as was illustrated by his authorship of the Dole-Lieberman amendment as well 
as his primary role in plotting legislative strategy for the anti-Clinton Bosnia cause in the 
Senate. Beyond his clear ideological commitment to changing America's overall Bosnia 
policy, Senator Dole brought considerable personal skills as well as an unparalleled 
bureaucratic position to the Bosnia debate, making him a central leader in determining the 
overall Congressional schools of thought orientation regarding the Bosnian crisis.
Dole's personal characteristics, which to some extent have hindered his presidential 
campaigns, have paradoxically enhanced his Senate career. Senator Dole's take-no-prisoners 
rhetoric has become legendary. As Barone and Ujifusa observed, "The aggressiveness, the 
mixture of conciliatory language with clear threats of political hardball, the crisp tongue and
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sharp humor, are all vintage Dole. "82 The reason for Dole's 'meanness' or 'strength' 
(depending on one's viewpoint) can be traced to the battlefields of Italy in World War II, 
where Dole suffered grievous wounds which still cause him pain today.83 The negative 
aspects of Dole's personality have plagued him nationally since the 1976 Presidential 
campaign when Dole, as President Ford’s running mate, harshly attacked the Carter ticket to 
the detriment of his own cause. As Cramer stated, "Everybody knew Dole was...a hatchet 
man, "84 a tag that has stuck with Dole to this day. However in the Senate, Dole's rhetoric 
has been seen as a component of a man who has the courage of his convictions, a man who 
engenders as much respect in the chamber as fear. It also provided Dole with ample political 
cover to be the bipartisan pragmatist that he is. As Politics in America stated, "Dole is a true 
conservative and a man skilled at bare-knuckles politics. But foremost he is a legislative 
pragmatist, a deal maker."85 Dole's no-holds-barred rhetoric is just another example of his 
personal strength, a quality much admired in the Senate, that has made Dole perhaps its most 
influential member.
Likewise, Senator Dole's bureaucratic position has helped him assume a leading role in 
developing Congress' schools of thought orientation regarding Bosnia. Dole has been the 
Republican leader in the Senate since 1984, and has made his position as chief Republican in 
the Senate unassailable. It was as Minority Leader during the 103rd Congress that Dole 
utilised his considerable gifts, becoming one of the most important and effective Minority 
Leaders in Senate history. Senator Dole managed to keep his minority 44 Republicans 
together on issues such as the President's stimulus plan, where his filibuster strategy 
effectively killed this major Clinton initiative. Dole also easily scuttled President Clinton's 
Health Care plan, which had been the centrepiece of his legislative programme. Even when 
the President was successful, as over Nafta, Dole provided the majority of the Senate's votes 
for the President, and thus justifiably claimed a large share of the credit for what should have 
been viewed unambiguously as a victory for Clinton. Dole, as the successful and undisputed 
chief Senate Republican legislative strategist of the past ten years, was indeed central to the 
development of Congress' schools of thought predilections regarding the Bosnian crisis.
iii) The Interaction of the Executive and Legislative Schools of Thought Stances During the
103rd Congress
As section (ii) of this chapter has illustrated, unlike the White House, the legislative 
branch had collectively a conflicting schools of thought orientation. While powerful Senate 
leaders in foreign affairs, such as Dole and Lugar, advocated a neo-realist position, equally
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important Senators, such as George Mitchell, advanced the President’s institutionalist stance. 
The Senate was not united around a single school of thought (as was the executive 
branch).86 As Dewar stated, "the House and Senate are more tom and splintered over 
Bosnian intervention than they were over any other recent US military initiative. "87 It is this 
division in the schools of thought orientation of the various Senate leaders that partly explains 
the administration’s success in maintaining its institutionalist policy over Bosnia during the 
time of the 103rd Congress.
There are, of course, other factors which explain the White House’s success in 
maintaining its institutionalist Bosnia policy. Public opinion, as Citrin et al note, is a 
peripheral concern to legislators when considering foreign policy stances.88 Nevertheless, as 
Lake noted, "foreign policy does not need to be driven by politics to be influenced by it. 
Policy decisions can also be constrained by the anticipated political reaction. "89 Certainly this 
was the case regarding the democratist position toward the Bosnian crisis, which had 
engendered almost no support among the American people. More significantly, public 
opinion tended to favour the administration's minimalist institutionalist policy preference for 
Bosnia. "In polls last week [May 1993], CBS News found that half the public opposed US 
air strikes, with 38% in favor. A Gallup Poll found 55% in opposition and 36% approving. 
But ABC found 65% supporting air strikes if they were conducted jointly with European 
allies. "90 Certainly in the crucial month of May 1993, public opinion seemed to have 
generally supported an institutionalist position regarding Bosnia. While public opinion did 
not play a major role in determining the schools of thought output of American foreign policy 
regarding Bosnia, what residual effect it did have went the administration’s way.
Even with the end of the Cold War era, it is certainly true that the executive branch has 
much more of a role to play in determining foreign policy outputs than does the legislative 
branch. Historically, “except for treaties, tariffs and an occasional declaration of war, foreign 
affairs were generally understood to be the prerogative of the Executive. ”91 This historical 
expectation that the President is and ought to be the primary actor determining foreign policy 
outputs has had a subtle but telling influence on executive-legislative relations regarding 
international affairs, making Congress hesitant to collectively override the presidential will on 
foreign policy-making, whether they have agreed with him or not. President Clinton used 
this point to his advantage in the Bosnian crisis, as hesitant legislators, backed the Nunn- 
Mitchell amendment despite reservations about the President’s institutionalist Bosnia policy, 
citing the historical precedent of presidential authority in determining overall American 
foreign policy initiatives.
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In light of the presidency's obvious institutional advantages, what is striking about the 
schools of thought controversy regarding America’s Bosnia policy in the 103rd Congress 
was how close the anti-Clinton Congressional forces came to success. Almost all the 
bureaucratic advantages the President generally enjoys over Congress regarding foreign 
policy-making cut President Clinton’s way over Bosnia. The President did dominate the 
executive branch’s schools of thought posture toward Bosnia. This is evidenced by the fact 
that none of Clinton's advisers (certainly not Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary 
Talbott, Secretary Perry, or National Security Adviser Lake as profiled in this work) publicly 
advocated either a democratist or a neo-realist position over Bosnia. The same, of course, 
could not be said for Congress, where Majority Leader Mitchell used his considerable 
powers to oppose Senators Dole and Lugar, who attempted to overturn the arms embargo 
placed on the Bosnian Muslims. In the less relevant House, the schools of thought debate 
raged as well, with institutionalists such as Lee Hamilton opposing any attempt to divert from 
the President's policy. Yet despite all these advantages, the President was forced to 
compromise. His supporters in the Senate on Bosnia, such as Mitchell and Sam Nunn, the 
powerful Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, in a desperate attempt to defeat the 
Dole-Lieberman amendment to the Defence budget, introduced the Nunn-Mitchell bill, which 
generally supported the President's institutionalist policy preference regarding Bosnia, but at 
some cost.
"The bill stated the president would have until October 15 [1994] to seek 
multilateral support for lifting the arms embargo. Failing that and failing a 
peace agreement, all funds supporting the involvement of US forces in the 
embargo would end on November 15 [1994]. A last-minute letter from 
Clinton agreeing to push for a multilateral end to the embargo helped 
Nunn head off a more strongly worded House version. "92
In defence of his amendment, Nunn had stated, "I think the time has been - really, is 
overdue, in terms of lifting the embargo. But I believe it matters how we do it I do believe it 
matters that we coordinate what we do with the British and the French."93 This desperate 
institutionalist rationale to peel off natural Dole supporters succeeded but only because, as the 
quotation illustrates, Nunn conceded the central point that the embargo ought to be lifted, and 
soon. Clearly a majority of Senators were for some strategy that eventually would lead to a 
lifting of the embargo in July 1994. In the end, waverers decided to give the President more 
time to rally the European allies around a plan to end the embargo on the Bosnian 
government.
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Thus, while the embargo would not be unilaterally broken as the neo-realists called for, 
Nunn-Mitchell, with its conditions for active US involvement in the enforcement of the 
embargo, was not a ringing endorsement of the President’s institutionalist position either. 
The Nunn-Mitchell compromise passed only after Vice-President Gore killed Dole-Lieberman 
by breaking the tie in the Senate vote of July 1, 1994. How had the neo-realists managed to 
come so close to overturning the President's institutionalist policy?
That Senator Dole and his allies almost managed to severely embarrass the President 
(doubtless he would have vetoed the defence budget if Dole-Lieberman had passed, and 
Congress would have been unable to override the veto) gives an indication of the perceived 
degree of failure of the administration's institutionalist Bosnia policy. As Miller stated, 
"Congress is most deeply involved in foreign policy when it senses a vacuum or internal 
divisions within the executive branch. "94 While the President maintained a consistent 
institutionalist line in the executive branch regarding Bosnia, critics and even some 
supporters of his policy believed it to be flawed, as it had failed to bring the benefits 
institutionalists had insisted such an initiative would accrue if their policy preference was 
pursued. For example, despite the institutionalist priority for preserving Western unity 
whatever the Bosnia policy, Western European leaders, particularly in Britain and France, 
hearing President Clinton deride their policy preferences regarding Bosnia as he went along 
with them, reacted coolly to the American position. Likewise while President Clinton's 
institutionalist Bosnia policy did not seriously damage Yeltsin's position, as the Chechnya 
conflict illustrated, neither did it prevent him from appeasing some of his nationalist foes at 
the expense of relations with democrats such as Yavlinsky and Gaidar.
These diplomatic failures of the American institutionalist line, coupled with the fact that 
the war in Bosnia continued, despite a general appeasement of the Serbs, called into question 
the validity of the policy itself. While Americans were no more prepared to go to war on 
behalf of the Bosnian government in November 1994 than they had been in May 1993, with 
the failure of Clinton to seriously try, as he had promised to under Nunn-Mitchell, to unite 
the allies behind a plan to lift the embargo, the neo-realist option was adopted increasingly 
throughout the Republican party. The neo-realists around Senator Dole had used the concrete 
diplomatic shortcomings of the President's institutionalist policy to their political advantage in 
July 1994, when they nearly succeeded in forcing the President to veto the Dole-Lieberman 
amendment. After the stunning Republican triumph in the mid-term elections, and the 
corresponding growth in strength for the neo-realist school of thought at the expense of the 
institutionalist position, it was an open question as to whether President Clinton could
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successfully use his veto to override the renewed neo-reahst onslaught on his Bosnia policy 
in the 104th Congress.
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Chapter 8: A Reassessment of Schools of Thought Analysis
It is now necessary to conclude by reassessing schools of thought analysis, both within 
the context of the Bosnian crisis and in general.
A) Schools of Thought Analysis and the Climax of the Bosnian Crisis
One of the problems with any study of International Relations is that it is finite, that its 
’shelf-life’ is limited. This truism is particularly apt about a discipline that revolves around 
analysis of current events, as the factor of time makes many studies of foreign relations 
merely an .analysis of a ’snapshot’, while the world quickly moves on. A truly useful 
International Relations essay, like fine literature, art, or cinema, must be able to stand the test 
of time. So how has this schools of thought analysis of the Bosnian crisis stood the test of 
the tumultuous events that have occurred in Bosnia since November 1994?
The same fusion of bureaucratic politics and schools of thought analysis as was 
employed in chapter 7 regarding the American response to the Bosnian crisis in the time of 
the 103rd Congress, can now be applied to the question of American Bosnia policy during 
the 104th Congress. The starting point for this process is the recognition that the increasingly 
bitter dispute between institutionalists and neo-realists over Bosnia policy was not quieted by 
the President's ability during the 103rd Congress to maintain an institutionalist policy 
regarding Bosnia. Analysis of the differences of opinion regarding Bosnia illustrates that 
they related back to different basic schools of thought orientations about the fundamental way 
the world worked, and as such, were not likely to be easily papered over. True to form, 
Senator Dole once again attempted to pass legislation to lift the arms embargo in the summer 
of 1995.1
So how did this political process play out? The administration did not retreat from its 
institutionalist stand on Bosnia. Rather its position, if anything, hardened after July 1994. 
Not only did the administration fail to convince the European allies to lift the embargo on the 
Bosnian government, it did not press them to do so, as the Nunn-Mitchell amendment had 
directed. On November 11,1994 the US unilaterally stopped policing the arms embargo on 
the Bosnian Muslims in line with Nunn-Mitchell, but this act had little practical effect as it 
hampered the allied sea interdiction, leaving the primary point of entry for illicit weapons, by 
air into Zagreb, unmolested. The US agreed to a new ’take-it-or-leave-it' plan sponsored by 
the French. In return for recognising Croatia and Bosnia international sanctions on Serbia
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would be lifted by the Western allies.2 The plan again hoped to divide the Serbs from their 
Bosnian Serb compatriots by ending the dream of some at Pale that one day they would unite 
their conquered portions of Bosnia with Serbia proper. The plan was even more 
institutionalist than the previous initiatives, as gone was any attempt to present Milosevic 
with a ’stick’ if he refused to come to terms with the West. Also gone was the notion of 
punishing in any way the man who had done the most to spark the Bosnian conflict. Limiting 
the damage done in Bosnia, at heart an institutionalist impulse, had become both the 
American as well as the Western priority in the conflict. The President's Bosnia policy at last 
contained no shadings of difference with the European institutionalist agenda.
An even further refinement of the plan was offered to Milosevic in March 1995. It urged 
the Serbs to approve principles to keep Bosnia intact and in return sanctions would be 
gradually removed from Belgrade. This meant that the Serbs had to do even less than before, 
as Milosevic no longer had to formally recognise Bosnia but only approve a nebulous set of 
’principles’ that in practice might or might not lead to the eventual partition of the Bosnian 
state. Milosevic rejected the offer. He found an ally in Russia who agreed with the Serb 
leader, in defiance of the Europeans and the US, that he ought not to recognise Croatia and 
Bosnia until sanctions were first lifted from Serbia. As Gordana Logar, the editor of Nasa 
Borba, the last major independent newspaper in Serbia stated, "This proposal [the initial 
French plan] won't force Milosevic to do anything other than wait for the next proposal, 
which is bound to be better. "3 She was right.
Schools of thought analysis anticipated the strengthening of the administration's 
institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia. As chapter 7 indicated, President Clinton, National 
Security Adviser Lake, and Secretaries Christopher and Perry are all institutionalists and as 
such a specific institutionalist Bosnia policy was in keeping with their general global view. 
Thus the policy was not likely to change. In chapter 7 it was determined that President 
Clinton himself was the dominant bureaucratic figure in the setting of the administration's 
schools of thought orientation, as his primacy in the executive branch was not likely to be 
challenged, the overall schools of thought orientation of the executive branch and the specific 
institutionalist Bosnia initiative were likely to remain constant. Further, Secretary Perry, 
National Security Adviser Lake, and Deputy Secretary Talbott, three of the President's most 
bureaucratically powerful aides, for their own reasons generally agreed with the President's 
Bosnia policy, thereby reinforcing, not challenging the administration's Bosnia initiative.
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The same cannot be said for the 104th Congress. Unlike the 103rd Congress, its schools 
of thought orientation was not muddled, but was strongly neo-realist. This is illustrated by 
again looking at the political fates of the Congressional foreign policy ’leaders' discussed in 
chapters 5 and 7. Due to the mid-term elections, the institutionalist leaders, primarily 
Democrats, fared worse in the 104th Congress than during the 103rd session. In the less 
important (for foreign policy) House, the neo-realist Newt Gingrich became Speaker while 
the institutionalist Lee Hamilton lost the chairmanship of the (newly renamed) International 
Relations Committee. As the House has more of a winner-take-all ethos than the Senate, as is 
evidenced by the fact it has no filibuster provisions so 60% of the chamber is not needed to 
agree on a piece of legislation, the Speaker was able, with his neo-realist Republican 
majority, to easily steer the new Dole bill through the House.
In the Senate such passage also occurred, but was more problematic. Senator Dole found 
himself once again Majority Leader, and thus was in a far better political position on most 
issues in the Senate after the November elections. Considering as Minority Leader he 
mustered 50 votes for the Dole-Lieberman amendment in July 1994, with a 54-46 
Republican edge in the Senate, he was likely to pass his bill lifting the embargo on the 
Bosnian government this time. Dole's fervour stemmed partly from the fact that his 
neo-realist position on Bosnia conformed with his general neo-realist view of the world, as 
was highlighted in chapter 5. Such a congruence of specific schools of thought initiatives 
with general schools of thought predilections exhibits both a consistency of mind as well as a 
likely vehemence of stance, as the policy in question conforms with a decision-maker’s 
general analysis of both the state of the world and thus how problems ought to be rectified. 
Dole’s new bill was obviously neo-realist in that it called for: a pull-out of the UN peace­
keepers; a lifting of the arms embargo; and a robust Nato bombing campaign on Serb targets 
in Bosnia itself.4 Placed in the premier bureaucratic seat in the Senate to tactically promote 
legislation, Senator Dole finally succeeded in passing a neo-realist bill that threatened the 
institutionalist Clinton administration's control of overall American policy towards Bosnia.
Yet Senator Dole's victory in the Senate was not a sure thing for he could no longer 
count on his important bureaucratic ally, Senator Lugar. Lugar’s transition from a key 
proponent of the neo-realist position regarding Bosnia to a stance more supportive of the 
President, chronicled in chapters 5 and 7, continued into the time of the 104th Congress. 
Lugar criticised Dole's new amendment in January 1995, as he felt it would constrain the 
President's ability to lead.5 Why this sudden solicitude for President Clinton? In April 1995, 
Lugar declared himself a candidate for President. It is clear that his partial policy shift can be
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explained by political considerations. Senator Lugar rightly saw that if Congress overturned 
the President's Bosnia policy, it would call into question the executive’s central role in 
foreign policy decision-making. Lugar did not want this to happen either if he were 
(surprisingly) to become President, or (more likely) to become a member of the cabinet in the 
next Republican administration. Bureaucratic political analysis thus explains Lugar's shift.
In losing the unqualified support of Senator Lugar, Majority Leader Dole lost far more 
than a single Senator's advocacy. Lugar helped Senator Dole with legislative strategy 
regarding foreign affairs in the 103rd Congress, and as chapter 7 illustrated, was pointed to 
as 'the foreign policy expert' who helped give Dole's neo-realist Bosnia stance intellectual 
credibility.. While Senator Lugar voted with Dole initially, his possible loss on the veto- 
override vote was a grievous wound for the overall success of Dole’s cause. As Lugar is an 
acknowledged Senate 'leader' on foreign policy issues, it was likely that his possible shift 
would have persuaded other Republican Senators to desert Dole's neo-realist position. These 
defections would have had a weighty effect on any attempt to override President Clinton's 
expected veto of the Dole bill.
Senator Dole picked up supporters such as Joe Biden who had grown tired of the 
President’s mantra of multilateralism regarding the Bosnian crisis. As chapter 5 highlighted, 
Senator Biden, despite being a Democrat, has an overall neo-realist schools of thought 
orientation and thus easily coalesced with his neo-realist Republican colleagues over Bosnia. 
His hard-line democratist policy preference regarding Bosnia made the chances Senator 
Biden would decide to support the institutionalist Clinton administration's initiatives slim. 
Feeling betrayed by the President's lukewarm efforts to convince the European allies to lift 
the embargo, Biden, a crucial 'swing vote' in the Spring of 1994, broke ranks with his party 
in the summer 1994 vote. This defection was largely based on his schools of thought 
orientation.
Yet despite the strengthening tide of neo-realism in the 104th Congress, Senator Dole’s 
initiative was always likely to end in failure. An aide to Senator Biden accurately laid out the 
political scenario. "I'd be surprised if there are the votes to override a veto. The Republicans 
will follow their leader. The vote is so important to Dole, and is an easy stick to beat the 
President with. Lugar has changed his mind, one can speculate as to why this is, and this 
will affect moderate Republicans. However ultimately, I'd be surprised at a veto override. "6 
While Dole's bill passed the neo-realist Congress, there was never any doubt the 
institutionalist administration would certainly veto it. While a two-third’s override in the
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House was likely, with Lugar's possible defection a veto override in the Senate was unlikely 
as Senator Lugar would have enough followers to make Dole's attaining the 67 votes needed 
for a veto override improbable. In the end, despite an improved political situation for the 
neo-realists in the 104th Congress, they were able to politically embarrass the President, but 
unable to change the course of America's institutionalist Bosnia policy.
However the focus of the crisis shifted once again, away from the ornate chambers of 
Congress to the ghastly killing fields of Bosnia. Here for the first time in three years, the 
battlefield initiative came to rest with the Bosnian Muslims, or more exactly their Croatian 
allies. By Fall 1995, after Croatia had earlier recaptured the Krajina from the Croatian Serbs, 
a joint Bosnian-Croatian offensive had retaken territory so that it controlled approximately 
50% of Bosnia itself. Sarajevo, long the symbol of suffering in Bosnia, was at last out of 
range of Bosnian Serb artillery shells and was successfully protected by British and French 
soldiers on the ground, and decisively, by American servicemen in the air. How did this 
dramatic change come about and what does it say about my earlier schools of thought 
analysis of the American response to the Bosnian crisis?
The immediate changes on the ground were the result of several significant structural 
alterations to the forces underlying the conflict. Croatia’s lightning thrust into the Krajina 
was the immediate, historical reason for the shift in the fortunes of war in Bosnia. Even 
more importantly, the shift was accepted by Serbia proper, which did nothing to overturn 
Bosnian and Croatian gains. Milosevic came to accept that roughly half of Bosnia would 
remain under Bosnian and Croatian control, based on the fact that the West would not allow 
all of Bosnia to be overrun. In this context, Milosevic’s non-action made sense. He was 
merely allowing military losses in Bosnia to occur, as he would eventually have been forced 
to trade such land in negotiations anyway. In return, Milosevic hoped to receive both 
codification by the West of Serbian gains in Bosnia and a lifting of the crippling allied 
sanctions imposed on his country.
What was more surprising was that after so long American and Western European 
resolve began to stiffen, at least on the surface. This came about ostensibly because of the 
fall of the UN safe haven of Srebrenica to Bosnian Serb forces. The fall of Srebrenica was 
the worst blow of the war for the UN. The Serbs were so contemptuous of UN authority as 
to be able to overrun an area designated under UN protection. This outrage by the Bosnian 
Serbs, and the crimes against humanity that accompanied it, made either an increased contact 
group reaction or total UN withdrawal the only possible options, as the UN's frayed
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credibility was at last completely shattered. Nato forces next threatened the Bosnian Serb 
shelling of Sarajevo and carried out a massive two-week campaign that not only made the 
capital safe from Serb shelling but also significantly damaged Serbian command and control 
centers throughout Bosnia. In the end, the Serbs agreed to pull their artillery out of range of 
the city and to pursue negotiations with both the Croats and Muslims, under the auspices of 
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs. In two 
weeks, Nato bombing accomplished more than the institutionalists had initially thought it 
was capable of.
Yet this dramatic 'turning of the tide' masked the great continuities linking later American 
tactics with its earlier efforts of the past three years. For US policy remained institutionalist. 
What happened is this. The Clinton administration, stung to the quick by allied impotence in 
the face of the fall of Srebrenica and threatened by the very real possibility that the neo-realist 
Congress would overturn the thrust of its entire Bosnia policy, was forced to adopt new 
tactics to save that same institutionalist orientation. The President merely adopted the more 
hawkish variant of institutionalism, epitomized by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. 
The President was only able to accomplish this because of the emergence of a new player in 
the Bosnian drama, President Chirac of France, who unlike his predecessor Mitterand agreed 
with the Clinton White House that the Western institutionalist policy would have to become 
more martial. Thanks to Chirac, allied consensus, so crucial for institutionalists, allowed 
movement to a more aggressive Western stance.
Yet there can be no doubt that this 'new' stance was merely part of the old institutionalist 
policy. This is best illustrated by the fact that the outline of the peace agreement, so 
laboriously pursued by Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, was eerily reminiscent of the oft- 
maligned Vance-Owen institutionalist initiative of 1993. It still called for the Bosnian Serbs 
to receive 49% of Bosnia despite pursuing aggression, still gave the Bosnian Serbs the right 
to join a confederation with Serbia proper in return for remaining in a very weak Bosnian 
state, and still mandated that sanctions on Milosevic would be lifted in return for his approval 
of the plan. Nowhere within the institutionalist Clinton administration was there any talk 
about the Muslims continuing to overturn Bosnian Serb gains made by aggression, despite 
the change in fortunes on the battlefield. The underlying goal of the Clinton administration 
remained the same: to end the war as quickly as possible, to stop either its spread or its 
facilitating crises with either the Western Europeans or the Russians, despite the fact that 
such a policy rewarded Serbian aggression. As schools of thought analysis shows, despite
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all the drama of the past few months, the underlying policy of the Clinton administration 
regarding the conflict in Bosnia remained the same.
Not only has schools of thought analysis been proven extremely useful in assessing the 
legislative outcomes relating to the Bosnian crisis, it has stood the test of time, in that all that 
has happened since the initial analytical 'snapshot' was made can be explained clearly by the 
analytical tool. This ability to transcend the moment makes schools of thought analysis a 
useful guide for apprehending the mysteries of the new world order.
B) A General Assessment of Schools of Thought Analysis
Schools of thought analysis, like every other analytical tool in the social sciences, has not 
proven to be perfect. Yet as this thesis has demonstrated, it is a useful methodological tool 
regarding understanding how American foreign policy outputs are reached in the post-Cold 
War era.
Three qualifiers must be placed on the statement that this thesis has shown that schools of 
thought analysis can be successfully applied to the study of International Relations. Firstly, 
in chapter 4, limited policy substantiation was found regarding the 'opinion-maker' 
institutionalists (see chart 4-2). For none of the three opinion-makers (Hoffmann, Keohane, 
and Nye) was enough evidence collected to certify their institutionalist status. The major 
reason for this, as was explained in chapter 4, is that a major flaw of the institutionalist creed 
is a proclivity for description at the expense of propounding specific policy preferences. Still, 
based on the evidence that was collected (in 5 out of 6 issue areas identified, the three 
opinion-maker's positions fit the institutionalist box), and on their general theoretical 
writings there is little doubt that Hoffmann, Keohane and Nye are all institutionalists. 
Interestingly, as chapter 5 illustrated, specific institutionalist decision-makers like Hamilton, 
Christopher, and President Clinton were more easily identified as institutionalists by their 
specific policy preferences. While the lack of evidence supporting the institutionalist 
opinion-makers is vexing, as the record of the institutionalist decision-makers affirms, it 
does not invalidate the essence of this important school of thought.
Secondly, as the example of Secretary of Defence Perry exhibited in chapters 5 and 7, it 
is possible for some decision-makers to follow one school of thought's policy cluster 
preference using another school of thought's rationale. In this case Secretary Perry adopted 
the institutionalist policy on Bosnia for largely neo-realist reasons. In the abstract, this would
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seem to be a serious flaw with schools of thought analysis. In actuality, out of 49 
decision-maker issue areas identified, Perry's position was the only example of such a 
process taking place. This rate of error seems acceptable to countenance.
More usefully, the Secretary's position on Bosnia does point out the important fact that 
other processes besides schools of thought analysis need to be analysed in determining 
American foreign policy outputs. As chapter 7 highlighted, Perry's position can be largely 
explained through bureaucratic political analysis, that he was 'captured' by the collective 
schools of thought orientation of the Pentagon. What William Perry's stance on Bosnia does 
point out is that while schools of thought analysis is an important methodological tool needed 
for understanding American foreign policy outputs, as it explains and analyses the sub- 
ideological aspects of decision-making, it must be wedded with analysis of governmental 
bureaucratic power to apprehend the complete picture of what is involved in making US 
foreign policy.
Thirdly, while schools of thought analysis accurately helps to explain how American 
foreign policy outputs are reached, this thesis does not attempt to explain how the foreign 
policy outputs for the rest of the world are arrived at, or other state's impact on the global 
arena. For example in the case of Bosnia, to attain a complete picture of the crisis, an 
evaluation of the policies of the French, British, Russians, and the UN, as well as the 
stances of the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims would be necessary. Girling's criticism of 
Schurmann's paradigm along these lines also applies to schools of thought analysis. As he 
stated, "What Schurmann does is to provide a stimulating analysis of one part of the 
equation: of course, a very important part, namely the world's greatest power. "7 While 
analysis of American foreign policy is essential for any global analysis of the post-Cold War 
era, other states and institutions, and their interactions with American policy, must also be 
assessed for an overall global picture. Perhaps the other major players on the international 
stage can also be analysed through this new fusion of bureaucratic politics and schools of 
thought analysis. This thesis has been an attempt to innovatively assess the American aspects 
of the overall global power equation.
However even with these qualifications in mind, this thesis has illustrated the relevance 
of schools of thought analysis for the understanding of American foreign policy. The 
'boxing' of individual decision-makers and opinion-makers has proved a success. Out of 81 
specific policy prescriptions analysed (see chart 8-1), 60 coincided with the majority schools 
of thought box individual opinion-makers and decision-makers had been placed into, or an
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accuracy rate of 74%. When minority orientations are taken into account, that is minority 
orientations as defined as 2 issues areas out of 5 corresponding to the same school of 
thought, the percentage of prescriptions correctly classified rises to 88%. Interestingly it is 
the political decision-makers and not the opinion-makers whose schools of thought 
viewpoints are the more consistent, with a 69% consistency rate for the opinion-makers, 
with 22 out of 32 prescriptions corresponding to their majority schools of thought 
classification, and a rate of 78% (38 of 49 issue areas corresponded to the cluster of policy 
preferences indicated by the schools of thought categorisation) for the decision-makers. 
While these quantitative claims are derived from a rather thin body of evidence, this thesis 
has illustrated that schools of thought analysis has been proven qualitatively consistent over a 
majority of the issue areas here examined.
The success of the schools of thought analysis confirms a central hypothesis of this 
thesis, that major issue areas are linked together by decision-makers and that the linkages 
themselves are largely the product of a decision-maker’s general schools of thought 
orientation. For example in chapter 6 it was shown that the Clinton administration predicated 
its Bosnia policy at least partly on the conflict's lesser relevance in the administration's 
hierarchy of foreign policy priorities than were US policies to Russia and Western Europe. 
This prioritisation was shown to be in line with general institutionalist thinking. The success 
of schools of thought analysis confirms that the linkages of the issue areas a decision-maker 
confronts themselves follow a pattern, which is explicable by schools of thought analysis.
The schools of thought analysis presented here confirms the conventional wisdom that 
the Republican Party has tighter ideological discipline in foreign affairs than does its 
Democratic rivals. Republican decision-makers conform to their majority neo-realist 
orientation in 15 out of 17 issue areas discussed (see chart 8-1), or 88% of the time. 
Democrats, who espouse primarily either institutionalist or democratist viewpoints, are not 
nearly as consistent. Democrats in the thesis conform to their dominant school of thought 23 
out of 32 times, or at a rate of 72%. Again, while all quantitative claims in this thesis are 
based on a thin body of evidence, qualitatively it is safe to say that Republicans were more 
sub-ideologically consistent over the issue areas assessed than the Democrats. Thus schools 
of thought analysis can help determine the degree of ideological unity major governmental 
organisations possess. In the case of the two American political parties, this can be done by 
looking at the orientations of Congressional ’leaders' in the foreign policy field.
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Further, as was mentioned in the introduction, schools of thought analysis provides the 
building blocks for analysing whether a new overarching policy such as containment is now 
germinating in the post-Cold War era. Based on the evidence presented in this thesis, the 
answer so far is a resounding no. As Schurmann’s analysis of the post-war world and 
chapter 7 illustrated, for an overarching policy to become institutionalised it needs the 
support of both the President and the Congress. As over Bosnia, while the President is the 
single most important player in determining foreign policy outputs, he needs at least enough 
support in Congress to prevent the legislative branch from overriding presidential vetoes. As 
Schurmann illustrated regarding overarching policy, the Republican Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg was essential for the institutionalisation of containment policy, and the imperial 
current of thought it represented, as the over-arching theme of post-1945 foreign policy. 
Vandenberg symbolised the alliance of liberal Republicans with the non-Wallaceite centrists 
of the Democratic Party, such as President Truman.
This thesis illustrated that such a political process has not taken place after the collapse of 
the Berlin Wall. As has been shown, there are currently both institutional and political 
divisions, symbolised by different schools of thought orientations, between the Congress 
and the executive branch and the Democratic and Republican parties. The 1994 mid-term 
elections have widened the schools of thought gulf. As the Bosnian case study highlighted, 
whereas the 103rd Congress had no overall dominant schools of thought orientation, the 
104th Congress is effectively run by neo-realist decision-makers such as Speaker Gingrich 
and Majority Leader Dole, who were in no mood to compromise with the institutionalist 
Clinton administration. Part of the reason for their intransigence regarding foreign affairs, 
certainly in the case of Senator Dole, was his strenuous disagreement with the President's 
Bosnia policy. Until either a hybrid school of thought emerges as the result of a compromise 
between the neo-realist Republicans and the primarily institutionalist Democrats, or one party 
gains control of both houses of Congress as well as the presidency and successfully 
institutes policies predicated by its school of thought that become widely accepted by the 
general public, no new overarching foreign policy theme will emerge. At the moment it is 
doubtful these circumstances will occur, at least with the present administration still in office.
To sum up, there are very distinct limitations to schools of thought analysis. Before its 
efficacy can be conclusively illustrated, a larger sample of opinion-makers will need to be 
analysed. Also, as with all other analytical tools in the social sciences, schools of thought 
analysis is not wholly exact (witness the case of Secretary Perry) in that, in a few instances, 
decision-makers adhere to one school of thought’s policy cluster preference using another
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school of thought’s sub-ideological rationale. Also schools of thought analysis is not some 
mono-causal analytical panacea, as obviously other processes and methods are needed for a 
full explanation of the unity of thought and action (such as an assessment of bureaucratic 
political processes).
What schools of thought analysis has accomplished in this thesis is to illustrate the 
overlooked commonalities of the Clinton administration’s response to the Bosnian crisis, by 
delineating the hierarchy of policy priorities that so motivated America’s response to the 
Bosnian tragedy. Schools of thought analysis has also shown the process by which major 
policy issue areas are linked together by decision-makers, a process partly the result of an 
individual’s sub-ideological orientation. Schools of thought analysis has also provided the 
building blocs to assess how an overarching American foreign policy is likely to occur in the 
new world order, and if such a process is currently taking place. Thus schools of thought 
analysis has a place in the analytical armory of those who wish to study American foreign 
policy outputs in the new world order.
Finally, what does this assessment say about the American foreign policy-making 
structure in the new world order? Firstly, as chapter 7 exhibited, the institutional advantages 
of the presidency vis-a-vis the Congress in the realm of foreign policy-making are still 
immense. The row over Bosnia policy amounts to a near-miss for Congress in its perpetual 
struggle to erode presidential supremacy in making foreign policy. While the 104th 
Congress, in contrast to the 103rd session, does have a general schools of thought 
orientation, to defeat the President in a foreign policy battle it must have a veto-proof 
majority in both houses, united around a single school of thought. This circumstance is not 
likely to occur often.
However the Bosnia case also illustrates that while still the most important player on the 
chessboard in foreign policy-making, the President is likely to wield less overall power in the 
new era than during the Cold War. The Bosnia case study highlights how a President can be 
'beaten' regarding foreign policy-making in the post-1989 era. If the President pursues an 
unpopular initiative, especially for a period of time without substantial result, as occurred in 
the case of Bosnia, and Congress can unite around a single school of thought-derived policy 
in opposition to the President, his will can be ignored. The key to analysing this process, 
beyond the political aspects of the scenario so well explained by bureaucratic political 
analysis, is a schools of thought examination of the foreign policy issues confronting 
America. Schools of thought analysis, as the Bosnian case study has shown, provides a
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mechanism that can be used in assessing general foreign policy initiatives, such as the four 
other issue areas (Russia, China, trade, and Europe) mentioned in this thesis. It holds a key 
to analysing both the collective orientations of the American executive and legislative 
branches, as well as being a useful tool to gauge the likely fidelity of a decision-maker to his 
stance on a variety of foreign policy preferences.
Finally, schools of thought analysis is an analytical innovation that refines and enhances 
the concept of ideology. It is a refinement that links systemic beliefs to policy outputs. As it 
functions as a sub-ideology, it more tangibly links the remote realm of ideology to action. 
Fukuyama was right, liberal democracy is currently victorious in the realm of ideological 
combat. But that does not mean that the ideological contest is over, for within liberal 
democracy schools of thought analysis effectively illustrates that systematic differences have 
concrete policy implications. As this is so in the United States, the primary state exponent of 
liberal democracy, it is likely this process is occurring throughout the liberal democratic 
world. Schools of thought analysis is the useful analytical link between personal belief 
systems and transnational ideologies. Valentine, the hero of Arcadia, was right. Very little is 
known about this new era we find ourselves in. The schools of thought process is an 
analytical device that can help one to comprehend where the world is at the moment and why, 
and where it is going.
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Chart 8-1: The results of the schools of thought boxing process
The Opinion-Makers:
Democratists: 8/11 (Eight issue areas out of 11 generally follow the cluster of policy 
preferences indicated by the schools of thought categorisation)
Neo-realists: 9/15
Institutionalists: 5/6
The Decision-Makers:
Democratists: 6/10
Neo-realists: 15/17
Institutionalists: 17/22
The Opinion-Makers: (With minority schools of thought orientations calculated as
generally following the cluster of policy preferences indicated by 
the schools of thought categorisation)
Democratists: 11/11
Neo-realists: 13/15
Institutionalists: 5/6
The Decision-Makers:
Democratists: 10/10
Neo-realists: 15/17
Institutionalists: 17/22
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